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Violence from Above, Violence from Below: The State and Policing Citizens in Mubarak’s Egypt

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State Terror, State Violence

Part of the book series: Staat – Souveränität – Nation ((SSN))

Abstract

While observers and analysts list multiple sources as the root causes of the Egyptian uprising, it is beyond doubt that the mass protests were triggered by the violent practices of Ministry of Interior’s security apparatus. This chapter examines the different forms of police violence, probing the conditions that facilitated their production and development. I argue against a mono-causal analysis that attributes police violence to dynamics of autocratic rule, as this lens fails to capture repertoires of violence that characterized the last two decades of Mubarak’s rule. Instead, I put forth a more complex story that identifies authoritarian policies as well as institutional inequalities in the age of neoliberal economic policies at the heart of state violence. I argue that two levels of police repression existed: repression from above and repression from below. While the first form of state violence was directed against political opposition, the second form of police repression was directed at non-politicized residents of impoverished areas. These two levels of violence are distinct, but related. Violence from below was caused by the unequal distribution of state resources that favored high-ranking state agents over low-ranking and noncommissioned officers during times of declining state capacity and neoliberal economic shifts. At the same time, the regime’s sanctioning of repressive measures against political opposition provided a nurturing environment for low level violence to grow. I adopt an inter-disciplinary approach, putting into conversation understandings of political repression, policing and organizational behavior to explain forms of police violence in Egypt.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Excerpt from Mubarak’s speech in Police Academy on January 21st 2009. AlAhram January 22nd, 2009.

  2. 2.

    In political science, the police as an institution remains understudied with the exception of writings on ethnic conflict (C. Enloe 1980a, b; Baker 2003, 2007; Hills 2000) and regime and policing patterns change (Baker 2003, 2007; Hills 2000). Area studies focusing on the Middle East has engaged with the police in the context of the legal framework and criminal justice systems (Crystal 2001; Brown 1997) and historical origins and early formations (Fahmy 1997; Tollefson 1999; Khalili and Schwedler 2010).

  3. 3.

    Police professionalization under colonial rule adopted a militarized model, with an emphasis on strict discipline over skillful detective work (Tollefson 1999; Crystal 2001).

  4. 4.

    General ’Abd el’Azim Fahmy led the MoI from 1962 to 1965, but was ousted in the wake of what became known as the ‘Muslim Brotherhood Conspiracy’ (alGawady 2008).

  5. 5.

    Statistics and figures in this section are based on the Egyptian government’s reports published by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and Ministry of Administrative Development cf. Farouk, 2008.

  6. 6.

    Police and security personnel constitute about 90 % of MoI employees on average. Of the remaining 10 %, about 51,224 (or 7.2 %) are listed as civil servants within the ministry and about 20,631 (or 2.9 %) are listed as employees of the Prison Authority. The numbers of police forces do not include the CSF, whose membership stands at about 425,000 conscripts.

  7. 7.

    See interview with former Leut. General Abd alRaouf alManawi in AlWafd, January 19th, 2011.

  8. 8.

    For more details on methods of torture and testimonies of detainees see Human Rights Watch’s extensive report (Human Rights Watch 1992).

  9. 9.

    In the 1995 parliamentary elections the NDP won 318 seats and independents won 112. About 99 independents were later lured to join the NDP, making the final count of its representatives a total of 417 out of 444 MPs. In 2000, the NDP’s performance plummeted even further and reached its lowest point since 1976. It won 172 seats, while independents won 256. This clear loss of majority was prevented when 218 of the 256 independents changed affiliation and joined the ailing party. Most of these MPs were originally members of the NDP but were denied nominations on the party’s slate. They decided to run as independents. Appalled by its weak performance, the NDP’s leadership was more than welcoming of their return.

  10. 10.

    In many districts police forces stationed outside polling stations under the pretense of providing security for the stations. In reality the police blocked roads and prevented voters from getting into polling stations. When several judges asked police officers to step aside so that voters could get into the stations, they were often reminded by the police that the judges’ authority was confined to the inside space of the stations and that they had no authority over what went on outside it (Kassem 2004, p. 66).

  11. 11.

    The Kifaya movement grew largely from protests against the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The invasion deepened the underlying sense felt by many activists that Egypt’s security is being threatened. Between 2004 and 2005, members of the movement organized a number of silent demonstrations in public squares carrying banners inscribed with their simple slogan ‘enough (kifaya)’. The word was chosen to convey how people felt towards the rule of Mubarak. Activists and intellectuals who coalesced under the Kifaya umbrella were alarmed by the inheritance of power that took place in Syria in 2000, and the meteoric rise of Gamal Mubarak. For more on the political origins of Kifaya see Shorbagy 2007 and Mansour 2009.

  12. 12.

    Committee to Protect Journalists. “Attacks on the Press 2004: Egypt” http://cpj.org/2005/03/attacks-on-the-press-2004-egypt.php#more.

  13. 13.

    Abd elKodous acknowledged though, that he was not harmed and that discussions with SSI officers were civil and non-humiliating, but stressed that the vast majority of detainees do not receive similar treatment. Personal interview with Abd elKodous, winter 2009.

  14. 14.

    Calls for Reform Met With Brutality. Human Rights Watch. May 25, 2005. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/05/25/egypt-calls-reform-met-brutality.

  15. 15.

    Ahram Weekly, “Undefeated.” July 10–16, 2008.

  16. 16.

    Over 200 demonstrators gathered in downtown, forcing the CSF forces to close off most of the downtown area. The anti-riot units re-arrested 33 demonstrators, who later entered into a hunger strike after Al-Dhaher Police Station officers refused to release them despite the fact that Qasr Al-Nil Prosecution had ordered their release. Mohamed ElSayed, “Too little, too late.” Ahram Weekly, March 22–28, 2008.

  17. 17.

    The word baltaga refers to the act of thuggery. Baltagia means those who carry axes in the Turkish language and has been widely used in Egyptian Arabic to refer to armed thugs. The singular form of thug is referred to as Baltagi.

  18. 18.

    By the mid-2000s, some 7 million Cairenes lived in the informal housing of the ‘ashwa’iyyat (Singerman 2009).

  19. 19.

    Police officers have relied on drivers of minivans, the main transportation means for low-income groups, to provide information on the movement of citizens. Personal interviews with journalists, winter 2012.

  20. 20.

    To be eligible to apply to the Institute of Non-Commissioned Officers, men need to have completed eight-years of school education. The anti-riot force is made predominantly of illiterate men, who serve as conscripts in the CSF for 3 years.

  21. 21.

    Police Authority Law no. 109 for 1971 (and 2006 amendments).

  22. 22.

    Some governments resort to the two-cadre system to compensate state employees for job expenses such as diplomats. Farouk 2008.

  23. 23.

    Employees of MoI are followed by university professors and research scientists, who make about 11 and 1.9 %, respectively.

  24. 24.

    Interview with Ahmed alHelbawi, head of a newly-formed NCO union, in alWatan, May 15th, 2013. http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/182511.

  25. 25.

    Personal interviews with mid and high-level police officers 2013–2014.

  26. 26.

    Interview with General Mahmoud Qoutri, Sout alUma October 24th, 2009.

  27. 27.

    Reports showed that one public company in the power sector, paid LE 89 million to the police force for their protection services during the period July 2010 and March 2011. alMasry alYoum, January 2nd, 2015. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/619092.

  28. 28.

    Interviews with state officials whose institutions engaged in police-bonus practice, winter 2014.

  29. 29.

    Interviews with police officers, 2013–2014.

  30. 30.

    See interview with General AlManawi.

  31. 31.

    “10 Holes in the Ameen’s Uniform.” ElTahrir, September 15th, 2014.

  32. 32.

    Gamal Essam El-Din, “Unanswered Questions.” Ahram Weekly, January 19–25, 2006.

  33. 33.

    AlMasry alYoum, February 13th, 2011.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 5828 South University Avenue, 60637, Chicago, IL, USA

    Dina Rashed

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  1. Dina Rashed
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Correspondence to Dina Rashed .

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  1. Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytech. Inst. and State Department of Political Science, BLACKSBURG, Virginia, USA

    Bettina Koch

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Rashed, D. (2016). Violence from Above, Violence from Below: The State and Policing Citizens in Mubarak’s Egypt. In: Koch, B. (eds) State Terror, State Violence. Staat – Souveränität – Nation. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-11181-6_6

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