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Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism, and the Problem of Double-Counting

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Pluralisms in Truth and Logic

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

Simon Blackburn has recently alleged that truth pluralism “double-counts”: it distinguishes not only between different kinds of propositions; it (unnecessarily) distinguishes between different kinds of truth. In this chapter, I respond to this objection, arguing that, given certain explanatory goals that quasi-realists such as Blackburn or Price share with the pluralist, either distinction brings a functionally similar one in its wake.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The analogy is Nietzsche (1968, p. 540).

  2. 2.

    Recent examples include (Bar-On and Chrisman 2009; Blackburn 1998a; Ridge 2006, 2009; Schroeder 2008, 2010).

  3. 3.

    See (Lynch 2013a).

  4. 4.

    See for example, (Wright 1998b) and (Lynch 2009, 2013b); in contrast, see (Kölbel 2008) (Cotnoir 2009).

  5. 5.

    The functionalist way of putting the point was first expressed by Pettit (1996) and Lynch (1998); Wright (2013) now interprets his view in a similar way.

  6. 6.

    Expressions of the pluralist position (see Wright 1992; Lynch 2001) have sometimes obscured this point by presenting the position as relativizing or indexing truth realizing properties to domains. As David (2013) has correctly noted, these flourishes are unessential to the truth pluralist’s point. See also Lynch 2013b.

  7. 7.

    A recent sampling includes : Cotnoir 2009, 2013a, b; Edwards 2008, 2018; Horton and Poston 2012; Jarvis 2012; Pedersen 2006, 2012a, b; C. Wright 2013; and C. D. Wright 2005, 2010, 2012.

  8. 8.

    One might also see Jamin Asay as making a similar point (Asay 2018).

  9. 9.

    Quine, interestingly, does not say who these philosophers were. Clearly, though, truth pluralism was, as it were, in the air at this time.

  10. 10.

    Here I refer only to traditional correspondence theorists (see, e.g., Russell 1966 and Fumerton 2002). Such a view should be distinguished from a position—which is intended to be a form of truth pluralism—that says that correspondence itself comes in different kinds (see, e.g., Sher 2004, 2005).

  11. 11.

    Of course Quine himself didn’t think there are moral or modal properties, and Blackburn would agree. These are not the sorts of things we expect to quantify over in our final, most rigorous theory of the world.

  12. 12.

    Wright makes a similar point in his 1998 response to Blackburn (Wright 1998a).

  13. 13.

    Many people have contributed to my thoughts on these matters over the years, including notably, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen , Jeremy Wyatt, and Nathan Kellen—the editors of this volume—and Crispin Wright, Simon Blackburn, Huw Price, Mark Timmons, Mike Ridge, Mark Chrisman, Dorit-Bar On, and Cory Wright.

    While working on this paper, I benefitted from participation in the Pluralisms Global Research Network (National Research Foundation of Korea grant no. 2013S1A2A2035514). This support is also gratefully acknowledged.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

    Michael P. Lynch

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  1. Michael P. Lynch
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Correspondence to Michael P. Lynch .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Jeremy Wyatt

  2. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

  3. University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

    Nathan Kellen

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Lynch, M.P. (2018). Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism, and the Problem of Double-Counting. In: Wyatt, J., Pedersen, N., Kellen, N. (eds) Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_3

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