Abstract
Our project is to answer questions that lead to a clearer picture of third-person self-knowledge, the self-interpretation it embeds, and its narrative structure. Bringing together current research on third-person self-knowledge and self-interpretation, our authors focus on third-person self-knowledge, and the role that narrative and interpretation play in acquiring it. We regard the third-personal epistemic approach to oneself as a problem worthy of investigation in its own right, and our contributors try to clarify the relation between third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative capacities. We also invite cooperation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology about issues regarding self-knowledge.
Authorship of this chapter is divided equally.
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Kirsch, J., Pedrini, P. (2018). Introduction: Getting to Know Our Own Minds. In: Pedrini, P., Kirsch, J. (eds) Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 96. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_1
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