Abstract
Vittorio Benussi should be considered the empiricist of the Graz School. His emphasis on the primacy of experience was absolutely radical. Moreover, he constantly warned about the perils of constructing global theories holding that to do so inevitably deforms empirical data, especially when researchers are forced to fit the same data into a systematic edifice. This problem, Benussi held, was no less serious when the acquired data was arrived at by means of methodologically sound procedures.
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- 1.
Benussi Archive, Lessons, 1920, box 7, file 14.
- 2.
Benussi Archive, Curriculum vitae, box 17, file 2.
- 3.
Meinong’s letter of reference of 26.12.1918 attached to Benussi’s application for the appointment as full professor (Vittorio Benussi, Personal file, Central State Archive, Rome).
- 4.
Sante De Sanctis’s letter to the Rector of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Royal University of Padua, Rome, 19.05.1919 (Vittorio Benussi, Personal file, Central State Archive, Rome).
- 5.
Benussi Archive, Autobiographical notes, box 14, file 5.
- 6.
As we have seen, Meinong in fact avoided using the terms ‘intentional’ and ‘intentionality’, preferring to refer to the concept of “objectuality” (Gegenständlichkeit) for the mental phenomena characteristic of ‘having something as an object’.
- 7.
In his Grundlinien der Psychologie, as already mentioned, Witasek abandoned the thesis of Sinnestäuschung in favour of Produktionstäuschung, by endorsing the theoretical and experimental results which Benussi had found in the meantime (Witasek 1908, pp. 239–246).
- 8.
Benussi Archive, Psychologie der inadäquaten Auffassung (The Psychology of Inadequate Apprehension), 1913, box 5, file 3. See also Benussi 1914a, pp. 401 f. [346 f.].
- 9.
The cases of inadequate perception refer to an abnormality on the presentational level, not to the Meinongian Objektiv (Benussi 1906b, pp. 153 f.).
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
See Benussi 1914a, p. 402 [347]: “It is, therefore, absurd to speak of sensory illusions, since sense data are by no means assertions or deceptive convictions. But it makes sense to speak of deceptions by the senses. If the senses supply inappropriate data, and when we use this data to build assertions, we are accepting an illusion. If we abstain from any assertion, and if the sense data in question continue unhindered, this aspect does not change at all. Nevertheless, we call them inadequate or unadjusted in the sense that they may lead to deceptive convictions.” Cf. Benussi 1906a, p. 25, n. 1 [157, n. 6].
- 13.
“To perceive an object is to experience its presence.” (Benussi 1925b, p. 2 [192])
- 14.
See Benussi Archive, Psychologie der inadäquaten Auffassung (The Psychology of Inadequate Apprehension), box 5, file 3: “What has to be investigated and systematically classified is the inadequate intuition (Anschauung), and the contribution of different intellectual processes that allow it to arise, which needs to be specified. The moment of conviction is a non-essential side-effect, a fortuitous consequence of an intuition with this or that result, it is quite undifferentiated and accidental, and it does not contribute at all to the characteristics of what is said to be an equivocal illusion and an unequivocal inadequacy.”
- 15.
Benussi Archive, Studien zur experimentellen Psychologie der Gestaltwahrnehmungen (Adäquatheit und Inadäquatheit) (Studies on the Experimental Psychology of Gestalt Perceptions [Adequacy and Inadequacy]), 1910, box 3, file 11. This thesis is repeatedly supported by Benussi: “Errors do not exist in psychology. They only make sense if one considers the intellectual performance of a given process, thus, if one assumes the external point of view that pertains to theories of knowledge.” (Benussi Archive, Curriculum vitae, box 17, file 2)
- 16.
Benussi Archive, Notes, box 16, file 22.
- 17.
With the term ‘Gestalt ambiguity’ or ‘equivocity’ (Gestaltmehrdeutigkeit) Benussi designates the specific property of a given set of real objects serving as foundations for different higher-order objects: “If, on the one hand, different Gestalten (production objects) […] are given on the basis of one and the same complex of sensory objects, on the other hand, the presentations of different Gestalten can be formed, starting from one and the same complex of sensations. This (sensory) complex can be designated “presentationally ambiguous” (vorstellungsmehrdeutig). The Gestalt ambiguity of a complex of (sensory) objects thus, corresponds to the (Gestalt) presentational ambiguity of a given sensory complex.” (Benussi 1906a, p. 23 [155 f.]) Cf. Benussi 1906b, pp. 155 f.
- 18.
“The term ‘A-reaction’ indicates the case in which the subject must refrain from this gestaltic comprehension, and grasp the main line of the figure as an independent and isolated object.” (Benussi 1904, p. 310 [8])
- 19.
“The term ‘G-reaction’ indicates the case in which the subject is asked […] to consider the main line of the figure as part of a whole Gestalt, which is simultaneously perceived, and used for the comparison.” (Ibid.)
- 20.
“Finally, ‘S-reaction’ denotes the case in which the subject is not prescribed a particular reaction, in which case she will react spontaneously in the sense of either A or G.” (Benussi 1904, p. 310 [8 f.])
- 21.
Ibid., Sect. 7, pp. 321–334 [19–31]: Die doppelseitige (A- und G-) Übung (The Double-Sided (A and G) Exercise).
- 22.
Benussi 1904, pp. 413 f. [108]: “As regards the position of the production process within the opposites ‘active’ and ‘passive’, one has to point to the ‘exercise’ characterising both types of reaction. Insofar as exercisability is regarded as a criterion for activity, one is entitled to regard the production process as a form of mental activity.”
- 23.
Benussi 1904, Sect. 20, pp. 395–403 [95–97]: Der Anteil der Farbe an der Täuschungsgröße. Die Verbindung durch die Farbenaufdringlichkeit (The Contribution of Colour to the Size of Illusions. The Connection through Colour Obtrusiveness).
- 24.
- 25.
Benussi 1904, Sect. 10, pp. 392–395 [88–90]: Die Ursache des inadäquaten Vorstellens gegebener Inhalte (The Cause of the Inadequate Presenting of Given Contents).
- 26.
Benussi 1914a, p. 403 [348]: “Whether an inadequate impression is a case of the first or the second kind cannot be inferred through direct self-observation; just as self-observation cannot teach us whether we ‘hear’ a melody in the same sense as we unquestionably speak of hearing an individual sound.”
- 27.
“To justify the changes in terminology”, Benussi (1914a, pp. 400 f. [345 f.]) explained: “In substance, what I understand by a presentation of non-sensory origin coincides with what Meinong qualified as the production of presentations (Vorstellungsproduktion), following the corresponding theoretical remarks of R. Ameseder, who, in turn, was inspired by the precise distinction between content and act of the presentation made by Meinong himself. For Meinong, the contrast with the reproduction of presentations was decisive. On the other hand, Meinong and Ameseder proceeded from the nature of objects in their explanation. Factually, in my view, there is nothing to object. I did not find the term ‘production’ convenient, and I became increasingly convinced of this because of the questions posed by my students. Likewise, the characterisation of the produced presentations by recourse to the (ideal) nature of the Gestalten also seemed difficult to understand and misleading. Only for these reasons I preferred the expression presentations of non-sensory origin, and if possible, the description of these presentations should only be carried out by considering the lack of corresponding stimuli for any sense-organ.”
- 28.
- 29.
With the term Grundlage, Benussi means the objectual basis or foundation (Meinong’s inferiora), on which emerge multiple and different Gestalten, by virtue of otherwise productive acts. As mentioned, the term goes back to Ehrenfels, who used it to illustrate his concept of “Gestalt quality”.
- 30.
Benussi Archive, Auffälligkeit (Salience), 1905, box 1, file 11.
- 31.
- 32.
Benussi Archive, Psychologie der inadäquaten Auffassung (The Psychology of Inadequate Apprehension), 1913, box 5, file 3.
- 33.
Benussi 1913a, pp. 4 f. [9]. “The psychology of time has to investigate the conditions under which the means for understanding time, that is, temporal presentations, are such that the objects which are made accessible to us through them are adequate with respect to actual present-time; it has to establish through which internal events the various relations between subjective or grasped time, and objective or actual time are made possible.”
- 34.
- 35.
Benussi explicitly made his reference points clear in the “object-theoretical” or “phenomenological” analysis: “Fortunately, of late, the insight into the importance of an accurate analysis of the phenomena for any kind of psychological analysis has increasingly spread. In addition to the fundamental works of object-theoretical and phenomenological nature of A. Meinong and E. Husserl, a whole series of detailed investigations stemming from the Würzburg School can also be considered.” (Benussi 1913a, p. 62, n. 1 [51, n. 4]) “Undoubtedly, also time psychology has to expect some advantages from an object-theoretical clarification of the extra-mental phenomena associated with it.” (Ibid., p. 496, n. 2 [356, n. 8]) With explicit reference to Meinong’s theories of complexions, relations and objectives, of which he stressed the importance for the studies of D. Katz on colours and of P. F. Linke and M. Wertheimer on apparent motion and Gestalt illusions, Benussi wrote: “The more one becomes convinced that a-psychologism is of equal importance to psychology, as psychologism for the philosophical disciplines connected with psychology.” (Ibid.) Cf. Benussi 1907b, p. 376, n. 2.
- 36.
Benussi 1913a, Chap. I, pp. 9–58 [13–47]: Die einfachsten Beziehungen zwischen subjektiver und objektiver Zeit (The Simplest Relationships between Subjective and Objective Time).
- 37.
Ibid., pp. 10 f. [14]: “The contrast between intuitive and the non-intuitive can […] become sufficiently precise by saying: if a mere process of presentation is sufficient for the characterisation of the intellectual experiences which are necessary to make present (vergegenwärtigen) an object, then we will be able to call the grasping of this object intuitive; if, on the other hand, these events are insufficient, then we shall speak of non-intuitive apprehension. Thus, one can make present a second through a mere presentation, while the duration of a year requires a peculiar inner attitude […], or the thought: ‘the time between two limits, which can be determined by means of external limits’.”
- 38.
Benussi 1913a, pp. 19 f. [20]: “Self-observation points to two significant factors which are of importance to our problem: on the one hand, by grasping short times there is a growing difficulty in analysing the temporal stretch between the delimiting noises, as well as the two delimiting noises themselves; in the apprehension of long times, on the other hand, the increase in their length is accompanied by an increase in the difficulty of summarising the two delimiting noises as boundary points of a stretch. What is difficult here, therefore, is not the analysis of the temporal stretch from the total experienced impression, but the synthesis of the two boundaries into a close unity. […] Thus, apart from the qualitative differences of the more salient moments between short and long times, there seems to be a qualitative difference between the inner intellectual processes which are actualised in grasping short or long time. The effort to ignore the boundaries during short times contrasts with the effort, during long times, to hold together the limiting noises.”
- 39.
Benussi 1913a, p. 60 [50 f.]: “As soon as we wish to know more about the relations between objective and subjective time, we depend on a comparison of time. In this way, the participation of moments become possible, which do not regard the comprehending of time, that is, do not regard the emergence of a time-presentation, but the comparison of time. […] From this unavoidable interference of the comparison with the experiences actually to be investigated, arises the methodical requirement to question and to decide for each concrete result, to what extent this result depends on conditions related to the origin of the time presentation as such, or to what extent the result depends on processes leading to comparative statements related to the objects of temporal presentations. In other words, and making use of terminology that will be introduced later, one has to question whether one is dealing with a presentational or a comparative eventuality.”
- 40.
Benussi 1913a, p. 174 [130]: “Thus, a comparative statement is not directly dependent on the objective temporal magnitudes, but on the Gestalt with which its limits are grasped. Since this Gestalt is determined by the different degrees of unity among its founding elements, i.e. the delimiting noises, it has to be designated as a grouping or phrasing Gestalt.” Ibid., pp. 107 f. [82 f.]: “Here as there, the objective state of affairs is not important for our statement, but it is the nature of the comprehension (Auffassung), that is, something which already lies beyond a passive sense activity. […] Theoretically, this parallelism is of great importance because it shows that the peculiarities which one encounters in the investigation of the factors on which the production of the middle of a time stretch depends are not specific to time perception. They are as little bound to time perception, as they seem to be bound to the function of sense organs. Rather, they can be found whenever we are considering the comprehension of a distance, or of a gap, whenever there is an opportunity for comprehending, elaborating or forming.” Ibid., pp. 130 f. [100]: “In this regard, the comparison with the so numerous and contradictory explanatory attempts of so-called geometric-optical illusions becomes necessary. Here, too, we tried to make sense-moments responsible for the most diverse types of inadequacy in our presenting, and only recently we began to understand the fact that a moment alien to sensation plays a leading role in all these phenomena, namely the unitary grasping of the given material in a closed Gestalt.”
- 41.
Benussi 1913a, p. 189 [141]: “The above-mentioned absolute impression of a long duration does not arise because we subjectively ‘extend’ the time that passes, but because we estimate it by using data that we gained under circumstances which can subjectively shorten time. […] With regard to what I have said, I am entitled to the supposition that we are usually subject to time-shortening, but not to time-extending illusions.”
- 42.
- 43.
Benussi 1913a, p. 222 [163 f.]: “The magnitude of a ‘duration’ is completely determined by the magnitude of the difference of the temporal instants delimiting it to the same extent as the magnitude of a stretch is determined by the magnitude of the difference of the spatial points circumscribing it. This relationship of dependence is due to the fact that the two phenomena of ‘duration’ and ‘time difference’ between the endpoints, as objects, cannot be separated from each other, and therefore cannot subsist independently of one another.”
- 44.
Benussi 1913a, pp. 222 f. [164]: “This dependence regarding subsistence (Bestandabhängigkeit) on the level of objects, however, does not imply any dependence regarding existence (Existenzabhängigkeit) on the level of intellectual processes, which allow them to be present to us. The temporal difference can be presented and observed independently from the corresponding temporal duration, the spatial difference independently from the spatial distance, which is connected with it only as an object and in its subsistence.”
- 45.
See this Chapter, Sect. 4.3.5.
- 46.
Benussi 1913a, Chap. IV, pp. 198–220 [145–162]: Die Pause (The Pause).
- 47.
Ibid., pp. 234 f. [171 f.]: “With regard to the contrast between content and act, one could also speak, respectively, of content-experiences and act-experiences. In fact, one labels those (objects grasping) processes which are completely free of intuitive, ‘acts’”. Benussi adds: “The contrast between intuitive and non-intuitive would thus be due to the contrast between an apprehension of an object of an act or of a content type. From this would also result that there are no non-intuitive presentations, since the term ‘presentation’ (i.e. imaginative mode of presentification [Vergegenwärtigung]) usually signifies only imaginative contents. […] The controversy about intuition arose only because different modes of presentation were assumed, whereas actually there are only different processes of apprehension.”
- 48.
The distance from Meinong’s position is clear. For Meinong, in fact, the production of non-intuitive presentations took place through the mediation of acts of assumption. See Meinong 1910, Chap. VIII.
- 49.
Benussi 1913a, p. 234, n. 1 [171, n. 12]: “[T]he emphatic pointing out of directional experiences (Richtungserlebnisse) is one of the merits of the Würzburg School […]”. The concepts of Akterlebnis and Richtungserlebnis undoubtedly refer to the “intention” of Karl Bühler, and to the “tendency” (Tendenz) of Narziß Ach, who in turn referred to Husserl’s Bedeutungsintention. On the Würzburg School see Humphrey 1951; Ronco 1963. On the relations between the Graz School and the Würzburg School see Lindenfeld 1980, pp. 225 ff.
- 50.
Benussi 1913a, pp. 208 f. [153 f.]: “By immediately grasping the given times, of the two objects (the ‘complex of the delimiting noises’ and the ‘time interval between the noises’) that are comprehensible and are also actually comprehended, the complex becomes more salient. This (relative) maximum of salience shifts during the pause to the time interval as such, as soon as the whole complex is present by means of immediate mnestic data (these data do not imply the occurrence of actual mnemonic presentations, i.e. intellectual experiences which are due to reproductive processes, but only imply the mental direction to the no longer present object).”
- 51.
Ibid., pp. 209 f. [154 f.]: “This displacement of salience, however, has the consequence that, as soon as the second temporal moment is given, and thus the basis for grasping a ratio of time magnitudes is perfect, objects which are not subjectively homogeneous in all respects are used as basis for comparison. This basis is given, on the one hand, by the presentation of the first temporal moment, which already belongs to the past (whereby, in the first place, this memory-like mental direction is aimed at the temporal stretch as such); on the other hand, it is given by the direct impression of the second temporal moment, in which attention is directed, in the first instance, to the complex of delimiting noises. The objectual moment, which, by means of a corresponding presentation or direction of thought, fills, or at least ‘accompanies’ the expectation of the second temporal moment, is, by its very nature, something quantitative, something to which size adheres. On the other hand, that which completes the basis of the comparison through its addition, and makes possible the formation of the statement, is, by its very nature, something that is not quantitative, but qualitative: the complex, the group of delimiting noises.”
- 52.
Benussi 1913a, pp. 270 f. [196 f.]: “Impressions which are more or less remotely assigned to the objects to be detected can give rise to presentations of a non-sensory origin, to productive presentations, and these can both modify the subjective character of those objects, and indirectly turn attention to moments that do not belong to the actual ones to be compared. Finally, such moments can also have a direct influence on the comparative statement, in that the given circumstances are capable of increasing their salience.”
- 53.
Ibid., p. 258 [188]: “For the resulting statement, the relationship of salience between the proper and the simultaneously comprehended improper objects of comparison is decisive, since the statement is determined by the more salient objects. […] On the presupposition of an equivocally determined basis of comparison, the comparative result is determined primarily by the (relative) nature of the more salient objects, no matter whether these are the proper or improper objects of comparison. However, the comparative statement is based not on the former, but on the latter.” Cf. ibid., p. 282 [205 f.].
- 54.
Ibid., pp. 283 f. [206 f.]: “Inner perception can only teach us about the existence of states of consciousness; in our case, for example, only about the fact that at the present time, and whether at the present time, there is a current presentation of difference in me or whether it exists in me. However, inner perception can say as little about where this presentation of difference comes from, about its source, as an external perception can say about whether there is a causal link between the lighting of a match and the appearance of a flame. Hence, the fact that a comparative statement is based on objects (or impressions) foreign to the comparison does not contradict the evidence of inner perception, for the latter only provides us with knowledge about the instantaneous existence of mental states, but not about their relations.” Cf. Benussi 1907b, pp. 375 f.
- 55.
Specifically, Benussi reported the following data: when space (d) and time (t) of Vs were both larger (or smaller) than those of Ss, the percentage of correct answers was equal to 55.62% (53.12% when they were both smaller), whereas when t of Vs was longer (or shorter), but d was shorter (or longer), this rate was equal to 31.87% (36.24%).
- 56.
Benussi 1913a, pp. 287 f. [209 f.]: “This tendency […] is due to the fact that, under the same circumstances, the temporal differences are much more salient than the spatial ones. Although the temporal differences are foreign to comparisons from an intentional point of view, they strongly determine the result of the comparison. It should also be noted that the temporal differences act even more indirectly on the apparent spatial difference, in that the points following one another are grouped together, and grouping, as we already know, operates both on temporal and spatial levels, by diminishing what is contained in the ‘group delimitation’.”
- 57.
Benussi Archive, Experimental-Psychologie der Phantasie- und Vorstellungsvorgänge (Experimental Psychology of the Imaginative and Presentational Processes), 1906/07, box 1, file 23.
- 58.
Ibid. Cf. Benussi Archive, Ein Beispiel zur Einmischung uneigentlicher Vergleichsgroößen (An Example of the Intrusion of Improper Comparison Magnitudes), 1906, box 1, file 22.
- 59.
Benussi 1913a, Chap. VI, pp. 272–339 [199–246]: Zeitgröße und Begrenzungsart (Time Magnitude and Types of Boundary).
- 60.
Ibid., pp. 300 f. [218 f.]: “If the greater attentional time (Aufmerksamkeitszeit), and hence the greater present-time (Gegenwartszeit) fall on the first note (the sound at the beginning), then it seems to us as if it ceases a little later – the following short time must thus must be subjectively shortened; if, instead, the greater attentional time is directed toward the final sound, then the apparent magnitude of the temporal stretch must change in the opposite direction.”
- 61.
- 62.
Benussi 1913a, p. 387 [279]: “These [lights] are not presentified by means of two successive acts, but by a single act of Gestalt presentification, and they are experienced as non-simultaneous. The direction of this ‘non-simultaneous’ comprehending depends only on the difference of salience of the two lights, i.e. on whether the grasped Gestalt has a closed character.”
- 63.
Benussi 1913a, p. 390 [281]: “The distribution of attention determines an earlier grasping, that of salience, a grasping as earlier of a given light; but both the ‘earlier’ and the ‘as earlier’ are explained in terms of ‘precedence’.”
- 64.
Benussi 1913a, p. 501 [358]: “In any case, every attempt that considers memory to be involved in the development of time-consciousness suffers from being a tautology: is it not more natural to think of time consciousness as being a condition of memory?”
- 65.
Ibid., p. 503 [360 f.]: “It seems to me to be out of the question that the inner process which allow temporal apprehension (Zeitauffassung) to unfold are intimately related to those intellectual (Gestalt-comprehending) processes which give us a mental direction toward melodies, differences, and distances in general, and further, in a similar way, that the presentification of time (Zeitvergegenwärtigung) is most likely attributed to the group of presentations which we call productive presentations or presentations of a non-sensory origin.” Cf. ibid., p. 8 [12].
- 66.
Ibid., p. 505 [362]: “Here, too, as is obvious, we find ourselves conceptually embarrassed, and at present, there is no trustworthy path toward clarity. Actually, the matter is far worse, for we are not even able to grasp our embarrassment at its roots, and thereby we cannot take a first step towards the resolution of the question, which would require understanding the obstacles that need to be overcome.”
- 67.
Benussi Archive, Notes, box 16, file 22.
- 68.
In this regard, Husserl introduced the example of unstable perceptions, that is, perceptual situations in which, faced with the same set of sensory data, a conflict develops between two different apperceptive interpretations of the same complex (mannequin – real person). Husserl used this example on several occasions; see, e.g., Husserl 1948, pp. 99 f.; Eng. 92 f.
- 69.
Benussi’s work – especially his research on time consciousness – did not escape Husserl’s notice and he kept a copy of Benussi’s Psychologie der Zeitauffassung (see Hoofdwoordencataloog – 09.04.87) in his library. Benussi is also expressly mentioned in some of Husserl’s manuscripts (D 13 III / 208a; K II 4 / 59–62; BQ 27 / Vorbl.). Cf. Schuhmann 1975.
- 70.
Of course, beyond the often very surprising affinities between Husserl and Benussi’s projects, a fundamental difference remains: while Husserl’s genetic phenomenology programmatically intended to be an eidetic investigation, designed to bring out the necessary stages through which intentional experience is formed, Benussi’s project was an empirical and experimental investigation of the stages or phases, that can be determined empirically, through which our consciousness of objects is constituted in time. It made use of the instruments available to the experimental psychologist at the time: tachistoscopic presentations of visual and acoustic stimuli of different temporal amplitudes, increases or decreases in the intensity and brightness of the elements of Gestalt complexes, increases, reductions and rotations of visual Gestalten – techniques which were of great importance to cognitive psychology during the last decades. The use of these techniques aimed to analyse the Teil- or Vorgestalten, characterised by a relative mutability in the relationship between their parts, and their tendency to gradually take on a more stable shape.
Benussi’s research on Gestaltzeit (Gestalt Time) (Benussi 1914a; cf. Benussi Archive, Die Gestaltzeit, 1912, box 4, files 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9) has to be placed in this framework. The Gestaltzeit being the time required by the apprehensive act in order for the sensory data to gradually organise themselves into (relatively) stable percepts. Benussi used figural complexes attributable to well-known illusory figures and tachistoscopically projected some of their figural elements (e.g., the slanting segments of the Müller-Lyer figure) with different exposure times (brief, indifferent, long), while assessing the exposure time necessary for the occurrence of the maximum illusory effect, or for the full implementation of a grouping or Gestalt attitude. He discovered that this time was variable, depending on the constitutionally analytical or synthetic tendency of the observer.
- 71.
- 72.
Husserl then goes on to the formations of pure actuality, to the constitution of the individuality of the monad, to the inter-monadicity, and the implication of a monad in the genesis of another, to finally conclude with the intersubjective constitution of a single world, which is intersubjectively valid for all subjects. In the 1930s Husserl would calls this double, outward and backward movement Abbau-Analyse (deconstruction analysis) and Aufbau-Analyse (construction analysis).
- 73.
- 74.
Benussi Archive, Auffälligkeit (Salience), 1905, box 1, file 11.
- 75.
Ibid.
- 76.
Benussi Archive, Notes, box 16, file 22.
- 77.
Koffka 1935, p. 147: “In the first place, under certain circumstances, we find the field organisation dependent upon attitudes, i.e. forces which have their origin not in the surrounding field at all, but in the Ego of the observer. This is a new indication that our task of investigating the surrounding field alone is somewhat artificial, and that we shall understand its organisation completely only when we study the total field which includes the Ego within its environment.” Cf. ibid., pp. 319 ff., 519 ff., 594 ff.; Köhler 1947, pp. 123 ff.; Metzger 1954, pp. 81 ff. and Chap. VIII.
- 78.
- 79.
Benussi Archive, Notes, box 16, file 22: “[T]he (apparent) motion represents the perfect synthesis of spatial and temporal perceptual data, fused together in a single non-sensory perception: that of motion.”
- 80.
The most important were Schumann’s tachistoscope, and a slide projector or slider device (Schieber) of his own invention. The front part of the device was made of two laminae with slots. One foil was fixed, while the other was fitted with a handle and could be made to slide forward and backward behind the first.
- 81.
In addition to (1) the time interval between stimulus exposures, Wertheimer varied: (2) the distance between the stimuli, (3) the form, (4) the colour, (5) the intensity and (6) the mutual relationships of the two stimulus objects. He also introduced further objects in the exposure field, and considered the effects of the “variations in subjective behaviour”, which included prolonged observation, positions or attitudes, and attention to a focal point.
- 82.
Wertheimer 1912, p. 251; Eng. 78: “The basic supposition here is that the excitatory processes in the stimulated cells themselves (received from the periphery or through “associative connections”), or the sum of these individual excitations, is not at all that is essential: rather, characteristic transverse and holistic processes [Quer- und Gesamtvorgänge], resulting from the stimulation of individual loci – perhaps as a point of incidence, as a specific whole of greater scope – must play an important role, directly relevant for some factors that still need to be clarified psychologically.”
- 83.
Ibid., p. 252; Eng. 79 f.: “With a favourable temporal sequence of the onset of the two spreading activations of a and b, cross-over of an excitation occurs, but if t is very short, then the spreading begins to make its appearance too close to simultaneity to enable the directional short circuit. But in this case, what would occurs initially for certain effects is a kind of physiological connectedness and indeed a uniform overall process [Gesamtprozess], resulting as a whole from the individual physiological excitations: a simultaneous φ function.”
- 84.
Paul Ferdinand Linke (1876–1955) should be mentioned among the most significant scholars who, starting from the study of stroboscopic motion, contributed to the renewal of the conception of Gestalt in the early decades of the 1900s. He was a former pupil of Wundt, and vigorously rejected associationism and the constancy hypothesis. He devoted a part of his Grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre (Basic Issues of the Theory of Perception) (Linke 1918) to a criticism of Wertheimer’s interpretation of the results of his experiments on apparent motion. Linke himself had faced the same problem in 1907 (Linke 1907; see also Linke 1915, 1916), presenting his identification theory and the importance of fusion phenomena associated with stroboscopic motion.
- 85.
As Wertheimer himself wrote when summarising his analyses on the Gestalt principles or laws in his “Investigations on Gestalt Principles. I” (Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt. I.) (Wertheimer 1922, pp. 54–55): “The core of the statements can be found in the general sentences at the end of the “Experimental Studies on Seeing Motion” (Zeitschr. f. Psych., 1912, pp. 91–92, especially footnote 3) in a pure physiological terminology; in only physiological terms because of the great burden carried by the usual psychological and epistemological concepts.”
- 86.
Benussi 1912, pp. 41 f. [306]: “The apprehension (Auffassung) of a uniformly appearing positional change is motion perception.”
- 87.
Curiously, those were the days during which both Wertheimer and Benussi were taken into account by the University of Prague for a chair at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Charles University, which was vacated after the retirement of Anton Marty, and which was to be assigned to an experimental psychologist (cf. Ash 1995, p. 133). Despite the efforts of Christian von Ehrenfels, president of the appointed commission, neither Wertheimer nor Benussi received the summons, the first most likely because of his Jewish origins, the second because of his nationality. To this was added the hostility of the orthodox Brentanians’, especially of Marty’s pupils Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kastil, who had considerable influence within the faculty.
- 88.
Adhémar Gelb (1887–1936), a student of Carl Stumpf who had initially supported his theses about the status of Gestalt qualities in his dissertation of 1911 (Gelb 1911), after moving to Frankfurt became an ardent advocate of Wertheimer’s theories.
- 89.
The Congress also included Edgar Rubin, who presented a preliminary report on his seminal research on reversible configurations (Rubin 1915b).
- 90.
Benussi underlined that in individuals born blind the impression of apparent motion develops in an even more clear and evident manner than in people with normal vision, although the latter have a more pronounced ability to deliberately influence the organisation of motion.
- 91.
“[…] beside a number of general laws of form, [I could] establish the law of the tendency to a simple Gestalt (law of the ‘Prägnanz of the Gestalt’).” (Wertheimer 1914, p. 148)
- 92.
Studying stroboscopic motion in the visual field, Gelb had discovered that three lights arranged in a straight line and flashing in sequence, tended to be perceived as equally spaced, even when there was a threefold distance between the first and the second light compared to the distance between the second and the third – a perceptual effect very similar to the tau-phenomenon discovered by Benussi. Gelb also obtained similar results for other sensory modalities. The perceptual system thus operated with a clear tendency towards symmetry, “in line with the laws of Gestalt (discovered by Max Wertheimer, but not yet published […])” (Gelb 1914, p. 42).
- 93.
“Vom Congress hier möchte ich dies berichten, dass sich zwischen Benussi und mir lange Gestaltgespräche ergaben, die mich sehr freuten: Benussi, den ich früher nicht näher kannte, scheint mir ein höchst erfreulicher Mensch! Wir verstehen uns auch theoretisch ausgezeichnet miteinander, wie wir zu unserem beiderseitigen Erstaunen erfreut […] weiter feststellten.” Max Wertheimer’s letter to Christian von Ehrenfels, Göttingen, 10.04.1914, Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für österreichische Philosophie, Graz.
- 94.
In this work, Bühler had analysed the different research orientations in the study of Gestalt perception, and experimentally determined the psychophysical differential thresholds for Gestalt perception of both the spatial and acoustic-temporal proportions. The book attracted Benussi’s attention, who reviewed it extensively in Benussi 1914f.
- 95.
The full title of the journal was: Die Geisteswissenschaften. Wochenschrift für das gesamte Gebiet der Philosophie, Psychologie, Mathematik, Religionswissenschaft, Geschichtswissenschaft, Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft, Kunstwissenschaft, Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft, Gesellschaftswissenschaft, Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Militärwissenschaft, Länder- und Völkerkunde, Pädagogik.
- 96.
To these must be added the polemic against behaviourism lead by Köhler in the early 1930s. See Köhler 1933, Chap. I.
- 97.
Koffka 1915, p. 26: “When establishing Gestalt ambiguity, and beyond any theory, what must be considered a fact? Obviously, it is that the same stimulus can determine different experiences […]. But B[enussi], as we have seen, expresses this fact differently: he does not only speak of a constant stimulus, but also of constant sensory material.”
- 98.
- 99.
- 100.
Ibid., p. 16: “The production process, which is alien to the sensations and to judgment, is carried out by sensations, which often proceeds starting from sensations in a perceivable temporal development.”
- 101.
See this Chapter, Sect. 4.5.1.
- 102.
Benussi Archive, Notes, box 16, file 22.
- 103.
The reference is to Dewey 1903, and to Rahn 1913. But while Dewey’s, and more generally the North American functionalists’, concepts were guided by evolutionary and instrumentalist considerations, Koffka’s and the gestaltist’s interests were mainly ontological and physiological (cf. Ash 1995, p. 145).
- 104.
As Ash suggested (1995, p. 143), the reference is probably to the concept of a “biologically appropriate” stimulus by Ludwig Edinger (1855–1918), the German neurologist who founded the first German Neurological Institute at the University of Frankfurt, and who can be considered the founder of neuroanatomy.
- 105.
In correspondence to his functionalist approach, Koffka emphasised “that many of these deviations have a tremendous teleological and biological value; they are, with respect to our behaviour, precisely characterised by their adequacy” (Koffka 1915, p. 65).
- 106.
Koffka had essentially branded Benussi’s scientific approach as flawed, due to his philosophical prejudice in considering consciousness to be unintelligible on a purely material basis: Produktion could therefore be considered the umpteenth deus ex machina.
- 107.
Benussi 1917, p. 61, n. 2: “Koffka rightly notes (and this seems to me to be the main point) that ‘ambiguity’ cannot be a criterion for Gestalt perception, because it can also be found in the undisputable sensory field. Lately this has also been imposing on me, in terms of a self-objection, in opposition to my earlier statements in this respect, and this is on the basis of the following experiment, which is a variation of an older one, of Meyer and Wundt […]: about 20 grey small discs are arranged on a half red and half green background, so that half of the circle appears on a red background and the other half on a green one; the contrast effect diminishes when the circle Gestalt is analytically observed. The same experiment […] is also quoted by Koffka.”
In reality, this “self-objection” was made by Benussi as early as 1907. In an unpublished manuscript of that year (Zur Einführung in das Arbeitsgebiet experimentalpsychologischer Forschung [Introduction to the Field of Study of Experimental-Psychological Research], 1907, Benussi Archive, box 2, file 2) Benussi, starting from a further variation of the experiment described above, concluded: “The inadequacy of a colour is greater, the less one can abstain from perceiving the colour of the background while observing it.” This was a clear admission of the influence of the subjective setting on the phenomenon of antagonist chromatic contrast, which Benussi at all other times cited as a paradigmatic example of the presentational inadequacy of sensory origin.
- 108.
Benussi Archive, Notes, box 16, file 22.
- 109.
Metzger 1954, p. 82: “Gestalt theory is […] not at all ‘opposed to attention’. Careful readers cannot have had the impression that it regards subjects or their organs of perception as a ‘tabula rasa’ or a wax plate, into which stimuli simply ‘imprint’ something. […] Rather, in this theory, the effects of attention, of the direction of observations, of modes of apprehension, have a very definite place, as special cases of the effect of the whole on the parts (Ganzbestimmtheit der Teile). Again, it merely opposes the unjustified claims of theories of perception based on attention, observation, and comprehension, which are not to be preferred to other, just as possible theories, without first thoroughly examining the domains in which they are valid.”
- 110.
In the first article of the new journal, Stern outlined the nature and the tasks of “Applied Psychology” (Stern 1903) and also coined the term Psychotechnik. In 1908, Stern turned the journal into the Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie und psychologische Sammelforschung (Journal of Applied Psychology and Psychological Collective Research), that he directed with Otto Lipmann. This became the organ of the homonymous Institut für angewandte Psychologie und psychologische Sammelforschung (Institute of Applied Psychology and Psychological Collective Research), founded two years earlier, with the support of the Gesellschaft für experimentelle Psychologie (Society for Experimental Psychology), of which Stern was director and Lipmann secretary.
- 111.
A part of Krafft-Ebing’s research was on the relationship between psychiatry and criminal law. Already during his Strasbourg period, Krafft-Ebing published the Grundzüge der Kriminalpsychologie (Principles of Criminal Psychology) (Krafft-Ebing 1872) followed, in 1875, by the massive Lehrbuch der gerichtlichen Psychopathologie (Textbook of Judicial Psychopathology) (Krafft-Ebing 1875).
- 112.
It is perhaps no coincidence that criminology, which entails a close interdisciplinary collaboration especially between law and psychology, came to light in Austria during the late nineteenth century. It was in fact during that period, and especially in Austria, that the traditional idea of a subject with a personal autonomy was questioned. The Ego, traditionally conceptualised as a rational, unitary and autonomous entity, gradually came to be conceived as intrinsically interwoven with forces and demands not under its control, thus leading to its malleability and dissolution. It becomes less and less capable of attributing sense to the world in a meaningful way, by selecting and ordering the multiplicity of realities, as well as by consistently shaping itself through arts, sciences and law. Not only psychoanalysis undermined the comforting image of the self as guided by rational forces; this idea permeated literature (one need only think of Hofmannsthal and Musil), art (the Viennese Secession) and the first Austrian twentieth-century philosophy (see Ernst Mach). This crisis of the subject was a theme in literature, philosophy and art during the early twentieth century, having great implications for key concepts in criminal law. Guilt, responsibility and imputability, fraud and crime presuppose a strong and conscious Ego, a subject able to make rational and responsible decisions. Gross and other jurists felt that the law, and particularly criminal law, needed to move beyond the crisis, beyond an awareness of the “dissolution” of the Ego. It had to attempt to (re)-construct the possibility of founding individuals’ personal responsibility for actions and omissions – an aspiration that could only take place with the contribution of scientific knowledge – in the first instance that of psychological science. This involved a commitment of jurists to reforming and improving the definitions of their categories, making them more appropriate to the new psychosocial context, without giving up the essential governing and regulating functions of the law.
- 113.
Gross himself published a contribution on Tatbestandsdiagnostik (Gross 1905a).
- 114.
From this point of view, Wertheimer and Klein can be considered as the most remote forerunners of the lie-detector test, even though they mainly considered psychological symptoms, rather than physiological (or psychophysiological) symptoms to indicate falsehood.
- 115.
Wertheimer would devote numerous other contributions to the psychological diagnosis of a fact, from his doctoral thesis (Wertheimer 1905), submitted in Würzburg at the Institute of Psychology directed by Külpe, to the research carried out in collaboration with Otto Lipmann (Lipmann and Wertheimer 1908).
- 116.
“The Associations of Normal Subjects” (Experimentelle Untersuchungen über Assoziationen Gesunder) (Jung and Riklin 1904–1905), Jung’s first and most important contribution on this subject, indicated that the Swiss psychiatrist was a rigorous scholar in terms of methodology, and extremely attentive on an epistemological level. Jung described in detail how he attempted to avoid systematic errors and influences of the experimental context; how he introduced interfering variables (background noise, etc.); how the differences in the results obtained by individuals who were more or less educated, male or female could be interpreted; what kinds of inferences could be legitimately made from the results, and so on.
- 117.
Benussi Archive, Lessons, 1926/27, box 12, file 7.
- 118.
Benussi Archive, Lessons, 1920, box 7, file 14.
- 119.
Benussi referred here explicitly to Meinong’s observations on lies (Meinong 1910, pp. 116–120).
- 120.
The unreliability of opinions was particularly evident in the cases in which almost all experts believed they had witnessed a lie, simply because the subject was confused while speaking. Benussi commented: “How often does an examining magistrate find himself a similar situation when, just like most people, he only uses logical deductions as a criterion of truth but not expression, voice, or attitude, etc.! The significance of sincerity, which one ascribes to contradiction, in its exclusiveness is only based on psychological ignorance.” (Benussi 1914b, p. 252; Eng. 58) It should also be taken into consideration that experts tend to consider true statements to be false rather than false statements to be true. “This implies the expression of a non-humanitarian trait which, perhaps, in reality is more common than we are generally inclined to believe.” (Ibid., p. 253; Eng. 58)
- 121.
In Benussi’s experiments, respiratory diagnosis failed only in a single case of truthful testimony and in one untruthful case, because of accidental abnormalities which could be attributed to the specific experimental context.
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Antonelli, M. (2018). The Graz Period. In: Vittorio Benussi in the History of Psychology. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 21. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96684-7_4
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