Skip to main content

Lobbying in Europe: Professionals, Politicians, and Institutions Under General Suspicion?

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Lobbying in the European Union

Abstract

Interest representatives, also called lobbyists, try to influence European decision-makers by offering external expertise and inside knowledge on stakeholder views. Although lobbying is a normal part of modern pluralistic democracy, it includes at the same time some controversial aspects, such as risks of conflicts of interests and lack of transparency. Due to a number of recent scandals and revolving door cases, demands for more accountability of political actors toward EU citizens have increased. Thus, issues such as ethical standards, codes of conduct, and the chances for a mandatory transparency register are addressed in this introductory chapter. In addition, actual lobbying trends as well as post-Brexit lobbying scenarios are discussed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Their comparative analysis consists of two cases of rules (CO2 quotas and air safety) adopted by the Commission under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny.

  2. 2.

    Trilogues are informal tripartite meetings behind closed doors in the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure attended by representatives of the European Parliament (EP), the Council, and the Commission (COM). The purpose is to get an agreement on amendments to a COM proposal acceptable to Council and the EP.

  3. 3.

    Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).

  4. 4.

    The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is the voice and also the representative of organized civil society in Europe. The EESC has traditionally considered the social partners to be CSOs (Dialer, 2017).

  5. 5.

    LobbyFacts is a joint project of Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and LobbyControl. It collates information from two official sources. Firstly, data is from the EU’s Transparency Register (TR) and secondly from the Commission’s website on high-level lobby meetings of Commissioners, their cabinet members, and Directors General.

  6. 6.

    On 22 May 2018, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg met with the leaders of the EP’s political groups and the Chair and the Rapporteur of the LIBE Committee in the EP in Brussels to discuss data protection issues. He apologized to European users for the data breach, admitted they were slow to identify Russian interference, but also highlighted the jobs and investment Facebook is bringing to Europe. The 90-minute live-streamed meeting, which came in the same week that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation entered into force, triggered much attention but also criticism on behalf of some members and media.

  7. 7.

    European Commission (2018). Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, Brussels, 23.4.2018 COM(2018) 218 final.

  8. 8.

    Corporate Europe Observatory (2017). Open doors for forces of finance at the ECB. https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/open_door_for_forces_of_finance_report.pdf. Accessed 9 May 2018.

  9. 9.

    European Ombudsman (2016). Decision of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry into the European Commission’s handling of a former Commissioner’s occupational activities after leaving office. https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/68762/html.bookmark. Accessed 17 July 2017.

  10. 10.

    European Commission (2018). Commission Decision of 31.1.2018 on a Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission, C(2018)700 final, Brussels, 31.1.2018.

  11. 11.

    Kergueno, R. (2017). The Über-Lobbyists: how Silicon Valley is changing Brussels lobbying. https://transparency.eu/uber-lobbyists/. Accessed 18 May 2018.

  12. 12.

    Meierhans, J. (2016). Could leaving the EU make British chocolate taste bad? http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36457903. Accessed 12 February 2018.

  13. 13.

    The food and beverage industry involves more than 4 million employees and over 280,000 businesses, most of them being SMEs. http://www.fooddrinkeurope.eu/. Accessed 25 May 2018.

  14. 14.

    The debate surrounding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a good example of this. While many public interest organizations decided to oppose the negotiations, BEUC—in its position papers and public appearances—focused on advancing the consumer benefit.

  15. 15.

    These are the definition of lobbyist, individual registration, individual spending disclosure, employer spending disclosure, electronic filing, public access (to a registry of lobbyists), revolving door provisions (with a particular focus on “cooling-off periods”), and enforcement.

  16. 16.

    A group of 24 NGOs wrote to the EP’s Committees on Agriculture (AGRI) and Environment (ENVI) to even extend the ban on Monsanto lobbyists to “all those seeking to lobby MEPs on behalf of Monsanto,” including trade associations like the European Crop Protection Association (ECPA) (Politico EU 2017, 4).

  17. 17.

    European Parliament (2017). Report on transparency, accountability and integrity in the EU institutions (2015/2041(INI)), Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rapporteur: Sven Giegold (A8-0133/2017).

  18. 18.

    The five scenarios are offering kind of solutions for more or less integration. However, the principle of multispeed Europe is laid down in the Rome Declaration as follows: “We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later” (Hoogmartens 2018, 3).

  19. 19.

    Jointly organized by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Bruegel, the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS), Confrontations Europe, the Egmont Institute, the European Policy Centre (EPC), Friends of Europe—Les amis de l’Europe, the Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), Madariaga—College of Europe Foundation, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).

  20. 20.

    Venezuela has been a member of Mercosur since 2012 and is an observer in the trade negotiations.

  21. 21.

    From February 2015 to September 2016, for instance, AirBnB met with high level officials of DG GROW nine times, including five meetings with members of the Commissioner’s cabinet. Its lobby spending is rather small, according to the Transparency Register, around € 400,000 and half a million in 2016. Still, it more than quadrupled from the preceding year (CEO 2018, 11).

  22. 22.

    The public consultation received more than 1800 contributions. 98.5% of respondents considered that action to tackle SUP marine litter is “necessary,” and 95% consider it “necessary and urgent.” More than 70% of manufacturers and more than 80% of brands and recyclers considered action “necessary and urgent” (European Commission 2018, 9).

  23. 23.

    Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission on the transparency register for organizations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy implementation, OJ L 277, 19.9.2014, p. 11.

References

  • Beyers, J., & Braun, C. (2014). Ties that count. Explaining interest group access to policy makers. Journal of Public Policy, 43(1), 93–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bouwen, P. (2002). Corporate lobbying in the European Union: The logic of access. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(3), 365–390.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bouwen, P. (2004). Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions. European Journal of Political Research, 43(3), 337–369.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • CEO (Corporate Europe Observatory). (2018). UnFairbnb. How online rental platforms use the EU to defeat cities’ affordable housing measures. Report by Kenneth Haar, Brussels.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cotton, C. (2016). Competing for attention: Lobbying time-constrained politicians. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 18(4), 642–665. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12202.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooper, H., Hervey, G., Bauvier, E., & Antypas, I. (2017). Big East-West skew in record EU lobbying bonanza. Politico EU, 3(44), 8.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darvas, Z., & Wolff, G. (2018). Rethinking the European Union’s post-Brexit budget priorities, Bruegel Policy Brief 1. Accessed March 28, 2018, from http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/PB-2018_01_correction.pdf

  • Dialer, D., & Füricht-Fiegl, G. (2014). EU think tanks in the back seat? Perspectives for the 21st century. In M. Spindler, & T. Van der Zouwen (Eds.), On the move: Patterns, power, politics. COS (Challenging Organizations and Society), 3(2), 561–569.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dialer, D., & Richter, M. (2014). Lobbying in der Europäischen Union. Zwischen Professionalisierung und Regulierung. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drachenberg, R., & Brianson, A. (2016). Policy-making in the European Union. In M. Cini & N. Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (Eds.), European Union politics (5th ed., pp. 197–213). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dür, A., & Mateo, G. (2013). Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in five European countries. European Journal of Political Research, 52(5), 660–686.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eising, R. (2007). Institutional context, organizational resources and strategic choices: Explaining interst group access in the European Union. European Union Politics, 8(3), 329–362.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • European Commission. (2016). Proposal for a interinstitutional agreement on a mandatory transparency register, COM(2016)627 final, Brussels, 29.9.2016.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission. (2018). Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment, COM(2018)340 final, 2018/0172 (COD). Brussels, 28.5.2018.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Parliament. (2017). Draft Report on budgetary control of financing NGOs from the EU budget (2015/2345(INI)). Committee on Budgetary Control.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenwood, J. (2011). Interest representation in the European Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hoogmartens, J. (2018). Between Rome and Sibiu: A trajectory for the New European Narrative. European Policy Brief, 50(5).

    Google Scholar 

  • Klüver, H. (2012). Informational lobbying in the European Union: The effect of organisational characteristics. West European Politics, 35(3), 491–510. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.665737.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klüver, H., Braun, C., & Beyers, J. (2015). Legislative lobbying in context: Towards a conceptual framework of interest group lobbying in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(4), 447–461. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1008792.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McTague, T. (2017). Brexit boom for Britain’s lobbyists. Politico EU, 3(28), 1, 10–11.

    Google Scholar 

  • Politico EU (2017). Single Market. 25 years on – What’s next for the food and drink industry? A Q&A with Hubert Weber, President of FoodDrinkEurope and Executive Vice-President & President Europe of Mondelēz International. Accessed May 29, 2018, from https://www.politico.eu/sponsored-content/single-market-25-years-on-whats-next-for-the-food-and-drink-industry/

  • Politico EU. (2018). Lawyers or lobbyists (or both), March 14, 5(10), 4.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shotton, P., & Nixon, P. (2015). Lobbying the European Union. Changing minds, changing times. Burlington: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Teffer, P. (2017). History of the agencies (re)shuffle. EUobserver, Regions & Cities Magazine, Special issue: The EU Agencies Race, Brussels, 12–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiler, F., & Brändli, M. (2015). Inside versus outside lobbying: How the institutional framework shapes the lobbying behaviour of interest groups. European Journal of Political Research, 54, 745–766.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woll, C. (2012). The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison. Interest Groups & Advocacy, 1(2), 193–214.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Doris Dialer .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Dialer, D., Richter, M. (2019). Lobbying in Europe: Professionals, Politicians, and Institutions Under General Suspicion?. In: Dialer, D., Richter, M. (eds) Lobbying in the European Union. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98800-9_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics