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Digitale Geschäftsmodelle und asymmetrische Information in der Finanzierung von Unternehmen

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Innovationen für eine digitale Wirtschaft

Part of the book series: Business - Innovation - High Tech ((BIHT))

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Zusammenfassung

Digitale Geschäftsmodelle zeichnen sich oft durch die spezifische Nutzung von proprietären Daten oder Algorithmen aus. Wettbewerbsvorteile von Firmen mit digitalen Geschäftsmodellen sind dann charakterisiert durch Merkmale von erfolgsrelevanter Information und Aspekten von deren Offenlegung − oder bewusst gewählter Intransparenz − die intrinsisch zu asymmetrischer Information führen. Management und Personal der Firma kennen die Erfolgsaussichten und die relevanten Risikofaktoren dann besser als mögliche Kapitalgeber.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hochschule Offenburg, Gengenbach, Deutschland

    Thomas Wenger

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  1. Thomas Wenger
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Correspondence to Thomas Wenger .

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  1. Fak. BWL und Wirtschaftsingenieurwesen, Hochschule Offenburg, Gengenbach, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

    Andrea Müller

  2. Fak. BWL und Wirtschaftsingenieurwesen, Hochschule Offenburg, Gengenbach, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

    Matthias Graumann

  3. Fak. BWL und Wirtschaftsingenieurwesen, Hochschule Offenburg, Gengenbach, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

    Hans-Jörg Weiß

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Wenger, T. (2020). Digitale Geschäftsmodelle und asymmetrische Information in der Finanzierung von Unternehmen. In: Müller, A., Graumann, M., Weiß, HJ. (eds) Innovationen für eine digitale Wirtschaft. Business - Innovation - High Tech. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29027-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29027-6_8

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