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Soft Power Made in China pp 25–51Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

China’s Soft Power Building and Its TV Industry as a Soft Powerhouse

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Abstract

Conceptualizing China’s TV industry as a soft powerhouse, this chapter introduces the theoretical concept of a “transnational soft power field” by using scholarly debates on a field framework in sociology by Fligstein, McAdam, and Bourdieu to explore the ways in which soft power is exerted upon receiving countries, as well as returned to its source. In this process, this chapter pays attention to the developmental strategy of soft power in China’s policy realm with its industrial development, the evolution of “culture” in different government plans, and its evolving definition in the historical trajectory of post-socialist China. Using Nye’s concept of soft power as a baseline, this chapter also shows that Chinese soft power is developed along notions of “culture,” in its institutionalization of soft power in Chinese discourse, as well as in China’s institutionalizing cultural industry.

This chapter theorizes different forms of capital—aesthetic capital, cultural capital, economic capital, historical capital, economic capital—in distinct subfields of Chinese television series.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The actors—who craft and implement policies at the governmental level—and the institutions would shape the development of China’s soft power at critical junctures and historical configurations in post-socialist China.

  2. 2.

    In other words, the latter—China’s cultural system reform and cultural influence projection—needs to show its capacity with commensurable economic power. This discussion is in line with China’s discourse on the expansion of “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli).

  3. 3.

    See Caixin (2012).

  4. 4.

    This is a direct translation of Xiaokang Shehui, which refers to a “well-off society.” See the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] (2005).

  5. 5.

    This often refers to chuanbo liliang as well.

  6. 6.

    “…and communication capacity (chuanboli) as new engines, we need to develop our culture’s creativity (chuangzaoli), communication capacity and influence (yingxiangli)” is a literal translation of such statement. (“yao chongfen renshi keji jinbu dui wenhua fazhan de zhongyao zuoyong, jinjin zhuazhu xinxihua shenru fazhan de lishi jiyu, jiakuai tuijin wenhua he keji de ronghe, ba yunyong gaoxinjishu zuowei tigao wenhua chaungxin nengli he chuanbo nengli de xinyinqing, qieshi zengjiang woguo wenhua de chuangzaoli, chuanboli he yingxiangli.”)

  7. 7.

    For an examination of China’s cultural policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Pang (2012).

  8. 8.

    Depending on the source used, the date when the phrase “cultural industry” first appeared in an official Chinese document is different. For example, most literature indicate 2000, but Hu (2006) argues that it first appeared in 1992 (A Decision Made to Develop the Third Sector). However, the term was clearly included before the Eleventh Five-Year Plan started. Furthermore, I would argue that the official inclusion of the phrase “cultural industry” was done in preparation for further development , in line with the cultural industry argument in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan.

  9. 9.

    Most of the published literature, without taking account of any earlier attempts, informs us that the first inclusion of the phrase “cultural industry” was either in 2000 or in 2001.

  10. 10.

    There is no specification on the field of “international broadcasting” yet, although the English CCTV channel was launched in 2000. The Cultural Market Development Plan specifies that the Ministry and government aimed toward “Wenhuachanye jibenfa” (The Basic Law of Cultural Industry) in the year 2010.

  11. 11.

    From 2016, Shanghai started to host the Shanghai International B & B Cultural Industry Expo (2016 Shanghai guoji minsu wenhuachanye bolanhui ji xiangcun lvyou zhuangbeizhan), which has exhibitions related to cultural industry as well as travel.

  12. 12.

    Media reform is an example of this.

  13. 13.

    It is intriguing that it does not mention anything related to Hollywood.

  14. 14.

    For a more detailed discussion see Li, Wuwei. 2011. How creativity is changing China edited by Michael Keane, translated by Hui Li and Marina Guo, Bloomsbury London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

  15. 15.

    For example, in terms of the real estate industry, its industrial upgrading has been followed a similar step to this configuration.

  16. 16.

    This can be regarded as a result of the National Cultural Reform Testing Points Work Conference which was held in Beijing in 2003 (Flew 2012: 48).

  17. 17.

    See also Keane (2006).

  18. 18.

    Flew (2012) and Keane (2006) observed a desire of the government aspiring to move from “China fake” and “China manufactured” toward “China Created/China Inc.”

  19. 19.

    Ministry of Culture (2005, 2007), “Opinions on further strengthening and improving the export of cultural goods and services.” There are two versions using the same title. One is dated in 2005 and another is dated in 2007.

  20. 20.

    In the Chinese official documents, China’s cultural power (Zhongguo wenhuali) is less observable than national cultural power. The latter appears as a different category because it further links to the function of the idea as a vehicle of nation building (Zhonghua fuxing).

  21. 21.

    On a slightly different note, China’s “One Country, Two Systems” policy can be interpreted in this regard, as well. Bringing all ethnic Chinese into the program demonstrates this approach.

  22. 22.

    This version was released in October 2010.

  23. 23.

    Cultural studies include publishing, comics, music, films, game, animation, broadcasting, advertisement, characters, licensing, knowledge and information. This is based on the Classification of Culture and relevant industries (wenhua ji xiangguanchanye fenlei) (The Chinese government 2012) and also resonates with “Classifications of Contents, Media Industry” (OECD) and UNESCO Framework for Cultural Statistics (UNESCO).

  24. 24.

    By quantity, without a doubt, China is one of the largest TV drama producers in the world. In 2007 China produced 14,670 episodes (529 seasons), in 2008, 14,498 episodes (502 seasons). China produced 14,685 episodes (436 seasons) in 2010 and 14,942 episodes (469 seasons) in 2011 (SARFT 2012).

  25. 25.

    It is noted that there is burgeoning literature on the Chinese commercial media products (e.g., Zhu and Berry 2009). This has a tendency to focus on a single type or period. In part due to this, it may not be sufficient to present a systematic snapshot of the full picture of what kind of Chinese TV dramas are (not) to be produced in the Chinese domain.

  26. 26.

    Due to the availability and inconsistency of published data by the Bureau of Statistics of China, figures for “imported and exported TV programs during the year (hour)” are not included. This is because TV programs in these categories include both TV series and cartoon TV programs. It is not possible to separate one from the other.

  27. 27.

    This is the first appearance of such specific categories of the Asia and the Pacific in the corresponding annual data. Acknowledging such differences in the data, however, in order to make presentable and coherent figures, Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Oceania are incorporated as others.

  28. 28.

    In 2003 a Thai TV drama Qiaonvyong was broadcasted in CCTV-8 for the first time. Chutaode gongzhu, which was aired on Hunan Satellite TV (Hunan Weishi) in 2008, was a great success (Nai Niu 2009). An increasing number of Thai TV series were shown on Chinese Televisions from 2010 to 2012. In 2010 eight Thai series were imported: three were in CCTV-8, five in Anhui Satellite TV (Anhui Weishi). In 2011, 17 Thai series were imported to the Chinese market. For example, two were in CCTV-8, nine were in Anhui TV, one in Jiangsu Satellite TV (Jiangsu Weishi), two in Zhejiang TV station (Zhejiang dianshitai), one in Yunnan Satellite TV (Yunnan Weishi), one in Hebei Satellite TV (Hebei Weishi), one on the Shanghai TV-Drama channel (Shanghaidianshitai dianshiju pindao). In 2012, 15 Thai TV dramas were shown on Chinese TV stations. Two were on CCTV-8, seven in Anhui Satellite TV (Anhui Weishi, one in CCTV-1, one in Beijing Yingshi, one in Zhejiang TV station, one in Sichuan Satellite TV (Sichuan Weishi), one 1 in Hubei Economic TV Station (Hubei Jingshi), and one in Xizang Satellite TV (Xizang Weishi).

  29. 29.

    For a detailed discussion of a Thai drama in China, see Deng (2013).

  30. 30.

    For a similar discussion, see Hua Chen (2010), Nai Niu (2009), and Ying Zhang (2008).

  31. 31.

    However, it is not straightforward to argue that whether this will be continued in the subsequent data.

  32. 32.

    A document of “No. 42 Provisions on the Administration of Import and Broadcasting of Overseas TV Programs (Article 18)” is important. The content of the document is as follows: “(1) The time for broadcasting overseas TV plays per day should be less than 25% of the total time for broadcasting TV plays in each TV channels ; (2) The time for broadcasting other imported TV programs per day should be less than 15% of the total time for broadcasting in each TV channels and (3) During prime time (19:00–22:00) imported TV plays can only be broadcasted with the approval from SARFT (before 2004, it was 15% of the total programming during prime time) (Italian Trade Commission 2011: 21).” See also Globaltimes (2012).

  33. 33.

    This is consistent with the South Korean data which will be discussed in Chap. 5. The latter is presented based on both episode and USD calculation, but not by seasons .

  34. 34.

    It is noted that data from the year of 2007 for Japan and South Korea is unavailable. The average was counted for nine years for Japan and South Korea. However, data from the United States is available for all years from 2006 to 2015.

  35. 35.

    From 2006 to 2015, the United States bought a Chinese television series on average 2.54 million USD per season.

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  1. Inha University, Incheon, South Korea

    Claire Seungeun Lee

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Lee, C.S. (2018). China’s Soft Power Building and Its TV Industry as a Soft Powerhouse. In: Soft Power Made in China. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93115-9_2

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