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Entering the Oversight World

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Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of Congressional investigations and the role they’ve played in U.S. history. It also summarizes the Constitutional and legal basis for Congress’ investigative powers. In addition, the chapter describes how the narrator was hired by Senator Carl Levin and learned the skills and responsibilities of a Congressional investigator while working for the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management. It includes a description of a year-long Subcommittee investigation into campaign finance issues that tarnished the 1996 Presidential election.

“The scope of [Congress’] power of inquiry … is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”

Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504, n. 15 (1975)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For more information on the Pujo Committee investigation, see Congress Investigates: A Critical and Documentary History, editors Roger A. Bruns, David L. Hostetter, and Raymond W. Smock (Facts on File 2011) (hereinafter “Congress Investigates”), Volumes 1–2, at 417–459; “Money Trust Investigation: Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States,” House Committee on Banking and Currency subcommittee (5/16/1912), HRG-1912-BCU-0017, Y4.B22/1:M74/2-1, http://bit.ly/2ASceSc (first of multiple hearing days).

  2. 2.

    For more information on the Pecora investigation, see Congress Investigates, at 500–539; “Stock Exchange Practices,” Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. Hrg. 73-1455 (6/6/1934), http://bit.ly/2hKZVDt (report and associated hearings from January 1933 to May 1934).

  3. 3.

    For more information on the Watergate investigation, see Congress Investigates, at 886–926.

  4. 4.

    For more information on the Church Committee investigation, see Congress Investigates, at 927–967; “Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate together with Additional, Supplemental, and Separate Views,” S. Rpt. 94-755 (4/26/1976), https://archive.org/details/finalreportofsel01unit.

  5. 5.

    See, for example, the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369 (S. 2127); Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984, P.L. 98-460 (S. 476); Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986, P.L. 99-634 (S. 2250); Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, P.L. 100-503 (S. 496); Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, P.L. 101-648 (S. 303); Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, P.L. 104-65 (S. 349).

  6. 6.

    See, for example, the following hearings and reports from investigations conducted by the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management: “Department of Defense Subcontractor Kickbacks,” S. Hrg. 99-810 (2/27/1986), http://bit.ly/2jEncHL; “Wedtech: A Review of Federal Procurement Decisions,” S. Prt. 100-108 (5/1988), http://bit.ly/2Cwa9Q8; “Department of Defense Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research,” S. Hrg. 100-902 (7/27–28/1988), http://bit.ly/2itP2mx; “Oversight of Oil Spill Protections for the Great Lakes,” S. Hrg. 101-354 (9/6/1989), http://bit.ly/2yWWFbk; “Lax Federal Enforcement of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Program,” S. Prt. 102-52 (10/1991), http://bit.ly/2zPXVAu; “Navy’s Mismanagement of the Sealift Tanker Program,” S. Hrg. 103-1044 (10/12/1994), http://bit.ly/2zPYNVJ.

  7. 7.

    273 U.S. 135 (1927). For more information on the Teapot Dome scandal, see Congress Investigates, at 460–499.

  8. 8.

    See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

  9. 9.

    See U.S. Code, Title 2, “The Congress.”

  10. 10.

    Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821).

  11. 11.

    The Supreme Court has upheld Congress’ right to use imprisonment to induce a subpoena recipient to produce requested information or impose punishment for noncompliance. The Court has limited the term of imprisonment by stating it may not exceed the term of the Congress that authorized it. See, for example, “Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure,” Report No. RL34097, Congressional Research Service (5/12/2017), at 8, 10–11 (hereinafter “CRS Report on Congress’s Contempt Power”).

  12. 12.

    See 2 U.S.C. § 192 (authorizing Congress to find a person who was summoned as a “witness” before a house of Congress, but refused to appear, answer questions, or produce requested papers, guilty of a criminal misdemeanor, and subject to a monetary fine or imprisonment for up to one year); 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(b) and 288d, 28 U.S.C. § 1365 (authorizing the Senate to file civil contempt lawsuits in federal district court); CRS Report on Congress’s Contempt Power, at 20–25. In place of the Senate’s civil contempt statutes, the House requires adoption of a House resolution each time a House committee seeks to enforce a subpoena through civil contempt proceedings. Id. at 25–30. The last time Congress conducted its own trial on contempt charges, outside of a federal court, was in 1935. Id., at 12.

  13. 13.

    If voting is successful and a contempt citation is “certified” by the Senate President or House Speaker, the law states it becomes the “duty” of a federal prosecutor “to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.”

  14. 14.

    Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503–507 (1975).

  15. 15.

    Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 408–409 (1961).

  16. 16.

    The number, names, and jurisdictions of its subcommittees also underwent repeated alteration.

  17. 17.

    The Governmental Affairs Committee’s jurisdiction was set forth in the Senate’s standing committee rules and the committee’s funding resolution. See, for example, Senate Rule XXV-1(k) and S. Res. 85, both in force during the 99th Congress.

  18. 18.

    Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 665 (1938).

  19. 19.

    Senate Select Committee on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17, 20–21 (D.D.C. 1994), stay pending appeal denied, 510 U.S. 1319 (1994).

  20. 20.

    Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503–507 (1975). See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (The investigative power of Congress “encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”).

  21. 21.

    18 U.S.C. § 1621.

  22. 22.

    In the 99th Congress, Senate Rule XXVI provided the standing procedural rules for how Senate committees operated, while the same function was performed for House committees by House Rule XI.2(m)(1).

  23. 23.

    “Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” Report, Volumes 1–6, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Rept. 105-167 (3/10/1998) (hereinafter “1996 Campaign Report”), Volume 1, at 11–12, http://bit.ly/2hKgO0W et seq. (6 parts). See also related hearings at http://bit.ly/2zQ0bHF et seq. (10 parts).

  24. 24.

    Senate Resolution 39 (3/11/1997).

  25. 25.

    1996 Campaign Report, Volume 1, at 14–15.

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Bean, E.J. (2018). Entering the Oversight World. In: Financial Exposure. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94388-6_1

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