Abstract
The euro crisis has dramatically impacted the institutional architecture of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The crisis propelled Europe towards an unprecedented and distinctive fiscal centralization trajectory. A unique form of fiscal authority has been institutionalized in the shadow of euro crisis management. Newly-centralized powers were not captured by the European Commission. Instead, powers have been fragmented and spread across both existing and new executive EMU bodies. After documenting this phenomenon, the chapter presents the key actors which embody Europe’s fiscal authority – the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup and reviews the relevant available literature. The chapter then explains how the data has been collected, specifies the book’s expected contributions and provides the roadmap of this book.
Keywords
- Euro Crisis
- European Fiscal Authority
- Eurogroup
- Euro Working Group (EWG)
- Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
If money rules the world, who rules money?
(Margrit Kennedy)
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Schlosser, P. (2019). Introduction. In: Europe's New Fiscal Union. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98636-4_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98636-4_1
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