Abstract
I will explore the concept of self-realization by means of realizing what one really wants to do, i.e., by realizing the desires one is committed to. I briefly review views of three philosophers, Frankfurt, Watson, and Bratman, and contrast my view with theirs. Unlike Frankfurt and Bratman, I argue that higher order attitudes toward desires are not necessary for the commitment. I agree with Watson that value judgments on desires are necessary, but they are not sufficient for the commitment. My view is that the commitment is partly constituted by intentions based on value judgments through practical reasoning. While my view is similar to Bratman’s in appealing to intentions which are prospective about a future, I add a further element which is retrospective about the past, i.e., the mood of satisfaction.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Bratman, M.E. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M.E. 1999. Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason. In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency, 185–206. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M.E. 2007a. Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency. In Structures of Agency: Essays, 21–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. 2007b. Hierarchy, Circularity, and Double Reduction. In Structures of Agency: Essays, 68–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. 2007c. Three Theories of Self-Governance. In Structures of Agency: Essays, 222–253. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Original work published 2004).
Frankfurt, H.G. 1988a. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. In The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, 11–25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H.G. 1988b. The Importance of What We Care About. In Frankfurt, H.G. The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, 80–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H.G. 1999. The Faintest Passion. In Necessity, Volition, and Love, 95–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heidegger, M. 1962. Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. New York: Harper & Row.
Watson, G. 1975. Free Agency. Journal of Philosophy 72: 205–220.
Watson, G. 1987. Free Action and Free Will. Mind 96: 147–172.
Acknowledgements
I am thankful to Lee Taehee and Takuya Niikawa for giving useful comments to the draft of this article. I am also grateful to Momo Deza for her diligent proofreading.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Suzuki, Y. (2018). Realizing Oneself by Realizing What One Really Wants to Do. In: Altobrando, A., Niikawa, T., Stone, R. (eds) The Realizations of the Self. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94700-6_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94700-6_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-94699-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-94700-6
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)