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Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition

Part of the book series: Primary Sources in Phenomenology ((FRBRE))

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Abstract

One might well be tempted to follow Myles Burnyeat, and see the young Brentano as treating the psychic causality in the De anima as identical to intentionality. As shown above, however, Brentano in his later writings does not maintain this interpretation, but finds in Aristotle a distinction between causality and intentionality. For Brentano, this distinction is based on Metaphysics Δ.15, where Aristotle assigns the causal connections and intentional connections between cognitive acts and their objects to two different classes of relation. Brentano adopts this distinction, and contrasts psychic “affection” (Leiden) and intentionality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On these questions, see Sects. 2.1 and 2.3 above.

  2. 2.

    On the distinction between “being intentionally directed towards something” and “referring to something,” see Horgan and Tienson, The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, 529; for the expression “mental reference,” see Kriegel, Brentano’s Mature Theory of Intentionality (both quoted in the Introduction [Chap. 1] above).

  3. 3.

    See Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, n. 51046. My translation.

  4. 4.

    On psychic causality in Scotus, see Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.

  5. 5.

    See Sect. 2.2.3.1 above.

  6. 6.

    Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 7, art. 10, ad 5 (Marietti ed., 211a): “Ipsae autem res sunt causa et mensura scientiae nostrae.” My translation.

  7. 7.

    Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1, art. 2, corp. (Leonina 22.1.2: 9.85–90): “[…] intellectus speculativus, quia accipit a rebus, est quodam modo motus ab ipsis rebus, et ita res mensurant ipsum; ex quo patet quod res naturales, a quibus intellectus noster scientiam accipit, mensurant intellectum nostrum, ut dicitur in X Metaphysicae.” My translation.

  8. 8.

    Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17 (Marietti ed., §1003): “Tertius modus est secundum quod mensurabile dicitur ad mensuram.” My translation. Aquinas explains the reversal of the order between measure and measurable in Metaphysics Δ.15 by appeal to Aristotle, Met. I.1, 1053a31–b3 and I.6, 1057a7–12; see especially Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 10, lect. 8 (Marietti ed., §2095). The idea is to reject Protagoras’s relativistic claim that “man is the measure of all things.” On the concept of a measure in Aquinas’s theory of cognition, see Seidl, Bemerkungen zu Erkenntnis als Maßverhältnis bei Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquin.

  9. 9.

    Note that “order” in the technical scholastic sense used here must be distinguished from the notion of order as found in contemporary discussions of asymmetric relations. For more on the contemporary notion, see MacBride, Relations.

  10. 10.

    Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3 (Lethielleux ed., 708): “[…] relativorum invenitur triplex diversitas. […] Quaedam vero quorum alterum importat relationem realem, et alterum relationem rationis tantum, sicut scientia et scibile. Et hujusmodi diversitatis ratio est, quia illud supra quod fundatur relatio, quandoque invenitur in altero tantum, et quandoque in utroque; ut patet quod relatio scientiae ad scibile fundatur supra apprehensionem secundum esse spirituale . Hoc autem esse spirituale in quo fundatur relatio scientiae, est tantum in sciente et non in scibili, quia ibi est forma rei secundum esse naturale ; et ideo relatio realis est in scientia, non est in scibili.” My translation.

  11. 11.

    Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 13, art. 7, corp. (Leonina 4: 153a): “Quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res rationis tantum. Et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis. Sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile, quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis: et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se consideratae, sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi. Unde in eis non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum; sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde Philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa referantur ad alia, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa.” My translation.

  12. 12.

    See Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 7, art. 10, corp. (Marietti ed., 210A–B).

  13. 13.

    For Aquinas, the “true” does not pertain just to judgements, but is also said, in a broad sense, of sensation and intellection . See Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17; Peryermeneias, lib. 1, lect. 3, n. 9. On the different senses of “true” and the priority among them, see Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1; see also Wippel, Truth in Thomas Aquinas, and Truth in Thomas Aquinas, Part II. On what I call “reference,” see again the Introduction (Chap. 1) above.

  14. 14.

    On this interpretation, see Sect. 3.1 above.

  15. 15.

    Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17 (Marietti ed., §1003): “Tertius modus est secundum quod mensurabile dicitur ad mensuram. Accipitur autem hic mensura et mensurabile non secundum quantitatem (hoc enim ad primum modum pertinet, in quo utrumque ad utrumque dicitur: nam duplum dicitur ad dimidium, et dimidium ad duplum), sed secundum mensurationem esse et veritatis. Veritas enim scientiae mensuratur a scibili. Ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, oratio scita vera vel falsa est, et non e converso. Et similiter est de sensibili et sensu. Et propter hoc non mutuo dicuntur mensura ad mensurabile et e converso, sicut in aliis modis, sed solum mensurabile ad mensuram. Et similiter etiam imago dicitur ad id cuius est imago, tamquam mensurabile ad mensuram. Veritas enim imaginis mensuratur ex re cuius est imago.” My translation. See also Thomas Aquinas, SCG, lib. 2, c. 12, n. 3.

  16. 16.

    Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias, lib. 1, lect. 3, n. 9 (Leonina 1*.1: 16.149–153): “Et, sicut dicitur res uera per comparationem ad suam mensuram, ita etiam et sensus uel intellectus, cuius mensura est res extra animam: unde sensus dicitur uerus quando per formam suam conformatur rei extra animam existenti.” My translation. See also Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias, lib. 1, lect. 3, n. 7 and De veritate, q. 1, art. 2, corp. Note also that in De veritate, q. 4, art. 5, ad 1 (Leonina 22.1.2: 132.177–187), Aquinas maintains that the intellect and volition, when their object is not “actually existent” (actu existens), have a “habitual relation ” (respectus habitualis) with their object. According to the online Index Thomisticus, this is the only occurrence of this expression in Aquinas’s writings. The concept of a potential relation of reference to the possible object will be important for Scotus, as we shall see in the next section.

  17. 17.

    Aristotle, De int. 1, 16a3–9.

  18. 18.

    Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1, art. 1, corp. (Leonina 22.1.1: 5.162–163): “Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam.” My translation.

  19. 19.

    Thomas Aquinas, SCG, lib. 2, c. 11, n. 3 (Marietti ed., §907): “Similitudo est relatio quaedam.” My translation. This text is quoted in Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 156. On the connection between the form in the soul and its relational aspect, see Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 10, art. 4, corp.

  20. 20.

    Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 10, art. 4, ad 5 (Leonina 22.2.1: 308.176–180): “[…] quamvis qualitates corporales non possint esse in mente, possunt tamen in ea esse similitudines corporearum qualitatum, et secundum has mens rebus corporeis assimilatur.” My translation.

  21. 21.

    Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias, lib. 1, lect. 2, n. 9 (Leonina 1*.1: 12.199–201, 12.206–208): “[…] res non cognoscitur ab anima nisi per aliquam sui similitudinem existentem uel in sensu uel in intellectu. […] in passionibus autem anime oportet attendi rationem similitudinis ad exprimendas res, quia eas naturaliter designant, non ex institutione.” My translation. See also especially Thomas Aquinas, In De anima, lib. 2, lect. 12 (Leonina 45.1: 115.76–94).

  22. 22.

    Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17 (Marietti ed., §1022): “Similia, quorum qualitas est una.” My translation.

  23. 23.

    On this point, see especially Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17 (Marietti ed., §1027) and Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 140–160. On Aquinas’s understanding of cognition as an immanent action , see Sect. 2.2.3.1 above.

  24. 24.

    Thomas Aquinas, SCG, lib. 1, c. 29, n. 5 (Marietti ed., §273): “Simile enim alicui dicitur quod eius possidet qualitatem vel formam.” My translation.

  25. 25.

    On the theory of formal identity (formale Identität), see Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 31–105. As indicated by Brower and Brower-Toland, Aquinas on Mental Representation, 212–218, Perler’s position has also been defended by Joseph Owens and Anthony Kenny: see Owens, Aristotle and Aquinas on Cognition; Kenny, Aquinas: Intentionality and Aquinas on Mind. Note that Kenny, in Aquinas: Intentionality, 87, criticizes Geach, Form and Existence, for holding that intentionality in Aquinas is explained by “two different existences of the same individualized form,” whereas, according to Kenny, the form does have two different modes of being, but there are also “two different individualizations of the same form” in reality and in the mind. Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 85, speaks of “two modes of existence” (zwei Existenzweisen) depending on whether the form is “instantiated” (instantiiert) in reality or in the mind, and is thus rather on the side of Kenny. On Geach’s exact place in the debate, however, see Brower and Brower-Toland, Aquinas on Mental Representation, 208.

  26. 26.

    On the origins of the identification of the Aristotelian “similitude ” (ὁμοίωμα) with “image ” (εἰκών), see Ammonius, In De int., CAG 4.5: 18.23–20.31, and the commentary by Brunschwig, Le chapitre 1 du De Interpretatione. Aquinas possessed William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of Ammonius’s commentary when he composed his own commentary; see Couillaud and Couillaud, in Thomas Aquinas, Commentaire du Traité de l’interprétation d’Aristote, xvi–xviii; Ammonius, In De int., trans. William of Moerbeke, CLCAG 2. However, in his reading of Aristotle he does not associate similitude with image , despite the brief comparison in Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias, lib. 1, lect. 3, n. 4. For an “iconist” reading of Aristotle, see also Stephanus, In De Int., CAG 18.3: 5.37–6.13.

  27. 27.

    Thomas Aquinas, SCG, lib. 4, c. 11, nn. 14–15 (Marietti ed., §§3474–3475): “Verbum autem interius conceptum est quaedam ratio et similitudo rei intellectae. Similitudo autem alicuius in altero existens vel habet rationem exemplaris, si se habeat ut principium: vel habet potius rationem imaginis, si se habeat ad id cuius est similitudo sicut ad principium. Utriusque autem exemplum in nostro intellectu perspicitur. Quia enim similitudo artificiati existens in mente artificis est principium operationis per quam artificiatum constituitur, comparatur ad artificiatum ut exemplar ad exemplatum: sed similitudo rei naturalis in nostro intellectu concepta comparatur ad rem cuius similitudo existit ut ad suum principium, quia nostrum intelligere a sensibus principium accipit, qui per res naturales immutantur. […] Verbum igitur in intellectu conceptum est imago vel exemplar substantiae rei intellectae.” My translation.

  28. 28.

    Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 4, art. 3, ad 4 (Leonina 4: 54b): “licet aliquo modo concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo, nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod Deus sit similis creaturae: quia, ut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., in his quae unius ordinis sunt, recipitur mutua similitudo, non autem in causa et causato; dicimus enim quod imago sit similis homini, et non e converso. Et similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura sit similis Deo: non tamen quod Deus sit similis creaturae.” My translation. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, c. 9, §6 (Corpus Dionysiacum 1: 211.13–212.8). For Aquinas’s commentary on this text, see Thomas Aquinas, In De divinis nominibus (Marietti ed., §832).

  29. 29.

    See Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II, q. 163, art. 2, corp. (Leonina 10: 329b–330a), and the reference to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, c. 9. On similarity of imitation as a one-sided relation , see also Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 31, pars 1, art. 1, q. 3, corp.; I thank Charles Girard-Cédat for this reference.

  30. 30.

    On the closeness between “image ” (εἰκών) and “imitation” (μίμησις), see Aristotle, Top. 6.2, 140a14–15, quoted in Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image, 263. See also Aristotle, De mem. 1, 450b20–451a17.

  31. 31.

    One might prefer not to speak of “similarity” at all here, and instead use only the vocabulary of “imitation”; but this would go against Aquinas’s explicit statements.

  32. 32.

    I thank an anonymous referee for the airport–art gallery comparison.

  33. 33.

    Readers familiar with contemporary debates on representation will recognize here the discussions generated by Nelson Goodman’s strict distinction between representation and resemblance. Goodman holds that representation cannot be understood in terms of resemblance, since representation is an asymmetric relation, whereas resemblance is a symmetric relation; see especially Goodman, Languages of Art. In response to this, some authors have pointed out that there are cases of asymmetric resemblance, especially in the relation between image and model; see Blanc-Benon, Logique des relations et/ou psychologie de la perception. On the idea that the model is a “standard” against which the conformity of the image is evaluated and that the image reproduces certain properties of its model, see Van Gerwen, Art and Experience, 20–21, quoted in Soszynski, How Do Pictures Represent?; on the idea that, despite the one-sidedness of the relation between image and model, a two-sided similarity between them must be admitted, see Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 159. For a discussion of similar issues in Wittgenstein and his followers, as well as in Husserl, see Mulligan, Wittgenstein et la tradition austro-allemande, 107–108; see especially Anscombe, Cambridge Philosophers II: Ludwig Wittgenstein, 398, who wonders how isomorphism, which is “two-way,” could explain the one-sidedness of depiction .

  34. 34.

    For a discussion of representation, similarity and isomorphism in Aquinas, see also Panaccio, Aquinas on Intellectual Representation, 196–200.

  35. 35.

    Thomas Aquinas, In Liber de causis, lect. 14 (ed. Saffrey, 85.11–13): “Imago enim est quod fit ad similitudinem alterius, sicut exemplar est id ad cuius similitudinem fit aliud.” My translation.

  36. 36.

    See Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 85, art. 2, corp. (Leonina 5: 334a) and SCG, lib. 4, c. 11, n. 6 (Marietti ed., §3466).

  37. 37.

    On these debates, see, for the first position, Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 80–89; Michon, L’espèce et le verbe and Les représentations rendent-elles indirecte la connaissance des choses?. For the second position, see Panaccio, Le discours intérieur, 184–185 and Aquinas on Intellectual Representation; Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 195–219 and 256–262. For a defence of Panaccio, see Băltuţă, Remarks on Thomas Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind. On the origins of the categories “direct realism ” and “representationalism ” in William Hamilton, see De Libera, Archéologie du sujet, tome 3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double révolution, 162–163.

  38. 38.

    Haldane, Brentano’s Problem, 25–26.

  39. 39.

    For Aquinas’s reception of Aristotle’s three classes, see especially Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17.

  40. 40.

    See above.

  41. 41.

    In addition to Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17, see also In I Sent., d. 30, art. 1.

  42. 42.

    Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas, 476.

  43. 43.

    Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 21, art. 6, sed contra 3 (Leonina 22.3.1: 608.76), quoted in Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas, 477.

  44. 44.

    For references on the connection between exemplarity and truth, see Cesalli, Le réalisme propositionnel, 46–47. Cesalli mentions in particular the Platonist influences on medieval philosophy transmitted through Augustine’s “Question on Ideas” (Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus, q. 46). On the role of exemplarity in Albert the Great, see the discussion in de Libera, Métaphysique et noétique. For more general accounts, see Courtine, Inventio analogiae, and especially Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image.

  45. 45.

    Courtine, Inventio analogiae, 279–280 and more generally 257–282. For more on exemplary causality in Aquinas, see Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes. On the connection between causality and image in Aquinas, see also Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image, 270.

  46. 46.

    See James of Viterbo, Quodl. IV, q. 25 and Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XII, q. 1, both discussed in Côté, L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines. For other medieval discussions on the distinction between cause and object, see Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IX, q. 2 (ed. Macken, 26.24–27) and Matthew of Aquasparta, De cognitione, q. 1, ad 12 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 237), both quoted in Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, 48n43, 49. On this distinction, see also Étienne Gilson, Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot.

  47. 47.

    See especially William of Ockham, Summa Logicae I, c. 1 (OPh 1: 7.1–9.65) and In De int., prol., §6 (OPh 2: 351.1–358.206), both quoted and discussed in Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 361–374. For arguments in favour of a distinction between reference and causality, see Sects. 4.1.2 and especially 4.2 below.

  48. 48.

    John Duns Scotus, In Met., lib. 5, q. 11, n. 92 (OPh 3: 638.11–13): “Scientia nostra causatur a rebus, et ideo scibile mensurat scientiam. Sed artificialia causantur a scientia practica, et ibi scibile est mensurabile, et scientia mensura.” My translation; in place of Scientia practica nostra causatur, as found in the manuscripts, I read Scientia nostra causatur: first, because Scotus says nowhere else in his commentary on Metaphysics 5 that practical cognition is measured by things; second, because there is no trace of such a claim in the parallel passages in his commentary on the Categories (see John Duns Scotus, In Cat., c. 7, q. 27 [OPh 1: 447.1–453.7]); and finally, because it is commonplace in scholastic philosophy to maintain that practical cognition is the measure of artefacts , whereas theoretical cognition is measured by things.

  49. 49.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §12, n. 39 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “Cum aliquid possit multipliciter participare perfectionem ab alio, actus cognoscendi sic participative se habet respectu obiecti sicut similitudo respectu cuius est. Non dico similitudo per communicationem eiusdem formae, sicut est albi ad album, sed similitudo per imitationem , sicut est ideati ad ideam.” My translation. On this passage, see Demange, Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir, 235–236. See also John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 122 (Vat. 3: 75.2–3) and Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 479 and 490 (Vat. 3: 286.22–287.2 and 490.5).

  50. 50.

    On the species as a similitude , see John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 544 (Vat. 3: 325.3).

  51. 51.

    See also Sect. 4.1.1 above on Thomas Aquinas.

  52. 52.

    John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 356 (Vat. 3: 215.9–10): “[…] in ista relatione […] non est tantum similitudo sed imitatio et exemplatio passiva.” My translation.

  53. 53.

    Boulnois, Être et représentation, 98, and more generally 88–105.

  54. 54.

    John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 575 (Vat. 3: 340.19–341.5): “Sed illa conformitas expressiva ‘totius’ non sufficit, sed requiritur imitatio, quia secundum Augustinum 83 Quaestionum quaestione 74, ‘quantumcumque duo ova sint similia, unum non est imago alterius’, quia non est natum imitari ipsum; et ideo requiritur quod imago nata sit imitari ipsum cuius est imago, et exprimere illud.” My translation. Cf. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 74. On the image in Augustine, see Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image, 25–53.

  55. 55.

    For the inclusion in the third class, see, among others, John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 2, n. 297 (Vat. 3: 180.15–181.2).

  56. 56.

    See John Duns Scotus, In Met., lib. 5, q. 11, n. 92 (OPh 3: 638.11–13), quoted above, which seems to admit a causality both from the object to the act and from the act to the object. For Scotus on intellectual efficient causality , which is what the term “exemplary causality” refers to according to him, see Ord. I, d. 36, n. 23 (Vat. 6: 279.22–280.8).

  57. 57.

    On the self-portrait metaphor, see Sect. 4.1.1 above.

  58. 58.

    See John Duns Scotus, In duos libros Perihermeneias, lib. 1, q. 3, n. 8 (OPh 2: 154: 8–25), quoted in Demange, Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir, 231–232. More generally, my analysis in Sect. 4.1.1 above of the one-sidedness of depictive similarity in Aquinas applies also to Scotus.

  59. 59.

    See Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.

  60. 60.

    See especially John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 481. See also Sect. 4.2 on Brentano below for a longer discussion of the difference between causality and reference.

  61. 61.

    On the four senses of intentio, see John Duns Scotus, Rep. II, d. 13 (ed. McCarthy, 39), quoted and discussed in de Libera, Intention, 610–613.

  62. 62.

    See Williams, Introduction, 8, and the editors’ introduction to volume 3 of the Opera Philosophica of Scotus (OPh 3: xlii–xlvi). See also Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, 44n14.

  63. 63.

    See John Duns Scotus, In Met., lib. 5, qq. 12–14, n. 98 (OPh 3: 638.5–9) and In Met., lib. 5, q. 11, n. 57 (OPh 3: 585.17–586.7).

  64. 64.

    John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.21–22): “Nec sola relatio mensurati est tertii modi, sed omnis similis, scilicet non mutua, qualis est terminati—modo praedicto—ad terminans.” My translation. On the different interpretations of Aristotle’s text, see Sect. 3.1 above.

  65. 65.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §11, n. 36 (ed. Alluntis, 459): “[…] actus etiam voluntatis vel intellectus totaliter causantis obiectum videtur habere relationem tendentiae respectu eius ut termini intellectionis vel volitionis, sive ista relatio sit realis sive tantum rationis, non tamen talis intellectio vel volitio habet respectu talis obiecti relationem mensurabilis, sed magis relationem mensurae.” My translation.

  66. 66.

    For a contrary reading, see Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species, and Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 153–167. Cross holds that Scotus’s psychic relation of similarity serves as an account of intentionality. But it seems to me that this view is difficult to defend, especially because, in the case of practical cognition , the object is measured by the thought, such that there would have to be an intentional relation from the object to the thought. Cross sees the problem, and concludes that objects are sometimes “signs” of thoughts. However, it is not clear to me what this means. On this question, see Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species, 143, and Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 155.

  67. 67.

    As a guide to the reading of this question, one can consult the chart in Day, Intuitive Cognition , 64–65, which lists the various psychic relations that Scotus mentions.

  68. 68.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §8, nn. 27–28 (ed. Alluntis, 455): “Aliqua ergo cognitio est per se exsistentis, sicut quae attingit obiectum in sua propria exsistentia actuali. Exemplum: de visione coloris et communiter in sensatione sensus exterioris. Aliqua etiam est cognitio obiecti, non ut exsistentis in se, sed vel obiectum non exsistit vel saltem illa cognitio non est eius ut actualiter exsistentis. Exemplum: ut imaginatio coloris, quia contingit imaginari rem quando non exsistit sicut quando exsistit. Consimilis distinctio probari potest in cognitione intellectiva.” My translation.

  69. 69.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 6, §8, n. 19 (ed. Alluntis, 213). My translation. Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species, and Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition insist on the importance of the presence of the object for the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition .

  70. 70.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §10, n. 33 (ed. Alluntis, 458): “Dicentur igitur cognitiones distinctae; et hoc secundum speciem, propter rationes formales motivas hinc inde; quia cognitione intuitiva res in propria exsistentia est per se motiva obiective, in cognitione autem abstractiva est per se motivum aliquid in quo res habet esse cognoscibile, sive sit causa virtualiter continens rem ut cognoscibile; sive ut effectus, puta species vel similitudo repraesentative continens ipsum cuius est similitudo.” My translation.

  71. 71.

    I leave aside the hypothesis of the cause virtually containing the object, which has to do with the production of intelligibles by the divine essence. For the stages of the production by God of the intelligibles , see especially John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 35, n. 32 (Vat. 6: 258.4–18).

  72. 72.

    On the idea that the object “shines forth” in the species, see John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 386 (Vat. 3: 235.4–9) and Rep. I-A, d. 3, q. 4, nn. 118–119 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov, 218).

  73. 73.

    See especially John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 388–390 (Vat. 3: 236.2–238.3 and 242.10–243.13).

  74. 74.

    Boulnois, Être et représentation, 99.

  75. 75.

    On this distinction, see Sect. 3.2.2 above. I thank Olivier Boulnois for suggesting this comparison to me; for more on these questions, see his Être et représentation, esp. 432–438.

  76. 76.

    On the contrast between cognized being —or more precisely, “intelligized being ” (esse intellectum)—and real being , see John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 66 (Vat. 6: 298.13–15). I thank Dominik Perler for suggesting this “coincidentalist” reading of sensation in Scotus.

  77. 77.

    John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.21–287.2).

  78. 78.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §11, nn. 34–35 (ed. Alluntis, 458–459): “Ista distinctione actus cognoscendi supposita, potest dici quod primus, scilicet, qui est rei exsistentis, in se necessario habet annexam relationem realem et actualem ad ipsum obiectum; et ratio est, quia non potest esse talis cognitio nisi cognoscens habeat actualiter ad obiectum talem habitudinem, quae necessario requirit extrema in actu et realiter distincta et quae etiam naturam extremorum necessario consequitur. In speciali autem videtur esse duplex relatio actualis in isto actu ad obiectum. Una potest dici relatio mensurati vel verius mensurabilis ad mensuram. Alia, potest dici relatio unientis formaliter in ratione medii ad terminum ad quem unit, et ista relatio medii unientis specialiori nomine potest dici relatio attingentiae alterius ut termini vel tendentiae in alterum ut in terminum.” My translation.

  79. 79.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §13, n. 40 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “Secundus actus cognoscendi, qui scilicet non est necessario exsistentis, ut exsistentis, non necessario habet relationem actualem ad obiectum, quia relatio realis actualis requirit per se terminum realem et actualem; tamen iste secundus actus potest poni habere ad obiectum relationem realem potentialem; et hoc primam de qua in praecedenti membra dictum est, scilicet mensurabilis vel dependentiae, non autem secundam, scilicet unionis vel attingentiae. Potest etiam ista cognitio habere ad obiectum relationem rationis actualem, sed illam necessario requirit ad hoc quod sit ipsius obiecti.” My translation; for the last sentence, I follow the text in the edition of Alluntis and in that of Wadding (12: 320), which are accepted in Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species, 147, then rejected in Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 165n2, where he follows Alluntis and Wolter’s translation in God and Creatures, 294.

  80. 80.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §13, n. 41 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “[…] illud quod habet relationem actualem ad terminum exsistentem, et quantum est ex parte sui semper uniformiter se habet ad illum, habet relationem aptitudinalem ad illum terminum, quando non est exsistens; operatio est huiusmodi, quia est aliquid mensurabile per obiectum, hoc est, aptum natum in entitate sua dependere ad obiectum, hoc in speciali tali dependentia qualis est eius quod est similitudo per imitationem vel participationem ad illud cuius est similitudo. Haec omnia quantum est ex parte fundamenti essent in actu, si terminus esset in actu.” My translation. On this passage, see Demange, Accidents et relations non convertibles selon Thomas d’Aquin, Pierre Olivi et Jean Duns Scot.

  81. 81.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §14, n. 42 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “[…] de relatione attingentiae ad terminum qui attingitur, potest dici quod cognitioni abstractivae non convenit talis relatio realis vel aptitudinalis. Probatur: Quia non convenit fundamento quantum est ex parte eius, nec sibi competeret in actu si terminus poneretur in actu, quia terminus non est natus per illum actum attingi ut actu exsistens.” My translation.

  82. 82.

    On this subject, see Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.

  83. 83.

    On these two examples, see Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.

  84. 84.

    On the distinction between object ut cognitum and object taken absolutely, see again Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.

  85. 85.

    See John Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 1, q. 2, n. 93 (Vat. 7: 49.7–8) and Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, 522n188, both quoted in Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.

  86. 86.

    I thank Olivier Boulnois for drawing my attention to this point.

  87. 87.

    For more on Marty, see Sect. 4.2 below.

  88. 88.

    The case of an act of abstractive intellection directed at the existential being of something that does not exist is mentioned by Scotus at Lect. I, d. 36, n. 26 (Vat. 17: 469.1–8) and Ord. I, d. 36, n. 28 (Vat. 6: 281.18–282.2), both quoted in Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.

  89. 89.

    See John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 6, §8, n. 19 (ed. Alluntis, 213), quoted above.

  90. 90.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §13, n. 40 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “Potest etiam ista cognitio habere ad obiectum relationem rationis actualem, sed illam necessario requirit ad hoc quod sit ipsius obiecti.” My translation; see the remarks above on the translation of this sentence. On the acceptance of this relation of reason , see also Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species, 147, who completely changes his mind in Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 165. Against Cross’s book, see the recent criticism made by Pini, Duns Scotus on Material Substances and Cognition, 777, who holds that in Scotus, even abstractive cognition has an object, in the sense that “any thought is about or directed at something, even though it may well be the case that no extramental individual corresponds to that thought.”

  91. 91.

    See also John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §15, n. 45 (ed. Alluntis, 463–464). In this passage, Scotus affirms that the non-referential relation attributed to abstractive cognition is a real relation , which contradicts the rest of his text. Here I follow Cross, who holds that Scotus’s claims mean “that it is a (necessary) feature of a real item; not that it falls under the technical category of real relation” (Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species, 150; see also Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 167).

  92. 92.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §15, n. 46 (ed. Alluntis, 464): “Contra hoc: Ens reale non requirit tanquam ad naturam eius consequens vel concomitans, aliquod non reale; igitur actus cognoscendi realis non habet relationem rationis consequentem ipsum ex natura sui.” My translation.

  93. 93.

    On the fact that in Scotus, “cognized being ” is the same as “being of reason ,” see Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.

  94. 94.

    John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §15, n. 46 (ed. Alluntis, 464): “Respondeo: Per actum cognitionis obiectum habet esse cognitum, et ideo potest naturam actus sequi aliqua habitudo, quae sit ad obiectum ut habens tale esse.” My translation. Note that later in the text, Scotus says that when the intellect thinks of an act of abstractive cognition , it cannot but think of it as having a relation of reason of termination to the object; see John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §33, n. 100 (ed. Alluntis, 491). In my opinion, however, this does not mean that the relation is posited in the act by the intellect. As Scotus affirms, the relation in question is “consequent to or concomitant with” the act.

  95. 95.

    For the idea that the sensible form is a constituent of sensory experience in Aristotle, see Kalderon, Form Without Matter, quoted in Sect. 2.2.1 above. For more on disjunctivism, see Sect. 4.2 above.

  96. 96.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 2, art. 3, n. 91 (ed. Buytaert, 200.123–126): “Realitas visionis non exigit realem praesentiam obiecti existentis, quamvis exigat eam veritas visionis pro eo quod veritas addit super realitatem visionis respectum conformitatis ad rem.” My translation.

  97. 97.

    See Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 2, and the discussion in Sect. 3.3.1 above.

  98. 98.

    William of Ockham, Ord. I, prologus, q. 1 (OTh 1: 34.2–3). My translation.

  99. 99.

    William of Ockham, Ord. I, prologus, q. 1 (OTh 1: 36.15–16): “idem totaliter et sub eadem ratione a parte obiecti est obiectum intuitivae et abstractivae.” My translation.

  100. 100.

    See especially Husserl, Intentionale Gegenstände, and Logische Untersuchungen V, §11 (Husserliana 19.2: 387.12–15; 1913 ed., 373): “Jupiter stelle ich nicht anders vor als Bismarck, den Babylonischen Turm nicht anders als den Kölner Dom, ein regelmäßiges Tausendeck nicht anders als einem regelmäßigen Tausendflächner.” My translation.

  101. 101.

    Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen V, “Beilage zu den Paragraphen 11 und 20” (Husserliana 19.2, 439.15–17; 1913 ed., 425): “Der transzendente Gegenstand wäre gar nicht Gegenstand dieser Vorstellung, wenn er nicht ihr intentionaler Gegenstand wäre.” Trans. Findlay, in Logical Investigations, 127.

  102. 102.

    Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 117: “[Aristoteles] teilte die Relationen in drei Klassen, von denen die eine die komparativen, die andere die kausalen, die dritte die intentionalen Relationen enthielt.” Trans. Chisholm et al., in The True and the Evident, 70.

  103. 103.

    On this point, see Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.

  104. 104.

    Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, 29; ed. Sauer, 35: “Der Grund dieser Lehre, die wir Metaph. Δ, 15. finden, ist leicht einzusehen. Die Harmonie oder Disharmonie unseres Denkens mit den Dingen ändert durchaus nichts an dem Bestande derselben, sie sind unabhängig von unserem Denken und bleiben davon unberührt. “Nicht deshalb,” heißt es Metaph. Θ, 10, “bist du weiß, weil wir mit Wahrheit glauben, daß du weiß seiest.” Dagegen hängt unser Denken von den Dingen ab und muß sich, um wahr zu sein, nach ihnen richten: “vielmehr weil du weiß bist, sagen wir, die wir es sagen, die Wahrheit.” Ebenso im fünften Kapitel der Kategorien: “Darum weil die Sache ist oder nicht ist, wird auch von der Rede gesagt, sie sei wahr oder falsch.” Nicht die Dinge sind Abbilder unserer Gedanken, unsere Gedanken sind ihnen nachgebildet, wie die Worte den Gedanken (De Interpr. 1. p. 16, a, 6.), und unser Verstand erreicht eben sein Ziel nur, indem er durch die Wissenschaft zu dieser Conformität mit den Dingen, zur Wahrheit gelangt.” Trans. George, in On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, 19.

  105. 105.

    See Sect. 3.1 above.

  106. 106.

    See Sect. 4.1 above.

  107. 107.

    See Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, ed. Kraus, 16 and 54n19; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 39 and 62n19 (quoted in the introductory remarks of Chap. 3 above).

  108. 108.

    See Brentano, EL 72, Logikkolleg, nn. 12540–12543 (transcription: B03488–B03490). These lectures were given in Vienna at the beginning of the 1880s. For a more precise dating, see Rollinger, Editor’s Preface. I thank Thomas Binder from the Franz Brentano Archiv Graz for provided me with the typed transcription of these lectures.

  109. 109.

    Brentano, EL 72, Logikkolleg, nn. 12542–12543 (transcription: B03490): “Verhältniße der Quasigleichheit zwischen dem was als immanentes Object besteht, und dem was ihm entsprechend nicht intentional modifiziert besteht.” My translation.

  110. 110.

    Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie II, §§20–21, 109–113. For a more precise dating of these lectures, see Antonelli and Marek, Editorische Vorbemerkungen.

  111. 111.

    Marty, Deduktive und induktive Logik, notebook 1, 196 (quoted in Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie II, §20, 109): “Zwei Orte sind als Orte, zwei Urteile als Urteile gleich; eine Farbe und ein Ton als Qualitäten, ein Urteil und eine Gemütsbewegung als psychische Phänomene usw.” My translation. On the dating of these lectures, see again Antonelli and Marek, Editorische Vorbemerkungen. On quasi-sameness in Marty, see Cesalli and Taieb, The Road to ideelle Verähnlichung .

  112. 112.

    Marty, Deduktive und induktive Logik, notebook 1, 202, quoted in Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie II, §20, 111.

  113. 113.

    On “formal identity ” (formale Identität), see Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 31–105, quoted in Sect. 4.1.1 above.

  114. 114.

    Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51045–51046: “Sollte es sich nicht um etwas Imaginäres in Jupiter handeln, sondern um etwas Reelles und wirklich Existierendes, so würde zwar von diesem gelten, daß es mit dem Denkenden in einer Relation sei, die als eine Art Übereinstimmung bezeichnet werden könnte, allein diese wäre nicht die s.g. psychische Beziehung des Denkenden zum Gedachten, sondern eine Übereinstimmung des Denkenden mit dem Dinge aufgrund der Eigentümlichkeit des Denkenden einerseits und des Dinges andrerseits. Es wäre eine Relation, welche als eine Abart denen der Gleichheit und Ähnlichkeit im gewöhnlichen Sinne zuzuordnen wäre.” My translation. See Sect. 3.3.2 above.

  115. 115.

    On Brentano’s tripartition of psychic phenomena into presentations, judgements, and emotions, see Brentano, Psychologie. On Brentano’s theory of imagination , see especially Brentano, Grundzüge der Ästhetik. It should be noted that Husserl severely criticized Brentano and his students for not distinguishing between presentation and imagination; in particular, he reproached Brentano and Twardowski for accepting immanent objects understood as mental images (I thank Kevin Mulligan for drawing my attention to this point). This criticism, which appears already in Husserl’s 1894 paper “Intentionale Gegenstande,” is taken up again in the Logical Investigations; see especially Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen V, “Beilage zu den Paragraphen 11 und 20” (Husserliana 19.2: 436.1–440.8; 1913 ed., 421–425). For remarks directed more specifically at Twardowski, see Husserl’s review of Twardowski’s Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Clearly, the criticism will no longer apply once Brentano and his students abandon immanent objects. On Husserl’s theory of imagination, see Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung. For a comparison between Brentano and Husserl on imagination , see Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology , 29–50.

  116. 116.

    Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51060–51061: “Sehr verschieden von dem Denkenden sich beziehend auf ein Objekt ist die Correlativität, welche durch den Vergleich zwischen einem Denkenden und dem betreffenden wirklichen Ding, das dem Denken entspricht, erfaßt wird, wenn wir zum beispiel beide als übereinstimmend erkennen.” My translation.

  117. 117.

    Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, n. 51050: “Sie sind sehr mannigfaltig. Wir bemerkten schon nicht bloß die Differenz von Gleichheit und Verschiedenheit sondern auch die von Übereinstimmung in eigentlicher Gleichheit und in jener Art, wie Denkendes und eine dem Gedachten entsprechende Wirklichkeit übereinstimmend genannt werden könne[n].” My translation.

  118. 118.

    Brentano, Abkehr, 324: “Damit, daß jedes Denkende einen Gegenstand, einen Inhalt hat, ist nicht gesagt, daß es ein relativ ist, dem ein Korrelativ gegenübersteht. Es ist auf etwas als Gegenstand gerichtet. Wenn dies besteht, dann besteht eine Art von Beziehung, die man Ähnlichkeit in besonders modifiziertem Sinne nennen mag, zwischen dem Seienden, welches Gegenstand ist, und dem Denkenden.” My translation.

  119. 119.

    Thoughts about mental acts are perhaps a problematic case, but I will not discuss this here.

  120. 120.

    On relations in Marty, see Cesalli, Relative Bestimmung . For a discussion of Marty’s theory, see below in this section.

  121. 121.

    Brentano, Abkehr, 309: “Was Sie von dem Vorstellenden sagen, daß im Fall, das vorgestellte Ding sei, die Relation eine andere werde, indem sie zu jenen gehöre, bei welchen auch das Korrelat existiert, kann ich nicht billigen. Vielmehr kommt hier zu der Beziehung des Vorstellenden noch eine zweite Beziehung hinzu, insofern der Vorstellende etwas zum Gegenstand hat, dem dieses in Wirklichkeit entspricht.” My translation.

  122. 122.

    See Brentano, Psychologie; Simons, Judging Correctly. The following four paragraphs incorporate and (slightly) expand upon material in Taieb, Intentionality and Reference.

  123. 123.

    Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, 417n1: “[…] der Gegenstand kann gegeben sein, ohne das ich urteile, er sei gegeben.” My translation; the emphasis is Marty’s.

  124. 124.

    Brentano, EL 72, Logikkolleg, n. 12549 (transcription: B03493): “Wahr sind die anerkennenden Urtheile, wo und die verwerfenden wo nicht dem Gedachten ein Wirkliches entspricht; falsch umgekehrt.” My translation; the underlining is Brentano’s. See also Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, 417. This theory may be of interest to philosophers who want to get rid of facts in their ontology, since it accounts for judicative truth and reference to reality without positing facts. For a recent rejection of facts, see Betti, Against Facts.

  125. 125.

    On Brentano’s (complex) theory of truth and the evolution of his position on it, see Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz. See also Srzednicki, Franz Brentano’s Analysis of Truth; Baumgartner, Die Begründung von Wahrheit durch Evidenz; Rojszczak, Wahrheit und Urteilsevidenz bei Franz Brentano; Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 50–89; Parsons, Brentano on Judgement and Truth; Soldati, Brentano über innere Wahrnehmung, intrinsische Wahrheit und Evidenz.

  126. 126.

    See especially Thomas Aquinas, De veritate.

  127. 127.

    Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 124.

  128. 128.

    See Brentano, Psychologie; Seron, Adolf Reinach’s Philosophy of Logic, 170; Richard, Marty against Meinong on Assumptions.

  129. 129.

    Brentano, EL 72, Logikkolleg, n. 12548 (transcription: B03493): “[…] nämlich daß [die adäquatio] nur auf die anerkennenden, nicht aber auf die verwerfenden Urtheile Anwendung findet, bei welchen gerade das Gegentheil gilt, nämlich daß im Falle einer Gleichheit von Gedachtem und Wirklichem das Urtheil falsch ist, während es wahr ist, wo sie fehlt.” My translation. Note however Brentano, EL 80, Logik, ed. Rollinger, 132, where “correspondence” (Übereinstimmung) is used more broadly for all true judgements.

  130. 130.

    See Mulligan, Brentano’s Knowledge , Austrian Verificationisms, and Epistemic Accounts of Truth and Value, 89–90, and Incorrect Emotions in Ancient, Austrian and Contemporary Philosophy. Note that this interpretation, according to which the correctness of a judgement depends on the stance taken towards the object of an underlying presentation also provides a possible explanation of what Brentano means when he says that one judges truly when one judges as one ought to judge (see, for example, Brentano, EL 80, Logik, ed. Rollinger, 132): when judging, one ought to acknowledge the object of a presentation that refers to reality and reject the object of a presentation that does not refer.

  131. 131.

    Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, 421: “Wir fanden den wahren Sinn der Lehre, daß jedes Vorstellen (resp. Bewußtsein überhaupt) eine Objektsbeziehung sei, darin, daß jedes eine wirkliche oder mögliche ideelle Verähnlichung mit etwas (was eben das Objekt genannt wird) sei.” My translation. On the nature of this type of similarity and its relationship to isomorphism, see Mulligan, Marty’s Philosophical Grammar, 18–19; on the historical roots of Marty’s theory, see Cesalli, Mental Similarity: Marty and the Pre-Brentanian Tradition.

  132. 132.

    See Brentano, Abkehr, 309 (quoted above).

  133. 133.

    Marty, Raum und Zeit, 58.

  134. 134.

    On the attribution to Marty of a non-relational theory of intentionality, see Chrudzimski, Marty on Truth-Making.

  135. 135.

    Soteriou, The Disjunctive Theory of Perception, whose presentation of disjunctivism I follow here.

  136. 136.

    See Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51041–51042, and for a similar case in medieval philosophy, see especially John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 481 (Vat. 3: 287.7–11). Both passages are discussed in Sects. 2.2.3.2 and 2.3 above.

  137. 137.

    For a discussion of the difference between veridicality (which I call “reference”) and causality based on the problem of veridical hallucinations , see Kriegel, The Perception/Cognition Divide. I consider here the standard case of veridical hallucination, in which the object does not cause the act at all; I thus neglect cases in which the act is produced by the object via abnormal causal chains. For a detailed discussion of veridical hallucinations and its varieties, see Lewis, Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision, as well as his Postscript to the paper.

  138. 138.

    See Sect. 2.3 above.

  139. 139.

    Brentano, M 89, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31046 (Kategorienlehre, 276): “In manchen Fällen macht sich das, wovon das Denken bewirkt wird in seiner Besonderheit bemerklich, wie z.B. beim Schliessen, beim motivierten Wollen, bei der Erkenntnis eines Axioms ex terminis, bei der Liebe von etwas, die aus der Vorstellung des Objektes selbst entspringt. Anderemal macht sich dagegen das Wirkende oder Bewegende nur ganz im allgemeinen bemerklich, sodass der Erleidung nur der Charakter eines von irgendetwas Bewirktem anhaftet. So scheint es z. B. beim Sehen, Hören und anderem Empfinden der Fall zu sein. Dass wir von dem, was das primäre Objekt der Empfindung ist, bewegt werden, ist nicht richtig, allein gemeiniglich neigt man zu dieser Annahme, indem man wahrnimmt, dass man von etwas zum Empfinden bewegt wird, und damit das primäre Objekt des Empfindens, das selbst von diesem verschieden ist und zugleich mit ihm erscheint, identifiziert. Sogar nachdem die Erfahrung längst aufs deutlichste gezeigt hat, dass die primären Objekte nicht so wie sie uns erscheinen in Wirklichkeit sind, finden Viele Schwierigkeit sich von dem Wahne freizumachen.” Trans. Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 195–196 (slightly modified). This text is quoted in Sect. 2.3 above.

  140. 140.

    Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeine Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, 421–422: “Wenn es bei den abstrakten Gedanken ausgeschlossen wäre, daß sie in gewissem Sinne das Gedachte abbilden und ihm konform sind, müßte es meines Erachtens auch von den konkreten Anschauungen gelten, und wir ständen also vor einem extremen Nominalismus oder Semantizismus, der die Vorstellungen insgesamt zu etwas machte, was dem Vorgestellten in keiner Weise ähnlich oder konform sondern ein bloß unähnliches und in diesem Sinne willkürliches Zeichen desselben wäre. Und eine solche Lehre scheint mir—konsequent festgehalten—überhaupt jede Möglichkeit einer Erkenntnis des Wirklichen zu zerstören. Wohl hat es einen Sinn zu sagen, es seien z.B. die Farbenempfindungen nicht etwas Wirklichem konform; mit anderen Worten, was in Wirklichkeit existiert, seien nicht Farben sondern Schwingungen oder etwas, was gewisse den Schwingungen analoge Gegensätze aufweist, und dafür seien die Farbenempfindungen nur Zeichen, die dem Bezeichneten unähnlich sind. […] Und wie schon bemerkt, hat es nur in dem Falle einen Sinn zu behaupten, wir erkannten, daß, zwar nicht merklich ausgedehnte farbige Körper, wohl aber unsichtbar kleine Atome, daß zwar nicht Töne, wohl aber Luftschwingungen existieren usw.” My translation.

  141. 141.

    See especially Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, 423n1; Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen; and Rollinger, Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano, 217–226, who defends Husserl against Marty. See also Searle, Intentionality, 27 (quoted in the Introduction [Chap. 1] above).

  142. 142.

    Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie, 15: “[…] alle unsre Vorstellungen sollen nach ihm nur Zeichen sein, die, wie der Rauch mit dem Feuer, mit dem Gegenstande, dessen Zeichen sie sind, keine Ähnlichkeit haben.” My translation. See also Brentano, Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie im christlichen Abendland, 82.

  143. 143.

    See especially William of Ockham, Summa logicae I, c. 1 (OPh 1: 7.1–9.65) and In De int., prologus, §6 (OPh 2: 351.1–358.206), both quoted and discussed in Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 361–374.

  144. 144.

    Aristotle, De int., 1, 16a3–9.

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    Hamid Taieb

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Taieb, H. (2018). Reference. In: Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition. Primary Sources in Phenomenology(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0_4

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