Abstract
The BGP protocol is at the core of the routing infrastructure of the Internet. Across years, BGP has proved to be very stable for its purpose. However, there have been some catastrophic incidents in the past, due to relatively simple router misconfigurations. In addition, unused network addresses are being silently stolen for spamming purposes. A relevant corpus of literature investigated threats in which a trusted BGP router injects malicious or wrong routes and some security improvement to the BGP protocol have also being proposed to make these attacks more difficult to perform. In this work, we perform a large-scale study to explore the validity of the hypothesis that it is possible to mount attacks against the BGP infrastructure without already having the control of a “trusted” BGP router. Even though we found no real immediate threat, we observed a large number of BGP routers that are available to engage in BGP communication, exposing themselves to potential Denial-of-Service attacks.
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Cavedon, L., Kruegel, C., Vigna, G. (2011). Are BGP Routers Open to Attack? An Experiment. In: Camenisch, J., Kisimov, V., Dubovitskaya, M. (eds) Open Research Problems in Network Security. iNetSec 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6555. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19228-9_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19228-9_8
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