Abstract
The relationship between insurer and insured frequently bears the issue of opposing incentives concerning preventive efforts once the mitigation of risk has taken place; this topic is commonly known as moral hazard. One solution to this dilemma is observation. This chapter is dedicated to exploring the potential of aggregating two insured individuals into an interdependent group for the purpose of reducing observation costs.
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© 2019 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature
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Rödl, M. (2019). Moral hazard and group sample observation. In: Contributions to the Economics of Index Based Insurance Schemes. Management, Organisation und ökonomische Analyse. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25248-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25248-9_5
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Publisher Name: Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden
Print ISBN: 978-3-658-25247-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-658-25248-9
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