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Setting the Stage

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Examining Schellenberg's Hiddenness Argument

Part of the book series: Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion ((PFPR))

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Abstract

Weidner discusses how the notion of the hiddenness of God, or alternatively of divine hiddenness, has its origins in theology rather than philosophy. In that context, the term has been taken in a literal sense, presupposing that there is a God who is in some sense hidden. Weidner elucidates two of the senses in which God has been claimed to be hidden, which include the hiddenness of his presence and essence, and two of the senses in which God has been claimed to be not that hidden, which include the evidence of his existence and energies. By contrast, Weidner clarifies how Schellenberg’s non-literal understanding of the term used in his hiddenness argument refers to the occurrence of what he calls nonresistant nonbelief, i.e., the state of affairs in which someone lacks belief that God exists, even though she is not resistant toward a personal relationship with God.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a start, see the publications in which Schellenberg has been introducing, defending, or developing his argument. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason; id., “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals: A Collaborative Discussion,” in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, eds. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 33–61; id., “Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, eds. Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 30–41, and id., “Reply to Moser,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, eds. Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 54–56; id., The Wisdom to Doubt, 195–242; id., “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” Religious Studies 41, no. 2 (2005): 201–215, as well as “The hiddenness argument revisited (II),” Religious Studies 41, no. 3 (2005): 287–303; id., “Divine Hiddenness,” 510; id., “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” in Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, eds. Adam Green and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 13–32; id., “Divine hiddenness: part 1 (recent work on the hiddenness argument),” Philosophy Compass 12, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12355, as well as “Divine hiddenness: Part 2 (recent enlargements of the discussion),” Philosophy Compass 12, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12413. See also his recent short presentation of this argument for a more general audience in The Hiddenness Argument, esp. p. 103.

  2. 2.

    See, for example, Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Hiddenness of God,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Thomson Gale and Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), 352–357. For a special reference to it under the entry “Philosophy of Religion,” see, e.g.,—in Section 5. “Problems of Evil and Suffering,” Subsection d. “The Hiddenness of God”—Chad Meister, “Philosophy of Religion,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, eds. James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, http://www.iep.utm.edu/religion. And for a short mention of it under the same entry but in the context of introducing the debate about the evidential weight of religious experience, see, e.g.,—in Section 4. “The Concept of God,” Subsection 4.2. “God’s Existence,” Subsubsection 4.2.6. “Religious Experience”—Charles Taliaferro, “Philosophy of Religion,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (first published March 12, 2007, substantively revised September 11, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion. See also, more recently, Trent Dougherty, and Ross Parker, “Hiddenness of God,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, ed. Tim Crane (2015), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-k3574-1, as well as Daniel Howard-Snyder, and Adam Green, “Hiddenness of God,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (first published April 23, 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-hiddenness.

  3. 3.

    See, to begin with, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and Paul K. Moser, eds., Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Kevin Timpe, ed., “Evil and Divine Hiddenness,” in Arguing About Religion (New York: Routledge, 2009), 201–308. See also Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 509–518. J. L. Schellenberg, “Would a Loving God Hide from Anyone? Assembling and Assessing the Hiddenness Argument for Atheism,” in Introducing Philosophy for Canadians: A Text With Integrated Readings, eds. Robert C. Solomon and Douglas McDermid (Don Mills, Canada: Oxford University Press, 2011), 165–168. Again, see Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism,” 30–41, and ibid.—in Part I “Attacks on Religious Belief,” Chapter 2 “Does Divine Hiddenness Justify Atheism?”—also the aforementioned “Reply to Moser,” 54–56, as well as Paul K. Moser, “Divine Hiddenness Does Not Justify Atheism,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, eds. Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 42–54, and Moser, “Reply to Schellenberg,” 56–58. Michael J. Murray, and David E. Taylor, “Hiddenness,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, eds. Chad Meister and Paul Copan, 2nd ed. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 368–377—to be found in Part IV “The theistic concept of God.” Richard E. Creel, Philosophy of Religion: The Basics (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 145–147—‘the Problem of Divine Hiddenness’ is Subchapter 11.4 of Chapter 11 “Arguments against Belief in the Existence of God.” Louis P. Pojman, and Michael C. Rea, eds., “Evil and the Hiddenness of God,” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 7th ed. (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2015), 228–392—to be found in Part III, where the problem of evil is discussed alongside the problem of hiddenness. For contributions to an Internet debate, see John Schellenberg, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof,” in God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence, ed. and intro. Paul Draper, Section IV (2008), http://infidels.org/library/modern/john_schellenberg/hidden.html, and John Schellenberg, “The Sounds of Silence Stilled: A Reply to Jordan on Hiddenness,” in God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence, ed. and intro. Paul Draper, Section IV (2008), http://infidels.org/library/modern/john_schellenberg/silence-stilled.html, as well as Jeff Jordan, “The Sounds of Silence: Why the Divine Hiddenness Argument Fails,” in God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence, ed. and intro. Paul Draper, Section IV (2008), http://infidels.org/library/modern/jeffrey_jordan/silence.html, and Jeff Jordan, “On Joining the Ranks of the Faithful,” in God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence, ed. and intro. Paul Draper, Section IV (2008), http://infidels.org/library/modern/jeffrey_jordan/faith.html.

  4. 4.

    The masoretic text printed in the Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia reads from right to left: (see Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia, eds. Karl Elliger and Wilhelm Rudolph, 5th ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1997)). In the Vulgata, the Latin wording goes like this: “vere tu es Deus absconditus Deus Israhel salvator” (see Biblia Sacra Vulgata: Editio quinta, eds. Robert Weber and Roger Gryson (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2007)). The verb abscondere of which the perfect passive principle is used in this expression means among other things: to hide something, to conceal something; to stash something, to cause something to become invisible; to cover something, to lose sight of someone or something; to keep something secret (see “abs-condo,” in Der neue Georges: Ausführliches Lateinisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch, coll. and prep. Karl-Ernst Georges, ed. Thomas Baier, and mod. Tobias Dänzer, vol. 1 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013), 23).

  5. 5.

    For profound research of some biblical scholars on the subject, see, for example, Samuel Terrien, The Elusive Presence: Toward a New Biblical Theology (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978); Samuel E. Balentine, The Hidden God: The Hiding of the Face of God in the Old Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); and Otto Kaiser, Vom offenbaren und verborgenen Gott: Studien zur spätbiblischen Weisheit und Hermeneutik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008). For a trial of summarising and systemising the biblical accounts of divine hiddenness, see Insa Meyer, Aufgehobene Verborgenheit: Gotteslehre als Weg zum Gottesdienst (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 11–77.

  6. 6.

    Thomas Reinhuber, “Deus absconditus/Deus revelatus,” in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft, eds. Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowski, and Eberhard Jüngel, 4th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 683.

  7. 7.

    Both notions are treated synonymously hereafter.

  8. 8.

    For Schellenberg’s own emphasis on this matter, see, e.g., his Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 4–6, “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 204, or also “Divine Hiddenness,” 509.

  9. 9.

    See on this point also Thomas Gerlach, Verborgener Gott – Dreieiniger Gott: Ein Koordinationsproblem lutherischer Gotteslehre bei Werner Elert (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1998), 25–27. For an example of mentioning a colorful mixture of these phrases in a short encyclopedic entry on the hiddenness of God , see Eva-Maria Faber, “Verborgenheit Gottes,” in Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, ed. Walter Kasper et al., vol. 10, 3rd ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2001), 607. Similarly, some of these terms are also named under the headline of God’s invisibility (see Gerhard Ludwig Müller, “Unsichtbarkeit Gottes,” in Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, ed. Walter Kasper et al., vol. 10, 3rd ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2001), 431–432).

  10. 10.

    Palpably, no reference to the program of, e.g., the French existential philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, or Gabriel Marcel will be made here.

  11. 11.

    This is not to say that the believer claims to always be able to identify the reason why God does not show his presence to her anymore. While, for example, in the Psalms, God’s hiddenness is mainly lamented about as occurring without any conceivable divine reason, the texts of the prophets often designate a reason for God’s withdrawal, namely the sinful or rather culpable behaviour of the believer herself evoking divine hiddenness (see Meyer, Aufgehobene Verborgenheit, 12, 13–39).

  12. 12.

    In this context, one might also think of Jesus Christ’s desperate cry on the cross: “‘Eli, Eli, lema sabachthani?’ that is, ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’” (Mt 27:46).

  13. 13.

    In other words, the notion of the ‘face of God’ being either turned away or turned toward a human being is usually interpreted by biblical scholars as referring to the presence of God which is either withdrawn from or granted to the believer (see Meyer, Aufgehobene Verborgenheit, 17). Whereas, as stated above, the hiding of God’s face, if it occurs, is mainly conceived of as a rather life-threatening state of affairs, there is at least one biblical passage where this is not the case. In the book Exodus, Moses asks God to show him his divine glory, yet God is reported to refuse to turn his face toward Moses not to seriously challenge, but, on the contrary, to save Moses’ life: “‘I will make all my goodness pass before you … But,’ he said, ‘you cannot see my face; for no one shall see me and live’” (Ex 33:19–20). In the gospel of John, a statement is made which may be viewed as a distant echo to the passage in Exodus: “No one has ever seen God” (Jn 1:18; see also 1 Jn 4:12).

  14. 14.

    For the following, see San Juan de la Cruz, “Noche oscura,” in Obras Completas, text rev., introd. and comments José Vicente Rodríguez, instr. introd. and comments Federico Ruiz Salvador, 5th crit. ed. (Madrid: Editorial de Espiritualidad, 1993), 431–487.

  15. 15.

    See, exemplarily, Howard-Snyder and Green, “Hiddenness of God .”

  16. 16.

    These two terms are used synonymously hereafter.

  17. 17.

    The distinction Howard-Snyder and Moser make between an existential versus a cognitive concern from divine hiddenness, depending on whether the term hiddenness is taken literally or non-literally, is a helpful one (see Daniel Howard-Snyder, and Paul K. Moser, “Introduction: The Hiddenness of God ,” in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, eds. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–3). Regarding the former, they mainly refer to the elusiveness of the presence of God, whereas the latter, as will be seen later, points to Schellenberg’s argument. Yet, they as well as Schellenberg (see, e.g., Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 5–6) seem to miss the fact that the literal notion of the hiddenness-term can also point to a certain kind of cognitive concern. In fact, it has been treated as such in the theological tradition, as I illustrate in the next paragraphs.

  18. 18.

    Even though these problems (both the somewhat practical one and the more theoretical one) need to be sharply distinguished, both of them may plausibly occur simultaneously in someone’s life, as Howard-Snyder and Moser rightly notice (see Howard-Snyder, and Moser, “Introduction,” 5).

  19. 19.

    See DH 501, 800, 804.

  20. 20.

    DH 3001.

  21. 21.

    Augustinus, “Sermo CXVII,” in Opera Omnia: Post Lovaniensium Theologorum Recensionem, ed. J.-P. Migne, vol. 5.1 (Paris, 1865), 663.

  22. 22.

    Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 51.

  23. 23.

    Karl Rahner, “Die menschliche Sinnfrage vor dem absoluten Geheimnis Gottes,” in Schriften zur Theologie, ed. Paul Imhof, vol. 13 (Zürich: Benziger Verlag Einsiedeln, 1978), 116.

  24. 24.

    See Karl Rahner, “Über die Verborgenheit Gottes,” in Schriften zur Theologie, ed. Karl H. Neufeld, vol. 12 (Zürich: Benziger Verlag Einsiedeln, 1975), 285–305, esp. 299, 305. For Rahner’s most prominent theology of the mysteriousness of God, see, e.g., Karl Rahner, “Über den Begriff des Geheimnisses in der katholischen Theologie,” in Schriften zur Theologie, vol. 4, 2nd ed. (Zürich: Benziger Verlag Einsiedeln, 1961), 51–99, esp. 80–81. By now, the phrase that ‘God is a mystery’ seems to be part of the active vocabulary of many theologians, even though it is not always as obvious as it could be what exactly they mean when using it (see, e.g., Wilhelm Breuning, “Gotteslehre,” in Glaubenszugänge: Lehrbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik, ed. Wolfgang Beinert, vol. 1 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995), 206).

  25. 25.

    See Rahner, “Über die Verborgenheit Gottes,” 286. Exemplarily, let me point to these few dogmatic references on God’s incomprehensibility. Breuning, “Gotteslehre,” 242–243, 254–255. Johannes Brinktrine, Die Lehre von Gott: Von der Erkennbarkeit, vom Wesen und von den Vollkommenheiten Gottes, vol. 1 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1953), 39–42, 69. Gerhard Ludwig Müller, Katholische Dogmatik: Für Studium und Praxis der Theologie (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1995), 23, 27, 113. Joseph Pohle, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, ed. Josef Gummersbach, vol. 1, 10th ed. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1952), 148–155, 174–176.

  26. 26.

    I agree with Rahner’s assessment on this point, see Rahner, “Über die Verborgenheit Gottes,” 285–286. Regarding the notion of the knowability of God, see, e.g., Wilhelm Trillhaas, Dogmatik, 4th ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 97–119, who in the first section of the first main part of his dogmatics, entitled “The Mystery of God,” names his seventh chapter “Hiddenness of God and Cognisance of God.” Karl Barth also deals with it in this context in his Church Dogmatics. More precisely, chapter one of §27 “The Limits of the Cognisance of God” is “The Hiddenness of God” in which he prominently argues for the claim that God is only known by God alone (see Karl Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik: Die Lehre von Gott, vol. 2 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1980), 200–229). On the other hand, there are multifaceted treatments on divine hiddenness such as by Wilfried Härle, Dogmatik, 4th ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 92–96, 284–286, who writes on “The Hiddenness of God in Jesus Christ” and “The Hiddenness of the Reality of God”. Regarding the hidden God in respect to “The Reality of the Wrath of God,” see Paul Althaus, Grundriss der Dogmatik (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt Berlin, 1951), 31–33. Werner Elert also alludes to it in very different settings; see Werner Elert, Der christliche Glaube: Grundlinien der lutherischen Dogmatik, ed. Ernst Kinder, 3rd ed. (Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1956), 77, 114, 147–150, 155, 231, 280, 284, 343. For an attempt at a clarification of and a critical assessment on Elert’s thoughts, see Gerlach, Verborgener Gott – Dreieiniger Gott. However, there are also publications by Catholics which deal with a diversity of topics under the title of the hiddenness of God . See, e.g., Fernand Van Steenberghen, Ein verborgener Gott: Wie wissen wir, daß Gott existiert?, author. transl. from French and epilogue Georg Remmel (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1966); Walter Kern, and Walter Kasper, “Atheismus und Gottes Verborgenheit,” in Christlicher Glaube in moderner Gesellschaft, ed. Franz Böckle, vol. 22 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1982), 5–57; and Hans Kessler, Den verborgenen Gott suchen: Gottesglaube in einer von Naturwissenschaften und Religionskonflikten geprägten Welt (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006).

  27. 27.

    In what follows, I only refer to proponents of apophaticism in Christianity, while I ignore that apophaticism plays a major role in all world religions. For examples of this from several different religions, see Moses Maimonides, Ibn ‘Arabī, Adi Shankara, and Nāgārjuna.

  28. 28.

    See Plato, “Timaios,” in Platonis Opera, ed. Johannes Burnet, vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 28c, 3–5; 52a, 3. The original Greek wording says that “τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.”

  29. 29.

    Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, “The Divine Names,” in The Divine Names and The Mystical Theology, transl. and introd. John D. Jones, repr. with Errata Corrigenda (Milwaukee, WI: The Marquette University Press, 1999), I.2.

  30. 30.

    This is the case since—given the principle of contradiction—‘It is x’ implies ‘It is not not-x.’ Plotin, “Ennead VI,” in Plotini Opera, eds. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University, 1982), 9.3, 41–42; for more details, see Brian Leftow, “Divine Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2006): 376. See also Plotin, “Ennead V,” in Plotini Opera, eds. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 3.13, 1.

  31. 31.

    See Proclus, Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon, introd. and notes John M. Dillon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 1128, 1191.

  32. 32.

    Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, “The Divine Names,” XIII.3.

  33. 33.

    Anselm von Canterbury, “Proslogion,” in Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1968), II, 5.

  34. 34.

    Anselm von Canterbury, “Monologion,” in Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1968), LXIV, 11.

  35. 35.

    See Thomas de Aquino, “De Potentia,” in Quaestiones Disputatae, eds. P. Bazzi, M. Calcaterra, T. S. Centi, E. Odetto, and P. M. Pession, vol. 2 (Turin: Marietti, 1965), q. 7, art. 5, ad 14.

  36. 36.

    See Meister Eckhart, “Predigt 83,” in Meister Eckharts Predigten, ed. and trans. Josef Quint, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1976), 585.

  37. 37.

    See Nicolai de Cusa, “De Docta Ignorantia,” in Opera Omnia, eds. Ernst Hoffmann and Raymund Klibansky, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1932), esp. chapts. 3, 4, and 26. See in this context also Martin Thurner, Gott als das offenbare Geheimnis nach Nikolaus von Kues (Berlin: Akademie Verlag GmbH, 2001).

  38. 38.

    Nicolai de Cusa, “Dialogus de Deo Abscondito,” in Opera Omnia, ed. Paul Wilpert, vol. 4 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1959), 10.

  39. 39.

    See, for example, John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989), esp. 233–251. For a rather recent German edition on the topic of apophaticism, see Alois Halbmayr, and Gregor Maria Hoff, eds., Negative Theologie heute? Zum aktuellen Stellenwert einer umstrittenen Tradition (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2008). See also Magnus Striet’s habilitation thesis Offenbares Geheimnis: Zur Kritik der negativen Theologie (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2003).

  40. 40.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 3, and, similarly, Thomas de Aquino, “De Veritate,” in Quaestiones Disputatae, ed. Raymundi Spiazzi, vol. 1 (Turin: Marietti, 1964), q. 10, art. 11, ad 4.

  41. 41.

    The idea of these three ways can be traced back to Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, see the first paragraph of the lyrics in “The Divine Names,” VII.3. Yet, on the whole, his “The Divine Names” constitute affirmative theology, whereas his “The Mystical Theology” exemplifies kataphatic theology.

  42. 42.

    Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 22–23. As Thomas Schärtl-Trendel rightly pointed out, for ease of this quote’s classification I need to add that Plantinga defends a strictly personal concept of God opposing any form of classical theism and also apophaticism.

  43. 43.

    For a more thorough treatment of this topic, see Armin Kreiner, Das wahre Antlitz Gottes – oder was wir meinen, wenn wir Gott sagen (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2006), 35–73.

  44. 44.

    Plotin, “Ennead VI,” 9.11, 51.

  45. 45.

    Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, “The Mystical Theology,” in The Divine Names and The Mystical Theology, transl. and introd. John D. Jones, repr. with Errata Corrigenda (Milwaukee, WI: The Marquette University Press, 1999), II. For a pragmatic guide for contemplation and prayer of the later middle ages applying apophatic thoughts for this spiritual way of life which seeks to, so to speak, touch God in the ‘cloud of unknowing,’ see the anonymously published script The Cloud of Unknowing, ed. Patrick J. Gallacher (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997).

  46. 46.

    For a further treatment on this specific notion, see its mention in the dogmatic constitution on the Catholic Faith of the First Vatican Council, Dei Filius, which I introduce in Subchapter 2.1.3.3 Three Models of Revelation, (e) Divine Instruction.

  47. 47.

    In the following, I summarise a way of categorising revelation which has been very influential in the last decades of Christian theology without questioning it. Yet, I thereby do not treat new approaches for classifying revelation as, for example, proposed by Gregor Maria Hoff, Offenbarungen Gottes? Eine theologische Problemgeschichte (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2007). I leave it as a future task to critically discuss diverse categories of revelation and their relation to hiddenness literally as well as non-literally understood.

  48. 48.

    Rudolf Bultmann, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung im Neuen Testament (1929),” in Glauben und Verstehen: Gesammelte Aufsätze, ed. Rudolf Bultmann, vol. 3, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1965), 1.

  49. 49.

    See Max Seckler, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung,” in Handbuch der Fundamentaltheologie: Traktat Offenbarung, eds. Walter Kern, Hermann Josef Pottmeyer, and Max Seckler, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: A. Francke Verlag, 2000), 41.

  50. 50.

    See Seckler, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung,” 42, or also Peter Eicher, Offenbarung: Prinzip neuzeitlicher Theologie (München: Kösel-Verlag, 1977), 48–57, esp. 48. Its respective definition has a crucial impact on one’s view regarding other fundamental terms or topics such as, e.g., faith and its relation to human reason, Holy Scripture, ecclesiology, ecumenism, or the theology of religion.

  51. 51.

    In classical apologetics, it has been the task of a demonstratio christiana to argue that a positive epistemic stance toward Christian theism is reasonable and to elucidate the peculiarity of so-called supernatural knowledge of God in contrast to so-called natural knowledge of God (see Perry Schmidt-Leukel, “Demonstratio christiana,” in Den Glauben denken: Neue Wege der Fundamentaltheologie, eds. Heinrich Döring, Armin Kreiner, and Perry Schmidt-Leukel (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1993), 49). For more information on what natural and supernatural knowledge of God might be, see, in what follows, Subchapter 2.1.4.1 The General Revelation of God, (i) Systematic Classifications, (ia) A Natural Knowledge of God as well as (ib) The Twofold Model of Knowledge.

  52. 52.

    This is not to say that according to tradition God did not reveal “aeterna voluntatis suae decreta,” as it is stated, for example, in Dei Filius (DH 3004). Yet, according to the supernatural concept of revelation proclaimed by the First Vatican Council, as I outline later on, the supernatural content of these eternal decrees of God’s divine will is claimed to be not recognisable by human reason but needs to be accepted by “the obedience of faith ” (Rom 16:26). Also, this does not imply that human beings would not at least be able to learn about the overall aim of and reason why divine revelation takes place at all. Traditionally, it has been claimed to be knowable that they both consist in God’s eternal plan for the salvation of humankind.

  53. 53.

    For other biblical references to the inscrutability of God’s wisdom, see, e.g., the texts of the newer Wisdom literature in the Old Testament (such as Job 11:7, 28:12 and 20–21; or Eccl 7:24).

  54. 54.

    See the letter “Lectis dilectionis tuae” of Leo I. which he wrote to bishop Flavian of Constantinople in 449, DH 294.

  55. 55.

    Unfortunately, there “is arguably no such thing as ‘the’ doctrine of Luther regarding the Deus absconditus which one seeks to find by trying to reconstruct Luther systematically: the Deus absconditus remains a chiffre which is suitable for different theological problems which are by all means related to each other but just not identical” (Volker Leppin, “Deus absconditus und Deus revelatus: Transformationen mittelalterlicher Theologie in der Gotteslehre von ‘De servo arbitrio’,” Berliner Theologische Zeitschrift 22, no. 1 (2005): 66). In the following, just two interpretations of Luther’s notion of the Deus absconditus are presented, one in the main text and one in footnote 62.

  56. 56.

    In the German original, the reading is very unique. “Uberal ist er, er will aber nicht, das du uberal nach ihm tappest, sondern wo das wort ist, da tappe nach, so ergreiffestu ihn recht” (Martin Luther, “Sermon von dem Sakrament,” in Werke, vol. 19, crit. compl. ed. (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1897), 492, lines 22–24).

  57. 57.

    See Otto Hermann Pesch, “‘Unser Gut ist verborgen:’ Der verborgene und offenbare Gott,” in Hinführung zu Luther, ed. Otto Hermann Pesch, 3rd ed. (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 2004), 274–296.

  58. 58.

    Luther does not mention why he claims that this state of affairs needs to obtain necessarily.

  59. 59.

    Martin Luther, “Der Brief an die Römer,” in Werke, vol. 56, crit. compl. ed. (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1938), 376, lines 31–32, and 377, line 1.

  60. 60.

    Martin Luther, “Der Brief an die Römer,” 392, line 29.

  61. 61.

    See Pesch, “‘Unser Gut ist verborgen:’ Der verborgene und offenbare Gott,” 291–292.

  62. 62.

    Volker Leppin offers another interpretation of Luther’s Deus absconditus according to which this notion only refers to the distant majesty of God the Father and God’s unrecognisable essence. “Relinquendus est igitur Deus in maiestate et natura sua” (Martin Luther, “De servo arbitrio,” in Werke, vol. 18, crit. compl. ed. (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1908), 685, line 14). In fact, Luther is saying that God the Father willingly hides from his creatures since God apparently does not want to be known by them (see Luther, “De servo arbitrio,” 685, lines 5–6). And Luther’s phrase of the Deus revelatus is taken by Leppin to be pointing solely to God the Son who is somehow available for humans in that it is possible to learn about and relate to the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth. Hence, according to Leppin’s reading of Luther one would be well advised to concentrate on the saviour who is available in Christ, the Deus revelatus, rather than speculate about the divine depths, the Deus absconditus (see Leppin, “Deus absconditus und Deus revelatus,” 55–69, esp. 68).

  63. 63.

    I owe this distinction to Perry Schmidt-Leukel, Grundkurs Fundamentaltheologie: Eine Einführung in die Grundfragen des christlichen Glaubens (München: Don Bosco Verlag, 1999), 141–142.

  64. 64.

    By this I refer, roughly speaking, to an event which is neither explainable nor predictable as to be happening in accordance with the laws of nature in the actual world.

  65. 65.

    Peter Eicher, Im Verborgenen offenbar (Essen: Ludgerus Verlag, 1978), 35; see also 37–44. Similarly, see Seckler, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung,” 48, 49–50.

  66. 66.

    See Seckler, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung,” 43–48. As Seckler remarks, there is a certain chronological order in which these three revelatory models occurred in history and can be classified thereby (p. 43). Yet, this is not to say that they exclude each other as regards content. In other words, it is the case that they partly overlap in this respect, which is true especially for the first and the third model.

  67. 67.

    To be more exact, Seckler demarcates the third model of revelation in the German original as “kommunikationstheoretisch-partizipativ,” i.e., as being communication-theoretical and participatory (Seckler, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung,” 47–48). But the notion of ‘theory’ which is added to the term ‘communication’ does not, in my view, contain any significant additional information about the meaning of this revelatory concept. Also, the German title of this concept as a whole is rather hard to translate, and even more cumbersome to handle. Therefore, I refer to this concept of revelation by abbreviating Seckler’s expression as ‘communicative-participatory.’

  68. 68.

    See Seckler, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung,” 43. See also Alexander Sand, “Erstes Kapitel: Die biblischen Aussagen über die Offenbarung,” in Offenbarung: Von der Schrift bis zum Ausgang der Scholastik, ed. Michael Seybold with Pierre-Réginald Cren, Ulrich Horst, Alexander Sand, and Peter Stockmeier (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1971), 2. For the following, see Sand, “Erstes Kapitel,” 3–4.

  69. 69.

    See Seckler, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung,” 44.

  70. 70.

    See Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation, 2nd ed., 19th print (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2013), 36. Contemporary proponents of this view include, for example, Richard Swinburne or Nicholas Wolterstorff (see Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine discourse: Philosophical reflections on the claim that God speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)).

  71. 71.

    See for the following Dei Filius, DH 3000–3045.

  72. 72.

    See, for example, DH 3006.

  73. 73.

    To be more exact, the revelatory events, which, e.g., the prophets or apostles reportedly experienced, are briefly referred to without any further description of the details of these events.

  74. 74.

    See DH 3006. The credibility of many of these transmitters of divine revelation , in turn, is held to be guaranteed by their martyrdom.

  75. 75.

    See DH 3004.

  76. 76.

    The following pope, Pius X., explicitly condemned some falsities of the modernists in the decrete of the Holy Office called “Lamentabili” of 1907, namely, inter alia, the erroneous claim that revelation was not completed with the apostles. That is, the magisterium officially proclaimed promptly after Vaticanum I that revelation was actually completed with the death of the last apostle.

  77. 77.

    For the following, see DH 3006.

  78. 78.

    DH 3012.

  79. 79.

    See DH 3007, or, similarly, DH 3011.

  80. 80.

    In fact, I presume that is why Avery Dulles calls this concept of revelation the propositional model or also the doctrinal model (see Dulles, Models of Revelation, 36–52).

  81. 81.

    See DH 3016. Additionally, the capacities of human reason are claimed to be limited because they are irreversibly impaired by original sin (see the encyclical Humani Generis of Pius XII., DH 3875).

  82. 82.

    DH 3015.

  83. 83.

    However, a small restriction is granted concerning the faithful ones and their cognitive possibilities. Namely, their faith is claimed to be able to illuminate reason so that the latter is—with the help of God—at least partly able to recognise the supernatural truths. This is due to the analogy (i.e., in terms of their resemblance) of these truths with the objects about which the human intellect can actually acquire full knowledge (i.e., the so-called religious as well as natural truths—for discussion of them, see the next Subsection 2.1.4.1 The General Revelation of God, (i) Systematic Classifications, (ia) A Natural Knowledge of God), the internal order of the supernatural truths, and their connection with the salvific purpose for which they are disclosed to humankind. Nevertheless, it is also stated that even for the faithful ones the supernatural truths remain covered by darkness in this life, i.e., they are neither fully recognisable nor understandable by reason but remain mysteries (see DH 3016). On the one hand, this understanding of faith does not principally disregard the role which the intellect plays in the act of faith. Moreover, one of the presumed concerns of the authors of Dei Filius may have been to express their rejection of fideism which diminishes the value of reason too much, or even denies that it plays any significant role at all. Nevertheless, it is, on the other hand, quite obvious that reason is at the same time clearly put into its place. In fact, Dei Filius constitutes, according to Josef Schmitz, an explicit refusal of any form of rationalism which is feared to unduly overstate the role of the intellect (see Josef Schmitz, “Das Christentum als Offenbarungsreligion im kirchlichen Bekenntnis,” in Handbuch der Fundamentaltheologie: Traktat Offenbarung, eds. Walter Kern, Hermann Josef Pottmeyer, and Max Seckler, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: A. Francke Verlag, 2000), 4).

  84. 84.

    See DH 3005, 3012. See on this point also Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1.

  85. 85.

    See DH 3008.

  86. 86.

    See DH 3010.

  87. 87.

    See DH 3008.

  88. 88.

    See, for example, DH 3010, 3012.

  89. 89.

    See DH 3016.

  90. 90.

    See DH 3010.

  91. 91.

    See DH 3010. Thus, I presume, without arguing for it, that the traditional (Catholic) concept of freedom is the so-called libertarian concept of freedom referring to a certain kind of inner sovereignty in regards to one’s own volitions and thoughts. As a result, someone is the source and cause of her further volitions, thoughts, and additionally, but not necessarily, also of her corresponding actions, insofar as she has real alternatives, and is able to choose between them as well as, finally, to make a decision. To be more precise, this concept of freedom is not compatible with someone being completely determined by external causes such as, for example, other agents, some conditions of the universe, or any events in the past. Furthermore, I take it that, according to this traditional concept of freedom, exhibiting freedom of will does not necessarily also imply being free in relation to one’s actions, i.e., being free to act on the decision one made.

  92. 92.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 3, q. 55, a. 5, ad 2. More precisely, Aquinas claims that having meritorious faith consists in believing what one does not see. That is, having faith, in general, involves holding certain propositional beliefs. Furthermore, having meritorious faith, more specifically, is conceived of as involving a voluntary element, i.e., being able to and, then, actually deciding to hold certain propositional beliefs about God (see on the so-called Thomist view of faith also Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 138–141, esp. 140).

  93. 93.

    DH 3010.

  94. 94.

    DH 3009. Due to space constraints the well-known critique by the English Deists in the seventeenth and eighteenth century of this alleged role of miracles or prophecies cannot be discussed here.

  95. 95.

    See also Schmitz, “Das Christentum als Offenbarungsreligion im kirchlichen Bekenntnis,” 7. As for the text of this dogmatic constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, see DH 4201–4235.

  96. 96.

    DH 4202.

  97. 97.

    Seckler, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung,” 47.

  98. 98.

    I have to admit that drawing a roughly consistent picture of the instructive-theoretical model of revelation is a comparatively easier task.

  99. 99.

    See also Schmitz, “Das Christentum als Offenbarungsreligion im kirchlichen Bekenntnis,” 10.

  100. 100.

    See DH 4201.

  101. 101.

    See DH 4203.

  102. 102.

    This is the case even though Seckler’s name for this model of revelation , which has the adjective ‘communicative’ in its title, might be misleading in this regard. For the term ‘communicative’ may suggest that the event, which the third concept of revelation mainly refers to, includes a special kind of communication between God and a human being, e.g., an audition in which a human being listens to God’s talking to her. But this interpretation would be mistaken, and, in fact, rather apply to the instructive-theoretical model which highlights that at a revelatory event God informs humankind about the supernatural truths by way of speaking to humankind. It would also go well with the epiphanic model according to which God expresses his will to guide humans mainly in form of divine speech.

  103. 103.

    See Schmitz, “Das Christentum als Offenbarungsreligion im kirchlichen Bekenntnis,” 9.

  104. 104.

    DH 4202.

  105. 105.

    In DH 4203, for instance, the present perfect tense, which is a certain perfective tense used to express the view that an action started in the past but continues in the present time, is used to claim that God has been making himself known (“Semetipsum manifestavit”) to humankind from the start.

  106. 106.

    In DH 4202, for example, the present tense is used to claim that God speaks to human beings (“alloquitur”) as if they were God’s friends, and that God associates with them (“conversatur”) in order to invite (“invitet”) and include (“suscipiat”) them into communion with God.

  107. 107.

    See DH 4203.

  108. 108.

    See DH 4204.

  109. 109.

    See, e.g., DH 4202, 4204, 4207, 4224.

  110. 110.

    See DH 4204. The Catechism of the Catholic Church adds that the so-called private revelations, thereby presumably referring to those events such as in Lourdes or Fatima, do not perfect the already completed public revelation of God. Rather, the purpose of private revelation is to help humankind at a particular period of time to live from public revelation more deeply (see Katechismus der Katholischen Kirche: Neuübersetzung aufgrund der Editio typica Latina (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), 66–67). (By these numbers, I refer to the Catechism’s own counting of its paragraphs, but not to the page numbers on which the passages may be found respectively. In the following, I abbreviate the title of the Catechism and would refer to the quoted passages like this: “KKK 66–67.”)

  111. 111.

    DH 4204.

  112. 112.

    DH 4202.

  113. 113.

    That is, by using the plusquamperfect of ‘revelare,’ which is a special perfective tense used to express that an action started and was also completed in the past, the writers of this passage apparently want to express the view that divine revelation constitutes an already finished matter.

  114. 114.

    However, it is not further specified what this ‘good news’ of God for humankind consists in.

  115. 115.

    See DH 4207, 4208. In the following chapters of Dei Verbum, these two sources of divine revelation and their relation to one another are described in detail (see DH 4207–4220).

  116. 116.

    See DH 4214.

  117. 117.

    DH 4217.

  118. 118.

    See DH 4217–4218.

  119. 119.

    See DH 4229, 4233–4234.

  120. 120.

    I assume this is also what the common expression “the real personal self-communication of God” (see Schmitz, “Das Christentum als Offenbarungsreligion im kirchlichen Bekenntnis,” 10) refers to, i.e., God’s communicating to human beings what God’s will for them consists in.

  121. 121.

    For the following paragraph, see DH 4202.

  122. 122.

    Thus, denoting this model of revelation as ‘communicative-participatory’ makes sense.

  123. 123.

    DH 4202.

  124. 124.

    See DH 4203.

  125. 125.

    See DH 4204.

  126. 126.

    See DH 4202.

  127. 127.

    DH 4221.

  128. 128.

    DH 4205.

  129. 129.

    DH 4205.

  130. 130.

    Yet, it is questionable if the claim that faith consists in an act of both obedience as well as trust is consistent, since, at least at first sight, the two latter notions seem to contradict each other. If ‘trust’ is, however, used as a synonym for ‘obedience’ (and vice versa), then Dei Verbum cannot be read as proposing an account of faith which differs significantly from the one which is outlined in Dei Filius.

  131. 131.

    See DH 4205. This plain reference to Dei Filius concerning the account of faith is made in the first chapter of Dei Verbum, as is likewise the one, for instance, regarding the aforementioned transmitters of divine revelation . That little hint may suffice to indicate that Schmitz’s suggestion of, as he states, a final breakthrough to a deeper understanding of revelation in the first chapter of Dei Verbum (i.e., DH 4201–4206), which is holding a so-called hermeneutic key position for the interpretation of Dei Verbum as a whole, and is also apparently standing in sharp contrast to the compromise texts in the following chapters 2–6 in Dei Verbum (i.e., DH 4207–4235), can, in my view, not stand up to scrutiny (see Schmitz, “Das Christentum als Offenbarungsreligion im kirchlichen Bekenntnis,” 7–10). On the contrary, the majority of chapters in Dei Verbum appear to be compromise texts exhibiting a mixture of rather divergent theological approaches and concepts.

  132. 132.

    See DH 4203, 4206.

  133. 133.

    Both direct quotes are to be found in Seckler, “Der Begriff der Offenbarung,” 47.

  134. 134.

    Paul-Henri Thiry d’Holbach, Système de la nature ou des lois du monde physique et du monde moral, vol. 2 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966), 75.

  135. 135.

    That is, I interpret d’Holbach’s notion of God’s ‘making himself known through revelation ’ as referring to the effects of God’s activity in the world which I discussed above, i.e., as referring to God’s special revelation (or, as it is put in Dei Filius, God’s supernatural revelation).

  136. 136.

    This is the case despite the fact that I am currently discussing the literal notion of hiddenness, that is, to be more precise, two possible ways of how hiddenness in a literal sense was conceived of traditionally (regarding the presence or essence of God), and how hiddenness in a literal sense was denied to obtain in two respects (concerning the effects of divine activity as well as God’s existence ).

  137. 137.

    Yet, as already pointed out, when I am generally talking about revelation in this book, I usually refer only to the intension of special (or supernatural) revelation.

  138. 138.

    Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 51.

  139. 139.

    I am well aware that there is a big debate about the actual authorship of the epistle to the Hebrews, while there seems to be considerable agreement that the epistles to the Corinthians, as well as the epistle to the Romans, were de facto written by Paul. But I leave the treatment of this question to the exegetical experts. Here, I am mainly concerned with the content of these texts which, for simplicity, I label as ‘Pauline.’

  140. 140.

    To be more precise, Paul speaks of the invisible about God (“τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ”) being knowable, which is subsequently specified as God’s eternal power and his divinity (“ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης”), i.e., a divine attribute and the fundamental nature of God. Yet, these lines have often been received as making a claim about the existence of God which can be recognised in the things God has made (for the Greek original, see The Greek New Testament, eds. Barbara Aland, Kurt Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, Carlo M. Martini, and Bruce Metzger, prep. Institute for New Testament Textual Research, Münster/Westphalia under dir. Holger Strutwolf, 5th rev. ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2014)).

  141. 141.

    See DH 3004.

  142. 142.

    DH 3026.

  143. 143.

    DH 4203. Interestingly, no reference to an epistemological process of recognition which certainly produces an output being classifiable as ‘knowledge’ is made in Dei Verbum.

  144. 144.

    See DH 4206.

  145. 145.

    See KKK 36.

  146. 146.

    See KKK 47. See also KKK 39 or 286.

  147. 147.

    In the following, I refer to this kind of knowledge simply by labelling it the ‘natural knowledge’ about God.

  148. 148.

    See DH 3015.

  149. 149.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Contra Gentiles (Turin: Marietti, 1934), l. 1, c. 7. (In this way of citing, “l” is the abbreviation for liber, i.e., the book or volume, whereas “c” stands for caput, i.e., the chapter, in which the text referred to can be found.)

  150. 150.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Contra Gentiles, l. 1, c. 3. As one might notice, Dei Filius speaks of the natural light of human reason (see DH 3004). Yet, Aquinas, to whom the constitution may be alluding, talks about the light of natural reason. Since he apparently uses the notion of ‘human’ reason and ‘natural’ reason synonymously, Aquinas could also be read as referring to the light of human reason.

  151. 151.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1.

  152. 152.

    See, for example, Thomas de Aquino, Summa Contra Gentiles, l. 1, c. 3.

  153. 153.

    Whereas the truth of the former is claimed to be demonstratable by the aforementioned proofs for God’s existence , the truth of the latter is held to be guaranteed (a) by the already mentioned external signs, such as, e.g., miracles or fulfilled prophecies accompanying the revelatory event, and (b) by the credibility of the transmitters of revelation , which is, e.g., secured by their martyrdom.

  154. 154.

    In fact, all truths constituting natural knowledge about God (i.e., all the religious truths as well as all natural truths) are claimed to be knowable by human reason alone not presupposing any religious beliefs whatsoever.

  155. 155.

    In addition, Calvin famously claims that every human being can be aware of the Divine, since everybody has a disposition to belief in God’s existence due to the so-called sensus divinitatis, i.e., a certain innate capacity to recognise the Divine which God himself implanted in the human mind or in the human heart (see Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 43–44).

  156. 156.

    That is to say, traditional (Catholic) theology has been endorsing ontological realism, i.e., the view that there actually is an objective reality which is ontologically independent of as well as external to the perceiver’s existence and her subjective points of view.

  157. 157.

    See DH 3015. The Catechism adds that the mere constitution of man (i.e., being able to recognise that one has neither one’s origin nor destination in oneself and that one possesses a soul (see KKK 33–34) and experience the inner voice of consciousness (see KKK 46)) can serve as a basis to infer that God exists. Also, I should note that, according to tradition, it is the task of natural theology to show that God’s existence cannot only be proven to be true a posteriori, i.e., from the grounds just mentioned, but also a priori (this distinction was introduced, for example, by Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 2, a. 2). Regarding a proof which is made a priori, the object of investigation may just be some theoretical concept of a perfect being, whereby this perfect being can be proven to exist. Then, that perfect being has to be proven to be identical with the theistic God. Thus, as a result, the existence of the theistic God can be proven as well.

  158. 158.

    As is the case regarding natural knowledge of God, I refer to this kind of knowledge simply by the abbreviated phrase of the ‘supernatural knowledge’ of God.

  159. 159.

    See, again, DH 3015. In the German-speaking area, this twofold model of knowledge is mostly referred to as the ‘doppelte Erkenntnisordnung’ or also as ‘Zwei-Stockwerke-Modell.’

  160. 160.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1.

  161. 161.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1.

  162. 162.

    As a consequence, showing that the occurrence of divine revelation can be proven to obtain by reason alone was viewed as one of the main tasks of systematic theology. Because this endeavour was accomplished regardless of the content of divine revelation which was, as already mentioned, regarded to be rather unrecognisable for human intellect, but solely by referring to the external signs accompanying such a divine revelation, it has partly been criticised as being extrinsicistic.

  163. 163.

    See Schmidt-Leukel, “Demonstratio christiana,” 52; for discussion of this notion, see esp. pp. 54–60.

  164. 164.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1, resp.

  165. 165.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1, resp.

  166. 166.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Contra Gentiles, l. 1, c. 3.

  167. 167.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 1, a. 2, resp.

  168. 168.

    See, e.g., Schmidt-Leukel, “Demonstratio christiana,” 52.

  169. 169.

    Using this word may be motivated by the claim that faith owes itself to divine grace, or also by the attempt to further highlight the supernatural or rather divine character of this kind of knowledge.

  170. 170.

    DH 3017.

  171. 171.

    DH 3019. In fact, grace presupposes nature (see Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1).

  172. 172.

    Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, p. 1, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.

  173. 173.

    Of course, it might be objected that God’s creation, i.e., (a) the creatio ex nihilo of the universe, including its boundary and initial conditions, the fundamental laws of nature governing it, and all being in it, as well as (b) the maintenance of this creation in being and motion (creatio continua), also owes itself to some divine action, as does, for example, God the Father’s resurrection of Jesus Christ. In general, there is no doubt about that from a theistic point of view. Here, I am only highlighting what has been regarded as being evident in respect to God. The resurrection of Jesus Christ has usually been viewed as showing that it is recognisable that God acts in the course of the world. Yet, the world itself, which is thought of as owing its existence to prior divine activity, has been conceived of as elucidating the knowable fact of God’s mere existence.

  174. 174.

    See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Contra Gentiles, l. 1, c. 4.

  175. 175.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 205. See also his The Hiddenness Argument, 17, 74–75.

  176. 176.

    See, for example, Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 205.

  177. 177.

    As I will outline in the next chapter, Schellenberg additionally claims that there is a second type of ‘divine hiddenness’ taken non-literally, which also does not presuppose belief that there is a God but refers to the state of affairs in which there are individuals who involuntarily lack theistic experiences , i.e., a state of affairs which might be denoted as the ‘occurrence of nonresistant nonexperience.’ Yet, as I explicate later, Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument focuses on the occurrence of nonresistant nonbelief.

  178. 178.

    See, for example, Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 4, or “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 40–41.

  179. 179.

    This is the title of Schellenberg’s essay in the already cited collection edited by Howard-Snyder and Moser in 2002, Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, 33–61.

  180. 180.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 4.

  181. 181.

    See Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 15–16. On the one hand, Schellenberg is grateful to Penelhum for suggesting to him such a well-fitting title which gets to the heart of Schellenberg’s endeavour that human reason should reject the theological notion of divine hiddenness literally understood, since divine hiddenness non-literally understood obtains in the actual world. Then again, Schellenberg also seems to regret that he accepted this title which Penelhum suggested to him. For since then, Schellenberg’s argument has been mainly referred to as ‘the hiddenness argument,’ ‘the argument from the hiddenness of God ,’ or ‘the argument from divine hiddenness.’ But when a theologian or a philosopher of religion hears about an argument bearing such a title for the first time, she may associate it with certain authors or themes which are not central to Schellenberg’s argument. In light of the obvious potential and, occasionally, actual confusion with the traditional literal notion of divine hiddenness, another term might have been more apt.

  182. 182.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 2–3. For a more detailed account of Schellenberg’s concept of nonresistant nonbelief, see in the following chapter of this book Subsection 3.2.3.4 Subpremise (*4).

  183. 183.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 15–16.

  184. 184.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 35.

  185. 185.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 197.

  186. 186.

    See, e.g., Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 512–513.

  187. 187.

    It may be the case that the literal notion of divine hiddenness (in either one or in both of its exemplifications discussed above) once troubled Schellenberg.

  188. 188.

    See Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 35.

  189. 189.

    See J. L. Schellenberg, “Replies to My Colleagues,” in Critical Essays on J. L. Schellenberg’s Philosophy of Religion, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Special Issue, Religious Studies 49, no. 2 (2013): 273.

  190. 190.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 118.

  191. 191.

    Needless to say, the other epistemic theme connected with the hiddenness of God , which is based on its literal reading and refers to the incomprehensibility of God’s nature, is also puzzling for me.

Author information

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  1. Catholic Theological Faculty, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany

    Veronika Weidner

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  1. Veronika Weidner
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Correspondence to Veronika Weidner .

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Weidner, V. (2018). Setting the Stage. In: Examining Schellenberg's Hiddenness Argument. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97517-7_2

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