Abstract
We consider a scenario where a service provider has created a software service \(S\) and desires to outsource the execution of this service to an untrusted cloud. The software service contains secrets that the provider would like to keep hidden from the cloud. For example, the software might contain a secret database, and the service could allow users to make queries to different slices of this database depending on the user’s identity.
This setting presents significant challenges not present in previous works on outsourcing or secure computation. Because secrets in the software itself must be protected against an adversary that has full control over the cloud that is executing this software, our notion implies indistinguishability obfuscation. Furthermore, we seek to protect knowledge of the software \(S\) to the maximum extent possible even if the cloud can collude with several corrupted users.
In this work, we provide the first formalizations of security for this setting, yielding our definition of a secure cloud service scheme. We provide constructions of secure cloud service schemes assuming indistinguishability obfuscation, one-way functions, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.
At the heart of our paper are novel techniques to allow parties to simultaneously authenticate and securely communicate with an obfuscated program, while hiding this authentication and communication from the entity in possession of the obfuscated program.
D. Boneh—Supported by NSF and DARPA.
D. Gupta and A. Sahai—Research supported in part from a DARPA/ONR PROCEED award, NSF Frontier Award 1413955, NSF grants 1228984, 1136174, 1118096, and 1065276, a Xerox Faculty Research Award, a Google Faculty Research Award, an equipment grant from Intel, and an Okawa Foundation Research Grant. This material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency through the U.S. Office of Naval Research under Contract N00014-11-1-0389. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the NSF, or the U.S. Government.
I. Mironov—Work done in Microsoft Research.
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Boneh, D., Gupta, D., Mironov, I., Sahai, A. (2015). Hosting Services on an Untrusted Cloud. In: Oswald, E., Fischlin, M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2015. EUROCRYPT 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9057. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_14
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