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Changing Tack (1976–1977)

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The Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the United States
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Abstract

This chapter follows the process of political liberalization instigated by the Shah in 1976–1977 and examines its root causes. Some time in the mid-1970s, the Shah decided that he should gradually transform the nature of governance in Iran from royal autocracy to constitutional monarchy. The literature has long maintained that the policy shift was a reaction to the advent of Jimmy Carter as US president in November 1976. His campaign emphasis on human rights, morality and militarism were perceived by political forces in Iran as the “Carter ambiguity” toward the Shah. That notion soon created a potent political dynamic that prefaced the Revolution. The author argues that, although the Carter factor cannot be dismissed totally, the Shah’s decision to change tack was rooted in dynastic concerns related to the aggravation of his medical condition in that period.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A Senate sub-committee chaired by Senator Church—as well as two House committees chaired respectively by Otis Pike and Lucien Nedzi—was investigating abuses by the CIA and other agencies in relation to the above topics. Another congressional committee held hearings on the Northrop bribery scandal.

  2. 2.

    Key critics in Capitol Hill were Frank Church, William Proxmire, Hubert Humphrey, J. W. Fulbright, Edward Kennedy, Robert Byrd and Representative Otis Pike; among cabinet officers from the Nixon and Ford administrations, Defense/Energy Secretary James Schlesinger and Treasury Secretary William E. Simon were known to be unfriendly.

  3. 3.

    On Chomsky’s pro-Khmer Rouge campaign, see William Shawcross, Quality of Merci; Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), chapter 3.

  4. 4.

    Parviz Radji, In the Service of the Peacock Throne: The Diaries of the Shah’s Last Ambassador to London (London: Trafalgar Square Publishing, 1983), 15.

  5. 5.

    Comte Alexandre de Marenches (former French external intelligence service chief) and Christine Ockrent, Dans le Secret des Princes (Paris: Stock, 1986), 249.

  6. 6.

    For specific instances where the Shah saw underhand tactics by Israel, see Alam Diaries, Ibex ed., 6.234 and 6.242–3, entries for September 7 and 12, 1976; see also Sick, All Fall Down, 106.

  7. 7.

    Memoranda of Conversations with Ford, August 13, 1976, Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Box 20. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/Memoranda_of_Conversations.asp

  8. 8.

    Kimche, The Last Option, 195–6; Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 57.

  9. 9.

    The two sub-committee staffers, Robert Mantel and Geoffrey Kemp, were described by Kissinger as anti-Iranian; see New York Times, August 2, 1976.

  10. 10.

    Bill, The Eagle and Lion, 211.

  11. 11.

    Alam Diaries, Ibex ed., entries for June 21 and 27, 1977, 6–496, 6.506.

  12. 12.

    Alam’s conversation with Senator Birch Bayh, entry for September 7, 1976; ibid., 2.236.

  13. 13.

    National Intelligence Estimate (para. I.1–5), May 9, 1975, FRUS (1973–6), vol. 27, doc. 121.

  14. 14.

    Full text of the Ford–Shah correspondence dated respectively October 29 and November 1, 1976, in Alam in The Shah and I, 520–1.

  15. 15.

    For a frank admission of deliberately spreading false information by a student activist abroad, see, Dr. Ahmad Karimi Hakkak interview in Mandana Zandian, ed., baz’khani’e dah shab (Re-reading of the ten nights [of poetry-reading at Goethe Institute, Oct 1977]) (Hamburg: Homayoon Foundation Publication, 2013), 93ff.

  16. 16.

    See New York Times, November 29, 1976 (World News Brief).

  17. 17.

    Agheli, Roozshomar, 2.315.

  18. 18.

    John Kifner, New York Times, May 30, 1979.

  19. 19.

    Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had personally briefed the mission; Alam in The Shah and I, January 19, 1976, p. 463.

  20. 20.

    Relevant entries in Alam in The Shah and I are on pages 463, 507, 517, 523–4, 527–9, 536, 538, 550.

  21. 21.

    New York Times, September 24, 1976.

  22. 22.

    His first novel, Les Quarantaines, was nominated for the Goncourt prize. He had also served on the editorial board of the prestigious Cahier du Cinéma.

  23. 23.

    See (as an example) Fereydoun Hoveyda, “Not all Clocks for Human Rights are the Same,” opinion piece in the New York Times, May 18, 1977.

  24. 24.

    Parsons, The Pride and the Fall; obituaries of Parvis Radji, The Telegraph, April 24, 2014.

  25. 25.

    Alam in The Shah and I, entry for December 1, 1976, p. 526.

  26. 26.

    Cable from Radji to Foreign Minister (Khalatbari), March 8, 1977, doc. 22,242, Tehran, Foreign Affair files; Radji, In the Service of the Peacock Throne, 51, 67.

  27. 27.

    Radji, 67.

  28. 28.

    The then ICRC chief delegate to Iran, Jean de Courten, confirmed to this author the role played by Ganji in this affair, July 23, 2014; see also Manoucher Ganji, Defying the Iranian Revolution, 3–4.

  29. 29.

    “Rapport de synthèses confidentiels par les délégués de CIC,” ICRC Archive, Geneva.

  30. 30.

    Haj-Seyyed-Javadi interviewed by Zia Sedghi, HIOHP, 1984, Paris, tape 6.7–8; see also Mohammad-Hossein Khosrow-Panah, “Nameh’ha’ei dar da’vat az diktator baray paziresh’e hoquq’e siasi’ye mardom” (Letters inviting the dictator to accept people’s political rights). Negah’e No, 23rd year, no. 100 (1392/2014).

  31. 31.

    Some time in February or March 1977 (the exact date not available), Premier Hoveyda summoned the top security officials to convey the Shah’s strict orders, author’s firsthand knowledge.

  32. 32.

    The coordination of the task of revising the military judiciary procedures was assigned to this author by Prime Minister Hoveyda.

  33. 33.

    Sabeti/Qaneen-Fard, 329–3.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., 150; Radji, In the Service of the Peacock Throne.

  35. 35.

    Homayoon, Man va Rouzegaram.

  36. 36.

    Jimmy Carter, White House Diary, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 2010, 3–5.

  37. 37.

    Transcripts of Ford–Carter foreign policy debate, New York Times, October 7, 1976.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., January 22, 1977.

  39. 39.

    For examples of such a take by opposition leaders, see Karim Sanjabi, Khateran Siasi (Political memoirs) (Tehran: Sadeday’e Moaser Publishers, 1381/2002), 311–12; Bakhtiar, Ma Fidélité, 160; Mehdi Bazargan, eghelab Iran dar do harakat (The revolution in two movements) (Tehran: Bonyad Farhangi Bazargan, 1362/1983) (EV), 13.

  40. 40.

    Javier Gil Guerrero, “Human Rights and Tear Gas: The Question of Carter Administration Officials Opposed to the Shah,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, online (25 November 2015).

  41. 41.

    Alam refers to the Shah’s state of heath in Alam Diaries, Ibex ed., 6.289, 6.300–1, 6.308 6.340–43 all in 1976

  42. 42.

    An Enduring Love, 262.

  43. 43.

    Dr. Flandrin to Professor Bernard, in ibid., 263–65.

  44. 44.

    Dr. Flandrin to Prof. Bernard, in ibid., 267.

  45. 45.

    The Shah frequently brought up this topic; for example, see Mission for my Country, Hutchinson, 1961, 76–77; in conversation with his authorized biographer Karanjia, The Mind of a Monarch, 43ff; and in conversation with General Abbas Gharabaghi, Vérités sur la crise iranienne, La Pensée Universelle, 23.

  46. 46.

    Top Spanish establishment officials in alliance with military leaders were regrouped in a Movimiento Nacional to ensure continuity, while a coalition of liberal democratic and leftist parties assembled in the Junta Democrática advocated a clean break with the Franco era. Fearing civil war, the opposition opted for gradual reform, an approach championed by King Juan Carlos.

  47. 47.

    A copy of Juan Carlos letter dated June 22, 1977 (original in French), is printed in Alam Diaries, Ibex ed., 6.520–21.

  48. 48.

    See “Oil Diplomacy,” in Chapter 2.

  49. 49.

    Parsons, The Pride and Fall, 48.

  50. 50.

    Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 167; Sullivan to DOS, 07882, August 17, 1977, “Where are we now and where are we Going?” DSWL; “Recommendation to President”, 08217, August 29, 1977, DSWL.

  51. 51.

    Alam Diary, (Ibex edition), entry, November 27, 1976, 6.340–43.

  52. 52.

    The relevant passage of the Shah’s letter was cited earlier in this same chapter.

  53. 53.

    Alam Diaries, Ibex ed., entry, November 27, 1976, 6.340–43; Alam in The Shah and I: 524–5.

  54. 54.

    Joseph Kraft was a major media personality regarded as the successor to legendary Walter Lippmann (1889–1974). He was one of three panelists in the third and final Carter–Ford debate in October 1976 and reputedly well connected with both camps.

  55. 55.

    Alam Diaries, Ibex ed. entry, November 27, 1976, 6.340–43.

  56. 56.

    Alam in The Shah and I, 524–5.

  57. 57.

    Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 116–17.

  58. 58.

    Carter, White House Diary entry, July 30, 1977, 74–75.

  59. 59.

    General Abbas Gharabaghi, Vérités sur la crise iranienne, 23.

  60. 60.

    Parsons, Pride and Fall, 48.

  61. 61.

    Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 318.

  62. 62.

    Carter Presidential Directives PD-NSC, May 13, 1977, Carter Library papers; Vance, Hard Choices, 319.

  63. 63.

    Photostatic copy of Carter’s letter of May 24, 1977, to the Shah in Alam in The Shah and I, 6.454–5.

  64. 64.

    Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 20–21.

  65. 65.

    Vance: Hard Choices, 319.

  66. 66.

    Vance, Hard Choices, 28–29, 44; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 125–6.

  67. 67.

    PD-NSC.30, February 17, 1978, Carter Presidential Directives.

  68. 68.

    Vance, Hard Choices, 44.

  69. 69.

    Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 147–8; Stemple, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 294; Yazdi memoirs, citing his conversation with Richard Cottam (3.319–20) and with Henry Precht, (3–618), both in late 1978.

  70. 70.

    Alam Diaries, Ibex ed., 6.439–40

  71. 71.

    Ibid., 6.459–60.

  72. 72.

    Ibid. 6.476, 6.415 and 6.476; Radji, on edginess, In the Service of the Peacock Throne, 97.

  73. 73.

    Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 120; New York Times, May 14, 1977.

  74. 74.

    New York Times, May 8, 11 and 26, 1977; Alam Diaries, Ibex ed., 6.476 (June 8, 1977).

  75. 75.

    Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 129; announcement of the two-year freeze by Premier Amouzegar, Sullivan to the Department of State 10,592, December 1, 1977, DSWL.

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Bayandor, D. (2019). Changing Tack (1976–1977). In: The Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the United States. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96119-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96119-4_5

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