Abstract
The following section is particularly directed at readers who are interested in theory. Using the two main approaches of the new institutional economics (Schauenberg et al. 2005; Coase 1988, 1993; Demsetz 1967, 1968, 1988; North 1991; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Hart and Moore 1990; Furubotn and Pejovich 1974; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Sloan 1988), certain fundamental ideas will be introduced about the design of institutions as well as incentive and monitoring systems. The transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1986, 1993; Windsperger 1996) offers a method for analysing the assessment of vertical integration along the value chain and, thus, for evaluating integrated care systems, among other things. The principal-agent theory (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Pauly 1968; Mooney 1993; Akerlof 1970; Arrow 1963) is concentrated on delegation relations and their inherent information asymmetries. There is hardly another field in which the considerable information asymmetries are so clear between those who delegate tasks (e.g. the patient) and those who carry out the tasks (e.g. a physician). The principal-agent theory investigates how contracts can best be designed in such a configuration.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Literature
Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.
Alchian, A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777–795.
Arrow, K. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review, 53(5), 941–973.
Arrow, K. (1984). The economics of agency (Technical Report No. 451). A report of the Center for Research on Organizational Efficiency, Stanford University.
Arrow, K. (1985). The economics of agency. In J. W. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser (Eds.), Principals and agents (pp. 1–38). Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Ballesteros, P. (2010). Haemophilia in the German risk adjustment scheme. Hämostaseologie, 30(1), 65–69.
Cacace, M. (2010). Das Gesundheitssystem der USA. Frankfurt am Main: Governance-Strukturen staatlicher und privater Akteure.
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economia, 4, 386–405.
Coase, R. (1988). The firm, the market and the law. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Coase, R. (1993). The nature of the firm. In O. Williamson & S. G. Winter (Eds.), The nature of the firm – Origins, evolution, and development (pp. 18–47). New York: Oxford University Press.
Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a theory of property rights. American Economic Review, 58, 347–360.
Demsetz, H. (1968). The cost of transacting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 33–53.
Demsetz, H. (1988). Ownership, control and the firm (The organization of economic activity series) (Vol. I). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Fontaniri, M. (1996). Kooperationsgestaltungsprozesse in Theorie und Praxis. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Furubotn, E., & Pejovich, S. (1974). The economics of property rights. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing.
Grobe, T. H., Dörning, H., & Schwartz, F. W. (2003). GEK-Gesundheitsreport 2003. St. Augustine: Asgard.
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990). Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1119–1158.
Janus, K., & Amelung, V. (2005). Integrated health care delivery based on transaction cost economics – Experiences from California and cross-national implications. Advances in Health Care Management, 5, 117.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. The Journal of Financial Economics, 3(1997), 305–360.
Milgrom, P. R., & Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, organization and management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Mooney, G. (1993). Agency in health care: Getting beyond first principles. Journal of Health Economics, 12, 125–135.
North, D. (1991). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pauly, M. (1968). The economics of moral hazard: Comment. American Economic Review, 58, 531–537.
Picot, A., Dietl, H., & Franck, E. (1997). Organisation. Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel.
Picot, A., Reichwald, R., & Wiegand, R. (2003). Die grenzenlose Unternehmung (5th ed.). Wiesbaden: Gabler.
Porter, M. E. (1998). Competitive advantage: Creating and sustaining superior performance (New ed.). New York: Free Press.
Pratt, J. W., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (1985). Principals and agents: The structure of business. Boston: Harvard Business Press.
Raulinajtys-Grzybek, M. (2015). Pricing health services: Transaction cost approach. Hamburg: Anchor Academic.
Richter, R., & Furubotn, E. (1996). Neue Institutionenökonomik. Eine Einfü hrung und kritische Würdigung. Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck).
Robinson, J. C. (1997). Physician-hospital integration and the economic theory of the firm. Medical Care Research and Review, 54, 3–24.
Schauenberg, B., Schreyögg, G., & Sydow, J. (2005). Institutionenökonomik als Managementlehre? Wiesbaden: Gabler.
Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative behavior (4th ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster.
Sloan, F. (1988). Property rights in the hospital industry. In H. E. Frech (Ed.), Health care in America (pp. 103–127). San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute.
Spremann, K. (1990). Asymmetrische Informationen. ZfB, 5(6), 561–568.
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. (1986). Economic organization. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.
Williamson, O. (1993). The logic of economic organization. In O. Williamson & S. G. Winter (Eds.), The nature of the firm – Origins, evolution, and development. New York: Oxford University Press.
Windsperger, J. (1996). Transaktionskostenansatz der Entstehung der Unternehmensorganisation. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Amelung, V.E. (2019). Theoretical Concepts for the Assessment of Managed Care. In: Healthcare Management. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59568-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59568-8_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-59567-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-59568-8
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)