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The EU’s Policy on the Integration of Migrants pp 133–161Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Why Implement Without a Tangible Threat? the Effect of a Soft Instrument on National Migrant Integration Policies

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics ((PSEUP))

Abstract

This chapter shifts the focus to the implementation phase. It bridges the literature on soft law, compliance and policy instruments to examine the determinants of member states’ responses EU soft provisions. Using multilevel regression analysis, it shows that, when member states have no legal obligation to implement, the main driver of compliance with soft law lies with governments’ preferences. These may be constrained by civil society whilst the financial incentives prove incapable of dragging the preferences of member states towards the EU’s.

This Chapter reproduces the contents published in Van Wolleghem (2017) © 2017 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Despite the fact that the EIF was adopted through Council Decision, the provisions it includes are of a soft law nature. See below for more on this. See also Trimikliniotis (2012).

  2. 2.

    See Chapter 2 for more on this point.

  3. 3.

    Time-series cross-section models are nowadays well known in the academic community so that there is no need to go in-depth on the method here (see notably Beck 2006). Models’ specifics and the data used are detailed in the appendices.

  4. 4.

    Such an approach can be found in inter alia Mbaye (2001), Pridham (1994), Lampinen and Uusikylä (1998), König and Luetgert (2008), Falkner et al. (2005, 2007), Falkner and Treib (2008).

  5. 5.

    So found Thomson et al. (2007), König and Luetgert (2008), König and Mäder (2014), Börzel (2000).

  6. 6.

    On this aspect, see notably Salamon (2000), Gunningham and Sinclair (1998).

  7. 7.

    Different strands in policy tool literature agree on this point; see notably Gunningham and Sinclair (1998), Kassim and Le Galès (2010).

  8. 8.

    For more on this, see Börzel (2001) and Treib (2014).

  9. 9.

    Note that, whilst this chapter looks into an implementation phase close to that of transposition for Directives, Chapter 6 delves into the next phase, close to that of application of Directives.

  10. 10.

    COM (2001) 387 final; see Chapter 1 for more on this.

  11. 11.

    The EIF was adopted on the basis of article 63 (3) (a) relating to legal immigration and ruled by unanimity voting.

  12. 12.

    Council Decision 2007/435/EC, art. 10.

  13. 13.

    Tholoniat (2010: 97) notes that in the first OMCs, members states ‘tended to avoid peer review exercises or simply refused to report on progress’ on sensitive issues.

  14. 14.

    See C. (2007) 3926 final.

  15. 15.

    These indications, so-called ‘specific priorities’, are defined in C. (2007) 3926 final (see Chapter 3 for more on these). They regard inter alia: participation of migrants in integration policies; targeting vulnerable groups; innovative introduction programmes.

  16. 16.

    See Chapter 4; but see also examples in Carrera and Faure Atger (2011: 30).

  17. 17.

    See notably Howlett and Giest (2012).

  18. 18.

    Eurostat data (2014) show conflicting positions in the public’s attitude towards migrants for instance. Note that the public’s preferences as to integration and/or how much Europe there should be in integration policy is more difficult to fathom.

  19. 19.

    As a matter of fact, parties’ policy preferences on the matter change very little over short periods of time. Policy preferences on multiculturalism for the period 1999–2014 have rarely moved of more than one point on a zero-to-ten scale.

  20. 20.

    See the CBPs, Box 3.2.

  21. 21.

    The concepts of assimilation and multiculturalism have been discussed a great deal in the specialized literature (see this book’s introduction). They are here considered as a policy preferences. Assimilation refers to a policy position viewing integration as a one-sided process of adaptation whereby immigrants are to be incorporated into the host society (Brubaker 2001) whereas multiculturalism refers to the acceptance (and sometimes) promotion of long-term cultural differences (Kymlicka 1995).

  22. 22.

    Commission Decision C. (2008) 795.

  23. 23.

    See inter alia Scharpf (2003).

  24. 24.

    For migration, see inter alia Geddes (2000), but see also the INTI programme; that is, NGOs directly financed by Commission for the integration of third country nationals.

  25. 25.

    CSOs overwhelmingly considered the CBPs to be up-to-date and a fundamental framework for national policy-making. See Council conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the integration of third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, June 2014. On the Commission’s progressive position, see Geddes (2000).

  26. 26.

    See appendices for the method.

  27. 27.

    Coefficients are discussed irrespective of their statistical significance since: (a) the study does not rely on representative sampling but on a finite population; (b) the population is rather small; (c) statistical and substantive significance are two different things. See the appendices for more on this. See also Taagepera (2008) and Valentine et al. (2015) for a very interesting discussion on statistical significance.

  28. 28.

    See the appendices for methodological details.

  29. 29.

    The slope is the steepest for CSO low and PO high but implementation begins at a higher level of government salience (5 on the scale). Note however that this line meets the CSO-low-PO-low one towards government maximum salience.

  30. 30.

    See the concept of fire alarm oversight as in McCubbins and Schwartz (1984); policy mix in Gunningham and Sinclair (1998).

  31. 31.

    And here I endorse a definition of Europeanization close to that of Featherstone (2003), in a top down fashion; see Chapter 2.

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  1. Fondazione ISMU and University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem

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Van Wolleghem, P.G. (2019). Why Implement Without a Tangible Threat? the Effect of a Soft Instrument on National Migrant Integration Policies. In: The EU’s Policy on the Integration of Migrants. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97682-2_5

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