Abstract
Personnel economics is the study of contracts between workers and firms. The principal (the employer) hires an agent (the worker) to perform a series of tasks. However, the principal and agent share neither the same underlying objectives nor information sets. This chapter illustrates how research in economic history can help to address challenges relating the employment relationship, including hiring, training, job assignments, and compensation.
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Notes
- 1.
The assumptions of risk neutrality and profit maximisation are for the sake of modelling convenience. Many of the underlying conclusions of personnel economics fundamentally do not rely on these assumptions. For example, the nature of firm/worker contracts is much the same in non-profit organisations .
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Seltzer, A. (2018). Human Resources and Incentive Contracts. In: Blum, M., Colvin, C. (eds) An Economist’s Guide to Economic History. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96568-0_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96568-0_22
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