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1.1 Historical Distribution of Dams in Brazil

1.1.1 First Dams

Dams play a very important part in the Brazilian society, whether through the electricity they produce or through their influences on the economic, political, and environmental life of the country. This, however, has not always been the case. Dams are not a recent invention, but their arrival on the Brazilian territory for energy production dates back only about a 100 years. To provide a detailed framework for our work, we will first explain what hydroelectric dams are, before describing when they first arrived in Brazil and the historical situation at that time. We will finally present the foundations and bases of the electricity sector in Brazil.

A dam is a civil structure whose aim is to block the water flow, thereby creating a reservoir. The use of watercourses to produce energy is ancient, and the traces of hydraulic structures have been dated back to Ancient Egypt (−3000 BC). However, it was not until the nineteenth century that dams started being used to produce electricity. Major technical developments and industrialization are the main reasons for the rapid multiplication of hydroelectric dams.

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) defines a large dam as a structure with a minimum height of 5 m and with a reservoir volume of more than 3 million cubic meters (WCD 2000). This refines a definition of The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) which, in 1928, described large dams as structures higher than fifteen meters. Following on from the WCD definition, the new small dam category can be described as structures lower than 5 m and/or with a reservoir volume under 3 million cubic meters.

For the Brazilian energy sector, the definition of large dams is based on the amount of energy produced. According to the Atlas of Energia Elétrica do Brasil, the power of production determines the size of the hydroelectric dam: If a plant produces more than 30 megawatts (MW), it is considered large; if it produces less than 30 MW, it is classified as a small hydroelectric dam or a hydropower generating plant for installations with an output below 1 MW (ANEEL 2008). Here, we would like to make it clear that there is a difference between the installed capacity and the actual generation of energy: Installed capacity is the amount of energy that would be generated in a year if all the turbines were to run at full capacity during 365 days.

These three categories of electrical installations coexist throughout Brazil, each of which is accompanied by a dam used to retain the watercourse in order to supply the turbines with water. Since our focus in this work is only on large dams, we will use the terms hydroelectric plant and dam interchangeably to speak of one and the same type of structure.

The construction of the dam, usually in concrete, aims to control the watercourse. For a long time, Brazil built hydroelectric plants with dams creating a reservoir of water much greater than the natural river bed. These structures had a significant impact on the people and the environment. Due to pressures from actors outside the field of hydroelectricity, the companies responsible for the construction of dams decided to move toward “run-of-river” dams, which use the original bed of the river and a slight lake of accumulation, in no way comparable to the dams previously built. From an engineering point of view, run-of-river dams are still controversial: They do not always store enough water, making it difficult to manage extreme climatic periods (rain and drought periods), sometimes requiring the construction of additional retention dams upstream.

The first dams built in Brazil were not aimed at producing electricity but at combatting drought. As early as the nineteenth century, the authorities in power became aware that repeated droughts in the Nordeste region were hindering development. Consequently, the National Department of Works against Drought decided to analyze the situation and made some recommendations (construction of a reservoir and diversion of the San Francisco River), which barely got any response. The great drought that took place between 1877 and 1889 greatly influenced the construction of the first dam in Brazil, the Cedro Dam (state of Ceara), which began in 1884 and ended in 1906 (Mello 2011).

The first hydroelectric plant in Brazil was built at the end of the nineteenth century in the state of Minas Gerais (1883). Backed by a small dam, creating about 5 m of head, the plant, located on the Jequitinhonha River, is associated with the Mines and Metallurgy School de Ouro Preto. This first development represents the starting point of a movement to build other plants to support the mining activities of the region. A few years later (1889), a hydroelectric plant (Marmelos) was used for the first time for public illumination in Juiz de Fora (Minas Gerais). Thus began the development of this technology for public and private purposes (the location of the mentioned dams can be observed in Fig. 1.1).

Fig. 1.1
figure 1

Data source ANEEL (2017)

Location of the mentioned dams.

Full size image

The end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century marked a period of creation and development of urban centers and of rapid industrialization. The demand for energy was increasing, and electricity generation moved from an experimental phase to a production phase. Thus began what is still today called the Brazilian electricity sector. We are using this term in our work to better explain how this industrial branch is organized. Production increased rapidly at the turn of the twentieth century, from 5 MW in 1900 to more than 30 MW (data from IPEA 2014, http://www.ipeadata.gov.br) the following year. Political and legislative conditions were put into place. The Brazilian Constitution of 1891 granted municipalities the right to distribute concessions for the use of waterfalls and the production of electricity. Later, a law (1903), followed by a decree (1904), gave the federal government the authority to use the hydraulic energy of the rivers for public service.

The country was booming but did not yet have enough investors, so foreign companies were invited to invest, notably by establishing themselves in the urban centers of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In parallel, Brazilian private and public companies were also created to offer a variety of services, such as transportation, street lighting, electricity production and distribution. The Light Company, originally from Canada, was the first one to really put its mark on the sector through its influence and investments. It set itself apart by the diversity of its activities—in the production of electricity, with the construction of dams, in the distribution of electricity in major urban centers, and also for public transport, with trams in Rio de Janeiro.

With the development of the sector, the Brazilian state began to observe and control, initially creating, within the Ministry of Agriculture, the Federal Commission of Hydraulic Forces (1920), before writing the Water Code in 1934. This was the first regulation of the energy sector which declared the state sole owner of the territorial waters and therefore required authorization to exploit resources. At the same time, energy production was constantly increasing to meet demand, doubling the production capacity each decade until the 1930s (IPEA 2014). A few years later, in 1939, the National Council of Water and Electrical Energy was formed. Its role was to manage the exploitation and use of energy in Brazil and to implement the provisions included in the Water Code. The idea was to strengthen the role and position of the state in this sector, which previously belonged to private companies. This corresponded to the political will to centralize power with President Getúlio Vargas (1937–1945) and his establishment of the “Estado Novo.” The instigation of a concession regime was the hallmark of the Brazilian model for the exploitation of natural resources. There was a real planning vision for the future, both for the electricity sector and for the country and its growing energy needs. At this time, there was a growing awareness of the hydroelectric potential of the country because of its characteristics in terms of relief, climate, and geomorphology (Queiroz 2013). The future of the country in terms of energy was decided, and it depended on hydroelectricity. Since the beginning of the twentieth century until 1960, the installed capacity of hydroelectricity accounted for at least 80% of the country’s total electricity capacity (IPEA 2014).

Wishing to confirm its new position on a regional level, the federal state created in 1945 the CHESF, São Francisco’s Hydroelectric Company, whose aim was to operate the watershed of the São Francisco River in the Nordeste region of Brazil. In 1948, the CHESF began construction of the first large hydroelectric plant in the region, Paulo Afonso I, which started operating in 1954 (Fundação Getulio Vargas 2009). The hydroelectric potential of the river São Francisco, coveted for several years, began to be harnessed over the following decades. From the 1950s, the second Vargas government chose to invest in hydroelectricity to boost power generation and provided general guidance. In 1954, a Federal Electrification Fund was set up, financed by a single tax on electricity based on consumption, thus becoming the main source of income for investments in the sector. In the same year, a new National Electrification Plan was presented to the Congress. It confirmed the state’s investment in the electricity sector (Corrêa 2003) and proposed the creation of the state enterprise Eletrobras. Congress opposed this creation, and it took another 8 years for Eletrobras to be officially established.

During the 1950s, there was much debate on the future of the sector, particularly at the political level, and engineers played a fundamental role in it, as described by Mari Letícia Corrêa in her thesis. No substantial progress was made during this decade, and the electricity generating fleet grew as a result of federal government interventions. The second half of the 1950s saw the development of the institutional structure, with mainly the creation of state enterprises in the federal states (Corrêa 2003). This decade saw the consumption of electricity increase as a result of population growth, increased urbanization, and the military government’s economic policy.

1.1.2 Energy and Politics

In the early 1960s, the sector continued its structuring in which two institutions played a very important role. In 1960, the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) was established and given powers previously belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture.

In 1962, Eletrobras was finally created and linked to the MME. The company holds a prominent place in the Brazilian electricity sector with regard to the production, transmission, and even distribution of electricity. It coordinates the “technical, administrative, and financial aspects of the country’s electricity sector” (Martins 2008). Eletrobras is a holding company which manages the states of the federation’s public enterprises. It is an essential player in Brazil’s future energy policies.

The 1960s were marked by a profound change in the national policy, which upset all economic sectors, including, of course, the electricity sector. The junta, following a “development” strategy, undertook major projects such as the construction of hydroelectric dams. In this logic, two National Development Plans were established in 1967 and 1976, in which dams played a prevalent role. The Brazilian government opened up to foreign investors for these projects. This decade saw the consumption of electricity increase.

Brazil took part in an international wave of “dam ideology,” an economic rationale for the construction of major structures, carried out by international organizations (McCully 2001), such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (FMI). Those projects were politically endorsed by local elites, especially the military in power in the case of Brazil (Locatelli 2014). Because of the coup, different political orientations, project development issues, and the quest for funding, the major projects planned by the military were delayed until the second half of the 1970s (Itaipu or Sobradinho for example).

Social and environmental issues only really started to emerge in the early 1980s, toward the end of the military rule. The 1980s also marked a new period of change in the electricity sector, with increased concerns for environmental and social issues.

In the early 1980s, the country experienced a deep political, financial, and economic crisis. The whole structure of the country changed with the return of democracy, and a phase of transition began in which certain rules of the economic game were rewritten. The international context also started to weigh more heavily, with new environmental concerns emerging. Ongoing projects were completed by dealing with the conflicts arising in the best possible way. No new dam construction was undertaken and national electricity production capacity remained steady, while consumption continued to rise. A new electricity rationalization program was put in place, similar to that of the 1950s.

With the transition, a whole new political, institutional, and legislative framework was established, which lead to the constitution of 1988. A new institutional framework for the country’s electricity activities was set up. Demand also arose for assessing the environmental impacts of development projects.

The first stage, still in a period of military rule, was the creation, in 1981, of the National Environmental Policy, which for the first time established a system of environmental licenses for potentially polluting activities (Mello 2011). However, it was not until 1986 and a publication in the official gazette that the measure came into force. In 1981, the National Environment System (SISNAMA) was also created. It brought together all environmental organizations at the federal, state, and municipal levels. Finally, in 1981, the National Council for the Environment (CONAMA) was also established to look after the regulation and legislation of the PNMA. In 1985, the first Ministry of the Environment was constituted (MMA). The first environmental institutions appeared at the end of the military regime and the return to democracy accelerated the movement. After 1985, the whole landscape of the Brazilian electricity sector evolved, following other changes in the country.

As a continuation of the preliminary environmental initiatives of the early 1980s, CONAMA published its first resolution in 1986 defining what an environmental impact is. This new resolution, which is still applicable today, requires two preliminary studies to be carried out before starting work on a potentially polluting project. The objectives of these studies are to evaluate the likely impacts both of the construction site and of the final structure. The first study is called the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and the second, the Environmental Impact Report (RIMA), is a summary of the first. They provide, according to the CONAMA resolution, an environmental diagnosis of the building site and an assessment of the likely post-construction environmental consequences. The studies must be accompanied by an Environmental Basic Project (PBA) including plans to mitigate negative effects on the environment and a support plan for dealing with all types of impacts (positive/negative, direct/indirect, short/medium/long term) (Martins 2008).

The same year (1986), the CONAMA released several resolutions describing in detail the steps required for the application of environmental licenses (LA). Their implementation completely changed the planning for hydroelectric structures. To obtain an environmental license, three steps are required to be granted three preliminary licenses:

  • LP—Prerequisite License: Sought at the end of a project site’s study phase, it is valid for a maximum of 5 years.

  • LI—Installation License: This license validates the project and allows construction to start. It must be preceded by the presentation of the PBA. It has a maximum validity of 6 years.

  • LO—Operation License: Once construction is complete, the LO allows commencement of the activities. It may be granted for a period of 4 to 10 years and may be renewed.

Licenses are granted by environmental monitoring bodies, at the state or federal level, for example, in the case of dams built on a river forming the border between two states. The Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) is responsible for environmental licensing at the federal level, while the Secretariat for the Environment deals with it at the state level.

The environmental licensing system has been questioned for various reasons. The first concerns the non-compliance, by private companies, with the law and advocated standards, in particular, due to the lack of inspection and support during construction work (Moreira 2006). For C. Caubet, Professor of Law, there has not been a single case of full compliance with the environmental law for the construction of hydroelectric dams in Brazil (Caubet 2004). The environmental law is only really a framework, which does not fundamentally prevent the construction of structures. According to C. Caubet, the laws are really only “apparent standards,” which means they are not actually enforced and basically ineffective. He gives the example of the Barra Grande Dam, for which the justice system recognized that licenses were irregularly obtained, but only after the dam had been completed. The construction of a dam is never questioned during the process of obtaining licenses. Environmental studies allow a better understanding of the negative and positive effects of the dams but do not influence their construction. The WCD (2000) states that impact studies must be carried out to “offset or mitigate the expected impacts and make them acceptable when the decision to build has already been made” (International Network Rivers 2008). Numerous dam construction examples demonstrate the fragility of the laws and their applications (Belo Monte or Jirau, among others), especially in the face of economic and political interests. Environmental laws are benchmarks that provide guidance but whose principles and application are sometimes flouted.

The first legislative measures taking into account the environment greatly influenced national policies and set the trend for the new constitution of 1988: All water resources (lakes, rivers, aquifers, springs, marine waters, etc.) are thus defined as property of the state which has therefore the power to use, directly or indirectly, the hydraulic potential of these resources.

The electricity sector adapted to the changes, and in 1986, Eletrobras published a master plan (PDMA) for the protection and improvement of the environment for electricity projects and services. This first environmental policy for the sector was based on four key aspects: environmental sustainability, regional integration, coordination between institutions and with the company, and management efficiency (Mello 2011). The PDMA is supported by an Environmental Advisory Committee within Eletrobras (Consultative Committee of Meio Ambiente). The electricity sector was therefore responsive to the changes underway and preparing for the coming decades. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, environmental laws continued to evolve but with no major changes. It is even possible to identify the beginnings of a backtracking in the sphere o environmental laws. Taking advantage of the chaotic political situation, some representatives, driven by different lobbies and pressure groups (such as landowners and contractors), are trying to shorten the process of environmental licensing (draft bill 65), simplifying it as much as possible (Fearnside 2016b). Opposition groups started to organize to prevent those measures, but threats are still present.

An ecological awareness was starting to develop regarding water resources, not only in the electricity sector but also more globally within society and among policy makers. A range of measures was taken to improve management of these resources. Law Nº 9.433 of 1997 established a National Council of Hydric Resources (CNRH) whose responsibility was to develop a national water resources policy. A National Plan of Hydric Resources (PNRH) was established under the same law. The PNRH defined “a set of general guidelines and objectives for the management and planning of the use of water resources” (Martins 2008). It required the states of the federation to draw up plans for water resources in the states’ catchments. Relying on the social participation of citizens (Wolkmer and Pimmel 2013), its governance is considered democratic, at least in theory. The 1997 Act recognized water as a “limited natural resource” and a vulnerable resource and gave it an economic value, therefore encouraging a multiplicity of uses. In addition, the National Water Resources Management System (SINGREH) was created in order to collect and disseminate information on existing resources. The 1997 Act also required a license application for companies wishing to exploit water resources. After 9 years of discussions and negotiations, the PNRH was finally approved by the CNRH in January 2006.

In 2000, the government founded the National Agency for Water (ANA), a government agency responsible for the monitoring, control, and evaluation of activities related to water resources. The agency is also responsible for the implementation of the National Water Resources Plan (PNRH).

All developments from the end of the 1980s were a prelude to the privatization of the electricity sector, which began in 1992 and slowly took shape during the decade. The first step was the National Plan of Privatization (PND) which started by selling the states’ public companies responsible for the distribution of energy (Gomes et al. 2006). Legal provisions made in 1993 and 1994 gave the National Congress the power to authorize sales of businesses. In 1995, a national privatization council was created by the government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The first sales were made to foreign companies, mainly American.

The next step began with the preparation of the sale of power generation companies. To this end, a control agency was created: the National Agency for Electrical Energy (ANEEL). Attached to the MME, it is the last in a series of agencies that came into existence about a century ago: the Water Directorate (1933), created with the Water Code; the Water Department, which later became the Water Division, still within the Ministry of Agriculture; and the National Council of Water and Electrical Energy (1939) which in 1965 became the National Department of Water and Energy. ANEEL’s aim is to monitor and order the production, transmission, and marketing of energy. The three main phases of the energy market therefore came under the control of ANEEL which is also responsible for monitoring the market and its players.

The privatization phase continued with the use of an English firm (Coopers & Lybrand) to manage the privatization of the production sector. The process of selling the production companies, controlled by the state, began in 1997, and very rapidly Eletrobras was fully reorganized, including all the state companies under its control. Eletrobras also ceased to be in charge of energy transmission which became the responsibility of a new management agency, the National Operator of the System (ONS).

Finally, in 2004, a reform of the Brazilian electricity sector once again allowed state-owned enterprises such as Eletrosul to produce electricity and to make its return for the construction and management of hydroelectric dam. This reform was the result of the last major production crisis in the sector. In 2000 and 2001, the crisis was so profound that a new rationing had to be put in place and the government asked Brazilians to reduce their electricity consumption by 20%. This plan was a success for the government as the country managed to meet the expectations of the central government with a greater than expected decline in consumption.

In just over a century, Brazil went through various phases in electricity generation and environmental management. The relationship between these two areas evolved over the years. Initially (before 1930), foreign companies could produce electricity without any constraint. The economic and financial crisis of the 1930s led to the second phase, with the federal government taking over the entire energy sector. Through legislative frameworks and governmental entities, the state took control of the sector for nearly 55 years (from 1930 to 1985). The last phase was the privatization and sale to local and foreign investors. The state sold its businesses and reorganized itself to try and respond to the new economic framework and environmental concerns. However, the sector may still not be stable, because the 2001 crisis was profound. According to S. Meritet, “the reform is no yet complete, particularly in terms of defining an appropriate regulatory framework, but it is fundamental for the long-term reorganization of the industry” (Meritet 2004). The political wills in 2017 target a new privatization of the sector, notably of Eletrobras.

1.1.3 Significant Dams

The history of hydroelectricity in Brazil is marked by a few significant projects, which have marked the hydroelectric landscape for various reasons, such as their location, their international implications, their role in the electricity sector. Each of these projects has influenced and modified the history of the sector in its own way. Four of them in particular provide a better understanding of how they represent and illustrate an entire industry.

Tucuruí

The Tucuruí Dam marked history as the first major hydroelectricity project in the Brazilian Amazon. Started and completed during the military dictatorship, the first construction phase took 10 years, between 1974 and 1984. A second phase began in the late 1990s to increase the installed capacity. The impacts of the second phase were in no way comparable to those of the first stage. The dam was built on the Tocantins River, in the middle of the state of Pará (Fearnside 1999), in a small municipality which counted less than 9000 inhabitants in 1970 (IBGE—Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). Its main objective was to provide energy to aluminum smelters (Fearnside 2016a). This project, launched in 1982, aimed to exploit the mineral resources of an entire region and therefore required a close source of energy.

The construction of the Tucuruí Dam dates back to a political era that has now ended in Brazil and is very significant, from an environmental point of view, because of its location in the heart of the world’s largest rainforest. However, no impact assessment, positive nor negative, was requested before starting work on the Tucuruí Dam. Eletrobras only carried out an impact assessment 1 year after the start of construction (Barrow 1988). The social and environmental impacts were considered secondary at that time, and every effort was taken to not slow down the progress desired by the military government.

The period and the context also explain the lack of reliable and detailed information coming from researchers but also from the project managers (Magalhães 2007). Eletronorte estimated the number of affected families at nearly 6000. Researchers Mougeot (1988) in fact believe that between 25,000 and 35,000 people have been affected by the dam. This data relates to the first phase of the project in the early 1980s. In the second phase, the project did not foresee any new migrations but ultimately around 4000 families had to change their place of residence (Magalhães 2005). Irony and misfortune persisted for certain families which were forced to move twice in 20 years.

The uniqueness of the Tucuruí Dam is due to the diversity of the affected families. According to Magalhães (2007), in 1988 about one-third of the affected families lived in urban areas and the rest in the countryside. The total population that year counted 5031 families. About one-third of the urban families chose to radically change their place of residence and to move to the countryside. To respond to the needs of the other families, two new urban areas and eleven rural housing estates were built near the dam (Magalhães 2007). There are conflicting accounts on the number of affected people, and it is very hard to arrive at an exact final figure. Many families and family groups were excluded from the official data. Therefore, we assume that the exact number of affected families has been underestimated. It is also worth noting that the official data did not include migrations that were incorporated into the total flow of people.

Some indigenous people were also affected by the construction of the Tucuruí Dam, and three ethnic groups were partially disrupted by the reservoir (WCD 1999). These native people had already suffered from the construction of the Trans-Amazonian Highway. The Parakanãs, the main group affected by the Tucuruí Dam, saw their territory cut down and their population reduced by the various forced displacements (Destaque Amazônia 1985). The original group was separated and moved several times (WCD Tucuruí, 2000). At that time, the indigenous people were not yet organized and united to defend themselves and suffered greatly from large construction projects such as the Tucuruí Dam.

Fishermen endured reduced production (WCD 1999 and Vainer 2007) and requested compensation for several years (at least 5 years). However, it was not until the second phase of the project that they started to receive fairer compensation, especially for those downstream of the dam. For the first time in Brazil, financial compensation was offered in areas downstream from a dam, notably through the Popular Plan for Sustainable Development of the Downstream Region of the Tucuruí Hydroelectric Plant (PPDJUS) (Ferreira 2008). Reservoir fishermen are now more numerous than in the 1980s and seem to have adapted by becoming professionals and integrating commercial channels, not only locally but also in other parts of the country (Cintra et al. 2013).

The Tucuruí Dam is characterized by its location in the heart of the rainforest, the first of its sort in Latin America. Despite some preliminary studies that predicted adverse effects on the environment, nothing was done to stop them (Barrow 1988). In 1977, a report entitled “Environmental Assessment of the Tucuruí Hydroelectric Project, Rio Tocantins, Amazônia,” by the ecologist Robert Goodland (1977), was published but its audience was not sufficient to prevent or change the construction of the dam. The main point raised in the report was the cleaning of the vegetation in the future dam reservoir: If the vegetation does not get removed before the water level increases, negative consequences for the climate and the local environment emerge. After years of detailed research, P. Fearnside’s work indicates that the accumulation of decomposing organic matter at the bottom of the reservoir results in the release of methane (2008, 2011, 2015, 2016a). The impact of methane emissions on global warming is a subject that fuels many debates, and Fearnside (2016a) states that “tropical hydroelectric power stations emit significant quantities of greenhouse gases.”

Another type of pollution encountered in Lake Tucuruí came from the transformation of mercury (methylation), in the fish, which can be hazardous to health. The phenomenon has been studied in the Amazon for a long time by researcher Jean Remy Davée Guimarães who claims that the concentration of mercury in fish is moderate in dam reservoirs with the exception of Tucuruí (2001). In a detailed study of Tucuruí, Petri Porvari stated that 92% of predatory fish samples showed traces of mercury above the Brazilian limit allowed for consumption (1995) and predicted serious dangers for the thousands of people who may consume them.

Another issue was the rapid onset of mosquito invasions mentioned by the people. It was mainly a problem on the left bank of the reservoir in areas where deforestation had not been carried out by the company. When the water level of the reservoir decreases, mosquito larvae develop rapidly. This serious phenomenon is commonly described as a scourge. Moreover, invasions were obviously accompanied by the usual side effects (Louzada 2009). The situation was so critical that it forced families to migrate again (Fearnside 2015). The sharp rise in malaria cases was also denounced (Couto 2002), causing a huge problem for local public health.

The town of Tucuruí, located 7 kms away from the dam, has benefited from royalties since the creation of the dam which helped finance public initiatives. It has received more than 160 million reais (48 millions of dollars) since 1997, but studies point the finger to the lack of investment in urban infrastructure (Nogueira 2010).

The process of relocation of the victims of the Tucuruí Dam was long and tedious as during the construction of the dam various conflicts broke out for the recognition and construction of rural reassentamentos.Footnote 1 To this day, families who have been affected by the dam are still demanding compensation from the authorities (Magahães 2005). The Brazilian government has already been condemned by an international court for its shortcomings in terms of social and environmental impacts in Tucuruí (Fearnside 2014a, b).

The Tucuruí Dam is exemplary because of the diversity of its negative impacts and its location in the Amazonian forest. It is the first of its kind and remains the symbol of the effects of this type of work in environmentally fragile areas.

Sobradinho

The Sobradinho Dam in the Brazilian Nordeste is significant in the history of dams in Brazil by its location and its extent. It leaves a trace in the heart of Brazil that has marked an entire region.

Owned by the São Francisco Hydroelectric Company (CHESF), the Sobradinho Dam was built between 1973 and 1983 in the last years of the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964–85), at the same time as the Itaipu and Tucuruí Dams. The attached plant is impressive and can produce up to 1000 MW (Daou 1988). The dam is built on the São Francisco River, an emblematic watercourse in Brazil due to the important role it played as a major axis of colonization since the sixteenth century during the construction of the country (Sigaud 1992). The São Francisco, popularly known as the “river of national unity,” covers about 3200 kms and carves out a large area of the semiarid zone of the Nordeste region. It crosses the drought polygon, a dry area recognized by law before 1970, which benefits from special public policies. The establishment of the dam is part of an old desire to develop the region which is perfectly described in the works of Sigaud (1988). Its construction was an important decision on the part of the military regime to continue to develop hydroelectricity. It was also justified for the regulation of river flows in particular for navigation and for economic reasons linked to the irrigation of new agricultural areas. The construction of the dam created a reservoir of more than 320 kms in length and 4200 sq. kms in area (CHESF 2017) which cuts across the entire region and transforms the Brazilian landscape. The trace of this new artificial lake, the largest in Latin America, is so deep that it modifies the cartographic representations of the region and of Brazil. It is also important to note that the final produced power/reservoir size ratio is relatively low for such an immense lake.

In terms of social context, the construction of the Sobradinho Dam took place in the 1970s in the Brazilian Nordeste. This was at the heart of the dictatorship, and the region was considered the most destitute of the country. The São Francisco River was a source of income for the inhabitants of the river banks and sometimes their only means of survival. The local population had occupied the shores of the river for several decades, and the new lake “destroyed a physical base on which a whole production system was structured” according to the movements of the river around a combination of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries (Sigaud 1992).

Sigaud (1988) explains that the negative social effects were known to the authorities and to the CHESF in particular after a report by a parliamentary committee showed that the Sobradinho Dam did not improve the living conditions of local populations. On the contrary, the dam caused a chaos of exodus, poverty, delinquency, prostitution, etc. (Sigaud 1988). Faced with the ongoing social disaster, social organizations encouraged and helped the population to demonstrate, protest, and gradually organize themselves to better put their claims forward and be heard.

The authoritarian aspect of the decisions accompanying the construction of the Sobradinho Dam must be emphasized. More than for other dams of this period, unacceptable practices have been denounced by the local populations and their representatives. Duqué (1984) and Sigaud (1988) questioned the authoritarian power of the military state. Sigaud speaks of “social destructuring,” and Silva and Germani (2009) of “disarticulation,” provoked by the state. Duque insists on the rigidity, denouncing the lack of negotiation for compensation. The population was perceived as an obstacle by the company (Broeckelman 1979); it was undervalued and “relegated to the level of second-class citizens” by the state according to Silva and Germani (2009). Here appears a total disregard of the population by the decision makers. In order to continue to exist, families decided to mobilize.

Local populations had to organize themselves in order to succeed in receiving some compensation. The first action of the families was the permanence and persistence in their residences which resulted in straining the relations with the CHESF even more (Sigaud 1988). While it appears that the military regime had not envisaged a compensation and resettlement plan for families forced to migrate, according to Vainer (2004), the first ideas for compensation started to appear 4 years after the beginning of the works. In 1976, the CHESF organized the first migration of a group of families because hitherto the migrations had been individual (Sigaud 1988). Compensation for families appeared in disorderly ways, and the work of researchers demonstrates the difficulties faced by families in spite of the precious help of the Catholic Church, notably with the Pastoral Commission of the Earth (CPT) and the trade unions, especially of rural workers. The change of residence was particularly disastrous for the families, especially the first 5 days. During the journey to their new homes, either by boat or by bus, the affected families lost many belongings and several animals, for which no compensation was ever paid, and therefore, they had to begin a new life with very little in their hands.

Despite efforts and struggles, Sigaud’s (1988) final analysis of family resettlement is overwhelming, using the term “military operation” to evacuate a territory. According to the data gathered by Silva and Germani (2009), based on the work of Duqué and Sigaud, a total of 11,853 families migrated, an estimated 60,000 people having to change residence and being forced to rebuild their lives somewhere else.

The Sobradinho Dam is emblematic of its location, in the context of military junta, in the heart of a territory occupied by poor rural populations. Although the Sobradinho Dam was not the first built on the São Francisco River, it reduced the authorities’ scruples to install further large structures on the river, such as other hydroelectric plants in the following years, and more recently, the monumental works aimed at diverting the river flow to feed the rest of the Nordeste region.

Itaipu

The Itaipu Dam, built between 1975 and 1982, is the most famous Brazilian dam in the country and in the world. This can be explained not only by its size, as it remained for a very long time the largest dam in the world, but also by its international character because it is built on a border and therefore required the involvement of five countries before its construction could begin. The Itaipu Dam is built on the Paraná River, the natural border between Brazil and Paraguay.

The Itaipu Dam stands out for its unique character in international relations and international law. In his very comprehensive publications, Christian Caubet explains all the stages and negotiations necessary before the construction of the dam (1991). He stresses the complexity of the debates to resolve conflicts of interest between countries that wanted to exploit the same shared resource in different ways. The dam had to be built in an ancient zone of conflict, caused by the delimitation of the borders, notably on the site of “Sete Quedas” disputed by Brazil and Paraguay (Benetta 2002).

The Itaipu Dam, located on the Paraná River and in the Great Plata River basin (3 million km2, half of which is in the Paraná basin), involved the five countries that have land in the basin. Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina were the main actors in this project, while Uruguay and Bolivia, who also own land in the basin, played a minor role. While the first two quickly found an agreement for the construction of the dam, Uruguay, in a global context of military power in Latin America, entered the game of negotiations. The project came under discussion between Brazil and Paraguay in 1966 with the “Ata de Iguaçu” (Germani 2003), and a treaty of construction of Itaipu was signed in 1973 (Germani 2003). It was not until 1979, after long negotiations, that a tripartite agreement was finally signed (Caubet 1991).

For a long time, the dam was regarded as “the largest in the world,” thus becoming a propaganda tool for Brazilian civil construction and military power. In terms of installed capacity, the hydroelectric plant now takes second place with a potential of 14,000 MW. The construction work was huge in terms of workers (25,000), amount of concrete used, and financial resources (total cost of about 30 million dollars). It is now a recognized tourist destination in Brazil.

Due to its size, the social and environmental impacts of Itaipu are numerous. G. Germani, who studied this aspect, explained in her 2003 book how the project came about without taking into account at any time the interests of the local population and the life projects of the inhabitants of the region (2003). In total, an estimated 42,444 people were expelled from their land, 90% of them from rural areas (Germani 2003). The expellees were spread over eight municipalities, with over 110,000 ha flooded, which G. Germani described as an “area of conflict” (2003). She considers this lack of involvement as the starting point for the many struggles that appeared in the region, fueled in addition by the status of the inhabitants (owners or not) which profoundly changed the conditions of negotiations with Itaipu Binacional (Germani 2003), the company responsible for the construction of the dam.

G. Germani divides into three phases the struggles of the expropriated families which lead to the organization of the social movement.

The first phase, between 1973 and 1977, corresponds to the beginning of construction and the first stage of compensation. The population was informed of the construction of the structure but did not participate in any decision making. A first inventory of the flooded lands was made in 1973, and during meetings in 1976, the company gradually explained the notion of expropriation to families. There was still a climate of trust between the population, the company that promised to pay a fair price, and the government that supported the process more or less. That level of confidence however diminished because of the low compensation that was offered, the absence of official documents, the individualization of the process, the non-compensation of land for squatters (posseiros), pressures to accept compensation, etc. (Germani 2003). In this context and seeing the problems increase, the Catholic and Lutheran churches, who were direct witnesses in the communities, decided to get involved. However, a catalyst was still needed to unite the population who wanted to demonstrate but was afraid of the junta and its powers. In 1977, the Pastoral Commission of the Earth (CPT) officially established itself in the region and played a central role in the organization of the families expropriated by Itaipu (Germani 2003).

The second phase (1978–1979) corresponds to the time when families started to organize themselves. Two meetings were held to structure the group of demonstrators. The first, in October 1978, brought together 1500 farmers and concluded with a written summary of the problems. Signed by more than 1000 people, it was handed over to President Ernesto Geisel who was visiting the site the following week. The document had many consequences for the government, the Itaipu Binacional Company, and the press. Because of its disclosure, the church placed itself on the front line for the representation of the expropriated. At the beginning of 1979, the company increased the compensation value by 40% but this did not stop the public’s dissatisfaction as the conflict kept spreading, notably because of the posseiros’ situation. A second meeting, held in April 1979, was attended by more than 2000 farmers. This meeting marks the continuation of the protest against Itaipu but also against the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), which, according to farmers, did not play its role of helping the resettlement of expropriated farmers and was taking too long to legalize the newly occupied land. The pressure of bad publicity for Itaipu by the expropriated forced the company to find land solutions more or less appropriate (example of the “Agrarian Market,” sort of internal market in the state of Paraná where families can find land to buy). Compensation was slow and distant and did not satisfy many of the expropriated. The pressure continued to rise, there was a risk of violence (Germani 2003), and most of the expropriated families were still awaiting compensation or a fair price.

The third phase began in 1980 with the establishment of a camp surrounding the headquarters of Itaipu Binacional in the municipality of Santa Helena. Due to its popularity, the camp grew in size with the arrival of farmers from all over the region. Through it was created the “Justice and Earth Movement,” the first organized and peaceful social group aimed at bringing together victims of hydroelectric dams. The company quickly started to accept a lot of settler claims but not at inflation-adjusted prices. As a result, the camp and the demonstrations continued to strengthen and started to receive support from other regions of Brazil. After 11 days, the company accepted the adjustment but under certain conditions which the demonstrators did not find suitable. They decided to intensify their action by threatening to move the encampment toward Foz do’Iguaçu. This pressure proved effective and the negotiations resumed, finally leading to an agreement and the dismantling of the camp. The social movement nevertheless continued and organized an encampment of 56 days from March 1981. The pressure once again worked, and families gradually started to receive compensation, but the struggle continued for several months. During all these years of conflict, the main point of contention had always been access to land (Schmitt 2008), the first condition for the survival of farm families.

Lastly, another significant social impact affected indigenous populations in the flooded area. Guarani families living in the indigenous land (TI) of Ocoí (Santos and Nacke 2003) had two-thirds of their reserve flooded and were at the same time threatened by the resettlement of expropriated farmers. In the mid-1980s, 11 families, totaling 27 people, lived in this IL. In 1986, the indigenous people internationalized the conflict by sending a letter to the World Bank which succeeded in alerting the Brazilian authorities. As the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) was in crisis (Santos and Nacke 2003), the social situation of the indigenous people did not improve but deteriorated with the arrival of other Guarani families, bringing the total population to more than 700 people (Terras Indigenas no Brasil 2002). The indigenous people had to move twice, on lands bordering the reservoir (Benetta 2002), but their living conditions remained precarious.

The dam has become an important tourist destination in the west of the Paraná state, and efforts have been made to remember the workers and expropriated people through various initiatives such as museum. Families who have been victims of the dam have managed to rebuild their lives after years of struggle.

Belo Monte

The Belo Monte Dam has been the most debated dam since the beginning of the twenty-first century recent years and has been observed with international attention. Built in the Amazon, the dam is one of the three largest in the world resulting in several significant impacts.

The origin of the construction project for the Belo Monte Dam dates back to the 1970s when the military authorities asked the Camargo Corrêa Company to carry out a study on the hydroelectric potential of the Xingu River. In 1980, while other large dams were under construction, the government was considering the construction of seven dams for a total production of 22,300 MW and a flooded area of 19,000 km2 (Filho 2005). The project did not come to fruition, but the plans were retained by the Brazilian electricity sector’s decision makers.

In 1987, the project was revised to create the Altamira Complex with two dams (Kararaô and Babaquara) with an installed potential of 17,700 MW. The project quickly spurred several demonstrations. The national context of fight against dams (see works by Filho (2005)), the economic context (refusal of financing by the World Bank in 1990), and the political scenario did not favor construction. Once again, the project was placed on hold.

The transition to the twenty-first century proved to be decisive as the project returned under the name of Belo Monte and joined the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) in 2004. The project was downsized compared to previous revisions, with a flooded area down from 1200 to 400 km2, thus reducing its impact on indigenous reserves in the Altamira region. The Belo Monte Dam has a potential power output of 11,000 MW. This rated power output has often been questioned because it is only really achievable during the rainy season which typically runs from January to June.

The construction of the Belo Monte Dam finally started and from then on could not be stopped. It quickly appeared as very high on the agenda of the political powers in place. In an interview in April 2010, the Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said that if private companies were not interested in building Belo Monte the country would build it alone. The justification for the project was twofold: fear of an “apagão” (general power outage in the country), which had been used as a justification by the sector since the last power outage in 2001, and the discourse on the need to build dams so as not to slow down the development of the country. The projected cost of the project (30 billion reais or 9 billion of dollars) was a real deterrent for private companies, but the government played all the strings to encourage the private sector to invest. The state also took part in the consortium (Norte Energia) chosen for the construction and operation of the plant. A group made of Eletrobras, CHESF, and Eletronorte currently owns 49% of the plant, while the other minority shareholders are Cemig, Vale, Light, Neoenergia, Petros, Funcef, J. Malucelli Energia and Sinobras. It should be noted that Norte Energia has been on sale since early 2017 and that its future remains uncertain in particular because of investigations for corruption in the framework of the national survey “Lava Jato.”

In terms of funding, the government assumed the risks associated with the project. Eighty percentage of the project was funded (Brzezinski 2014) by the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) which offered special conditions (interest rates and payment terms) to the government. In return, the bank received payment insurance because the government guaranteed itself by the public treasury and pension funds. Once the financial and economic package had been put in place, the government was committed to defend the project at other levels.

The Belo Monte project could not be hindered by environmental authorities. It did not seem to follow the normal process of environmental licensing after the withdrawal of a president of IBAMA (Sakamoto 2011). A group of nearly forty academic researchers gathered in 2009 to denounce the problems and shortcomings of Belo Monte’s environmental impact report (EIA) in a 230-page document (Magalhães and Hernandez 2009). Even though the document was widely disseminated and relayed to the media, it had limited consequences for the finalization of the Belo Monte project.

The government also faced opposition from the media, NGOs, and celebrities, well-known nationally (such as known actors from Globo, the largest television network in Latin America) and internationally (actors like Arnold Schwarzenegger and singers such as Sting). This buzz against Belo Monte was only temporary, and public opposition mostly disappeared once construction started. NGOs nevertheless continued their fight against the project but, with work progressing, opted to focus more on the respect of environmental rules and the social conditions of the families affected by the dam.

The government also had to respond and defend itself before the courts. In 2005, the Minister Chief of the Civil House defended the project before the Supreme Federal Court. The judicial conflict then focused on the issue of environmental licenses (Fleury 2013) involving the Federal Supreme Court, the Public Prosecution Office, regional courts, and civil society organizations.

Finally, the government also defended the plant construction against the local populations by using deterrence. In 2013, the National Security Force was sent to Altamira for 90 days in order to suppress protests and guarantee the continuity of the construction (Brzezinski 2014). The government therefore used all the state apparatuses at its disposal to guarantee the construction of the Belo Monte Dam.

The construction of the Belo Monte Dam was at the center of a major environmental conflict involving the public authorities, private authorities, the media, and civil society and its representatives. All layers of Brazilian society were involved in this conflict, and its repercussions were so wide that it was almost necessary to review the concept of environmental conflict (Fleury 2013). The conflict was so large and complex that, in an analysis of the project’s vision on social networks, there was a clear division of opinions for and against the project (Santos and Mello 2014), thus demonstrating the lack of discussions and democracy in the construction of the project.

The Belo Monte plant is characterized by the scale and diversity of its impacts. The entire region has been affected by the construction of the dam whether it is the neighboring municipalities, the Trans-Amazonian road, the town of Altamira and the Xingu meander or Volta Grande. Norte Energia defined a direct area of influence which consists of five municipalities near the dam (Altamira, Anapu, Brasil Novo, Senador José Porfírio, and Vitória do Xingu) and an indirect influence area consisting of six municipalities (Gurupá, Medicilândia, Pacajá, Placas, Porto de Moz, and Uruará).

All the municipalities in the region have been affected to a certain extent, at least in their demographics, mainly because of the attractive opportunities offered by the construction of the plant. Local municipalities received various subsidies and compensations from the company.

The Trans-Amazonian Highway, which passes by the foot of the main powerhouse of Belo Monte Dam, crosses an agricultural area occupied by settlers since the 1970s and 1980s. The influence of the dam, whether positive or negative, has been felt. There has been a renewal of the ownership of agricultural lots with the arrival of populations in the region and also a new shortage of labor for agricultural activities. In addition, the road took advantage of the construction of the plant to increase its asphalted surface thus facilitating access and transport in the region.

The city of Altamira is the largest urban area having been affected by the construction of a hydroelectric plant in Brazil. With just over 75,000 inhabitants in 2010 (IBGE 2010a, b, c), Altamira is the logistical and nerve center of the Belo Monte region but also a city along the Xingu River which saw its water level rise with the construction of the dam. According to RIMA (Eletrobras, Eletronorte and MME 2009), 4362 families living in Altamira moved in 2009 for a total of 16,420 people, and according to a 2016 communication from the company, 30,000 people benefited from new houses in Altamira, about twice what was expected. Other structural changes accompanied migration in Altamira: a lack of health infrastructure, a rise in the price of land, and above all an unprecedented level of insecurity. In 2015, Altamira became the most violent city in Brazil with a homicide rate of more than 105 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (IPEA 2017), while the national average is 28.9.

The final large area affected by the Belo Monte Dam is the Volta Grande meander, downstream of the first dam of Belo Monte. This part of the Xingu River is now isolated from the rest of the river because it has been cut by the dam and the floodway of Belo Monte. The flow of water has therefore been greatly reduced with negative consequences on the fauna, flora, and people living along this part of the river, about a 100 kms long. The Volta Grande hosts numerous “ribeirinhos” on the shores and islands, a community of artisanal gold diggers (about 300 people) and two Indian reserves: Paquiçamba and Arara da Volta Grande do Xingu. According to a census of the Ministry of Health of 2014, they count 238 indigenous people (respectively, 95 and 143), on 30,000 ha. The flow of water running into the Volta Grande after the construction of the dam has greatly diminished and does not allow indigenous families to meet their needs for food and transport, etc. (Bermann 2012). In addition, a major project to open a gold mine is also in the pipeline: the Belo Sun project. Announced as the largest open-pit mine in Brazil, it would involve building a tailings dam (waste) on the edge of Xingu.

The riverain families are the most affected by the dam, and social and geographical circumstances make it difficult to measure its full impact. First, it is very hard to locate them; riverains pretty often have two homes, one by the river and other in town, and this lifestyle is not accepted by the authorities. Reparations to the riverain families have generally been paid in money; therefore, they did not take part in the relocation effort and went off the radar of official programs that track the migrants. So, when it comes to mobility and reparations, it is as if they have disappeared from the analysis after the building of the dam. It is important to notice that these families suffered a lot with the change of residence, especially when it comes to their livelihoods, which have always been connected to the river. In most cases, these families were unable to overcome the loss of their natural environment, as can be seen in the analysis made by the SBPC in 2017. The five riverain groups identified by the research were deprived of their means of production and left with no possibility of rebuilding their riverain lifestyle. Because their new houses were not built on riversides, their traditional life space, so essential to their existence (Cernea 2000), was destroyed, and this led many riverains from Belo Monte into a very precarious situation. These are the groups most negatively affected by the dam, left in a “critical situation of violence, social, environmental, and alimentary insecurity” (Magalhães 2017).

Other impacts have affected the Altamira region but were less substantial and more isolated, for example the changes encountered in terms of fishing in the mining reserves upstream of the Xingu River. Traditional populations especially indigenous people that had been affected in different ways by the construction of the dam took part in the fight against the construction as described in the book of FiIlho of 2005 “Tenotã-Mõ.” Native American populations were deeply affected by the building of the Belo Monte Dam, especially those living downstream: the Juruna, from Paquiçamba, the Arara, from Volta Grande do Xingu, and the Xikrin, from Bacajá. In Volta Grande do Xingu, besides the impact on the land, the greatest impact was the dismemberment of groups and communities. Amid pressures, negotiations, political, and territorial games, the Native American groups did not enter any agreement and got divided. Thus, the number of villages went from 19 to 39 between 2010 and 2015 (Fearnside 2017a). Once again, Native American groups pay the price of development (Fearnside 2017b): Even with all the struggles before the building of the dam, they have been affected by deep local changes.

Urban centers near Belo Monte have also been affected by the construction of the dam such as those of Brasil Novo and Vitoria do Xingu which saw their population increase. Economic activity in the region was booming at the beginning of the construction of the dam but quickly came down.

These four examples of hydroelectric plants in Brazil give an overview of the situations that accompany these constructions and the diversity of their consequences. The role of the public authorities in the implementation of projects and the almost automatic negative consequences for the populations can be noted. We will describe in the next chapters the impacts and adaptations of the victims of dams in Brazil.

1.2 Scales Analyses

1.2.1 Local Scale

The issue of proximity must be taken into account to understand the territorial and spatial effects of dams in Brazil. Depending on the perspective taken, transformations can indeed be seen differently, therefore influencing the comprehension of the issues. The effects of dam constructions are more or less foreseen by preliminary environmental studies as they have a ripple effect, with initial transformations producing secondary modifications. We will also talk about the impacts which are seen as consequences of the effects. Effects and impacts are inherent to dams, but they are more or less controlled by companies. All dams affect their area of influence on various scales, with intensities varying with distance. In addition, the larger the dam, the larger the impact analysis required. The analyses mainly target demographic, economic, cultural, environmental, social, and infrastructure issues. For each of these categories, it is possible to describe the type (positive or negative), mode (direct or indirect), intensity, duration, permanence (reversible or not), and zone of direct and close influence of the impacts which can then be used as the first analysis criterion.

The impact study must first focus on the local level, which is the area of influence closest to the dam, plant, and reservoir. The local area of influence covers a radius of a few dozen kms around the construction site.

The local effects are determined by looking at the different parts of the dam. The first area affected by the construction is the site chosen to build the plant and the dam. The site of the reservoir only gets affected after completion of the first stage of construction.

The choice of the construction site is of the utmost importance due to the changes induced by the reservoir and dam as a whole. There are several examples of projects’ relocation following protests and re-evaluations. For instance, the projected sites for the Belo Monte and Machadinho dams had to be moved to greatly reduce their future effects. Some engineers who think and plan the dams only have a selective view of the final product, a technical view mainly focused on the production of energy. They sometimes ignore other aspects of the project such as environmental concerns, impacts on local populations, historical value of the site. The dam location is therefore often discussed in the early stages of planning because it directly influences the area and intensity of local impacts, whether positive or negative.

All dams have local impacts, whether big dams like Itaipu or smaller ones of which there are many in the south and southeast of the country. The succession of smaller dams along the same river also has cumulative effects on local impacts. Global change then takes on another dimension.

The first systematic effect of a dam construction concerns the indigenous population. As Brazil’s rural areas are not deserted, the construction of a dam systematically results in the displacement of rural families living nearby (84% of Brazil’s population lives in urban areas according to the IBGE criteria, during the census of 2010). The local impacts of dams are mainly experienced by families living on the shores of the river where the reservoir is created and in the dam and plant area. Dams are almost always built in rural areas, and it is difficult to imagine a dam near a city. Brazil’s rural areas, though not totally neglected, are areas of relative demographic decline, and riverbanks are abandoned by agribusiness capital and thus occupied by small farmers and/or fishermen.

A small dam like Monjolinho in the Rio Grande do Sul moved between 200 and 400 families, while a large dam like Sobradinho mobilized about 60,000 people. The Monjolinho Dam, despite its small size (74 MW installed on the Passo Fundo River), has significant local impacts on several levels. From a demographic point of view (information available on the portal of the Socio-Environmental Observatory of Dams), according to the Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB), about 400 families had to leave their home, whereas according to the preliminary environmental study only 217 families were to move. Indigenous communities were also affected by the dam (Kaingang and Guarani) and received special compensations. Families living on the banks of dammed rivers always experience the local impacts of the dam.

The local populations most rapidly affected by a dam are often fishermen because their main resource, the river, gets disrupted from the early stages of construction. Alterations made to the river affect their economic activity and challenge their lifestyle and livelihood. Local economic consequences may not be significant in terms of value, but they profoundly impact local families and economies which are often already fragile. A large influx of capital in a short period of time changes local markets as demand increases and diversifies. Local people have nevertheless tried to respond. For example, farm families sometimes abandon their initial activity to get into something else hoping to find a larger source of income but forgetting the risks associated with this change and the limited period of this exceptional demand. The local economy is thus positively impacted for a relatively short time, and then it takes some time for the situation to stabilize once the initial excitement of dam activities has passed.

Dam constructions also have other automatic consequences, such as at the environmental level. Hydroelectric plants are often presented in Brazil as renewable and “green” energy sources, but the environmental impacts of their construction are irreversible. Damming a watercourse and building a power plant inevitably change nature. Even though the transformations do not necessarily take long, as they only last during the time of construction, their effects are permanent. A new environmental order then takes its course. The same applies to impacts on the landscape, whether real or imagined. The landscape as it was before the dam is destroyed and disappears little by little to give way to a new and more complex landscape integrating new elements.

An important local benefit concerns the collective infrastructures which are modified with the development of the site. It is indeed common to see improvements in transport infrastructures, mainly roads to be able to transport machines and heavy materials to the construction site. Investments are also sometimes made at airports and bus stations to facilitate access for the people coming to work on the site. Health and safety infrastructure (police) improvements are also often found as they directly serve the interests of the companies constructing the dams. These infrastructures also benefit the local population. Nevertheless, they only arise for the benefit of the dam and no investment is made beyond that. The dam of Foz do Chapecó provides a very interesting example: A road was asphalted in the municipality of Águas de Chapecó (state of Santa Catarina) as this was the main access to the site, but, on the other side of the river, the municipality of Alpestre (Rio Grande do Sul) did not see any improvement and kept a dirt road between the center of the municipality and the dam. The road improvement was therefore only carried out to assist in the construction of the dam, creating a striking contrast with the rest of the area.

The level of local impacts is different from the other impact zones due to the time factor. Everything that happens at the local level seems more intense and faster. The arrival of the dam causes modifications that mark the local space more deeply for a specified period. From a local demographic point of view for example, there is an influx of people even before the start of construction, with families settling to find work. During construction, agitation reaches its peak, and once the construction is completed, almost everyone leaves and only a part of the population present before the arrival of the dam and some people who decide to settle there remain.

The local effects of the establishment of dams in Brazil can sometimes be considered brutal and frenzied. Their repercussions are diverse (demographics, economy, environment, etc.) and deeply mark the local territory of the dam because they disrupt a rural “peace.” The local impacts of dams are undeniably greater than for at any other level.

1.2.2 Regional Scale

To understand the effects of dams at the regional level, it is first important to define the region as the area around the dam which gets affected either by the construction process or by the consequences of the installation. A functional definition of the region conveys the idea of internal cohesion and homogeneity of space. Administrative or border regions are not taken into account here because dams are built on rivers that often serve as boundaries, thus bringing together various administrative areas or sectors into one unit.

The notion of region refers to areas more or less directly affected by dams. Not all dams and their hydroelectric plants have a regional influence: The smaller ones indeed only affect the various sectors of society locally, and the region around them does not feel the consequences of the constructions. But a group of small dams, built in a row along a stream, might have greater influence and, therefore, reach an entire region.

The most significant regional impacts are related to the economy. The construction of a dam can revitalize the whole area around the site. Economically, the region is measured by the intensity of exchanges between a center and various peripheries. With the creation of a dam, exchanges of all kinds multiply and accelerate for a specific period of time. The region becomes an area of asymmetric interactions where flows of goods and services intersect. Regional relations may be more or less important and intense depending on the project.

A study of the workforce allows a better understanding of the influence a dam may have on the regional economy. The construction stage requires a large amount of manpower, mostly non- or low-qualified labor. At the very beginning of construction, the area near the dam is full of people looking for employment opportunities in the hope to improve their living conditions and incomes. The creation of a dam almost systematically triggers migratory flows of population in search of work in the south, Nordeste region, and north of the country. The workforce often depopulates rural areas and nearby urban areas to temporarily settle closer to the site.

The regional economy also benefits from the construction of a dam through the services. The urban centers in the vicinity of the site become the logistical hubs of construction. Services and businesses such as hotels, restaurants, transport, communication, work to meet the growing demand of the population. Urban centers in the nearby region quickly get occupied by migrants coming to work, and service prices change rapidly. For instance, the town of Altamira, 50 kms from the Belo Monte Dam, saw a very sharp increase in rent. The regional economy experiences a real explosion with all entrepreneurs trying to take advantage of the situation in one way or another.

This is also true of the informal economy and illegal activities that accompany dam constructions in Brazil, with a wide variety of sectors not legally recorded. With the massive arrival of workers on construction sites, some activities spontaneously arise to meet the workers’ needs and suit their incomes, sometimes quite low and irregular. These informal businesses commonly include bars and nightclubs built in a hurry, documentation services such as photocopies and photograph services, taxi and motorcycle taxi services not legally registered with the authorities. These could be legally authorized but for lack of time, structure and various other reasons (money, paperwork, tax, etc.), entrepreneurs often decide not to go through this step in order to earn money as quickly as possible.

All sorts of imaginable illegal activities can be found around dams: drugs, prostitution, sale of arms, etc. Cases of prostitution and child prostitution have been revealed around various dam sites. The Pastoral Commission of the Earth (CPT) notably denounced crimes of prostitution and pedophilia around the Jirau and Santo Antonio dams on the Madeira River (Comissão Pastoral da Terra de Rondônia 2011). The organization explains these issues by the large flow of population in the region because of the projects and the presence of the border with Bolivia only a few dozen kms away. Another case in the Belo Monte Dam area was also exposed in the media where police discovered a club involved in prostitution, including teenage prostitution, and bonded labor (Glass 2013; Leite 2015). The climate of violence surrounding this case is indicative of the human relationships that may exist around the construction sites.

There are also cases of employment under slavery-like conditions around certain hydroelectric plants. The CPT, known for its substantive work on the denunciation of bonded labor in Brazil, reported 38 cases during the construction of the Jirau Dam on the Madeira River in the Amazon in September 2009 (Rossato 2013). The Regional Labor and Employment Superintendency of Rondônia and the Ministry of Public Labor Prosecution then released 38 people working in slavery-like conditions for the construction of new quarters aimed at accommodating future-affected families. Without wanting to extrapolate too much, it is possible to imagine that this type of situation still exists for other dam constructions.

Regional infrastructures linked to the smooth running of the economy also come under pressure during the construction of a dam, such as airports, roads, railway stations, hospitals, health facilities, police stations. Their overuse sometimes causes system breakdowns. For example, as of 2011, the health services in Altamira became overloaded and could no longer cope with the influx of patients. Regional infrastructures are generally marked by the effects of a dam construction much more intensely than at the local level. This is a sign of an increased concentration of services around a few centers in rural areas and in nearby urban centers, increasing pressures and constraints on equipment. The same phenomenon took place near Altamira, in Tucuruí, during the construction of the dam at the end of the 1970s. The construction attracted so many people that the population increased sixfold between 1970 and 1980 (IBGE Census 1970 and 1980), rising from just under 9,000 to 61,100 in 1980. The construction of the Sobradinho Dam in Bahia also saw the population almost double between 1970 and 1980 when the dam was built. It increased by 57,000 people between the two censuses (municipality of Juazeiro). These demographic “booms” weigh heavily on the infrastructures and disrupt the regional dynamics.

The regional area is also marked by the consequences of dams with the forced migrations of families living near the river. Atingidos (affected) are obliged to find new residences, but despite their wish to remain close to their former home, they have to move to more remote areas (urban areas) within the region.

This flow of families and the search for agricultural land exerts a new pressure on land ownership. Increased demand automatically raises the prices of available land but also encourages owners to sell their property. Intermediaries benefit from this new momentum.

The significance of changes at the regional level is due to a cumulative process. The accumulation of development works in a region indeed multiplies impacts, both positive and negative. This is illustrated by the link between dam and aluminum smelter or mines. The phenomenon also exists when several dams are built in the same catchment area as in the case of the Uruguay River or the Paranapanema River which counts 11 hydroelectric plants along its 920 kms.

Various effects are more intense at the regional level than at the local level, and these durably mark the territory. Some dams take on a fundamental role at the regional level, even becoming the symbols of those spaces. They can become a hub for the region, therefore creating a real focal point for the area. The region is often conceived as an integrated subspace with a strong homogeneity. It is a space of cohesion where flows are organized around a common characteristic which can be the influence of a hydroelectric dam.

1.2.3 Global Scale

The analysis of the national and international effects of dams requires a broader view and a step back to look at the conditions of their construction in Brazil. All Brazilian hydroelectric plants are part of a national framework and in some cases international frameworks too: They respond to a national energy policy and to the planning of the electricity sector. But not all dams have the same significance: The smaller ones only have little influence, and their repercussions remain at the local and/or regional level.

There are not many dams with both national and international implications in Brazil, but the few that there are often very well known. This is notably the case of Itaipu, Belo Monte, Foz do Chapecó, Itá, and Tucuruí, among others. These dams are all trademarks and symbols of the Brazilian hydroelectric production, each for a particular reason. Their repercussions however can be of varying intensity and scale: Belo Monte has been the most discussed dam since 2010, while Itá retains the reputation of a well-known dam whose reservoir flooded a whole city, leaving only the very top of the church visible.

The largest dams are often the result of political plans and projects that go beyond simple electricity production. Thus, the Sobradinho, Itaipu, and Belo Monte dams were built because the Brasilia government had strongly supported, in one way or another, their construction. The Sobradinho Dam, built in the period of the military dictatorship, is described as very rigid in its planning and its construction, and authoritarian in its relations with the local population (Sigaud 1988). Dams serve as an example and symbol of the political actions of the governments and demonstrate the power of the central state. For instance, the Itaipu Dam illustrates the strength of the military government which overruled local and regional political powers (state of Paraná) on various occasions (Germani 2003). During the military dictatorship, large dams served as a showcase for the power in place, giving an image of power, order, progress, development, etc. The military period was over 30 years ago, but similar political power plays still exist.

Today, democracy has returned but major development works continue to be used as symbols and marks for politicians. The construction of the Belo Monte Dam was, for example, based on the will of some of the most influential leaders of the Workers’ Party. It shows the power of central government, in a similar fashion as during the military era.

Decisions to construct dams are made by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) following consultations and impact reports. But the final decision is taken before the reports and the public consultations, which are then used to legitimize the whole process. However, the final decision is often unilateral and centralized (Boanada et al. 2016), leaving little room for the opinions of local and regional populations. The decision comes from the top, at the national level, for a grassroots application at the local level.

Some dams have even more influence when they are built on international borders as is the case for Itaipu. As previously explained, international negotiations between five countries were required before its construction could begin. Built between Brazil and Paraguay, complex negotiations took place notably with Argentina, as described in detail by Caubet (1991). C. Caubet stressed that diplomacy and negotiations were always on the agenda despite tensions, and even asserted that the regional controversy of the construction of the dam had repercussions in international institutions, notably for legal matters, including International Environmental Law (1991). Negotiations are needed to deal with national economic effects, but also with the management of resources. The catchment area of rivers that serve as a border is often very large, and the governments concerned sometimes have different priorities.

National and international implications must be addressed with the question of funding of dams. Between 1950 and 1980, funding was often provided through state and international agencies, such as the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For instance, the construction of the Furnas and Sobradinho Dams in the 1970s was financed by the World Bank. These funds have however been greatly reduced (see Equator Principles) and are now lacking for some players in the Brazilian electricity sector (Goldemberg, in a 2008 article in the Estado de São Paulo newspaper).

With the privatization and restructuring of the sector in the 1990s, the financing of large dams changed rapidly. The government withdrew from direct financing, and investments started to come from the private sector. Currently, a large part of financing for development works such as dams comes from the National Development Bank (BNDES), an autonomous public bank (Uderman and Calvacante 2011). Already present in the middle of the twentieth century, its role has been transformed to support new construction projects in the context of privatization. From a global point of view, funding in the hydroelectric field has decreased in comparison with the 1970s and 1980s but remains important for this sector which is fundamental for the development of the country. Between 2000 and 2004, the BNDES provided almost 20 billion reais (6 billion of dollars) to hydroelectric generation projects (BNDES 2004) like those of the extension of the Tucuruí Dam or the construction of the Itá Dam. Major current projects in Brazil get almost all of their funding from the BNDES, such as the Estreito, Santo Antonio, and Belo Monte dams. The BNDES plays a fundamental role in financing investments in the Brazilian electricity sector (Uderman and Calvacante 2011), but these have also been reduced as the bank wants to support other renewable energies (2016). The resources (water) become merchandise in lot of cases (Zhouri and Oliveira 2008).

Some large dams have become symbols not only for the political power, but also more generally for the population and society. All Brazilians know the Itaipu and the Belo Monte dams. These structures have become part of the country’s history, national identity, and image. While most Brazilians are not really aware of the impacts of large dams, they know of their existence and they take pride in the technical and architectural achievements of the projects. Large dams serve to give a positive image of the nation. The Itaipu Dam is known around the world, its Wikipedia page is translated into more than 40 languages, and it is a popular site for tourists who come to visit the nearby Iguazu Falls.

At the same time, some dams have attracted the negative attention of international environmental protection groups (mainly NGOs), such as Greenpeace and the WWF. The latter two have officially opposed dam projects in Brazil and have a unique media power to attract global attention to these issues, especially when projects are to set up in the Amazon. Often associated with the protection of Amazonian indigenous peoples, these NGOs broadcast their messages internationally and can have a significant influence in Brazil.

With regard to hydroelectricity production, Brazil is a world leader, being the third largest producer, according to the International Hydropower Association (IHA 2017). Brazil’s hydrogenerating capacity is just under 100,000 MW, well behind China’s hegemony (more than 330,000 MW) and just behind the USA 102,000 MW. In 2016, Brazil was second in the world in terms of installed capacity increase, with an increase of 6300 MW, again behind China which is investing heavily in this sector (plus 11,700 MW in capacity in 2016). We can see on the following map the weight of each country in the global production of hydroelectricity, the impressive size of Brazil in the world (2006).

China is also an increasingly recurrent investor in the Brazilian electricity sector and thus in hydroelectric dams since 2013. Through the China Three Gorges (CTG) Company, one of the world’s largest energy companies, China is positioning itself in the sector. CTG first acquired the rights to operate two dams on the Parana River (Jupiá and Ilha Solteira) before buying the Brazilian subsidiary of Duke Energy. As a result, CTG has achieved an installed production capacity in Brazil of 8270 MW (CTG 2017) and, in its own terms, has become “the second largest power generator in the country with private capital.” CTG has a stake in 15 hydroelectric plants in Brazil and is in the midst of expansion, having just, in August 2017, signed a technical exchange agreement with Itaipu. Finally, it must be noted that Chinese investments in the sector are multiple with, at the same period, an agreement signed with the Chinese State Grid Company for the construction of a transmission line between Belo Monte and the state of Rio de Janeiro (2000 kms). With Chinese investments in the Brazilian hydroelectricity sector only just starting, one will have to wait to be able to fully analyze what seems like a shift in the history of electricity in Brazil.

To conclude, the effects of dams at the national and international levels involve larger and more comprehensive issues than at the local and regional levels. National and international effects are often less visible or less tangible. At the national level, they touch on imagination and politics. Some large dams have a significant impact on the history and collective memory of the country. Itaipu and Belo Monte, for example, are two important markers of the country’s history. They also represent a political period, notably the military junta and the start of twenty-first century. The construction of a dam is an event that can leave historical traces. For instance, the anecdote is that on the day of her dismissal, President Dilma Rousseff inaugurated the Belo Monte Dam, a controversial work she personally supported and which marked her government.

Internationally, dams create many global issues that affect the economy, finance, law, and so on. The Brazilian national economy is involved in the construction of dams, with financing, but also in the final production and electricity distribution to companies and individuals, and finally in the area of international investments, which have become increasingly open to foreign countries from the end of the twentieth century. The international effects of dams in Brazil have taken a new turn, the last 20 years, notably because of the recent interest of Chinese investors in the sector.

1.3 Landscapes and Territories Modifications

1.3.1 Landscape Evolution

The construction and dissemination of hydroelectric plants throughout Brazil end up changing the landscape. All regions and states of Brazil host dams and other large-scale structures with localized effects.

Widely studied by various geographical schools since the origin of the discipline, the notion of landscape has evolved a lot and is no longer limited to the rural landscapes traditionally analyzed. Similarly, the dichotomy between cultural and natural landscapes is often blurred in a kind of broad landscape shaping. We will use the notion of landscape as defined by Berque (1995): “Invested by human values, the landscape is at the same time a living environment, a heritage, a resource and a badge of identity.” The landscape is the result of the interaction and combination of biological (physical and chemical) and anthropogenic elements, creating an original but constantly evolving scene. To read and understand a landscape, we must remember the importance of the human outlook, the potential interpretations, and the imaginary images. To identify how large dams change Brazilian landscapes, it is therefore essential to consider this geographical concept in all its complexity.

We will start by looking at the type of landscape and geographical structure in which dams are constructed. Rural areas are always a favorable environment for construction, as they are old and complex, and generally occupied by agricultural activities and human habitats. In Brazil, dams are present in all regions so they are established in almost all types of possible geomorphological, climatic, and biological conditions. They are found in the Amazon rainforest, in the savannah of the Nordeste, in the Southern Pampa, in the hills of the Atlantic Forest of the Sudeste coast, in the semiarid areas of the Nordeste, etc. Dams are built in landscapes that have already undergone anthropogenic interventions, even in the most isolated areas.

To better understand the effects of the construction of a dam in a landscape, we will use as an example a photograph of the construction site of the Belo Monte Dam, in the Northern region of Pará, in the Amazon. This photograph gives us a lot of information on the landscape and its transformation. It can be divided into two parts: The first is composed of the dam construction site and surrounding work areas, while the second encompasses “natural” elements such as the Xingu River, symbol of the Amazon rainforest, and the vegetation marked by the presence of cultivated fields, evidence of human presence. The photograph can nevertheless be interpreted in other ways, by taking into account the evolution of the landscapes.

The construction of a hydroelectric plant brings with it a number of new landscape features varying in size, intensity, speed of development, etc. These changes all mark the territory and the landscape. As a dam-sized structure involves the construction of a concrete wall several dozens of meters in size in a rural landscape, it profoundly alters the local landscape. The dam, the plant, and the reservoir cause significant, long-lasting, and profound transformations. The building process can be likened to a violent act, for, in the space of 3–5 years, a complete landscape gets permanently altered by the construction of an imposing civilian work.

Figure 1.2 illustrates how the landscape profile changes with the arrival of a dam. The dam delimits two distinct spaces, two landscapes: The dam and the plant are very localized spaces, whereas the reservoir, above the major bed of the river, covers a wider area. To analyze the effects of dams on the landscape, it is therefore necessary to differentiate the various areas between the dam and its reservoir as the observations will differ depending on the affected area. Figure 1.2 only shows the lower part of the dam, the site where the turbines are installed, but not the reservoir.

Fig. 1.2
figure 2

Guillaume Leturcq, May 2015

Photograph of the construction site of the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant. Vitória do Xingu/PA/Brazil.

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The impacts of dams on landscapes are twofold, both a transformation and a disappearance. Transformations concern the natural environment. The natural biological life continues but is altered by the dam and its plant, therefore modifying the environment. The lake presents a different natural dynamic than the river, and therefore, transformations in the environment only tend to appear at the end of construction. A project of this scale also puts pressure on the characteristics of the site and can alter its identity. Disappearances concern parts of the material heritage (physical and biological for example) and intangible heritage (culture, memories, etc.). A dam and its reservoir can destroy physical elements such as waterfalls, villages, forests, and they can also destroy the soul of a place, its esthetics, its culture, its memories, and so on. Changes in landscapes can therefore be visible and invisible. The historical landscape which existed before the dam was constructed gives way to a new complex post-dam landscape.

In the analysis of the landscape modifications, one must also take into account perceptions and images, and not only visible aspects. Beyond modifications and disappearances, various intangible elements accompany the construction of a dam. A dam conjures up images of force, power, technology, domination, development, modernity, etc. Each observer or inhabitant has their own interpretation, which is not necessarily based on the images often associated with dams which are disclosed and used by the people involved in the dam development. Other people may have a more critical view of the works and associate them with images of authoritarianism, destruction, expulsion, etc. Thus, the vision and images associated with dams obviously depend on the point of view of the observer and the elements of interpretation at their disposal.

The people who observe the landscapes before and after the construction of a dam do so with their values, their history, their ideological position, and their role in the situation. The readings are therefore fundamentally different between a person forced to change residence and an engineer responsible for installing turbines. During an official visit of Belo Monte, we observed the opposition of landscape readings for the site. Our guide, who had been an engineer in the electrical sector for over 30 years, offered a look of admiration for the scale of the worksite, the means deployed, the size of the dam, and the impression of grandeur it gave. Among the visitors, there was also a student in ecology and sociology who was discovering this type of work for the first time and was outraged by its presence in the Amazon. She was astounded by the extent of the construction site and the scale of the potential upheavals on the environment. The effects of dams alter the vision people may have of it and therefore modify the image they have of its imprint on the landscape.

The perception of the landscape transformations around the dams varies with time and the duration of observation. The initial shock caused by the construction of the dam greatly affects the reading of the landscape, but, over time, the negative characteristics tend to fade and observations relative to the history of the structure and its integration into the local environment “soften.” For example, dam reservoirs are often better accepted visually and for their utility in the landscape after a few years, once new uses have been found for them. It seems that the negative view of the dam tends to diminish over the years. For example, the landscape around the reservoir of the Itá Dam, with the top of the old church of the Sunken Village, greatly revolted the victims of the dam during the rise of the waters but later became the symbol of the dam and of the city.

The irreversible impacts of dams on the landscape effectively cancel out the arguments that present hydroelectric plants as “clean” sources of energy. Often presented as such in Brazil, as a means to justify how many there are, dams mark forever the landscapes and transform the geographical spaces, more so than other human interventions. The reservoirs of the Sobradinho and Balbina dams, respectively, covering, officially, areas of 4200 and 2400 km2 in the semiarid Nordeste and in the Amazon, are the most striking examples in Brazil (Cf. Figs. 1.3 and 1.4). The irreversible and brutal impact of building a dam permanently affects the landscape.

Fig. 1.3
figure 3

From Google Image, 2017

Image of Balbina Dam reservatory.

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Fig. 1.4
figure 4

From Google Image, 2017

Image of Sobradinho Dam reservoir.

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After observing their extensive impacts, some countries are beginning to dismantle dams after their recommended lifespan has passed or because of a change of direction in energy policy. This has notably happened in North America (dam destroyed in Washington State in the USA on the Elwha River for example) and in Europe (Poutès Dam in the Haute Loire region in France), and we may wonder whether this could potentially also happen in Brazil in the future. This however still seems fairly unlikely for a country that still relies a lot on hydroelectricity. It should be noted that these dams being dismantled were of minor importance in terms of electricity generation and one will have to wait a long time before seeing a complete reversal of the situation.

Finally, some dams try to blend into the landscape or at least to limit their visual impact by using a variety of techniques and illusions, such as planting vegetation on the wall of the dam or painting it in similar colors as the local landscape. Such a method was used for a dam linked to a deactivated mine (Akinaga et al. 2010), but this has not yet been done for a hydroelectric plant in Brazil. In Uruguay, part of the dam of Rincón del Bonete has been vegetated in order to try and make it blend into the landscape.

To conclude, hydroelectric plants significantly mark the landscapes in which they are located, modifying the very definition of the places, and bringing a new appearance and a new identity to the area.

1.3.2 Territories’ Evolution

The building of hydroelectric dams in Brazil is changing the territories. The term “territory” is a popular word which is however sometimes misused, so we will use the definition of Guy Di Meo, French geographer, for whom the territory “testifies to an economic, ideological, and political appropriation of space by groups that give themselves a particular representation of themselves, of their history, of their singularity” (Di Méo 1998). He also emphasizes that geographical analysis, even more so in social geography, is concerned with “relational and multidimensional territorialities.” In the case of dams, it is necessary to analyze the changes and evolutions of the territories by first considering the double phenomenon of insertion/exclusion of the populations on the territory and then by presenting the roles of the territorial development stakeholders.

To understand the inclusion and exclusion of populations in spaces and territories, it is essential to look at the notion of migration. Most dam-affected people are indeed forced to migrate thus to radically change their place of residence and their life plans. Settlement of dam-affected families must be done relatively near the construction site. A new location implies administrative, political, logistical, and cultural changes, adding to all the adjustments due to migration.

When settling into a new administrative framework (municipality and/or state of the federation), families need to adapt to a new living environment and potentially establish new relations with the institutions, that is to say the public authorities, governments, associations, companies, etc. The institutional setting is important in the lives of families because it provides stability and security. A change causes upheavals. More specifically, changing banks, unions, links with local politicians, etc., weighs heavily on the families’ daily life and affects their well-being and their future. Making contact and establishing a new relationship of trust with the various stakeholders are long-term processes that will impact the way families cope.

For example, families need to adapt to a new healthcare environment and familiarize themselves with new procedures to see doctors, go to the dentist, visit a clinic, etc. The examples are even more striking for the populations who settle in rural areas because this requires increased mobility and longer travel times. The victims of the Machadinho Dam, between Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, provide a good example. Some affected families had to migrate from the south to the north, thus changing their state of residence. The shock in terms of relations with health institutions was important because the southern state offers different services, sometimes considered more comprehensive. For instance, a mobile dentist service, traveling by bus, exists in rural areas, unlike in Santa Catarina, and the number of dispensaries in some municipalities of Santa Catarina is lower than in Rio Grande do Sul. Families in the south complained particularly about queues and the quality of the service offered in Santa Catarina.

Integration in a new territory can be facilitated to a different extent depending on the terms of the families’ settlement. Families who settle individually do not benefit from the same support as those who arrive in groups. Sometimes, there is a collective settlement arrangement, mainly in rural areas, which facilitates the integration of families. The collective rural reassentamento (resettlement) gives families the same experience for their installation in their new place of residence. They can support each other and move forward together to build their new living environment. They may also benefit from basic infrastructures sometimes provided by this type of arrangement: a community center, a church, a school, telephone and electrical lines, etc. The families of collective reassentamento integrate more easily, both in the new community that they compose, but also in the new local rural and administrative areas of the municipality. A group of families going through the same experience can help each other and learn together about their new living place. It is however important to acknowledge that, despite benefiting from the same conditions as others, some families still struggle to settle into the new environment.

Let us look at a paradoxical example that shines another light on the issue of integration and exclusion. A group of families having received late collective compensation from the company responsible for the Machadinho Dam (MAESA) relocated to another state (Santa Catarina), several dozens of kms from the urban center of Curitibanos. They did not benefit from the same infrastructures as the other reassentamento established in the region. Due to various historical reasons, conflicts, and negotiations, the initial group of families settling in this new space had drastically reduced in the first few months. The living conditions being particularly difficult (no house built, very little help from institutions, isolated place), many families chose to leave and gave up their compensation. Nevertheless, despite the complexity of the living environment, some families decided to stay and unite to settle successfully. During the research in this reassentamento (field research in 2007), we noted a real unity and a very supportive environment among the families. They helped each other a lot during the first few months to build houses and plant the first crops. They then continued to meet at the end of each day to build together, with their own resources, a church and a community center. This collective action is also a way of strengthening the unity of the group and establishing roots in the territory.

Territorial exclusion affects rural communities present before the arrival of the dam. Some areas see their inhabitants leave because of the rising waters of the reservoir. Rural communities see their population drop and must adapt to a new context, that is to say a dissolution of interrelations between families and neighbors because of departures. Smaller communities have limited infrastructure, especially for businesses or community services, such as priests in churches. The rural community of São Francisco, in the municipality of Barracão/RS (Rio Grande do Sul), lost more than half of its inhabitants during the construction of the Machadinho Dam. At the same time, the loss was accompanied by the closure of businesses, a church, and a primary school. Public services were reduced due to a lack of families. A whole section of community life can disappear after the migration of families affected by a dam, and their original living areas become isolated.

Another type of exclusion concerns dam-affected families who migrate to a new living space but who are unable to settle permanently. We met families of “cabocla” origin who, in a collective rural reassentamento, did not manage to have an agricultural production and to feel comfortable in their new home. Excluded families who have lost their point of reference have difficulties in finding productive work, sometimes due to the necessity to adopt new farming practices. These families miss their former living environment (from a physical and psychological point of view). They suffer from the absence of parents and family, friends and neighbors, but also from the loss of their landscape, including the watercourse, which can be a fundamental element for their well-being and life structure. These families are however installed in reassentamentos where others are successful in their new life. Territorial exclusion can thus be expressed individually or collectively depending on the situation. The adaptation of families to the new environment affects their integration and their participation in the development of the new territory.

In his definition of territory, G. Di Meo speaks of ideological and political appropriation of space. The stakeholders who impact directly or indirectly on the territory are referred to as spatial actors. They influence and build the territory through their actions or their representations of the future territory. According to V. Noseda and J-B. Racine (Noseda and Racine 2001), the main geographical actors are: the individuals (including their family or their household), a more or less formal group, the company, the local community, and the state. Everyone may have a different field of action and a different strength, but all have a certain impact on the space and participate in the territorialization. These actors work according to their socio-spatial practices, their objectives, and their interests by setting up a strategy, based on domination, alliance, or cooperation. The spatial actors build the territory over time, and in this case, it is the period of the construction of a dam.

The construction of a hydroelectric dam implies the upheaval of the actors present in the area and thus the transformation of the territory. While new stakeholders appear, often powerful (economically, politically, in the decision-making domain, etc.), others disappear or see their fields of action and responsibilities diminish. This results in a power redistribution, especially economic and political powers, and a reconstruction of the territorial development with the arrival of a new set of actors in a specific area, i.e., the site of construction and the area of influence around the hydroelectric plant.

Dams are usually constructed in rural areas, which are dominated by agricultural stakeholders, mainly small farmers. They rarely get built in areas of large land holdings (fazendas) as powerful and influential owners tend to have more land on the plateaus than in the valleys (Monbeig 1952) and also have the means to prevent their construction. Small farmers therefore represent the largest group of stakeholders in rural areas before the arrival of a dam, despite the recent change in the profile of rural areas with an increase in non-agricultural populations (Balsadi 2011). For our field research, rural unions’ headquarters have often been key locations, starting points for identifying key players in the local territory. Small farmers do not have a strong economic domination, but by their number and their networks, they are the main actors of the territorialization. They are accompanied by traditional government services, whether local communities or federal state services. Public services are still major providers of jobs in rural Brazil in all sectors: administration, education, health, security, etc. With the establishment of dams, rural areas are in turmoil, especially through the introduction of new players (tourism and recreation, economic center, environment, new inhabitants, etc.).

A few months before the start of construction, the set of actors changes completely with the arrival of the dam construction company and its unique economic strength and equally impressive symbolic power. The company comes to an area where the most powerful stakeholders are of less importance and quickly takes over by deciding many elements that mark the territory. In addition to building a dam and a plant, it introduces various other infrastructure and service elements. For example, companies may decide to asphalt roads, reinforce police services, build churches, etc. They model the territory to their liking, and the other stakeholders do not have enough weight to discuss and oppose their decisions. Private entities take power despite their governance responsibilities being “unclear, non-transparent, and conflicting” (Boanada et al. 2016). One example among many, the CHESF Company that built the Sobradinho Dam in the state of Bahia in the 1970s built villages to accommodate the employees responsible for the construction of the structure. Even after fulfilling their original objective, these villages continue to exist years later as many employees chose to stay on site after completion of the dam. Today, Sobradinho is a small town of 20,000 inhabitants (IBGE 2010) whose origin is due to the construction of the dam about 40 years ago.

The construction of a dam is often marked by a questioning of the federal government’s involvement, or at least of its representatives. Good part of the dam construction is the result of a global energy policy, and the establishment of a dam is, theoretically, of benefit to the entire national electricity sector. The division of responsibilities between the federal state and the construction company is sometimes blurred because the financing may come from national banks. There is a confusion between private and public spheres. The state company and its private partners may argue over issues, responsibilities, and obligations with respect to public policies or activities related to the dam development (Boanada et al. 2016). The confusion of roles and responsibilities is complex and intermixed with other issues, making it hard for the local population to determine who to refer to in case of specific problems. For example, during the construction of the Belo Monte Dam, the presence and influence of FUNAI in Altamira have greatly diminished despite the presence of indigenous people in the impact zone of the dam. The number of officials of this public institution that protects the native indigenous populations dropped from 60 in 2011 to 23 (officially) in 2015, but most probably only 14 because of early departures (Indicadores de Belo Monte 2015 and G1 2015). FUNAI was therefore greatly weakened during the construction of the dam, a time during which they were most needed for the protection of indigenous people in the region, demonstrating the influence of the private sphere on the public sector. The local population, and especially indigenous people, are worried about this development and demonstrated in 2017 against the downsizing of FUNAI. In addition to a national policy of withdrawal from this foundation, the influence of Norte Energia has reduced the action of the institution in the region. The company can now deal with the indigenous families in its own way, deciding their future and therefore their territory in the region.

New stakeholders, beyond the construction company, also arrive in the dam area, such as other companies involved in construction, associations, or NGOs and public control entities. A whole new set of spatial actors settle in the area and remodel the territorial organization of the region by acting directly in the local space and very often ignoring the local population. These new stakeholders often replace previous local actors, and the balance of power is upset. The new actors act in the space according to their own interests and tend to settle in the area for a short period of time, namely the duration of construction. They seize the decision-making powers and the spheres of influence. Even associations and non-governmental organizations, that act to protect the population or the environment, mark the space and participate in the construction of the territory. The example of the social movements in defense of the victims of dams illustrates this point. Whether well-established and nation-wide (such as the Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB)), or new and local only, these organizations mark the territory by their grip on the dam-affected populations. The social movements organize meetings, demonstrations, and protests to claim land, better compensation, more negotiations, etc. By their protest actions, they create a territory of opposition against the dam company. This occurs very often during construction and sometimes even before the start of work. Before the beginning of Foz do Chapecó, the MAB installed a camp of local families who took turns to occupy the land marked out for construction, thus imposing their presence from the outset to negotiate compensation.

The stakeholders that were previously in a position of strength are left behind with regard to governance and territorial development. Local public entities are often subjected to decisions from above, either from a broader political power or from an influential economic entity. Spatial planning, which in Brazil is largely the responsibility of local communities, passes into the hands of the company building the dam and its associates. Territorial development takes a functional turn responding to the needs of economic actors. It is possible to question the real place of public power during the construction of dams because they sometimes seem very far behind. The city of Altamira is an enlightening example of the loss of power of the main local stakeholder, namely the town hall. To compensate for the negative effects of the Belo Monte Dam, Norte Energia undertook to set up a sewerage and water treatment system in the city. During interviews with town officials responsible for planning and public works, they explained not being aware of the project of the sanitation system and to have no information on the schedule or on the location or terms of operation. City officials did not know what was happening in their own city regarding the installation of a new public service for the population. The loss of power of a local actor is the consequence of the arrival of a new actor who takes over and decides the territorial future around the dam.

Similarly, local populations participate relatively little and in an illusory way in the decision-making process regarding the future of their living environment. The Brazilian environmental licensing system provides for public hearings, but these are conducted in such a way that they present a project already set up and approved by the company and the public authorities. Thus, the local population has no say in the official course of construction of a dam. For the company, the public hearings are controlled and organized and allow above all to legitimize their action publicly. In this way, there is a clear lack of space for dialogue and debate between civil society and the private sector (Locatelli 2014) (Cf. Fig. 1.5).

Fig. 1.5
figure 5

Leturcq (2005)

Meeting between future atingidos and federal government during 30 min in Rio dos Indios/RS.

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All the stakeholders, new and old, have the future of the region in their hands and decide the territorial development according to their desires and powers. Regions composed of various territories see their functions modified according to the construction of the dam and the many actors and spheres of influence on site. For example, after the wave of dam constructions on the Uruguay River, the city of Florianópolis, capital of the Santa Catarina state, became a logistical, administrative, political, and decision-making center for the Brazilian electricity sector in the southern region. This city brings together various key players in the sector.

The economies of the areas hosting the dams are modified by the arrival of the dams, in particular the agricultural sector and all that it incorporates: the loss of useful agricultural land, the loss of productive agents in this sector because of migrations, a change in the profile of the local workers, and a lack of economic interest due to the new dominant sector.

The territories around the dams are constantly redefined with several new or modified features: economies, stakeholders, institutions, etc. The local populations are in the midst of the transformations and have a reduced space of participation regarding the evolution of the territories. The construction of a dam is always a territorial element that becomes central, and it is often around it that the local and regional space gets restructured.