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Online Music Distribution - How Much Exclusivity Is Needed? pp 13–69Cite as

Relevant Rights and Their Applicability to Online Music Uses

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Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 12))

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to obtain clarity on the scope of coverage of the relevant online music uses by copyright. The analysis here looks merely at the scope of this coverage. It does not make final statements about the coverage’s intensity, which will be investigated more closely in the following chapters of this part. To find out the scope of this coverage, this chapter looks at the relevant copyright’s economic rights and examines whether they are applicable to the relevant uses. Finding out which exact rights cover which uses is also important for the subsequent analysis of the limits of exclusivity, as the rights typically function as necessary reference points for those limits.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Arts. 1 and 2(1) BC; on the interpretation of this provision see Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, paras. 8.28–8.30.

  2. 2.

    The list of contracting parties is available at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/berne.pdf.

  3. 3.

    Art. 9(3) BC furthermore specifies that “[a]ny sound or visual recording shall be considered as a reproduction”.

  4. 4.

    See Dreier, in: WIPO (ed.), Worldwide Symposium, 187, 199.

  5. 5.

    Although, as noted by Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 11.27, “[t]he need for the fixation to be in material form, however, may give rise to different views where the form is invisible”, such as in the case of a series of invisible electronic impulses.

  6. 6.

    Reinbothe/von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996, Annex to Art. 1(4) WCT note 14; Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet, p. 102; Ficsor, 21 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 197, 204 (1997).

  7. 7.

    Samuelson, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 369, 392 (1997); Vinje, 19 EIPR 230, 231 (1997); Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, paras. 11.27, 11.69 ff.; Sterling, World Copyright Law, p. 431; Sterling, Intellectual Property Rights in Sound Recordings, Film & Video, para 4.29; see also Goldstein/Hugenholtz, International Copyright, p. 308, who are inclined towards this view.

  8. 8.

    Second Committee of Governmental Experts on Copyright Problems Arising from the Use of Computer Systems for Access to or the Creation of Works, Report and Recommendations for Settlement of Copyright Problems Arising from the Use of Computer Systems for Access to or the Creation of Works, 1982, available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000582/058229eb.pdf.

  9. 9.

    Id., Annex 1 p. 3.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    For a different opinion see Spoor, in Hugenholtz (ed.), The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment, 67, 70.

  12. 12.

    See below Sect. 3 A I 4 a.

  13. 13.

    See Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, paras. 12.06, 12.13; Sterling, World Copyright Law, p. 787.

  14. 14.

    As far as one assumes that the term “musical work” under BC encompasses both music and lyrics, as indicated in Art. 2(1) BC; should one follow the view that lyrics are to be treated separately as literary works, then the right of communication to the public of the public recitation of a literary work set out in Art. 11ter(1)(ii) BC Art. 11ter(1)(ii) BC applies. This right is largely identical in its scope to the right laid down for musical works in Art. 11(1)(ii) BC, so no deviating conclusion would be reached on the basis of different legal qualification.

  15. 15.

    See Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 12.06.

  16. 16.

    See Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, paras. 12.17, 12.31; Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet, para. 4.19; see also Sterling, World Copyright Law, pp. 787–788.

  17. 17.

    This can also explain qualifications of transmissions over digital networks as communication to the public by cable under Art. 11(1)(ii) BC, see Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 12.21, 12.31 (although pointing out in para. 12.47 that “wireless access to the Internet is likely to become increasingly prevalent”); Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet, para 4.19.

  18. 18.

    See below Sect. 5 A I 1 b.

  19. 19.

    This holds for “mixed” transmissions only as long as wired access remains the predominant technology to access the Internet, which might well change in the future.

  20. 20.

    Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 12.38; Sterling, World Copyright Law, p. 788.

  21. 21.

    Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 12.33, 12.40.

  22. 22.

    See Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, paras. 12.17, 12.46, noting that only “performed versions” of the works are protected under Art. 11(1)(ii) BC, while musical notes and lyrics in text form enjoy no protection.

  23. 23.

    This is also confirmed by the wording of the French version (“transmission”) and of the official German text established under Art. 37(1)(b) of the Berne Convention (“Übertragung”).

  24. 24.

    Similarly Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 12.50, who however do not discuss the abovementioned differences between streaming and downloading.

  25. 25.

    See also Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 12.49.

  26. 26.

    Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 12.50.

  27. 27.

    Similarly Goldstein/Hugenholtz, International Copyright, p. 335, who hold that the Berne Convention falls short of resolving the question of whether newer technologies enabling interactive, on-demand transmissions come within copyright control.

  28. 28.

    See below Sect. 3 A I 4 b.

  29. 29.

    Art. I UCC.

  30. 30.

    The list is available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=208&group_id=22.

  31. 31.

    The list is available at: http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=15241&language=E&order=alpha.

  32. 32.

    Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. II, para. 18.40.

  33. 33.

    Goldstein/Hugenholtz, International Copyright, pp. 45, 50.

  34. 34.

    Currently Cambodia is the only country exclusively bound by the 1952 text of the UCC, and no more countries are exclusively bound by the 1971 text of the UCC.

  35. 35.

    In particular, the controversial Recommendations of the WIPO/UNESCO Committee of Governmental Experts (supra note 8) discussed above in Sect. 3 A I 1 a also attempted to interpret the UCC in the same manner as the Berne Convention.

  36. 36.

    See UNESCO, Records of the Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention, Unesco House, Paris, July 5–24, 1971, Paris 1973.

  37. 37.

    See above Sect. 3 A I 1 b.

  38. 38.

    The list of contracting parties is available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=231&group_id=22.

  39. 39.

    See Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, paras. 2.208–2.210; Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet, para. 4.33.

  40. 40.

    The list of contracting parties is available at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/wct.pdf.

  41. 41.

    See above Sect. 3 A I 1 a; Ricketson and Ginsburg even hold that this clarification is possibly meaningless and find the real contribution of the first sentence in its explicit confirmation that exceptions to the reproduction right apply in the digital environment, see Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 11.74; see also Reinbothe/von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996, Annex to Art. 1(4) WCT note 15.

  42. 42.

    Sterling, World Copyright Law, p. 887–888; Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 11.75.

  43. 43.

    See Art. 7 of the Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, Document CRNR/DC/4 of August 30, 1996.

  44. 44.

    For details see Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet, paras. 3.100–3.127; Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, paras. 11.72–11.75; Vinje, 19 EIPR 230, 231–233 (1997).

  45. 45.

    For a different opinion see Sheinblatt, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 535, 541 (1998), who however does not discuss the wording “storage” that leads to a contrary conclusion.

  46. 46.

    See Sect. 3 A I 1 b.

  47. 47.

    For a different opinion see Reinbothe/von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996, Art. 8 WCT note 11, who hold that these transmissions are covered by Art. 8 WCT; this does not seem convincing because Art. 11bis(1)(ii) BC had already previously displaced Art. 11(1)(ii) BC, which could otherwise (at least partly) have covered the concerned transmissions; it is thus not understandable why in its regulatory area it should not also displace Art. 8 WCT.

  48. 48.

    Reinbothe/von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996, Art. 6 WCT note 11; Sterling, World Copyright Law, p. 889–890; Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, paras. 11.89, 11.94.

  49. 49.

    ECJ Case C-128/11, Judgment of July 3, 2012—UsedSoft v. Oracle.

  50. 50.

    ECJ Case C-128/11, Judgment of July 3, 2012—UsedSoft v. Oracle, para. 52.

  51. 51.

    See below Sect. 3 B I 2.

  52. 52.

    Mezei, 6 JIPITEC 23, 26 (2015); Krüger/Biehler/Apel, MMR 2013, 760, 764.

  53. 53.

    See Hartmann, GRUR Int. 2012, 980, 982; Malevanny, CR 2013, 422, 423; Sheinblatt, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 535, 541 (1998).

  54. 54.

    See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and Digital Files, available at: http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-digital.html: “… any original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium (including a computer file) …”; U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA Section 104 Report: A Report of the Register of Copyrights Pursuant to § 104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, August 2001, available at: http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf, p. 78: “… a lawfully made tangible copy of a digitally downloaded work, such as an image file downloaded directly to a floppy disk, is subject to section 109”; see also Malevanny, CR 2013, 422, 424; Ruffler, 33 EIPR 375, 380–381 (2011); Rigamonti, GRUR Int. 2009, 14, 21.

  55. 55.

    On the European approach see below Sect. 3 B I 2.

  56. 56.

    See Samuelson, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 369, 396 (1997); such an understanding is also evident from the preparatory documents to the WCT, see Summary Minutes of Main Committee I, para. 301, in: WIPO, Records of the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Geneva 1996, p. 675; Reinbothe/von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996, Art. 8 WCT note 6.

  57. 57.

    See below Sect. 3 B I 2.

  58. 58.

    The list of contracting parties is available at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/rome.pdf.

  59. 59.

    Hereby the term “literary or artistic work” was understood by the Rome Conference in conformity with the Berne Convention and the UCC as also including musical works, see Nordemann/Vinck/Hertin/Meyer, International Copyright, Art. 3 RT note 1.

  60. 60.

    Füller/Langeloh, in: Busche/Stoll/Wiebe, TRIPs, Art. 14 note 6 (regarding the interpretation of the Rome Convention).

  61. 61.

    Nordemann/Vinck/Hertin/Meyer, International Copyright, Art. 7 RT notes 2–4; Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, p. 231; Sterling, Intellectual Property Rights in Sound Recordings, Film & Video, para. 4.31.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., see also Ulmer, GRUR Ausl. 1961, 569, 581.

  63. 63.

    Nordemann/Vinck/Hertin/Meyer, International Copyright, Art. 7 RT note 2; Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, p. 231.

  64. 64.

    WIPO Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms Convention, p. 34; Nordemann/Vinck/Hertin/Meyer, International Copyright, Art. 7 RT note 6; Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, p. 231.

  65. 65.

    WIPO Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms Convention, p. 37; Nordemann/Vinck/Hertin/Meyer, International Copyright, Art. 7 RT note 8.

  66. 66.

    On similar cases outside of the online environment see Nordemann/Vinck/Hertin/Meyer, International Copyright, Art. 7 RT note 10.

  67. 67.

    Nordemann/Vinck/Hertin/Meyer, International Copyright, Art. 12 RT note 9; Ulmer, GRUR Ausl. 1961, 569, 585.

  68. 68.

    Similarly Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, p. 239.

  69. 69.

    See above Sect. 3 A I 1 b, last paragraph.

  70. 70.

    See Sterling, World Copyright Law, p. 833; Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, p. 239.

  71. 71.

    On the debate regarding whether this fully corresponds to the meaning of this term under the Rome Convention, especially in the light of Art. 42 TRIPS, see Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, para. 2.203.

  72. 72.

    Dratler/McJohn, Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, Creative and Industrial Property, Vol. 1, § 1A.06[4][e][i], footnote 198; Morgan, International Protection of Performers’ Rights, p. 167; Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. II, para. 19.28; Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 159.

  73. 73.

    Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, para. 2.203; Füller/Langeloh, in: Busche/Stoll/Wiebe, TRIPs, Art. 14 note 11.

  74. 74.

    See Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, para. 2.203.

  75. 75.

    The list of contracting parties is available at: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=20.

  76. 76.

    Hereby, the WPPT definition is wider than that of Rome as it applies to performances of “expressions of folklore” in addition to performances of works.

  77. 77.

    See above Sect. 3 A I 4 a.

  78. 78.

    This especially holds considering that an early proposal explicitly covering temporary copies (see Art. 7 of the Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty for the Protection of the Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, Document CRNR/DC/5 of August 30, 1996) was amended to exclude the reference to temporary copies, see Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. II, para. 19.56; for a different view that temporary copies are covered by Art. 7 WPPT see Reinbothe/von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996, Art. 7 WPPT notes 16–19; this view cannot be followed here as it merely claims that such an understanding has been “the shared common ground in the international copyright community for many years”, without giving proper weight to the legislative history of the WPPT showing the contrary.

  79. 79.

    Communication to the public is hereby for the first time defined in Art. 2(g) WPPT as “the transmission to the public by any medium, otherwise than by broadcasting”.

  80. 80.

    See above Sect. 3 A II 1.

  81. 81.

    See Reinbothe/von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996, Art. 7 WPPT notes 11–12; Sterling, World Copyright Law, p. 916.

  82. 82.

    See above Sect. 3 A I 4 b.

  83. 83.

    See above Sect. 3 A I 4 c.

  84. 84.

    Nordemann/Vinck/Hertin/Meyer, International Copyright, Art. 3 RT note 12; Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. II, para. 19.09; WIPO Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms Convention, pp. 23, 43.

  85. 85.

    See above Sect. 3 A II 1.

  86. 86.

    When clarifying the reproduction right under Art. 10 RC, the diplomatic conference referred to “(a) moulding and casting; (b) recording the sounds produced by playing a pre-existent phonogram; and (c) recording off the air a broadcast of the sounds produced by playing a phonogram” (see Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the International Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Rome, October 10–26, 1961 (1968), p. 46), which reflects the technological realities of the early 1960s but no longer applies to reproductions in digital form; at the same time, this clarification is not exhaustive.

  87. 87.

    See above Sect. 3 A II 1 with regard to Art. 12 RC.

  88. 88.

    The list of contracting parties is available at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/phonograms.pdf.

  89. 89.

    Provided that this making or importation serves the purpose of distribution to the public.

  90. 90.

    Similarly Brison, in: Dreier/Hugenholtz, Concise ECL, pp. 154, 156; Clouse, 38 Val. U. L. Rev. 109, 140 (2003); Martin, 44 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 157, 176 (1997); Martin, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 733, 756 (1996) (the latter article however contemplates the application of the Geneva Convention to digital transmissions).

  91. 91.

    Füller/Langeloh, in: Busche/Stoll/Wiebe, TRIPs, Art. 14 note 21.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., stating that TRIPS rights of phonogram producers are not keeping pace with digital technology.

  93. 93.

    See Reinbothe/von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996, Art. 2 WPPT note 41; Brison, in: Dreier/Hugenholtz, Concise ECL, pp. 170–171; whereas Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. II, para. 19.44 see some room for considering “artistic” responsibility when determining who or what is the “producer of a phonogram”.

  94. 94.

    See above Sect. 3 A II 3.

  95. 95.

    Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 22, 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167/10, June 22, 2001.

  96. 96.

    See also Recital 21 InfoSoc Directive; ECJ Case C-5/08, Judgment of July 16, 2009—Infopaq I, para. 43.

  97. 97.

    See Walter, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 968; Bechtold, in: Dreier/Hugenholtz, Concise ECL, pp. 358–359; Ohly, in: Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, 212, 216.

  98. 98.

    See von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 1024: “[they] may last for several hours, days, or even longer”; see also ECJ Case C-360/13, Judgment of June 5, 2014—PRCA v. NLA, paras. 26–27 (confirming that this condition is met for the cached copies created in the course of internet browsing).

  99. 99.

    IViR Implementation Study, p. 32; von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 1025; Bechtold, in: Dreier/Hugenholtz, Concise ECL, p. 371; the condition was also subject to interpretation by the ECJ, which held that “an act can be held to be ‘transient’ within the meaning of the second condition laid down in Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29 only if its duration is limited to what is necessary for the proper completion of the technological process in question, it being understood that that process must be automated so that it deletes that act automatically, without human intervention, once its function of enabling the completion of such a process has come to an end”, see ECJ Case C-5/08, Judgment of July 16, 2009—Infopaq I, para. 64.

  100. 100.

    ECJ Case C-360/13, Judgment of June 5, 2014—PRCA v. NLA, para. 40.

  101. 101.

    Id., para. 42.

  102. 102.

    IViR Implementation Study, p. 32; von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 1025; Bechtold, in: Dreier/Hugenholtz, Concise ECL, pp. 371–372.

  103. 103.

    ECJ Case C-360/13, Judgment of June 5, 2014—PRCA v. NLA, para. 43.

  104. 104.

    Id., paras. 39–51.

  105. 105.

    Id., paras. 49–51.

  106. 106.

    ECJ Case C-302/10, Judgment of January 17, 2012—Infopaq II, para. 30; ECJ Case C-360/13, Judgment of June 5, 2014—PRCA v. NLA, para. 28; similarly von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 1025.

  107. 107.

    von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, pp. 1025–1026; Bechtold, in: Dreier/Hugenholtz, Concise ECL, p. 372.

  108. 108.

    Recital 33, sentence 5 of the InfoSoc Directive.

  109. 109.

    ECJ Joined Cases C-403/08 and C429/08, Judgment of October 4, 2011—FAPL/Murphy, para. 171.

  110. 110.

    Id., paras. 169–171.

  111. 111.

    ECJ Case C-527/15, Judgment of April 26, 2017—Filmspeler, paras. 69, 18.

  112. 112.

    See IViR Implementation Study, p. 35; Westkamp, 36 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 1057, 1100 (2004).

  113. 113.

    ECJ Joined Cases C-403/08 and C429/08, Judgment of October 4, 2011—FAPL/Murphy, para. 174; ECJ Case C-302/10, Judgment of January 17, 2012—Infopaq II, para. 48.

  114. 114.

    ECJ Joined Cases C-403/08 and C429/08, Judgment of October 4, 2011—FAPL/Murphy, para. 175; ECJ Case C-302/10, Judgment of January 17, 2012—Infopaq II, para. 50.

  115. 115.

    ECJ Case C-302/10, Judgment of January 17, 2012—Infopaq II, para. 52.

  116. 116.

    ECJ Joined Cases C-403/08 and C429/08, Judgment of October 4, 2011—FAPL/Murphy, paras. 176–178.

  117. 117.

    Ibid, paras. 163, 179; according to the ECJ, this objective results in particular from Recital 31of the InfoSoc Direction and from Common Position (EC) No 48/2000 adopted by the Council on September 28, 2000 with a view to adopting that directive (OJ C 344/1, December 1, 2000). See also ECJ Case C-360/13, Judgment of June 5, 2014—PRCA v. NLA, para. 24.

  118. 118.

    ECJ Joined Cases C-403/08 and C429/08, Judgment of October 4, 2011—FAPL/Murphy, para. 179.

  119. 119.

    For the discussion of the three-step test in international and European law see below Sects. 5 A I 3 and 5 B I 2.

  120. 120.

    ECJ Case C-302/10, Judgment of January 17, 2012—Infopaq II, paras. 56–57; ECJ Joined Cases C-403/08 and C429/08, Judgment of October 4, 2011—FAPL/Murphy, para. 181; Study on the Application of the InfoSoc Directive, p. 116. However, see ECJ Case C-360/13, Judgment of June 5, 2014—PRCA v. NLA, paras. 54–63, which applies, more thoroughly, the three-step test of Art. 5(5) InfoSoc Directive to the acts of reproduction in the course of internet browsing and finds no violation of the three-step test.

  121. 121.

    Walter, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 984; such an interpretation is also consistent with the Recital 23 of the InfoSoc Directive.

  122. 122.

    Walter, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 983; Schloetter, in: Synodinou (ed.), Codification of European Copyright Law, 115, 128; IViR Implementation Study, p. 25.

  123. 123.

    See Bechtold, in: Dreier/Hugenholtz, Concise ECL, p. 361; Walter, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 983.

  124. 124.

    ECJ Case C-128/11, Judgment of July 3, 2012—UsedSoft v. Oracle, para. 52.

  125. 125.

    ECJ Case C-128/11, Judgment of July 3, 2012—UsedSoft v. Oracle, para. 45.

  126. 126.

    According to some commentators, exhaustion would be prevented through Recitals 28 and 29 InfoSoc Directive, see Stieper, ZUM 2012, 668, 670; however, under closer examination these recitals do not prevent exhaustion for permanent downloads, as far as the ECJ qualifies them as “transfer of ownership”, see Malevanny, CR 2013, 422, 426; Scholz, ITRB 2013, 17, 20; Schneider/Spindler, CR 2012, 489, 497; Grützmacher, ZGE/IPJ 2013, 46, 81.

  127. 127.

    See Malevanny, CR 2013, 422, 426–427.

  128. 128.

    Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 12, 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified version), OJ L 376/28, December 27, 2006.

  129. 129.

    European Commission, Green Paper Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, Brussels, July 19, 1995, COM(95) 382 final, pp. 56–59; for a similar opinion see Reinbothe/von Lewinski, The EC Directive on Rental and Lending Rights and on Piracy, pp. 41–42; see also von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 267.

  130. 130.

    See von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 267.

  131. 131.

    See in this respect Hilty/Köklü/Hafenbrädl, 44 IIC 263, 274–282 (2013).

  132. 132.

    See above Sects. 3 A II 1 and 3 A II 3; see also von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, pp. 273–274.

  133. 133.

    von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 321; Krikke, in: Dreier/Hugenholtz, Concise ECL, p. 254.

  134. 134.

    von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 326.

  135. 135.

    See ECJ Case C-245/00, Judgment of February 6, 2003—SENA v. NOS, para. 38.

  136. 136.

    See above Sect. 3 B I 2. It should be noted that, according to Recital 19 part 2 Directive 2006/115/EC, member states may provide for a rebuttable presumption of the authorization of exploitation in respect of the exclusive rights of performers provided in the Directive 2006/115/EC, in so far as such a presumption is compatible with the RC. The ability of this Recital to provide a reliable guide to interpretation has been questioned, considering that there was disagreement among member states as to whether such a presumption can be at all compatible with the RC (see von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 340, suggesting that member states should disregard this part of the Recital). In the case that such a presumption can be provided, in the field of OMD it would be relevant for the level of exclusivity pertaining to the performers’ distribution right.

  137. 137.

    See above Sect. 3 B I 2.

  138. 138.

    See above Sects. 3 A III 1 and 3 A III 4; see also von Lewinski, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 274.

  139. 139.

    See above Sect. 3 B II.

  140. 140.

    Bundestags-Drucksache IV/270, p. 42; BGH GRUR 1982, 743—Verbundene Werke; BGH GRUR 1982, 41, 42—Musikverleger III; BGH GRUR 1973, 328, 329—Musikverleger II; Loewenheim, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 9 UrhG note 5; Thum, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 9 UrhG note 9; Wirtz, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 9 UrhG note 1; meanwhile, in the light of the term of protection regulation of the Directive 2011/77/EU, Flechsig suggested that musical works with text should be regarded as joint works instead of compound works, see Flechsig, ZUM 2012, 227, 234 (rejecting this opinion e.g. Thum, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 9 UrhG note 9 and Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 9 UrhG note 2, noting that the regulation of the term of protection does not alter the fact that music and text can be exploited independently).

  141. 141.

    As in the case of the compulsory license of Sec. 42a UrhG, see below Sect. 5 C I 1.

  142. 142.

    Dustmann, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 15 UrhG note 4; Heerma, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 15 UrhG note 15; Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 15 UrhG note 10; Dreyer, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 15 UrhG note 25; von Ungern-Sternberg, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 15 UrhG note 22.

  143. 143.

    See von Ungern-Sternberg, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 21 UrhG note 9, Sec. 22 note 11 with further references.

  144. 144.

    LG Munich ZUM-RD 2003, 607; Loewenheim, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 16 UrhG note 23; Heerma, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 16 UrhG note 19; Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 16 UrhG note 7; Dustmann, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 16 UrhG notes 12, 28.

  145. 145.

    OLG Hamburg GRUR 2001, 831—Roche Lexikon Medizin; Loewenheim, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 16 UrhG notes 20–21; Heerma, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 16 UrhG notes 18, 22; Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 16 UrhG note 13; Dustmann, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 16 UrhG notes 13, 26, 28; Schack, GRUR 2007, 639, 641; Wandtke/von Gerlach, GRUR 2013, 676, 678; von Gerlach, Die urheberrechtliche Bewertung des nicht-linearen Audio-Video Streamings im Internet, pp. 121–132; Busch, GRUR 2011, 496; Fangerow/Schulz, GRUR 2010, 677, 678; for a different opinion see Büscher/Müller, GRUR 2009, 558, 559.

  146. 146.

    See above Sect. 3 B I 1 b. The German scholarship on the exemption of Sec. 44a UrhG generally discusses it in the context of the interpretation of Art. 5(1) InfoSoc Directive, stressing the primary role of ECJ in defining the scope of the exemption, see e.g. Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 44a UrhG note 8. The interpretation of the fourth condition of the exemption, as far as enabling a lawful use of a subject-matter is concerned, is subject to some discussions in the context of illegal streaming. Some scholars have argued that the reception of the work by users is always lawful, see Stieper, MMR 2012, 12, 15–16; Fangerow/Schulz, GRUR 2010, 677, 681, while others require the communication to be lawful, i.e. authorized by the rightholder, see Radmann, ZUM 2010, 387, 391; Leistner, JZ 2011, 1140, 1145. As noted above in Sect. 3 B I 1 b, the case law of ECJ is controversial on this topic and currently seem to resolve this debate somewhere in the middle (i.e., mere reception is generally free, but not in the case of obviously unauthorized sources). Again, this discussion is not of primary relevance here, as this study is not specifically concerned with illegal streaming.

  147. 147.

    See below Sect. 4 A (on copyright contract law requirements) and Sect. 6 C II 1 b cc (on relevant rulings and their implications).

  148. 148.

    See above Sect. 3 B I 2.

  149. 149.

    von Ungern-Sternberg, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 19a UrhG note 42 with further references.

  150. 150.

    Dreyer, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 19a UrhG notes 2–3, 30.

  151. 151.

    Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 19a UrhG note 1; Schack, GRUR 2007, 639, 640–641; Poll, GRUR 2007, 476, 478–479.

  152. 152.

    OLG Hamburg MMR 2006, 173—staytuned; OLG Stuttgart NJW 2008, 1605, 1606–1607—Music-on-demand-Dienst; OLG Hamburg ZUM 2009, 575, 577; Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 19a UrhG note 6; Bullinger, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 19a UrhG note 25; Dustmann, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 19a UrhG note 20; Dreyer, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 19a UrhG note 26.

  153. 153.

    von Ungern-Sternberg, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 20 UrhG note 45; Ehrhardt, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 20 UrhG note 4; Dustmann, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 19a UrhG note 20 and Sec. 20 UrhG note 13; Hillig, in: Möhring/Nicolini, Sec. 20 UrhG note 9; Dreyer, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 20 UrhG note 17; Poll, GRUR 2007, 476, 480; Spohn/Hullen, GRUR 2010, 1053; Schulze, ZUM 2011, 2, 4; in contrast, in favor of qualification under Sec. 19a UrhG Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 20 UrhG note 16 (proposing to qualify only historical broadcasting cases as broadcasting within the meaning of Sec. 20 UrhG); Bortloff, GRUR Int. 2003, 669, 675.

  154. 154.

    See BGH GRUR 2004, 669—Musikmehrkanaldienst.

  155. 155.

    Klatt, CR 2009, 517, 522 (qualifying services like Pandora as broadcasting); similarly Castendyk, in: Hilty (ed.), FS Loewenheim, 31, 45; in this direction also Spohn/Hullen, GRUR 2010, 1053 (while not explicitly discussing personalized internet radio, they point out that whenever the user cannot choose the moment of the communication of the work in an unrestricted selective manner, a linear use is given which is to qualify as broadcasting under Sec. 20 UrhG).

  156. 156.

    Schwenzer, GRUR Int. 2001, 722, 728–729; Büscher, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 78 UrhG note 8.

  157. 157.

    von Ungern-Sternberg, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 15 UrhG note 27, Sec. 19a UrhG note 45 and Sec. 20 UrhG note 8; von Ungern-Sternberg, GRUR 2013, 248, 251, footnote 56; Poll, MMR 2011, 226, 231.

  158. 158.

    Such a possibility indicated by Castendyk for services where the streamed linear program is unique for every user—while noting that the protection could still be achieved through the reproduction right, which in this case would have independent economic significance and therefore fall outside of the scope of the exception of Sec. 44a UrhG, see Castendyk, in: Hilty (ed.), FS Loewenheim, 31, 36.

  159. 159.

    Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 20 UrhG note 9; von Ungern-Sternberg, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 20 UrhG note 8 (quoting case law of BGH in Internet-Videorecorder [BGH GRUR 2009, 845, 847, para. 29] and Regio-Vertrag [BGH GRUR 2010, 530, 531, para. 21] which allegedly underpin his opinion—hereby misinterpreting these decisions since they [as well as the written law in Sec. 21b(1) UrhG] demand simultaneous transmission only for rebroadcasting, but not for broadcasting); Bullinger, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 20 UrhG note 3; Dustmann, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 20 UrhG note 13.

  160. 160.

    Castendyk, in: Hilty (ed.), FS Loewenheim, 31, 40.

  161. 161.

    Sec. 15(3) UrhG.

  162. 162.

    See Bundestags-Drucksache 15/38, p. 17, which does not require simultaneous reception.

  163. 163.

    Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 15 UrhG note 42; von Ungern-Sternberg, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 15 UrhG note 71; Bullinger, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 15 UrhG note 21; Dustmann, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 15 UrhG note 37.

  164. 164.

    Dreyer, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 20 UrhG note 24 with further references; see also Riesenhuber, ZUM 2012, 433, 438–443 discussing broadcasting to “successive public” in the light of ECJ case law.

  165. 165.

    Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 20 UrhG note 16.

  166. 166.

    ECJ Case C-456/06, Judgment of April 17, 2008—Le Corbusier; BGH GRUR 2009, 840—Le-Corbusier-Möbel II; see also Loewenheim, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 17 UrhG notes 8, 30.

  167. 167.

    LG Berlin ZUM-RD 2005, 398 (for illegal downloads); Dustmann, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 19a UrhG note 17; Bullinger, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 19a UrhG note 23; Dreyer, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 19a UrhG note 26; Loewenheim, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 17 UrhG note 6.

  168. 168.

    See above Sect. 3 B I 2.

  169. 169.

    Ibid.

  170. 170.

    OLG Hamm ZUM 2014, 715; LG Bielefeld GRUR-RR 2013, 281; Dreyer, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 19a UrhG note 2;

  171. 171.

    See Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 19a UrhG note 11; Hoeren/Jakopp, MMR 2014, 646, 648; Redeker, CR 2014, 73, 76–77.

  172. 172.

    ECJ Case C-128/11, Judgment of July 3, 2012—UsedSoft v. Oracle, para. 52: “the existence of a transfer of ownership changes an ‘act of communication to the public’ provided for in Article 3 [InfoSoc Directive] into an act of distribution referred to in Article 4 of the directive”.

  173. 173.

    Malevanny, CR 2013, 422, 426; Kubach, CR 2013, 279, 283.

  174. 174.

    See above Sect. 3 B I 2.

  175. 175.

    Ibid.

  176. 176.

    Dünnwald/Gerlach, Sec. 73 UrhG notes 15 and 37; Krüger, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 73 UrhG note 19; Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, para. 674; Ernst, Urheberrecht und Leistungsschutz im Tonstudio, pp. 42–45; another opinion recognizes this only if the creative contribution of the sound engineers influences the live experience of the performance (but not the pure sound experience through a phonogram), see Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 73 UrhG note 14; Büscher, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 73 UrhG note 15; some scholars completely deny the recognition of sound engineers as performers, see Schaefer, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 73 UrhG notes 22–23 and Meckel, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 73 UrhG note 18, quoting BGH GRUR 1983, 22, 25—Tonmeister (which was however decided on the basis of the older legal definition of “performer”).

  177. 177.

    See above Sects. 3 C I 2–5.

  178. 178.

    Subject to the exemption of temporary reproductions under Sec. 44a UrhG, equally applicable to performances by virtue of Sec. 83 UrhG.

  179. 179.

    See above Sects. 3 C I 2, 3 C I 3 and 3 C I 5.

  180. 180.

    See below Sect. 5 C II 1.

  181. 181.

    BGH GRUR 2009, 403—Metall auf Metall; OLG Hamburg MMR 2006, 173, 174—staytuned; Schaefer, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 85 UrhG note 8; Vogel, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 85 UrhG note 30; Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 85 UrhG note 4; Boddien, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 85 UrhG note 40; Meckel, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 85 UrhG note 2; the official legislative justification similarly speaks of “high quality technical services and large economic expeditures” as a basis for the producer protection, see Bundestrags-Drucksache IV/270, p. 95.

  182. 182.

    Schaefer, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 85 UrhG note 9; Boddien, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 85 UrhG note 41; see also OLG Hamburg GRUR 1997, 826—Erkennungsmelodie; on the tape lease deal see also below Sect. 4 B II 2.

  183. 183.

    Schaefer, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 85 UrhG note 4; Vogel, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 85 UrhG note 30; Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 85 UrhG note 20.

  184. 184.

    Subject to the exemption of temporary reproductions under Sec. 44a UrhG, equally applicable to phonograms by virtue of Sec. 83 UrhG.

  185. 185.

    See Sect. 5 C II 1.

  186. 186.

    Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.05[B] (although admitting that where this issue might become relevant, especially in the case of the compulsory license of Sec. 115 CA, no court had ever tested the opposite theory); see also Goldstein on Copyright, § 2.8.

  187. 187.

    However, “other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work”.

  188. 188.

    See Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.03[C], noticing that the distinction between “copies” and “phonorecords” produces “[a]n unnecessary complexity in a necessarily complex statute”, although pointing out its usefulness i.a. in limiting the scope of compulsory licenses or record store rentals.

  189. 189.

    Sec. 101 CA.

  190. 190.

    This is true regardless of whether sound recordings or musical works are embodied in the object; as soon as the object includes sounds, it is qualified as a phonorecords; hereby musical works may well be embodied in phonorecords (see Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.03[C]; see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1088 [C.D. Cal. 2011]).

  191. 191.

    For the case law holding that server copies are covered by the reproduction right see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com , Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); similarly Rodgers & Hammerstein Org. v. UMG Recordings Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also Kohn on Music Licensing, pp. 42–43; Passman, All You Need to Know About the Music Business, p. 271.

  192. 192.

    U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA Sec. 104 Report (supra note 54), pp. 106–141, especially pp. 132–133 (hereby this report goes on to hold that such copies constitute “fair use” under Sec. 107 CA, see pp. 133–141); similarly Ricketson/Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, para. 11.71, footnote 305; Hardy, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 423, 426–429 [1997]).

  193. 193.

    U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA Sec. 104 Report (supra note 54), p. 111.

  194. 194.

    Id., p. 113.

  195. 195.

    MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993); criticizing the quality of this judgment Lemley, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 547, 551 (1996–1997) with further references in footnote 25.

  196. 196.

    NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1995); Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Exp. Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (D. Kan. 1995); Roeslin v. District of Columbia, 921 F. Supp. 793, 799 (D.D.C. 1995); see also Patry on Copyright, § 9:63, footnote 7 and Lemley, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 547, 552 (1997), footnote 26 for references to further progeny of MAI v. Peak.

  197. 197.

    See Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.08[A][5][a].

  198. 198.

    Id., § 8.08[A][5][b].

  199. 199.

    Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129–130 (2d Cir. 2008); on this case see Abrams, The Law of Copyright, § 5:10.50; Patry on Copyright, § 9:63.50.

  200. 200.

    Cate, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1395, 1453 (1996); similarly Litman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 29, 42 (1994); Samuelson, 37 Commun. ACM 21, 22–23 (1994).

  201. 201.

    Patry on Copyright, §§ 9:63–9:63.50.

  202. 202.

    Similarly Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2008).

  203. 203.

    H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 63 (1976); Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.14[B][1].

  204. 204.

    The formulation goes back to the 1966 House Judiciary Committee Bill and found its way into the 1976 Copyright Act, see Patry on Copyright, § 14:16.

  205. 205.

    See Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.14[C][3] explaining the intention of the legislator as follows: “if the same copy (or phonorecord) of a given work is repeatedly played (i.e., “performed”) by different members of the public, albeit at different times, the result is a “public” performance”.

  206. 206.

    See Kohn on music licensing, p. 743 et seq. for a summary of the arguments in the discussion.

  207. 207.

    U.S. v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); U.S. v. ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010).

  208. 208.

    See Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.14[B][3]; Patry on Copyright, § 14:28; Abrams, The Law of Copyright, § 5:197.50; Kohn on music licensing, pp. 751–753; this view was also endorsed earlier by the U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA Sec. 104 Report (supra note 54), pp. xxvii–xxviii.

  209. 209.

    U.S. v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

  210. 210.

    U.S. v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); this is also supported by the legislative history throughout which the term “represent” was deleted from the definition of “perform” to ensure that the mere act of input into a computer does not constitute performance, see Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, 89th Congress, 1st Session, May 1965, p. 22; Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.14[B][1], footnote 30; Patry on Copyright, § 14:14.

  211. 211.

    U.S. v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); U.S. v. ASCAP, 627 F3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2010).

  212. 212.

    U.S. v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

  213. 213.

    This is even more true, considering that limitedly downloaded files are usually stored locally on a user device, whereas the courts held that even the performance of a copy stored in the cloud for a particular user is no longer a public performance, see Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2008).

  214. 214.

    See Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (N.D. Tex. 2006); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 173–174 (D. Mass. 2008); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 651 (D.N.Y. 2013) with further references; see also Patry on Copyright, § 14:21; Goldstein on Copyright, § 7.5.1; Schaumann, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1001, 1037, footnote 148 (2002).

  215. 215.

    See e.g. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001), simply holding that: “Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate plaintiffs’ distribution rights”; similarly Universal City Studios, Prods., LLP v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D.Me. 2006); see also Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993).

  216. 216.

    Nimmer, § 8.11[D][4][c]; very thoroughly Menell, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1, 30–51 (2011); see also In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 803–804 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Warner Brothers Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65765 (D. Tex. 2006) which make references to the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) to underline the point that the right under Sec. 106(3) CA is to be equated with publication.

  217. 217.

    Menell, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1, 60–63 (2011); Henslee, 9 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 9–10 (2009).

  218. 218.

    Weissman, 27 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 737, 743–744 (2010); Henslee, 9 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 11–13 (2009).

  219. 219.

    Patry on Copyright, §§ 13:11–13:11.50; Galluzzo, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 1165, 1180–1189 (2009); Dines, 32 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 157, 175–177 (2009); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (D. Conn. 2008); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 984–985 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“It is not clear that the terms “publication” and “distribution” are synonymous outside the context of first publication, which was the subject of discussion in Harper & Row”); for a detailed analysis providing arguments for this view see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216–1225 (D. Minn. 2008); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com , Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007).

  220. 220.

    See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 173–174 (D. Mass. 2008), arguing as follows: “First, while the statute requires that distribution be of “material objects”, there is no reason to limit “distribution” to processes in which a material object exists throughout the entire transaction - as opposed to a transaction in which a material object is created elsewhere at its finish. Second, while the statute addresses ownership, it is the newly minted ownership rights held by the transferee that concern it, not whether the transferor gives up his own. … An electronic file transfer is plainly within the sort of transaction that § 106(3) was intended to reach. Indeed, electronic transfers comprise a growing part of the legitimate market for copyrighted sound recordings. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff & Ellen Lee, Tech Chronicles, S.F. Chron., Feb. 27, 2008, at C1 (reporting that through its iTunes Store, which operates exclusively via electronic file transfer, Apple has sold more than 4 billion songs to 50 million customers). What matters in the marketplace is not whether a material object “changes hands”, but whether, when the transaction is completed, the distributee has a material object. The Court therefore concludes that electronic file transfers fit within the definition of “distribution” of a phonorecord.”

  221. 221.

    Menell, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1, 55 (2011), i.a. elegantly quoting U.S. judge Learned Hand: “There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally” (Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 [2d Cir. 1944] [L. Hand, C.J., concurring]).

  222. 222.

    Id., at 55–56.

  223. 223.

    In the case of “digital retailers” such as iTunes this license can also be seen in the Terms and Conditions that each end user has to accept, which i.a. lay down which use of the “purchased content” is allowed (e.g. personal, non-commercial use).

  224. 224.

    Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).

  225. 225.

    UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).

  226. 226.

    F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2010)—while qualifying the agreement that permitted download distributors to produce and sell permanent downloads as “license”.

  227. 227.

    Criticizing such extensive freedom of rightholders to influence the legal qualification of a transaction, Patry makes the following point: “The circuit panel rejected indefinite possession and “the economic realities of the transaction” test, relying instead on boilerplate contract language. This approach, however, puts the cart before the horse, puts form over substance, or whatever cliché one wishes to use. If manufacturers can distribute goods but call the distribution a license even though the reality is that to the consumer the goods are owned, then law does become a weapon against common sense and consumer expectations”, see Patry on Copyright, § 13:25.

  228. 228.

    Patry on Copyright, § 14:21.

  229. 229.

    The provision of the CA granting protection to sound recordings became effective on February 15, 1972; therefore, sound recordings fixed prior to that date are ineligible for statutory copyright, but may remain the subject of common law copyright or other state law protection, see Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.10[A][1]; recently a court in California also ruled in favor of such protection, see Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166492 (D.N.Y. 2014); Knopper, SiriusXM Must Start Paying Artists for Pre-1972 Recordings, Rolling Stone of October 17, 2014, available at: http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/siriusxm-must-start-paying-artists-for-pre-1972-recordings-20141017.

  230. 230.

    Not including the sounds “accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work”.

  231. 231.

    See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 56 (1976): “Aside from cases in which sounds are fixed by some purely mechanical means without originality of any kind, the copyright protection that would prevent the reproduction and distribution of unauthorized phonorecords of sound recordings is clearly justified. The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not always, involve “authorship” both on the part of the performers whose performance is captured and on the part of the record producer responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final sound recording. There may, however, be cases where the record producer’s contribution is so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable element in the work, and there may be cases (for example, recordings of birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, et cetera) where only the record producer’s contribution is copyrightable”; the same view is supported in Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.10 [A][2]; Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1993); Sierra-Pascual v. Pina Records, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d 196, 203 (D.P.R. 2009); Boorstyn on Copyright, § 2.12; Patry on Copyright, § 3:161; Goldstein on Copyright, § 2.13; Bergman, 24 Sw. U. L. Rev. 351, 355–356 (1995).

  232. 232.

    Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.10 [A][2][b], noting that in this case the contribution is “closely analogous to the acts of a photographer capturing and photographically processing light images”.

  233. 233.

    Patry on Copyright, § 3:161; Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 607 (1st Cir. 1993).

  234. 234.

    Ibid.

  235. 235.

    See H.R. Rep. No. 104-274, 23 (1995): “In the absence of the applications of the work made for hire doctrine of the copyright law, record companies, as authors of the sound engineering, and performers, as authors of their recorded interpretations, are joint authors of a sound recording.”

  236. 236.

    See also Malevanny, GRUR Int. 2013, 737, 738; Hilty/Kur/Klass/Geiger/Peukert/Drexl/Katzenberger, GRUR Int. 2008, 907, 912.

  237. 237.

    See above Sects. 3 D I 1 and 3 D I 3.

  238. 238.

    “Digital audio transmission” is a transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other non-analog format that embodies the transmission of a sound recording, not including the transmission of any audiovisual work, see definitions in Secs. 101, 114(j)(5) CA.

  239. 239.

    See above Sect. 3 D I 2.

  240. 240.

    See below Sect. 5 D II 1.

  241. 241.

    See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (U.S. 1989); these factors are: “the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished”, “the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party”, with none of these factors being determinative (see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–752 (U.S. 1989)); see also Nimmer on Copyright, § 5.03[B][1][a][iii]; Patry on Copyright, §§ 5:53–5:67; Goldstein on Copyright, § 4.3.2.

  242. 242.

    See the Reid analysis by Moser/Slay, Music Copyright Law, p. 58: “Songwriting is generally regarded as a skilled occupation; songwriters generally work at times and places of their own choosing; songwriters are not usually paid a salary (although they may receive advance); publishers do not normally pay payroll or Social Security tayes; and publishers do not normally provide any employee benefits to songwriters”; similarly Kohn on Music Licensing, p. 136.

  243. 243.

    See the statement of Marybeth Peters, The Register of Copyrights in: United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Work Made for Hire: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Congress, 2d Session, May 2000, pp. 88–89: “In the 1960s, record companies exercised a great deal of control over the creation of a sound recording, employing back-up singers and engineers and owning the studio space in which featured artists would record. In this framework, record companies uniformly asserted an employment for hire relationship with featured artists. … That level of involvement by the record companies in the creation of sound recordings has generally diminished over the last few decades, so that now, in many cases, record companies simply provide funds at the “front-end” and distribution at the “back-end” of a sound recording’s production. By hiring or acting as producers, by retaining back-up singers, musicians and engineers, and by recording in their own studios or at independent studios, featured artists have increasingly come to control the creative elements of a sound recording, making it considerably more difficult now for record companies to characterize artists as employees producing works within the scope of their employment.”; see also Nimmer on Copyright, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii][I]; Nimmer/Menell, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 387, 393 (2001–2002); Rafoth, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1032–1040 (2000); Starshak, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 71, 104–105 (2001); Rich, 57 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 363, 370 (2012–2013); Field, 48 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 145, 171–172 (2000); Gould, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 91, 109, 112–113 (2007) (with further references, coming to the same conclusion with regard to producers).

  244. 244.

    Field, 48 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 145, 162 (2000); Nimmer on Copyright, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii][I]; Nimmer/Menell, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 387 (2001); Rich, 57 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 363, 371 (2012–2013).

  245. 245.

    See Nimmer on Copyright, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii][I]; Nimmer/Menell, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 387, 390–395 (2001–2002); Patry on Copyright, § 5:92.

  246. 246.

    See Rafoth, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1040–1045 (2000); Starshak, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 71, 105–111 (2001); Rich, 57 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 363, 379–381 (2012–2013); Field, 48 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 145, 173–175 (2000); Gould, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 91, 127–129 (2007) (seeing some perspectives only for audiovisual works); Nimmer/Menell, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 387, 398–403 (2001); Patry on Copyright, §§ 5.90–5.91; see also Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broadcast Servs., 128 F.3d 872 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the qualification under the audiovisual works category); Bucciarelli-Tieger v. Victory Records, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 702, 709 (D. Ill. 2007) (concluding that “[s]ound recordings are notably exempt from the list of works that can be specially commissioned as works-for-hire”).

  247. 247.

    See Rich, 57 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 363, 370 (2012–2013).

  248. 248.

    Starshak, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 71, 104, 111 (2001); see also Nimmer on Copyright, § 5.03[B][1][b][ii], [2][a][i].

  249. 249.

    See below Sect. 4 B II 1.

  250. 250.

    Discussion of the question of whether the U.S. law is consistent with the international treaties establishing neighboring rights is rather scarce and sometimes characterized by obvious misinterpretations, see e.g. Dratler/McJohn, Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, Creative and Industrial Property, Vol. 1, § 1A.06[4][e][ii] (erroneously equating phonograms and sound recordings and stating that phonogram producers are thus originally protected under the U.S. law).

  251. 251.

    This survey also apparently misinterprets the U.S. sound recording copyright, understanding it as the protection of phonogram producers but not of performers, see WIPO, Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Survey on Implementation Provisions of the WCT and the WPPT prepared by the Secretariat, Document SCCR/9/6 of April 25, 2003, pp. 883–887.

  252. 252.

    See below Sect. 5 D II 1.

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Malevanny, N. (2019). Relevant Rights and Their Applicability to Online Music Uses. In: Online Music Distribution - How Much Exclusivity Is Needed?. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 12. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59699-9_3

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