Abstract
In this chapter we reflect on the lived realities and consequences of the European Banking and Debt Crisis and the policy responses that sought to curtail its actual and prospective consequences. This is most explicitly apparent in the imposition of what we define as 'Troikanomics' on peripheral indebted countries. In the two case studies on Ireland and Greece that we provide, we are not seeking to retread already well-worn ground. Instead, our objective is to ask how both countries’ journey through the crisis provides insights into the anomalies and anxieties of Troikanomics—highlighting how its mandate and implementation stand in opposition to the foundational aspirations and values of the EU. The legacy of Troikanomics has involved social costs, diminished national autonomy, and endowed a profound sense of vulnerability within the Union. There is an abiding sense that both countries’ history, culture, and values were of little regard in the design and imposition of their austerity reforms. The teams operating under the mandate of the Troika were professional, polite, and well dressed. But all of this belied their true intentions. When they reached out their hand, it was not in solidarity. Rather, it was to sequester what little of the autonomy that 'debtor' nations had left. What ‘solidarity’ there was, was strictly conditional upon their surrendering political and fiscal governance to the Troika.
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Notes
- 1.
See Traynor (2015).
- 2.
Here, the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis (2014) notes that ‘[t]he crisis cannot be characterised as a simple banking systems failure but rather a crisis borne of a wider systemic failure’.
- 3.
It should be noted here that, in its letter seeking a bailout, the Irish government identified the banking sector as the primary cause of the crisis.
- 4.
As Stein (2011) notes, in becoming a member of the Eurozone, Ireland experience a sustained fall in nominal interest rates.
- 5.
For further insights on this point, see Kinsella and Kinsella (2011).
- 6.
For further discussion on this point, see Kinsella and Kinsella (2009).
- 7.
There is a vast body of literature analysing the Greek experience of austerity, at multiple levels. Our analysis aims to avoid restating established facts and numbers as much as possible. See, for example, Doxiadis and Placas (2018).
- 8.
See Bénéton et al. (2017).
- 9.
- 10.
A most eloquent starting point is Galbraith (2016).
- 11.
As Stiglitz (2016) points out.
- 12.
See Kinsella (2015).
- 13.
Stiglitz has noted the manner in which the financial markets turned rogue and attacked the Greek sovereign when the new Socialist Prime Minister Papandreou disclosed the true size of Greece’s budget deficit and debt burden.
- 14.
A question that was raised by one of the authors in Kinsella (2015).
- 15.
See, for example, Spiegel (2015).
- 16.
For a further analysis on this conflict, see Kuper (2017).
- 17.
As it happens, the authors had been invited to participate in a conference call at which Professor Varoufakis revealed this example—to the great consternation, it should be said, of the co-Chairman of the session, former Chancellor of the Exchequer Normal Lamont and David Marsh of the Financial Times.
- 18.
As Blyth (2013) has pointed out, ‘is not a well worked out body of ideas and doctrine, an integral part of economic or any other theory’.
- 19.
The ‘demos’ being, of course, what the EU orthodoxy would pejoratively define as ‘Populism’.
- 20.
There is compelling evidence of the subtle and incremental manner in which this can and has occurred. See, for example, Salter (2008).
- 21.
Lazaretou (2016) has pointed out that ‘[m]igration and poverty are undoubtedly the two most painful consequences experienced by a society in protracted crisis conditions’. She notes that in 2013, 100,000 people emigrated from Greece, tripling the yearly average up to that point with the same pattern continuing through 2014 and 2015. Cited in OECD (2018).
- 22.
In a recent analysis looking at the impact of austerity on pensions in the broader context of fiscal consolidation and longer-term sustainability, Angelaki (2018) notes that the introduction of significant cuts has led to an estimated reduction of pension benefits for current pensioners of close to 50% in certain cases.
- 23.
- 24.
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Kinsella, R., Kinsella, M. (2018). Case Studies: Exploring the Lived Reality of Troikanomics. In: Troikanomics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97070-7_7
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