Zusammenfassung
In jedem ökonomischen System muß eine Vielzahl von Transaktionen koordiniert werden. Dies gilt nicht erst für unsere heutige Zeit sondern schon für primitive Kulturen aus der Steinzeit: Erfindungen wie der Hausbau, die Getreide- und Haustierzucht oder die Töpferei führten zu einer stetig anwachsenden Spezialisierung der Menschen in individuelle Tätigkeiten. Diejenigen, die sich beispielsweise auf den Bau von Häusern konzentrierten, konnten mit der Zeit aus ihren bisherigen Erfahrungen lernen, spezifische Verfahren entwickeln und durch das wiederholte Häuserbauen bestimmte Fähigkeiten schulen und entwickeln. Somit entstanden aber Koordinationsprobleme: Wieviele Menschen sollten sich auf den Häuserbau spezialisieren? Wer sollte wieviele Steine für ein Haus herbeischaffen? Und wieviele Menschen sollten sich auf das Formen und Brennen von Töpfe spezialisieren? Wer sollte den Lehm dafür in welchem Umfang heranbringen?
Assume that somewhere in the world a new opportunity for the use of some raw material, say tin, has arisen, or that one of the sources of the supply of tin has been eliminated. It does not matter for our purpose — and it is very significant that it does not matter — which of these causes has made tin more scarce. All that the users of tin need to know is that some of the tin they used to consume is now more profitably employed elsewhere, and that in consequence they must economize tin. There is no need for the great majority of them even to know where the more urgent need has arisen, or in favor of what other needs they ought to husband the supply. If only some of them know directly of the new demand, and switch resources over to it, and if the people aware of the new gap thus created in turn fill it from still other sources, the effect will rapidly spread throughout the whole economic system and influence not only all the uses of tin, but also those of its substitutes and the substitutes of these substitutes, the supply of all the things made of tin, and their substitutes, and so on; and all this without the great majority of those instrumental in bringing about these substitutions knowing anything at all about the original cause of these changes.
(Hayek, 1945)
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© 2000 Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler GmbH, Wiesbaden
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Jost, PJ. (2000). Die Effizienz von Märkten. In: Organisation und Koordination. Gabler Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-94631-7_3
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