Abstract
We investigate whether fair behavior in negotiations depends on the frame given by an actor to a situation. To test this proposition, we study secondary data from bargaining experiments. In the experiments, subjects were asked what they thought the situation was about. We compare this perception with their behavior in the negotiations. The results show that subjects with a prosocial frame were more likely to distribute the resource equally than those with a proself frame. Investigating the factors that lead to the adoption of a prosocial or proself frame, we find that minor situational differences do not influence the choice of a frame, whereas factors which can be traced back to socialization exert considerable influence on the selection of a frame.
This paper reports results of the research group FOR2014 “Needs-based justice and distribution procedures”, project B1 “Needs-based justice and distributive preferences in social exchange networks” (http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/). We gratefully acknowledge funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, KI 1419/2-1) and the Austrian Wissenschaftsfonds (FWF, I1888-G11).
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- 1.
Note that asking the participants about their perceived frame after the experiment is controversial. We will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this procedure in more detail in the discussion section of the chapter.
- 2.
The language and visual set-up of the negotiations are almost identical across all experimental sessions. However, similar to other meta-studies, some collected control variables vary between treatments. We describe the differences later in this section.
- 3.
In this study, we concentrate on inclusive exchange and do not analyze data from the rounds with exclusive exchange. Still, the inclusive instructions might trigger a selfish frame. Yet, it is equally likely that the new opportunity to share the payoff across all three group members triggers a prosocial frame. Clear predictions are not possible in this case. Empirically, there are no differences.
- 4.
- 5.
Note that being in the neutral category does not exclude having a proself or prosocial stance, it only means that this stance did not become salient, which can be due to the way we asked for frames.
- 6.
Note that there were some differences within the neutral root category: E.g., in treatment 1, 45% of the neutral answers categorize as “fast” and 15% as “like”, whereas in treatment 4, only 16% fall under the subcategory “fast” and 25% of the answers in the neutral root category can be subsumed under the “like” subcategory. However, as these differences are not unambiguously informative for our research question, we do not further take them into account.
- 7.
\( \hbox{max} (x_{i} ,x_{j} ,x_{k} ) - \hbox{min} (x_{i} ,x_{j} ,x_{k} ) = \frac{1}{2}\left( {\left| {x_{i} - x_{j} } \right| + \left| {x_{i} - x_{k} } \right| + \left| {x_{j} - x_{k} } \right|} \right) \)
- 8.
The range is equal to 7.3 points if we could not clearly assign the central subject either to the proself or prosocial frame, i.e. neutral frame.
- 9.
Note, however, that we did not expect the measured outcome variable to vary significantly between treatments.
- 10.
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Hagauer, H., Kittel, B., Schwaninger, M. (2019). Fairness in Bargaining: How Self-selected Frames Affect the Fairness of Negotiation Outcomes. In: Debus, M., Tepe, M., Sauermann, J. (eds) Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie. Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-23997-8_1
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