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Kartelle klipp & klar pp 103–168Cite as

Kartellverfolgung in der Europäischen Union: Überblick und empirische Evidenz

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Zusammenfassung

Im vierten Kapitel des Lehrbuchs erfolgt eine Erweiterung der Analyse von EU-Kartellen um den Prozess der EU-Kartellverfolgung. Dieser schließt neben der Analyse und Entscheidung durch die Europäische Kommission auch (etwaige) gerichtliche Untersuchungen mit ein. Aufbauend auf einem umfangreichen qualitativ-empirischen Überblick des Kartellverfolgungsprozesses in der Europäischen Union, liegen die ersten beiden Schwerpunkte auf ökonometrischen Studien der Wirksamkeit des Kronzeugenprogramms bzw. des Verständigungsverfahrens. Im Anschluss daran erfolgt eine Analyse des gerichtlichen Berufungsverfahrens, die sich aufteilt in eine Betrachtung von Determinanten der Nutzung des Verfahrens einerseits sowie von Determinanten der Dauer der entsprechenden gerichtlichen Untersuchungen andererseits.

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  1. Hochschule Schmalkalden, Schmalkalden, Deutschland

    Kai Hüschelrath

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Hüschelrath, K. (2020). Kartellverfolgung in der Europäischen Union: Überblick und empirische Evidenz. In: Kartelle klipp & klar. WiWi klipp & klar . Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29139-6_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29139-6_4

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