Abstract
This chapter’s basic theme is that of social philosophy: how is order in human society possible and what is the structure of its order? Naturally, the structure of social order relates to ethical problems in rules and duties. The author begins with a dispute over property and civil society in which he was involved in his twenties and sketches his scheme of mutual “approval” on property and ownership. He distinguishes the autonomous type and the synchronous (conformist) type of approval and follows the development of the relationships of both to the emergence of law and general economic media. Then, he applies the framework to the problematique of social contracts to determine its modern validity. He analyzes the structure of deontological ethics of Jürgen Habermas and Immanuel Kant from the perspective of approval theory.
Kiichiro Yagi, “Shakai Keiyaku kara Shonin no Riron he: Danpen teki Shiron (From Social Contract to the Theory of Recognition: Tentative Consideration),” Keizai-Ronso (The Economic Review), vol. 186, no. 3 (April 2013), pp. 1–14. Kyoto Daigaku Keizai Gakkai (Kyoto University Economic Society). (Partly used in Sect. 2.3).
Kiichiro Yagi, Trust and Sympathy in the Social and Market Order, Chapter 2 of Yuichi Shionoya and Kiichiro Yagi (eds.) Competition, Trust, and Cooperation: A Comparative Study, Heidelberg, Berlin, 2001, pp. 20–41. Spiegel Nature. (Used in an abridged way in Sect. 2.2).
Kiichiro Yagi, “A note on discourse ethics and naturalized social contract,” Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, vol, 15, no. 2 (December 2018), pp. 341–350. Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics. (Partly used in Sect. 2.4).
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- 1.
- 2.
On the origin and influence of this so-called “civil society” school of Marxism, see Barshay (2007).
- 3.
The result of my investigation in this line was published in English as Yagi (2011).
- 4.
See author’s recollections in Yagi (2018), which is included as appendices to Part I.
- 5.
This is the abbreviation of the Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. This workshop was organized by Peter Koslowski, then director of the Hannover Institute of Philosophical Research, for several years around 2000 and published the results from Springer.
- 6.
We used the word “legitimation” to stress its normative nature. However, when its broader meaning includes sentimental consent, it is replaced by more straightfoward word “approval.”
- 7.
In my former presentation in Yagi (2001), I used the expression “domination of agent i over j” (Dij), as the dominium was the original term of property/ownership in Western tradition. I changed it to “possession” (Pij) to express our agenda more precisely. However, in case that it contains personal control of i over j, I continue to use the term “domination.”
- 8.
“every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominations of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it; …” (Locke 1988, p. 348 §119).
- 9.
In case the exchange of sympathy from both sides exist, it brings forth the situation of social exchange, which I discuss in the later chapter.
- 10.
Another way of introduction of the “sympathy” into social theory is that of David Hume and Adam Smith. Though they did not deny the human nature to sympathize to fellow beings, they did not believe that the effect of “direct identification” is so strong to concur the selfish interest. Thus, their use of sympathy was more reflective that they would understand the utility of fellow beings by exchanging the position in their reflection. K. Binmore (1998, 2005) distinguished this sort of reflexive observation from the “direct identification” by naming it as “empathy.” D. Hume constructed his utilitarian theory on this ground, while A. Smith traced the development of the sentiment of “propriety” on the similar ground. See the following section.
- 11.
Borrowed from Heath’s paraphrasing in English (Heath 2003, p. 227), in the original text, it is as follows: “daß die Folgen und Nebenwirkungen, die sich jeweils aus ihrer allgemeinen Befolgung für die Befriedigung der Interessen eines jeden Einzelnen (voaussichtlich) ergeben, von allen Betroffenen akzeptiert (und den Auswirkungen der bekannten alternativen Regelungsmöglichkeiten vorgezogen) werden können” (Habermas 2009, Bd. 3, S.60).
- 12.
Borrowed from the English paraphrasing by Heath (2003, p. 212). In the original text, it is as follows: “Der Diskursethik zufolge darf eine Norm nudann Geltung beanspruchen, wenn alle von ihr möglicherweise Betroffenen als Teilnehmer eines praktischen Diskurses Einverständnis darüber erzielen (bzw. erzielen würden), daß diese Norm gilt” (Habermas 2009, Bd.3, S.60).
- 13.
Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott in 1895. In the German original, it is as follows: “Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die Du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie eine allgemeine Gesetz werde” (5939). “Handle so, als ob die Maxime deiner Hanslung durch deinen Willen zum allgemeinen Naturgesetz werfen sollte” (5944) (Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785, in kindle edition (Kant 1785)).
- 14.
- 15.
The case of the stag hunt and hare hunt has its origin in Rousseau’s Origin of Inequality (Rousseau 1755). In this case, hunters facing two Nash equilibria (Stag-Stag and Hare-Hare) are tempted to choose the latter to avoid a bad result.
- 16.
- 17.
The social contract as viewed in evolutionary social science covers all four areas of the proposed scheme. We should note that the two types of social contract that Rousseau described in his two articles entail the transmutation of the individual itself. While in the social contract that proceeds as civilization changes individuals from natural humans to civilized humans, in the ideal renovation of the social contract, individuals are reborn as citizens of the new nation state.
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Yagi, K. (2020). Approval Theory and Social Contract. In: Yagi, K. (eds) From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance. Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science, vol 20. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54998-7_2
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