Germany

Rensmann, Thilo

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-94848-5_19

Germany

Domestic Courts as International Human Rights Courts: A German Perspective

Thilo Rensmann⁴

Chapter
First Online: 16 April 2019

857 Accesses

Abstract

Long before the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) became binding as a matter of international law, they were endowed with full normativity and justiciability in German domestic law by virtue of having been internalised in (West-) Germany’s 1949 Constitution. Germany thus became a pilot project for domestic courts exercising their new role as trustees of the observance of international human rights. Under the guardianship of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), German courts made a significant contribution to overcoming the legacy of the Nazi dictatorship by firmly entrenching human rights in German law and society. It was, however, not only in this domestic sense that German courts, and in particular the FCC, evolved into international human rights courts. The FCC’s fundamental rights jurisprudence fleshed out important doctrinal aspects of international human rights law and thereby exerted significant influence on the European Court of Human Rights, as well as many constitutional and supreme courts around the world. However, it is only in its more recent jurisprudence that the FCC has started to reflect on and adapt to the increasingly transnational dimension of its role as a human rights court.

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Notes

1.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights [‘UDHR’], 10 Dec 1948, GA Res 217 (III), UN GAOR, III, Resolutions, 71.
2.
On the ‘value system’ of the UDHR, see infra2.2.
3.
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949, Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 1949, 1; English translation available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/. Accessed 15 May 2018.
4.
UDHR, Preamble, para 1: ‘[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’.
5.
As to the notion of ‘highest constitutional value’, see Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court [‘FCC’]), BVerfGE 115, 118 (152).
6.
Art 1.1 and 1.2 Basic Law read: ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. … The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.’
7.
Art 79.3 Basic Law. See also FCC, BVerfGE 109, 279 (310); 94, 49 (102–103); 84, 90 (120–121): ‘Article 79.3 of the Basic Law prohibits amendments to the Basic Law that affect the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 of the Basic Law. This includes not only the principle of respect for and protection of human dignity anchored in Article 1.1 of the Basic Law. The acknowledgement of inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of the human community, peace and justice contained in Article 1.2 of the Basic Law also becomes important in that regard; in conjunction with the reference to the following fundamental rights contained in Article 1.3 of the Basic Law, the guarantees of these rights are in principle immune to restriction since they are indispensable to the maintenance of an order in compliance with Articles 1.1 and 1.2 of the Basic Law.’ (English translation: Bröhmer et al. (2012), p. 709).
8.
As to Art 79.3 Basic Law as a guarantee of ‘eternal’ principles or values and the notion of ‘constitutional identity’, see FCC, BVerfGE 142, 123, § 21; 140, 317 (336–337); 123, 267 (343–344).
9.
As to the fundamental rights entrenched in the Basic Law as an emanation of international human rights, see FCC, BVerfGE 128, 326 (369).
10.
Art 1.3 Basic Law.
11.
See Arts 19.4, 20.2, 20.3, 92–104 Basic Law.
12.
See, e.g. FCC, BVerfGE 119, 247 (258). This notion can be traced back to Schmitt (1931).
13.
Arts 93, 94, 100 Basic Law.
14.
As to the concept of ‘internalisation’ see Koh (1996), p. 183.
15.
On this notion, see Lauterpacht (1945), p. 185.
16.
UDHR, Preamble, para 6.
17.
As to the role played by the UDHR during the process of drafting the Basic Law, see Rensmann (2007), pp. 25–42 with further references.
18.
Basic Law, Preamble, para 2.
19.
See Rensmann (2007), pp. 25–26.
20.
See Rensmann (2007), pp. 33–34.
21.
Cf Arts 22–28 UDHR.
22.
See Rensmann (2007), pp. 53–62 with further references.
23.
One of the few exceptions is Art 6.4 Basic Law according to which ‘[e]very mother shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community’.
24.
See Rensmann (2007), pp. 34–36, 40–42.
25.
Cf Sohn (1982–1983), p. 1.
26.
As to the conceptualisation of the UDHR as a ‘value system’ see Cassin (1951), pp. 277–279; Glendon (2001), pp. 173–191; Rensmann (2007), pp. 18–21.
27.
Art 1 Sentence 1; Preamble, para 1 UDHR.
28.
Art 1 Sentences 1 and 2 UDHR.
29.
See Preamble, para 2 UDHR (quoting Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms).
30.
Cf Warren and Brandeis (1890).
31.
Art 22 UDHR.
32.
Arts 22, 23–27 UDHR.
33.
Thus the formulation in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993, (1993) 32 ILM 1661, Chapter I, para 5.
34.
Carl Schmitt describes this as the ‘fundamental distributive principle’ (fundamentales Verteilungsprinzip) of the liberal human rights conception, see Schmitt (1927), p. 164; English translation: Seitzer (2008), p. 203.
35.
As to human rights as the basis of ‘transformative constitutionalism’, see Hailbronner (2017), pp. 527–565.
36.
On the interrelationship between ‘values’ and ‘principles’, see Alexy and Rivers (2009), pp. 86–93.
37.
UDHR, Preamble, para 1.
38.
Art 1.2 Basic Law.
39.
See supra2.1.
40.
Thus the expression used to describe the US Bill of Rights, see Jackson v City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 465 US 1049 (1983).
41.
See references in Rensmann (2007), pp. 43–46, 303–304.
42.
Jerusalem (1950), p. 1. See also Forsthoff (1959), p. 146 (the human dignity guarantee in Art 1.1 Basic Law is to be understood as a mere expression of ‘solemn moral postulates’).
43.
Art 123.1 Basic Law.
44.
See, e.g. German Civil Code, 18 Aug 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt 1896, 195; German Criminal Code, 15 May 1871, Reichsgesetzblatt 1871, 127.
45.
See, e.g., Görtemaker and Saffering (2016), pp. 269–279 (up until 1962 up to 80 percent of the judges serving on the Federal Court of Justice had previously been part of the Nazi judiciary). In the FCC, by contrast, only a minority of the first generation of judges had been associated with the Nazi regime. In fact, nine of the 24 judges had been persecuted by the Nazis, see, ibid, 291–297.
46.
The facts are summarised in FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (199–203). See also Collins (2015), pp. 54–61. For English translations of the FCC’s judgment see Bröhmer et al. (2012), pp. 352–357; Kommers and Miller (2012), pp. 442–448.
47.
See Rensmann (2007), p. 82 with further references.
48.
Landgericht (Regional Court) Hamburg, Case No 15 O 87/51, judgment of 22 Nov 1951. Section 826 of the German Civil Code reads: ‘A person who, in a manner contrary to public policy, intentionally inflicts damage on another person is liable to the other person to make compensation for the damage.’ English translation taken from: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html. Accessed 15 May 2018.
49.
Art 5.1 Basic Law reads: ‘Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. …’.
50.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (200).
51.
See references in Laufke (1956), pp. 145–188.
52.
See e.g. Nipperdey (1954), p. 21. On the links between Nipperdey’s approach, the US Supreme Court’s ‘state action-doctrine’ and international human rights law see Rensmann (2006), pp. 274–275.
53.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (204–205). English translation based on Kommers and Miller (2012), pp. 443–444.
54.
On the ‘value system’ of the UDHR see supra2.2.
55.
Art 1.1 Basic Law reads: ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.’
56.
See FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (207).
57.
Art 1.3 Basic Law.
58.
For a more detailed explanation of the FCC’s reasoning see Rensmann (2007), pp. 113–119.
59.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (205).
60.
See the quotation supra n 53.
61.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (206–207).
62.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (214–230).
63.
See supra2.1.
64.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (207) (‘Ausstrahlungswirkung’).
65.
Scelle (1956), pp. 324–342.
66.
See FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (209): ‘In its function as ultimate guardian of the fundamental rights through the instrument of the constitutional complaint, the FCC must therefore have the power to supervise the decisions of courts whose application of a general law in this area may unduly restrict the scope of the fundamental right in the individual case’ (Translation based on Bröhmer et al. (2012), p. 356).
67.
See n 66.
68.
See Rensmann (2007), pp. 147–200 and supra2.3.
69.
See supra n 61 and 64.
70.
See infra text accompanying n 81–91.
71.
See Nußberger (2014), p. 13.
72.
See Rensmann (2007), pp. 150–153 with further references.
73.
See e.g. Hailbronner and Martini (2017), p. 367.
74.
Rensmann (2007), pp. 266–268.
75.
South African Constitutional Court, Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 48/00), 2001 (4) SA 938. (CC).
76.
See, e.g., High Court of Kenya, Republic v National Assembly, Speaker of National Assembly & 6 others Exparte George Wang’ang’a, judgment of 17 Jan 2018, Miscellaneous Civil Application 391 of 2017, [2018] eKLR, para 78 (with a direct reference to the Lüth decision); Constitutional Court of Peru, Eusebio Llanos Huasco, judgment of 13 Mar 2003, Expediente No 976-2001 AA/TC. For further references see Rensmann (2007), pp. 266–268.
77.
In the German Basic Law this finds its clearest expression in the so-called eternity clause which defines the FRG’s ‘constitutional identity’ (see references in n 8) by exempting the guarantees of human dignity (Art 1.1), universal human rights (Art 1.2) and democracy (Art 20.1 and 20.2) from constitutional amendment.
78.
Bickel (1962), p. 16.
79.
Art 19.2 Basic Law.
80.
See also Lauterpacht (1950), pp. 368–369.
81.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (209).
82.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (208–209).
83.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (209).
84.
The FCC employed this test for the first time in the Pharmacy judgment, BVerfGE 7, 377 (404–408).
85.
On the origins of the proportionality test see Grimm (2015), pp. 19–20; Schlink (2012), pp. 294–295.
86.
See e.g. Carter (2018), p. 375; Hailbronner and Martini (2017), p. 367.
87.
Petersen (2017).
88.
On the German origins of this substantive notion of democracy, see Rensmann (2011), pp. 988–990.
89.
Art 21 (3) UDHR.
90.
Art 29 (2) UDHR.
91.
Formulation borrowed from Canadian S.Ct., R. v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103; Gosselin v Quebec (AG) [2002] 4 SCR 429.
92.
See Art 59.2 Basic Law and infra n 110.
93.
See n 66.
94.
See Art 34 ECHR.
95.
See the overview in Nußberger (2014), pp. 3–4.
96.
ECtHR, von Hannover v Germany, judgment of 24 June 2004, App No 59320/00.
97.
FCC, BVerfGE 101, 361.
98.
Ibid, 391 ff.
99.
See Rensmann (2017), pp. 727–729.
100.
For references see FCC, BVerfGE 101, 361.
101.
FCC, BVerfGE 7, 198 (208). In Lüth the FCC referred to the ‘preferred freedoms’ doctrine of the US Supreme Court. The FCC quoted Cardozo’s famous dictum from Palko v Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), according to which freedom of speech is ‘the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom’. The FCC argued that there should therefore be a ‘presumption’ in favour of freedom of speech. This approach was in principle endorsed by the ECtHR in Handyside v United Kingdom, judgment of 7 Dec 1976, Series A No 24, 23, § 49; see also von Hannover v Germany (n 96), § 58. In applying this presumption some judges of the ECtHR felt, however, that ‘the [German] courts ha[d] to some extent and under American influence made a fetish of the freedom of the press’ (von Hannover v Germany (n 96), conc. op. Zupančič).
102.
See Bundesregierung will nicht gegen ‘Caroline-Urteil’ vorgehen, 1 Sept 2004, Der Spiegel, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/pressefreiheit-bundesregierung-will-nicht-gegen-caroline-urteil-vorgehen-a-316068.html. Accessed 15 May 2018.
103.
Press Release 84/2004, 1 Sept 2004, available at: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2004/bvg04-084.html. Accessed 15 May 2018.
104.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307. English translation available at: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2004/10/rs20041014_2bvr148104en.html. Accessed 15 May 2018.
105.
FCC, decision of 31 July 2001, 1 BvR 1174/01.
106.
ECtHR, Görgülü v Germany, judgment of 26 Feb 2004, App No 74969/01.
107.
See ILA Report (Part 2), The Domestic Implementation of Judgments/Decisions of Courts and other International Bodies that Involve International Human Rights Law; and Pinto de Albuquerque, State Obligations in the European System, both in this Volume.
108.
Ibid, § 64.
109.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307.
110.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (317).
111.
Ibid.
112.
Ibid.
113.
Thus the formulation in the Preventive Detention case (see infra3.3.), FCC, BVerfGE 128, 326 (369). See also BVerfGE 111, 307 (329).
114.
FCC, BVerfGE 128, 326 (369); 111, 307 (317).
115.
Art 79.3 in conjunction with Art 1.2 of the Basic Law. See also supra n 7 and 8.
116.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (329); 128, 326 (369).
117.
FCC, BVerfGE 128, 326 (369).
118.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (323, 325–326, 330).
119.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (330).
120.
See supra n 96.
121.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (318–319).
122.
Cf Nußberger (2014), p. 9 (‘The FCC’s judgment has often been misunderstood and quoted in a distorted manner’).
123.
Henkin (1999).
124.
Russian Constitutional Court, judgment No 21-P/2015 of 14 July 2015, English translation in European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), CDL-REF (2016) 019, 16–17. See also judgment No 12-P/2016 of 19 Apr 2016, English translation in European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), CDL-REF (2016) 033 and judgment No 1-P/2107 of 19 Jan 2017, English translation available at http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/2017_January_19_1-P.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2018.
125.
See the FCC’s decision on the Treaty of Lisbon, BVerfGE 123, 267 (400–401), English translation available at: http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html: ‘The Basic Law strives to integrate Germany into the legal community of peaceful and free states, but does not waive the sovereignty contained in the last word of the German constitution as a right of the people to take constitutive decisions concerning fundamental questions as to its own identity.’ (Emphasis added). Accessed 15 May 2018.
126.
Art 79.3 in conjunction with Arts 1 and 20 Basic Law.
127.
FCC, BVerfGE 123, 267 (346): ‘The Basic Law abandons a self-serving and self-glorifying concept of sovereign statehood and returns to a view of the state authority of the individual state which regards sovereignty as “freedom that is organised by international law and committed to it”…’.
128.
FCC, BVerfGE 112, 1 (25–26), English translation available at http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20041026_2bvr095500en.html. Accessed 15 May 2018.
129.
See BVerfGE 123, 267 (401): ‘… contexts of political order which are not structured according to a strict hierarchy …’.
130.
FCC, BVerfGE 128, 326 (369).
131.
ECJ, C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, EU:C:2013:518.
132.
FCC, BVerfGE 123, 267 (401).
133.
FCC, BVerfGE 307, 111 (319).
134.
FCC, BVerfGE 141, 1 (32), English translation available at: http://www.bverfg.de/e/ls20151215_2bvl000112en.html. Accessed 15 May 2018.
135.
The FCC left the question explicitly open as to whether Article 36 VCCR would qualify as a human right, see BVerfGK 9, 174, § 58.
136.
FCC, BVerfGE 140, 317. As to a more recent case see FCC, decision of 19 Dec 2017, 2 BvR 424/17.
137.
See ECtHR, Görgülü v Germany (n 106), § 64; FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (321).
138.
ECtHR, Görgülü v Germany (n 106), § 64; FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (321–322); 128, 326 (370).
139.
See Art 59.2 of the Basic Law.
140.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (323, 325–326).
141.
Ibid.
142.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (323).
143.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (323–324).
144.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (323).
145.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (324).
146.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (324).
147.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (327–328).
148.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (324–325); 128, 326 (371).
149.
Rensmann (2017), p. 731 with further references.
150.
See supra n 96.
151.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (324).
152.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (327).
153.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (327–328).
154.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (330–332).
155.
FCC, BVerfGE 111, 307 (331–332).
156.
See Rensmann (2017), pp. 731–732 with further references.
157.
Ibid.
158.
ECtHR, Kronfeldner v Germany, judgment of 19 Jan 2009, App No 21906/09, § 59.
159.
BGHZ 171, 275.
160.
FCC, BVerfGE 120, 180.
161.
ECtHR, von Hannover v Germany (No. 2), judgment of 7 Feb 2012, App Nos 40660/08 and 60641/08.
162.
See supra n 152.
163.
FCC, BVerfGE 128, 326.
164.
ECtHR, Kronfeldner v Germany, judgment of 19 Jan 2009, App No 21906/09, § 59.
165.
FCC, BVerfGE 128, 326 (368–370).
166.
FCC, BVerfGE 128, 326 (368–369).
167.
FCC, BVerfGE 128, 326 (369).
168.
FCC, BVerfGK 9, 174; BVerfGK 17, 390; FCC, order of 5 Nov 2013, 2 BvR 1579/11.
169.
FCC, BVerfGK 9, 174, § 58.
170.
FCC, BVerfGK 9, 174, § 58. As to this argument, see also BVerfGE 111, 307 (328).
171.
FCC, BVerfGK 9, 174, § 61.
172.
FCC, BVerfGE 142, 313. English translation available at: http://www.bverfg.de/e/ls20160726_1bvl000815en.html. Accessed 15 May 2018.
173.
ICJ, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo), ICJ Reports 2010, 639 at 663–664, para 66.
174.
FCC, BVerfGE 142, 313, § 90.
175.
Ibid (Emphasis added).

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Thilo Rensmann

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Faculty of Law, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Stefan Kadelbach
Faculty of Law, Augsburg University, Augsburg, Germany
Thilo Rensmann
Faculty of Law, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Eva Rieter

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Rensmann, T. (2019). Germany. In: Kadelbach, S., Rensmann, T., Rieter, E. (eds) Judging International Human Rights. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94848-5_19

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