Zusammenfassung
Das Lügen ist ein altes Thema der Philosophie, insbesondere der Ethik. Berühmte Denker, die sich mit dem Lügen befasst haben, waren Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin, und Immanuel Kant. Dass das Lügen als pragmatisches Phänomen aufgefasst wird, geht auf die Sprechakttheorie von John L. Austin und John Searle und die Bedeutungstheorie von Paul Grice zurück (vgl. Falkenberg 1982). Wenn Lügen sprachliche Handlungen sind, müssen sie auch im Rahmen einer Theorie der sprachlichen Handlung, zum Beispiel der Sprechakttheorie, beschrieben werden. So kann man Lügen als unaufrichtige Behauptungen deuten. Das Moment der Unaufrichtigkeit lässt sich auch als Verstoß gegen die erste spezifische Maxime der Qualitätsmaxime im Rahmen der Griceschen Implikaturentheorie analysieren (vgl. Fallis 2012).
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Meibauer, J. (2018). Lügen. In: Liedtke, F., Tuchen, A. (eds) Handbuch Pragmatik. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04624-6_33
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