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Part of the book series: Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation ((SEELR,volume 15))

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Abstract

The CETA Investment Chapter incorporates several of the substantive and procedural refinements developed in recent international investment policy-making. In particular, the agreement establishes a permanent investment court as an alternative to traditional investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS). The underlying concerns driving the current European Union (EU) proposal for reforming ISDS are very similar to the concerns that inspired the Calvo doctrine in Latin America in the nineteenth century. Inspired by the CETA Investment Chapter, the EU proposes the establishment of a multilateral investment court with an appeals mechanism. A similar proposal is under consideration at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Consequently, it is quite likely that the proposal for a multilateral court will soon be considered by Latin American countries, whose reactions are expected to reflect their diversified views on ISDS. In spite of the denunciation of the ICSID Convention and of some bilateral investment treaties by certain countries in the region, most Latin American countries have, in general, a positive attitude towards ISDS and might be supportive of the creation of a multilateral investment court. Yet, there are other emerging alternatives in parallel to the EU alternative, which are currently under consideration by several Latin American countries in other fora. It remains still unclear which reform alternative will to prevail and it is likely that international investment regime will be relying on traditional investor-State dispute settlement for the next years. The present contribution seeks to present and discuss the diverse positions of Latin American countries and their potential reaction to the proposal of a multilateral court.

The author is grateful for the valuable comments of Professor Diego Pedro Fernández Arroyo on the subject of this contribution.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, signed 30 October 2016, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10973-2016-INIT/en/pdf.

  2. 2.

    European Commission (2016) Investment provisions in the EU–Canada free trade agreement (CETA). http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf, p. 1.

  3. 3.

    European Commission (2016) The multilateral investment court project. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608.

  4. 4.

    Shan (2007), p. 632.

  5. 5.

    Lazo (2014b), p. 182.

  6. 6.

    Subedi (2008), p. 29.

  7. 7.

    United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2017) International investment agreements navigator, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.

  8. 8.

    Morosini and Xavier Junior (2015).

  9. 9.

    UNCTAD (2017) International dispute settlement navigator. http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.

  10. 10.

    International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (2017) The ICSID caseload statistics (issue 2017-2). https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID-Caseload-Statistics.aspx, p. 11.

  11. 11.

    Cremades (2006), p. 71.

  12. 12.

    Titi (2014), p. 386.

  13. 13.

    Lazo (2014b), p. 184. According to the author, “it seems that developed countries are revisiting the No of Tokyo. They now praise the Calvo Doctrine—without mentioning it by name, of course—and they are also highlighting their concerns about the efficiency of investment treaties and their particular arbitration system”.

  14. 14.

    UNCTAD’s database reports 235 international investment agreements between EU Member States and Latin American countries. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  15. 15.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), pp. 6–7.

  16. 16.

    Vandevelde (2005), pp. 169–170.

  17. 17.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  18. 18.

    Côté (2017), p. 91.

  19. 19.

    Vandevelde (2005), p. 168.

  20. 20.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 9.

  21. 21.

    Vandevelde (2005), p. 175.

  22. 22.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 9.

  23. 23.

    EU Member States are the home States of investors in 58% of the claims brought in ICSID. See ICSID, The ICSID caseload statistics: special focus European Union (April 2017). https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID-Caseload-Statistics.aspx, p. 17.

  24. 24.

    Poland is the respondent in cases brought by foreign investors under the ICSID Additional Facility rules. See ICSID (2017) Database of ICSID member States, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx.

  25. 25.

    From the 453 cases registered in the UNCTAD’s database brought by EU investors, 153 are intra-EU. From the remainder 300 cases, 105 were initiated against Latin American countries. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  26. 26.

    Nationals of Western European countries correspond to 47% of ICSID arbitrators and conciliators. ICSID (2017) (n. 10), pp. 19–20.

  27. 27.

    The number of appointments as arbitrators and conciliators in ICSID tribunals is 210 for France, 208 for the United States, 184 for the United Kingdom and 122 for Canada, see ICSID (2017) (n. 10), p. 22.

  28. 28.

    Canada is the home State in 45 cases, Germany in 57 cases, the United Kingdom in 69 cases, the Netherlands in 98 cases, and the United States in 152 cases. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 8).

  29. 29.

    ICSID (2017) Database of ICSID member States. https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx.

  30. 30.

    ICSID (2017) Cases database. https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx.

  31. 31.

    ICSID (2017) (n. 10).

  32. 32.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  33. 33.

    Considering the data in UNCTAD (2014) Investor-State dispute settlement: an information note on the United States and the European Union (IIA Issues Note n 2/2014), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d4_en.pdf, an average of 2.5 disputes per year were brought against EU Member States from 1994 to 2002; this average increased to 7 disputes per year from 2002 to 2011 and then to 20 disputes per year between 2011 and 2013.

  34. 34.

    The ICSID began to publish EU specific caseload data in 2014, see ICSID (2017) (n. 23).

  35. 35.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  36. 36.

    Erbil Serter v France, ICSID case No. ARB/13/22, pending.

  37. 37.

    Blusun v Italy, ICSID case No. ARB/14/3, Award 27 December 2017, annulment pending.

  38. 38.

    Belegging-Maatschappij v Austria, ICSID case No. ARB/15/32, pending.

  39. 39.

    European investors brought 153 out of 196 claims against EU Member States, UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  40. 40.

    Investors from developing countries brought 16 claims and investors from non-EU developed countries brought 27 claims against EU Member States. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  41. 41.

    Butler and Subedi (2017), p. 55.

  42. 42.

    Van Harten (2016), pp. 139–140.

  43. 43.

    Lazo (2014b), p. 184; Van Harten (2016), p. 140.

  44. 44.

    Lazo (2014b), p. 183.

  45. 45.

    Titi (2015), p. 640.

  46. 46.

    European Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on the Regions: towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, COM(2010)343, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147884.pdf, p. 10.

  47. 47.

    Butler and Subedi (2017), p. 55.

  48. 48.

    European Parliament (2015), European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to the European Commission on the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getdoc.do?pubref=-//ep//text+ta+p8-ta-2015-0252+0+doc+xml+v0//en, item xv. The recommendation reads as follows: “ensure that foreign investors are treated in a non-discriminatory fashion, while benefiting from no greater rights than domestic investors, and to replace the ISDS system with a new system for resolving disputes between investors and states which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny, where potential cases are treated in a transparent manner by publicly appointed, independent professional judges in public hearings and which includes an appellate mechanism, where consistency of judicial decisions is ensured, the jurisdiction of courts of the EU and of the Member States are respected, and where private interests cannot undermine public policy objectives”.

  49. 49.

    European Commission (2015), Investment in TTIP and beyond: the path for reform. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF, p. 1.

  50. 50.

    European Commission (2015) Commission proposes new investment court system for TTIP and other EU trade and investment negotiations. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1364. The complete text of EU’s proposal is available at European Commission (2015) Commission draft text TTIP investment. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf.

  51. 51.

    European Commission (2015), The EU and Vietnam finalize landmark trade deal. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409.

  52. 52.

    European Commission (2016) (n. 2).

  53. 53.

    European Commission (2017) CETA explained. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-explained/. The Commission affirms, “many EU countries have in the past negotiated agreements which include a mechanism for resolving disputes between governments and investors known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). CETA replaces this with a new and better Investment Court System (ICS)”.

  54. 54.

    Joint Interpretative Instrument on the comprehensive economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States (2016). http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/jii-iic.aspx?lang=eng, para. 6(a).

  55. 55.

    Newcombe and Paradell (2009), p. 18.

  56. 56.

    CETA, Arts. 8.18 and 8.27.

  57. 57.

    CETA, Art. 8.30.

  58. 58.

    CETA, Arts. 8.32, 8.33 and 8.39(5).

  59. 59.

    CETA, Arts. 8.19 and 8.20.

  60. 60.

    CETA, Art. 8.19(6).

  61. 61.

    CETA, Art. 8.36.

  62. 62.

    CETA, Art. 8.38.

  63. 63.

    CETA, Art. 8.31(3).

  64. 64.

    CETA, Art. 8.39.

  65. 65.

    CETA, Art. 8.28.

  66. 66.

    Joint interpretative instrument (2016) (n. 54), para. 6(f).

  67. 67.

    EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement [EU–Vietnam FTA] (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437.

  68. 68.

    European Commission (2017), A new EU trade agreement with Japan, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155684.pdf, p. 6.

  69. 69.

    Ibid, p. 6. According to the European Commission, “a new system—called the Investment Court System, with judges appointed by the two parties to the FTA and public oversight—is the EU’s agreed approach that it is pursuing from now on in its trade agreements. This is also the case with Japan”.

  70. 70.

    European Commission (2016) Report of the 15th EU–Japan FTA/EPA negotiating round, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154368.pdf, p. 4. European Commission (2016) Report of the 16th EU–Japan FTA/EPA negotiating round, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/may/tradoc_154554.pdf, p. 5.

  71. 71.

    European Commission (2017) EU–Japan EPA: the agreement in principle, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155693.doc.pdf. According to the European Commission, “on investment, while some parts such as investment liberalization were agreed in principle, there is still no agreement on the whole chapter, as the issue of investment dispute resolution remains fully open. The EU has tabled its reformed investment court system on the table in the negotiations with Japan. The EU continues to insist that there can be no return to old-style ISDS. Under no conditions can old-style ISDS provisions be included in the agreement. More discussions will be required to arrive at a conclusion on this in the next months”.

  72. 72.

    European Commission (2016) EU–China investment agreement: report of the 12th round of negotiations, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/october/tradoc_155061.pdf.

  73. 73.

    European Commission (2017), Overview of FTA and other trade negotiations. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf, p. 9.

  74. 74.

    CETA, Art 8.29; EU–Vietnam FTA, Art. 15.

  75. 75.

    European Commission (2016) Inception impact assessment: establishment of a multilateral investment court for investment dispute resolution, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_trade_024_court_on_investment_en.pdf, p. 3. According to the European Commission, “to ensure policy coherence at EU level and support by EU’s contracting partners, similar transitional provisions will also be proposed in the context of other trade and/or investment negotiations. New investment agreements concluded by EU Member States with third countries will also be required to include provisions allowing the transition to the multilateral court”.

  76. 76.

    European Commission and Government of Canada (2016) Reforming investment dispute settlement: considerations on the way towards a multilateral investment dispute settlement mechanism. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/january/tradoc_155266.07.13%20Non-paper%20on%20multilateral%20investment%20court%20(rev2)(clean).pdf.

  77. 77.

    European Commission and Government of Canada (2016), Reforming investment dispute settlement: considerations on the way towards a multilateral investment dispute settlement mechanism. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/january/tradoc_155265.pdf.

  78. 78.

    European Commission and Government of Canada (2016) Establishment of a multilateral investment dispute settlement system. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/january/tradoc_155267.12.12%20With%20date_%20Discussion%20paper_Establishment%20of%20a%20multilateral%20investment%20Geneva.pdf.

  79. 79.

    European Commission and Government of Canada (2017). The case for creating a multilateral investment dispute settlement mechanism. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/january/tradoc_155264.pdf.

  80. 80.

    European Commission (2016) (n. 72), pp. 5–6.

  81. 81.

    United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (2017) UNCITRAL to consider possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement. http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2017/unisl250.html.

  82. 82.

    United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (2017) Possible future work in the field of dispute settlement: reforms of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS): note by the Secretariat (A/CN.9/917), https://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/6106066.70379639.html, pp. 5–14.

  83. 83.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 79), pp. 6–8.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., pp. 9–14.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., pp. 4–5.

  86. 86.

    Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), para. 274.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., para. 275.

  88. 88.

    Ibid.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., para. 212.

  90. 90.

    UNCITRAL (2017) Investor-State dispute settlement framework: compilation of comments. http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/sessions/50th.html, p. 2.

  91. 91.

    The comments by the delegations of Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and United Kingdom are included in the different addenda. UNCITRAL (2017) (n. 86).

  92. 92.

    Ibid, addendum 1, p. 5.

  93. 93.

    Ibid, addendum 6, p. 4.

  94. 94.

    Ibid, addendum 8, p. 3.

  95. 95.

    Ibid, addendum 1, p. 3.

  96. 96.

    Ibid, addendum 4, p. 5.

  97. 97.

    Ibid, addendum 3, p. 10.

  98. 98.

    Ibid, addendum 4, p. 6.

  99. 99.

    Ibid, addendum 2, p. 3 and addendum 5, pp. 7 and 13.

  100. 100.

    Fernandez-Arroyo (2013), p. 424. According to the author, “in spite of several common features, it is hard to find a single attitude, even a single trend, in Latin American commercial arbitration”. Neither there is a single attitude in investor-State dispute settlement.

  101. 101.

    See Sect. 2.

  102. 102.

    Villarreal (2017).

  103. 103.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  104. 104.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  105. 105.

    Trans-Pacific Partnership (2016). http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng.

  106. 106.

    European Commission (2017) Mexico, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/mexico.

  107. 107.

    European Commission (2017) EU–Mexico trade negotiations: list of published textual proposals. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1694.

  108. 108.

    European Commission (2017) Report on the third round of negotiations for modernizing the trade pillar of the EU–Mexico Global Agreement. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/may/tradoc_155515.pdf, p. 3.

  109. 109.

    European Commission (2017) Report on the fourth round of negotiations for modernizing the trade pillar of the EU–Mexico Global Agreement. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155778.pdf, p. 1.

  110. 110.

    Morales (2017).

  111. 111.

    European Commission (2015) (n. 49), pp. 11–12.

  112. 112.

    Schill (2016).

  113. 113.

    European Commission (2016) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Advisory Group meeting report. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155087.pdf.

  114. 114.

    Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales (2017) Países TPP inician evaluación tecnica para seguir processo. https://www.direcon.gob.cl/2017/07/paises-tpp-inician-evaluacion-tecnica-para-seguir-proceso/.

  115. 115.

    Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales (2017) Acuerdos en negociación y suscritos. https://www.direcon.gob.cl/acuerdos-en-negociacion-y-suscritos.

  116. 116.

    European Commission (2017) Ex-ante study of a possible modernization of the EU–Chile Association Agreement. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155758.pdf, p. 122.

  117. 117.

    Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales (2017) (n. 115).

  118. 118.

    Canada–Chile Free Trade Agreement (2017), http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/chile-chili/fta-ale/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng.

  119. 119.

    The free trade agreements were signed with Uruguay, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and Hong Kong. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2017) (n. 7).

  120. 120.

    Foreign investors and damages were awarded in two of them. On the other hand, Chilean investors are claimants in seven cases. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  121. 121.

    Except for Brazil–Chile CFIA, investor-State dispute settlement is included in all other 56 mapped Chilean international investment agreements. UNCTAD (2017) Mapping of IIA content. http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent.

  122. 122.

    There are 57 international investment agreements registered in the UNCTAD database. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  123. 123.

    Except for Brazil–Peru ETEA and Czech Republic–Peru BIT, signed in 1994, all other 34 mapped agreements contain provisions on investor-State dispute settlement. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2017) (n. 121).

  124. 124.

    Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo (2017) Acuerdos comerciales de Perú. http://www.acuerdoscomerciales.gob.pe/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=192&Itemid=211. There are 12 cases registered in the UNCTAD database, including one pending case initiated in 2016 (Gramercy v. Peru) under the Peru–United States FTA. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  125. 125.

    Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo (2017) (n. 124). According to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism “el solo hecho de que un inversionista extranjero tenga acceso a este mecanismo de solución de controversias no garantiza una indemnización millonaria a su favor”.

  126. 126.

    Colombia had signed four bilateral investment treaties in the nineties. Colombia–Cuba BIT never came into force and the other three agreements (signed with Peru, Spain and the United States) were renegotiated in the years 2000. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  127. 127.

    Expect for Brazil–Colombia CFIA, all other 22 mapped agreements have investor-State dispute settlement provisions. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 123).

  128. 128.

    Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo (2016) Estado colombiano y controversias internacionales de inversión. http://www.mincit.gov.co/publicaciones/36241/estado_colombiano_y_controversias_internacionales_de_inversion. According to the UNCTAD database, there are four disputes pending settlement, which were registered in 2016. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  129. 129.

    Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and Mercosur (1995). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r14013.

  130. 130.

    Comité de Negociaciones Birregionales Mercorsur–Union Europea (2000) [Report on the first meetings]. http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MER_EU/negotiations/CNB_1_s.pdf.

  131. 131.

    Mercosur (2004) Mercosur’s completed offer on investment. http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MER_EU/negotiations/MA_offers/MER_Investment1_e.doc; European Union (2004) EC offer on establishment. http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MER_EU/negotiations/MA_offers/EUR_offer9_e.doc.

  132. 132.

    European Commission (2017) Mercosur. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur.

  133. 133.

    Mercosur–European Union Bi-Regional Negotiating Committee (2010) Final conclusions [of the seventeenth meeting]. http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MER_EU/negotiations/BuenosAires2010_e.pdf; European Commission (2011) Statement of the EU and MERCOSUR after the 7th round of negotiations on the future Association Agreement between both regions. http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MER_EU/negotiations/XXIII_BCN_e.pdf.

  134. 134.

    Mercosur–European Union Bi-Regional Negotiating Committee (2012) Final conclusions [of the XXV meeting] http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MER_EU/negotiations/XXV_BCN_e.pdf.

  135. 135.

    European Commission (2016) EU–Mercosur joint communiqué on exchange of negotiating offers. http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MER_EU/negotiations/EU-Mercosur_exch_neg_offers_e.pdf.

  136. 136.

    European Commission (2017) Report from the XXVIII round of negotiations of the trade part of the association agreement between the European Union and Mercosur. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155779.pdf.

  137. 137.

    European Commission (2015) (n. 49).

  138. 138.

    Pantaleo (2014), p. 62. According to the author, “given the steady pace of investment outflows from Europe to Mercosur, and in particular to Brazil, and the relatively low level of judicial protection currently available to European investors in this country, it seems safe to assume that the EU would find such proposal quite attractive. On the other hand, Mercosur producers would have greater access to European markets. This, in turn, would result in an increase of Mercosur exports to the EU and, in general, in a net economic growth in Mercosur countries”.

  139. 139.

    Leahy (2015), p 10. Quoting an official of the European Commission, Leahy (2015), p. 26 concludes that “the EU’s interest in the agreement has increased, albeit not as dramatically as Mercosur’s. It is still more of an opportunity for the EU than a need”.

  140. 140.

    It seems that “on the Mercosur side, there are also some concerns that procedures for public procurement and the resolution of investment disputes may disadvantage local companies”. New push for EU-Mercosur free-trade agreement (31 March 2017). The Economist http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1615284345.

  141. 141.

    Pantaleo (2014), p. 61.

  142. 142.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  143. 143.

    Morosini and Xavier Junior (2015).

  144. 144.

    Arruda and Costa (2016), Gabriel (2016) and Martins (2017).

  145. 145.

    Tiburcio (2014).

  146. 146.

    Tomimatsu and Alves (2015).

  147. 147.

    Besides the International Court of Justice, Brazil accepts the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas, the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the Permanent Revision Tribunal of Mercosur.

  148. 148.

    WTO (2017) Trade Policy Review (Brazil): report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/358), para. 2.40. According to the report, “further CFIA negotiations are ongoing and the signing of at least three new CFIAs is expected in early 2017 (e.g. India, and Jordan). A Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments Protocol of MERCOSUR (PCFI) was signed in April 2017 and exploratory discussions are underway with Ethiopia, Morocco, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to which Brazil presented its CFIA model”.

  149. 149.

    Protocolo de Cooperación y Facilitación de Inversiones Intra-Mercosur [CFIP] (2017). http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5548.

  150. 150.

    Venezuela became a full member of Mercosur in 2012, but remained out of the economic negotiations with the EU. European Commission (2017) Venezuela. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/venezuela/ Nevertheless, Venezuela was suspended from Mercosur in 2017 on grounds of violation of the “democratic clause”. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (2017) Decisión sobre la suspension de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela en el Mercosur en aplicación del Protocolo de Ushuaia sobre compromiso democrático en el Mercosur. https://www.mrecic.gov.ar/decision-sobre-la-suspension-de-la-republica-bolivariana-de-venezuela-en-el-mercosur-en-aplicacion.

  151. 151.

    CFIP, Art. 25.1.

  152. 152.

    Pantaleo (2014), p. 58.

  153. 153.

    Protocolo de Colonia para la Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones en el Mercosur (1994). http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3585.

  154. 154.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  155. 155.

    Presidencia de Uruguay (2016) Presidentes Tabaré Vázquez y Xi Jinping acordaron avanzar rápidamente en un tratado de libre comercio Uruguay–China. https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/tratado-libre-comercio-uruguay-china-vazzquez-jinping.

  156. 156.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 124).

  157. 157.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  158. 158.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  159. 159.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  160. 160.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  161. 161.

    Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (2017) (n. 150).

  162. 162.

    Pérez-Aznar (2017), p. 16.

  163. 163.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  164. 164.

    According to UNCTAD’s database, nineteen cases were decided in favor of the investor and fourteen were amicably settled. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  165. 165.

    Titi (2014), p. 396. Argentina presented seventeen requests for annulment, but only four were successful to annul either totally or partially. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  166. 166.

    Titi (2014), p. 372.

  167. 167.

    Titi (2014), p. 369.

  168. 168.

    The last investment agreement to enter into force had been Argentina–Guatemala BIT in December 2002 until the Argentina–Senegal BIT entered into force in 2010. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2017) (n. 7).

  169. 169.

    Vetulli and Kaufman (2016).

  170. 170.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  171. 171.

    Pérez-Aznar (2017), p. 16.

  172. 172.

    Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales (2017) Chile y Argentina avanzan y proyectan firma del acuerdo bilateral para fines de octubre. https://www.direcon.gob.cl/2017/08/chile-y-argentina-avanzan-y-proyectan-firma-del-acuerdo-bilateral-para-fines-de-octubre; Presidencia de la Nación (2016) Argentina y Japón firman un acuerdo para impulsar inversiones y fortalecer las relaciones comerciales. http://www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/eventos-destacados-presi/36204-argentina-y-japon-firman-un-acuerdo-para-impulsar-inversiones-y-fortalecer-las-relaciones-comerciales.

  173. 173.

    Vetulli and Fernández Arroyo (2016), p. 355.

  174. 174.

    Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (2017) Mercosur y Canadá más cerca de iniciar negociaciones para un acuerdo commercial, https://www.mrecic.gov.ar/mercosur-y-canada-mas-cerca-de-iniciar-negociaciones-para-un-acuerdo-comercial; Government of Canada (2017) Consulting Canadians on a possible Canada–Mercosur Free Trade Agreement, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/consultations/mercosur/index.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=281.

  175. 175.

    ICSID (2007) Denunciation of ICSID Convention. https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/News.aspx?CID=103.

  176. 176.

    ICSID (2009) Denunciation of the ICSID Convention by Ecuador. https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/News.aspx?CID=87.

  177. 177.

    ICSID (2012) Venezuela submits a notice under Art. 71 of the ICSID Convention, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/News.aspx?CID=47.

  178. 178.

    Titi (2014), p. 363. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) was created under the agreement signed in Havana on 14 December 2004. Its Member States are currently Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, Ecuador, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda and St Lucia. Allianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (2017) ALBA-TCP, http://alba-tcp.org/content/alba-tcp.

  179. 179.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  180. 180.

    Except for Ecuador–Germany BIT signed in 1965 and Ecuador–Switzerland BIT signed in 1968, all other 24 mapped Ecuadorian agreements provide for ISDS. In the case of Bolivia, except for Bolivia–Spain BIT signed in 1990, all other 21 mapped agreements included ISDS. In the case of Venezuela, all of the twenty-eight mapped agreements contained ISDS. See UNCTAD (2017) (n. 124).

  181. 181.

    Titi (2014), p. 357. Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, and Bolivia are the five main respondents in investment arbitration in Latin America. See UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  182. 182.

    Argentina has 49 disputes registered in UNCTAD’s database. Venezuela counts 41 proceedings against it. Ecuador has faced 23 disputes and is ranked behind countries such as Spain, Czech Republic, Canada, Poland and Mexico. Bolivia is still a little bit behind, having faced fourteen disputes, which is less than the proceedings faced by countries such as India, Hungary and the United States. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  183. 183.

    Titi (2014), p. 364 describes the decision as a “statement of censure towards the international system of investment protection”.

  184. 184.

    ICSID Convention, Art. 72.

  185. 185.

    ICSID Convention, Art. 71.

  186. 186.

    Ripinsky (2012), p. 11.

  187. 187.

    Investment Treaty News (2017) Ecuador denounces its remaining 16 BITs and publishes CAITISA audit report, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/ecuador-denounces-its-remaining-16-bits-and-publishes-caitisa-audit-report/.

  188. 188.

    UNCTAD (2010) Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: impact on investor-State claims (IIA Issues Note n 2/2010). http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf, p. 1.

  189. 189.

    Cheng and Bento (2012).

  190. 190.

    Olivet (2017); Investment Treaty News (2017) (n. 187).

  191. 191.

    Ripinsky (2012), p. 12.

  192. 192.

    Voon and Mitchell (2016); UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  193. 193.

    Riviera and Azuga (2017).

  194. 194.

    UNCTAD (2010) (n. 188), pp. 9–10.

  195. 195.

    Titi (2014), p. 366; Brauch (2014), p. 9; Leathley and Paez (2017).

  196. 196.

    Lazo (2014a).

  197. 197.

    Allianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (2009) Declaración conjunta de la VI Cumbre Extraordinaria. http://alba-tcp.org/contenido/declaracion-conjunta-vi-cumbre.

  198. 198.

    Allianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (2003) Resolución especial sobre arbitraje y transnacionales (XII Cumbre) http://alba-tcp.org/contenido/resolucion-especial-sobre-arbitraje-y-transnacionales.

  199. 199.

    Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana (2013) Estados latinoamericanos plantean mecanismos de defensa y asistencia reciproca para solucionar controversias con las transnacionales. http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/estados-latinoamericanos-plantean-mecanismos-de-defensa-y-asistencia-reciproca-para-solucionar-controversias-con-las-transnacionales/; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana (2014) Estados del Sur ponen en marcha observatorio sobre inversiones transnacionales, http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/estados-del-sur-ponen-en-marcha-observatorio-sobre-inversiones-transnacionales/.

  200. 200.

    Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana (2013) Declaration on the 1st Ministerial Conference of the Latin American States affected by transnational interests. http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/22abr_declaracion_transnacionales_eng.pdf, para. 2.

  201. 201.

    Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (2008) Resolucion de los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de America del Sur. http://docs.unasursg.org/latest-documents.

  202. 202.

    Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (2010) Informe de novena reunion del grupo de trabajo Mecanismo de solución de controversias en materia de inversiones en el marco de UNASUR. http://docs.unasursg.org/latest-documents.

  203. 203.

    Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (2010) Decisión para analizar un sistema de solución de controversias en materia de inversiones de UNASUR. http://docs.unasursg.org/latest-documents.

  204. 204.

    The draft text of the proposal is an annex of the final minutes of the 4th meeting of the working group. Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (2010) Acta final de la cuarta renunión del grupo de trabajo de expertos de alto nível de solución de controversias en materia de inversiones de UNASUR. http://docs.unasursg.org/latest-documents.

  205. 205.

    Ministerio de Comercio Exterior (2017) Ecuador y EFTA realizan segunda ronda de negociaciones comerciales. http://www.comercioexterior.gob.ec/ecuador-y-efta-realizaron-segunda-ronda-de-negociaciones-comerciales/.

  206. 206.

    Agencia Publica de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramerica (2016) Inician en Quito negociaciones para acuerdo de cooperación económica con Corea del Sur. http://www.andes.info.ec/es/noticias/inician-quito-negociaciones-acuerdo-cooperacion-economica-corea-sur.html.

  207. 207.

    European Commission (2016) Ecuador joins EU–Colombia/Peru trade agreement. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3615_en.htm.

  208. 208.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 87), addendum 3, p. 10.

  209. 209.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  210. 210.

    Except for the already replaced Costa Rica–Switzerland BIT (1965) and for the EFTA–Costa Rica–Panama FTA (2013), all other mapped investment agreements from Central American countries provide for investor-State dispute settlement. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 124).

  211. 211.

    Honduras has never faced a foreign investor claim in arbitral tribunals. Nicaragua was the respondent in only one case, which was ultimately amicably settled. El Salvador has favorable awards in the three disputes it faced. Guatemala was the respondent in only three cases, two of which were decided in favor of the investor and one in favor of the State. Panama has been a party to seven investment disputes, four of which are still pending; from the remainder three, two were decided in favor of the State and one was amicably settled. Costa Rica, in its turn, was the respondent of nine investment disputes: three were decided in favor of the State, one was decided in favor of the investor, two are pending, two were discontinued, and one found the State liable but awarded no damages. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  212. 212.

    Tratado sobre Inversión y Comercio de Servicios entre las Repúblicas de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua (2002). http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2520.

  213. 213.

    Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana (2013) Estado de situación de la integración económica centroamericana. http://www20.iadb.org/intal/catalogo/PE/2013/10763.pdf, p. 6.

  214. 214.

    Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Centroamérica y Panamá (2002). http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/capan/indice.asp.

  215. 215.

    Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana (2010) Declaración conjunta del Consejo de Ministros de Integración Económica (COMIECO) y el Ministro de Comercio e Industrias de Panamá, http://www.sieca.int/Documentos/DocumentosMostrar.aspx?SegmentoId=2&DocumentoId=1710.

  216. 216.

    European Commission (2017) Central America. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/central-america/. According to the Commission, “the trade pillar of the Association Agreement has been provisionally applied since 1st August 2013 with Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, since 1st October 2013 with Costa Rica and El Salvador, and since 1 December with Guatemala”.

  217. 217.

    EU–Central America Association Agreement (2012). http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=689, Art. 167 states “nothing in this agreement shall be subject, directly or indirectly, to any investor-to-State dispute settlement procedures established in those agreements”.

  218. 218.

    Government of Canada (2017) Canada–Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador Free Trade Agreement negotiations http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ca4/fta-ale/info.aspx?lang=eng.

  219. 219.

    Government of Canada (2017) Canada–Honduras Free Trade Agreement, http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/honduras/fta-ale/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng.

  220. 220.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  221. 221.

    Government of Canada (2017) Canada–Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/costa_rica/fta-ale/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng.

  222. 222.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  223. 223.

    Office of the United States Trade Representative (2017) CAFTA–DR. https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta.

  224. 224.

    ICSID (2017) (n. 24).

  225. 225.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  226. 226.

    The Dominican Republic is the respondent in three cases brought under the CAFTA–DR; one is pending, one was amicably settled and one was decided in favour of the State. There are two other cases: one was amicably settled under Dominican Republic–France BIT and one was discontinued under Dominican Republic–Panama BIT. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  227. 227.

    The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has fifteen member States: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Caribbean Community (2017) Member States and associate members. http://caricom.org/about-caricom/who-we-are/our-governance/members-and-associate-members/.

  228. 228.

    Government of Canada (2017) Canada–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement Negotiations. http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/dominican_republic-republique_dominicaine/fta-ale/info.aspx?lang=eng.

  229. 229.

    EU–CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (2008). http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/caribbean/. Art. 62 establishes that: “parties shall enter into further negotiations on investment and trade in services no later than five years from the date of entry into force of this agreement with the aim of enhancing the overall commitments undertaken under this title”.

  230. 230.

    The most recent agreements were Haiti–Mexico BIT in 2015, Guatemala–Trinidad and Tobago in 2013 and Jamaica-Kuwait BIT in 2013. The most active countries are Jamaica with seventeen agreements, Trinidad and Tobago with thirteen agreements and Barbados with ten agreements. Other CARICOM member States, except for Montserrat and Saint Kitts and Neves have less than ten agreements each. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  231. 231.

    CARICOM countries have 33 agreements with EU Member States, being ten with the United Kingdom and nine with Germany. Spain, the Netherlands, Italy and France have three agreements each with CARICOM countries. Austria and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union have one agreement each with CARICOM countries. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  232. 232.

    Ibid.

  233. 233.

    Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat and Suriname are not members of the ICSID Convention. Belize, on the other hand, has signed the ICSID Convention, but never ratified it, see ICSID (2017) (n. 24).

  234. 234.

    Except for Germany–Haiti BIT (1973), all other sixty-one investment agreements signed by CARICOM member States contain provisions on investor-State dispute settlement. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 124).

  235. 235.

    Barbados was the respondent of one amicably settled dispute. Belize was the respondent of three disputes; one was decided in favour of the investor and the other two were amicably settled. Grenada had one favourable award. Guyana was the respondent of one amicably settled dispute. Trinidad and Tobago had one dispute decided in its favour. UNCTAD (2017) (n. 9).

  236. 236.

    Government of Canada (2017) Canada–Caribbean Community Free Trade Agreement negotiations. http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/caricom/fta-ale/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng.

  237. 237.

    Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Government of the Republic of Cuba (2000). http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2498.

  238. 238.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 7).

  239. 239.

    ICSID (2017) (n. 24).

  240. 240.

    UNCTAD (2017) (n. 124).

  241. 241.

    País apresenta proposta na OMC para facilitação de investimentos (2017). http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/4946256/pais-apresenta-proposta-na-omc-para-facilitacao-de-investimentos.

  242. 242.

    Brazil joins China in investment facilitation initiative at WTO (2017) http://www.valor.com.br/international/news/4885184/brazil-joins-china-investment-facilitation-initiative-wto.

  243. 243.

    Sauvant (2016).

  244. 244.

    World Trade Organization (WTO) (2016) Concept note for an initiative on trade facilitation in services: communication from India (S/WPDR/W/55); WTO (2017) Trade facilitation agreement for services: communication from India (S/WPDR/W/58).

  245. 245.

    Hess and Cavalcante (2017).

  246. 246.

    The discussions took place in a workshop hosted by the WTO in July 2017. WTO (2017) Workshop on Investment Facilitation for Development. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/workshopinvestjuly17_e.htm.

  247. 247.

    WTO (2017) General Council: minutes of meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 27–28 February and reconvened on 7 April 2017 (WT/GC/M/166), paras. 11.1–11.34.

  248. 248.

    WTO (2017) Investment policy discussion group: communication from the Russian Federation (JOB/GC/120), para. 5.

  249. 249.

    Ibid., para. 1.3(b)(iv).

  250. 250.

    WTO (2017) MIKTA investment workshop reflection (JOB/GC/121), p. 2.

  251. 251.

    WTO (2017) Proposal for a WTO informal dialogue on investment facilitation for development: joint communication from the Friends of Investment Facilitation for Development (JOB/GC/122). By July 2017, the FIFD included 12 WTO members: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan and Qatar. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/seminar_invest_240717_e.htm.

  252. 252.

    WTO (2017) Possible elements of investment facilitation: communication from China (JOB/GC/123).

  253. 253.

    WTO (2017) Possible elements of a WTO instrument on investment facilitation: communication from Argentina and Brazil (JOB/GC/124).

  254. 254.

    WTO (2017) Possible elements of a WTO instrument on investment facilitation: communication from Argentina and Brazil (JOB/GC/124), paras. 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9.

  255. 255.

    Investment Treaty News (2017) India opposes trade and investment facilitation item in WTO General Council agenda. http://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/india-opposes-trade-and-investment-facilitation-item-in-wto-general-council-agenda/.

  256. 256.

    Sen (2017).

  257. 257.

    BRICS (2017) Seventh meeting of the BRICS Trade Ministers statement, https://www.brics2017.org/English/Documents/Meetings/201708/t20170831_1824.html.

  258. 258.

    BRICS (2017) Outlines for BRICS investment facilitation. https://www.brics2017.org/wdfj/201708/t20170831_1829.html.

  259. 259.

    BRICS (2017) BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, https://www.brics2017.org/English/Documents/Summit/201709/t20170908_2021.html, para. 9.

  260. 260.

    WTO (2017) General Council: minutes of the meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 10 and 18 May 2017 (WT/GC/M/167).

  261. 261.

    Ibid., paras. 5.41–5.45 for the comments of the EU and paras. 5.90–5.93 for the comments of Canada.

  262. 262.

    Ibid., paras. 5.20–5.25 for the comments of Brazil and Argentina, paras. 5.27 for the comments of Mexico, paras. 5.105–5.107 for the comments of Colombia and paras. 5.69–5.70 for the comments of Paraguay.

  263. 263.

    Ibid., paras. 5.32–5.36 for the comments of Ecuador, paras. 5.46–5.48 for the comments of Bolivia, paras. 5.98–5.100 for the comments of Cuba and paras. 5.114 for the comments of Venezuela.

  264. 264.

    European Commission (2017) (n. 68), p. 6.

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Xavier Junior, E.C. (2019). A Latin American View on the CETA Investment Chapter. In: Mbengue, M.M., Schacherer, S. (eds) Foreign Investment Under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98361-5_12

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