Abstract
The account of nomic truth approximation by empirical progress presented in Chap. 2 is based on the exclusion claim of theories. It is a simplified and generalized version of the one presented in my book From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism of 2000. However, its core itself, called the basic account, is based on several idealizations. In this chapter I will sketch a number of possible concretizations, to begin with a two-sided, otherwise also basic, version, based on an exclusion and inclusion claim, followed by quantification, refinement and stratification of this two-sided version. They will be elaborated in Chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Chapter 2 also illustrated straightforwardly how a theory of truth approximation in relation to empirical progress can be set up. The general tenet and the common elements will be summarized in this chapter. It will lead to a general outline of theories of nomic truth approximation by empirical progress. This will guide, explicitly or implicitly, the elaborating Chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Moreover, the common core of such theories of nomic truth approximation will also be summarized: the Nomic Principle, postulating a unique divide between nomic possibilities and impossibilities, the formal structure of nomic evidence, in terms of realized (nomic) possibilities and induced generalizations, and the hypothetico-deductive background of nomic evidence.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Also called ‘greater truthlikeness’ or ‘greater verisimilitude’.
- 2.
Deutsch (2013) is drawing attention, in terms of ‘constructor theory’, to the importance in physics and elsewhere of the distinction between possible and impossible ‘transformations’. In these terms, the present chapter is dealing with two-sided truth approximation regarding the true boundary between nomically possible and nomically impossible (but conceptually possible) transformations.
References
Cevolani, G., Crupi, V., & Festa, R. (2011). Verisimilitude and belief change for conjunctive theories. Erkenntnis, 75(2), 183–202.
Cevolani, G., Festa, R., & Kuipers, T. (2013). Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories. Synthese, 190, 3307–3324.
Deutsch, D. (2013). Constructor theory. Synthese, 190, 4331–4359.
Kuipers, T. (2000). From instrumentalism to constructive realism. On some relations between confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation. Synthese library 287. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kuipers, T. (2001). Structures in science. Heuristic patterns based on cognitive structures. An advanced textbook in neo-classical philosophy of science. Synthese library 301. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kuipers, T. (2014). Dovetailing belief base revision with (basic) truth approximation. In E. Weber, D. Wouters, & J. Meheus (Eds.), Logic, reasoning, and rationality, Proceedings-conference in Ghent, 2010 (pp. 77–93). Dordrecht: Springer.
Niiniluoto, I. (1987). Truthlikeness. Synthese library 185. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Oddie, G. (1986). Likeness to truth. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Zwart, S. (2001). Refined verisimilitude. Synthese library 307. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kuipers, T.A.F. (2019). Perspectives and Guidelines for Theories of (Nomic) Truth Approximation by Empirical Progress. In: Nomic Truth Approximation Revisited. Synthese Library, vol 399. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98388-2_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98388-2_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-98387-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-98388-2
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)