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The Metaphysics of Domains

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Pluralisms in Truth and Logic

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

Pluralist theories of various sorts commit themselves to the notion of a domain, but what exactly is a domain? In this chapter, I aim to answer this question. I begin by suggesting that the notion of a domain is not exclusive to pluralist theories and is implicit in a number of different philosophical views. I then outline both the semantic and metaphysical aspects of a domain before considering two problems associated with domain individuation that have been posed for truth pluralism: the problem of mixed atomics and the problem of mixed compounds. I show how solutions to each problem drop out of the account of domains given.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I will be using sentences, as opposed to propositions, as the main examples of truth-bearers . See Edwards (2018: Chap. 1) for more on this choice.

  2. 2.

    For examples of domain-based ontological pluralism, see Cotnoir and Edwards (2015) and Edwards (2018). See Lynch (2009) for an example of domain-based logical pluralism.

  3. 3.

    Note that Wyatt (2013) recommends talking of ‘topics’ and ‘domains’ as separate things, with Wyatt’s ‘topics’ loosely corresponding to my ‘metaphysical aspects’, and Wyatt’s ‘domains’ loosely corresponding to my ‘semantic aspects’. I choose to use the word ‘domain’ for both, because I do not think that these aspects can be separated enough to warrant them being called different things, as opposed to parts of the same thing. I hope it will become clear why below.

  4. 4.

    See Edwards (2018) for further development of this idea in relation to social and institutional predicates.

  5. 5.

    Examples of error theory in morality are Mackie (1977) and Joyce (2001).

  6. 6.

    See Haslanger (2012: 89–98) for an extended discussion of coolness.

  7. 7.

    For more on this distinction in relation to truth, see Edwards (2013).

  8. 8.

    The name is due to Armstrong (1978).

  9. 9.

    Note that this is not the most abundant view of properties available. As Lewis (1983) notes, if we take the view that properties are classes (class nominalism), then properties will be more abundant than on predicate nominalism, as there will be classes to which there is no predicate attached.

  10. 10.

    See Edwards (2014: Chap. 5) for more on this view.

  11. 11.

    See, for example, Armstrong (1978). See also Edwards (2014: Chap. 2).

  12. 12.

    This perhaps requires that universals are taken to be the immanent universals favoured by Armstrong (1978), as opposed to abstract universals, and I will assume that here.

  13. 13.

    See Edwards (2014: Chap. 6) for more on this idea.

  14. 14.

    Note that this terminology still applies if we are thinking about properties as classes, and classes as mind-independent. This is because, even if there is a vast number of classes, we still need to make sense of a predicate selecting a particular class, and thus having the particular extension it does, which will be dependent on our practices.

  15. 15.

    See, for example, Hale (1994).

  16. 16.

    By using ‘non-truth-apt’ here I am working through a case where the correspondence theory is paired with some form of expressivism, as opposed to a form of error theory. Regardless of whether the correspondence theory is paired with expressivism, error theory, or indeed a form of fictionalism, a distinction will need to be made between the sentences that are able to be true and those that are not.

  17. 17.

    Lynch (2009, 2013a) just holds that what matters is what a sentence is about, with aboutness encompassing both object and property, which leads straight into the problem of mixed atomics.

  18. 18.

    Eklund (2011) provides an overview. Also see Lynch (2013b) for an argument suggesting that expressivists should embrace alethic pluralism.

  19. 19.

    Compare this thought to the idea that it is a fact about truth that—no matter what theory of truth you have—truth is not a property that can be borne by shirt buttons.

  20. 20.

    As discussed by Stewart-Wallace (2016).

  21. 21.

    See, for example , Lynch (2009: Chap. 5) for discussion of these issues in relation to truth pluralism.

  22. 22.

    For instance, in the discussion above, the rules for the formation of a conjunction are those specified by the axioms of classical logic, where a conjunction is specified to be a compound proposition that is true if and only if each of its conjuncts are true. However, this does not commit one to classical logic in a substantial way, as what it takes for an atomic proposition to be true here can be determined in a number of different ways, in accordance with the general approach of truth pluralism.

  23. 23.

    The account given here is for truth-functional compounds only.

  24. 24.

    Thanks to Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, Jeremy Wyatt, and Nathan Kellen for very helpful feedback on this paper. I’d also like to thank audiences at the Pluralisms Week conference at Yonsei University and the University of Albany philosophy colloquium. Portions of this article draw on material originally published in Chap. 4 of my book The Metaphysics of Truth (Oxford University Press 2018), used with permission of Oxford University Press.

    While working on this paper, I benefitted from participation in the Pluralisms Global Research Network (National Research Foundation of Korea grant no. 2013S1A2A2035514). This support is also gratefully acknowledged.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Utica College, Utica, NY, USA

    Douglas Edwards

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  1. Douglas Edwards
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Jeremy Wyatt

  2. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

  3. University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

    Nathan Kellen

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Edwards, D. (2018). The Metaphysics of Domains. In: Wyatt, J., Pedersen, N., Kellen, N. (eds) Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_4

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