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Simulating Cooperation and Competition: Present State and Future Objectives

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Abstract

One hardly needs to argue that cooperation and competition constitute major components of most social interactions. Not surprisingly, then, that the study of these behaviors has occupied many scientists from the fields of biology, economy, sociology, political science, psychology and other disciplines of the behavioral sciences. Whereas no claim is made here in favor of any single approach, I argue that the application of game theory for studying minimal situations of cooperation and competition has proven quite beneficial.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Psychology, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

    Ramzi Suleiman

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  1. Ramzi Suleiman
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Sozialwissenschaftliche Informatik, Universität Koblenz-Landau, Rheinau 1, 56075, Koblenz, Germany

    Klaus G. Troitzsch

  2. Medizinische Soziologie, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Bunsenstraße 2, 35033, Marburg, Germany

    Ulrich Mueller

  3. Social and Computer Sciences Research Group, University of Surrey, GU2 5XG, Guildford, England

    G. Nigel Gilbert

  4. Department of Computer Science, University of Essex, CO4 3SQ, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, England

    Jim E. Doran

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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Suleiman, R. (1996). Simulating Cooperation and Competition: Present State and Future Objectives. In: Troitzsch, K.G., Mueller, U., Gilbert, G.N., Doran, J.E. (eds) Social Science Microsimulation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03261-9_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03261-9_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-08267-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-03261-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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