Abstract
With the growing importance of agencies in the EU executive space in terms of competences and resources (i.e., agencification), advocacy groups have started to direct their lobbying efforts toward EU agencies. In particular, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that advocate for human rights are currently represented in a number of consultative bodies and platforms of EU agencies such as the Fundamental Rights Agency, the European Asylum Support Office, and Frontex. The role of these bodies and platforms is to “merely” assist EU agencies in gathering information on fundamental rights issues. However, access to EU agencies gives advocacy groups a privileged position to push their claims forward.
However, Frontex—i.e., now the European Coast and Border Guard agency—since its inception has raised serious concerns on fundamental rights abuses and lack of accountability with regard to the respect of human rights. As a consequence, in 2011, the revised Frontex Regulation introduced a Fundamental Rights Strategy and two new bodies: the Fundamental Rights Officer and the Consultative Forum on fundamental rights (CF). The aim of this paper is to establish how advocacy groups lobby Frontex from within (i.e., in the CF) and what is the effect of this lobbying activity on the agency.
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Notes
- 1.
EU and Schengen borders do not coincide as the EU member states are not all signatories to the Schengen Agreement of 1985. The EU member states that are not part of Schengen are Ireland and the UK (even though the UK might leave the EU soon). There are also states which ratified the Schengen agreement but are not part of the EU, namely, Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland.
- 2.
I will use the terms “Frontex” and “EBCG agency” or “the agency” interchangeably in this chapter.
- 3.
Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 confirms that executive powers at the external borders pertain to member states only. However, Frontex operational role—i.e., coordinating member states’ joint operations at the external borders—and regulatory role, i.e., supporting the commission in the application of legislation relating to the borders (through what it used to be the External Borders Fund), have been enhanced, and a supervisory role has been added through the increased monitoring capacity and particularly through the introduction of the vulnerability assessment mechanism (Rijpma 2016).
- 4.
These operations are informed by research and analysis of risk carried out by Frontex itself.
- 5.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- 6.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
- 7.
International Organization for Migration
- 8.
The FRA fundamental rights platform has over 300 members, and all of them are CSOs. Similarly, the EASO Consultative Forum has hundreds of members, but the composition is more mixed, as civil society is represented alongside other stakeholders (e.g., UNHCR).
- 9.
It has been argued that advocacy organizations might see their survival as their main goal (Zald and Ash 1966; Lowery 2007); this implies that the choice on advocacy and/or lobbying strategies is dependent on how to raise funds and, therefore, on how to appease donors (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Armstrong 2002). Here, instead, it is contended that the simplification holds true particularly in the case of public and diffuse interest groups as these organizations are created to pursue the common interest (or their perception of it), not to enrich their members.
- 10.
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. OJ 2004 L 349. pp. 1–11
- 11.
Fundamental rights violations at the external borders of the EU have been proven by two leading ECtHR sentences, namely, Hirsi Jamaa v Italy and M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece.
- 12.
Regulation (EU) 1168/2011, amended by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 which was amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 863/2007 and No 2007/2004 as well as Council Decision 2005/267/EC.
- 13.
The CSOs that answered to Frontex’s calls of expression of interest and have been selected by Frontex Management Board to sit in the CF are AIRE (Advice on Individual Rights in Europe) Centre (member from 2015), Amnesty International European Institutions Office, Caritas Europa, Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe, European Council on Refugees and Exiles, International Catholic Migration Commission (member till 2015), International Commission of Jurists, Jesuit Refugee Service Europe, Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, and Red Cross EU Office.
- 14.
Two or three meetings per year are mandatory (i.e., CF plenary sessions), but the CF works mostly in working groups divided per thematic areas (e.g., return), and advocacy groups’ members also interact frequently and informally with Frontex officers.
- 15.
Google Scholar finds almost 7.600 studies on Frontex for the period 2010–2016 only.
- 16.
From 2015 the composition of the CF has slightly changed: the CCME—Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (faith-based)—left its place to the AIRE Centre (non-faith-based).
- 17.
A complaint mechanism for human rights violations has been formally introduced with the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard agency. However, the agency is still far from instituting a fully functioning complaint mechanism.
- 18.
The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007, and it entered into force on 1 December 2009. The legal bases for border management policy are Articles 67 and 77 TFEU.
- 19.
There is currently a page on Frontex website devoted to answering frequently asked question specifically on the issue of fundamental rights at the borders.
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Giannetto, L. (2019). Lobbying EU Agencies from Within: Advocacy Groups in Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights. In: Dialer, D., Richter, M. (eds) Lobbying in the European Union. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98800-9_12
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