Abstract
The administration of Enrique Burgos in Querétaro (1991–1997) drew on close relations between officials, organized business, and labor to implement a clear strategy to achieve global competitiveness in response to Mexico’s trade opening and deepening market reforms during the 1990s. The state’s strategy prioritized technical education and research, industrial infrastructure, and firm-level productivity gains. Importantly, these policy outputs had a cross-cutting, “economy-wide” logic rather than being specific to individual sectors, a reflection of the influence of the state’s strong, encompassing business associations. In addition to regular dialogue with organized business and labor, Burgos brought private sector leaders into his government as top economic officials. The administration witnessed a major expansion of research, higher education, and industrial park infrastructure; increasing productivity; and deepening linkages with the global economy. The economic crisis of 1994–1995 did not produce major social, political, or economic upheaval in Querétaro.
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Notes
- 1.
Underscoring his closeness to the labor sector, it was CTM Secretary-General Fidel Velázquez himself who officially “unveiled” Burgos as the PRI’s candidate for governor of Querétaro in early 1991. (El Nuevo Amanecer 4–10 March 1991, “Enrique Burgos: Más escrúpulo en la conducción de Querétaro”).
- 2.
As Camacho Guzmán’s personal secretary, it often fell to the impeccably polite Burgos to smooth over the governor’s rough edges (González Arias 2008).
- 3.
In addition to Querétaro’s strong economy, the massive earthquake that rocked Mexico City on September 19, 1985 led to largescale emigration of former residents of the capital to Querétaro.
- 4.
National PRI leaders intervened and brokered a deal between the parties that allowed the PAN victory to stand (see González Arias 2008).
- 5.
A business candidate, Francisco Barrio, would win the governorship of Chihuahua for the PAN in 1992, and in Guanajuato future President Vicente Fox, also a businessman, battled the PRI to a contested election in 1991. Eventually another panista would assume control of the governorship after an intervention by President Salinas.
- 6.
These comments, coming in the weeks before the vote, alluded to denouncements by panistas in San Juan del Río of intimidation and other electoral malfeasance by the PRI (Diario de Querétaro 8 August 1991, “Comicios limpios, espera Canacintra”).
- 7.
Coparmex President Pablo Troffinoff stated mildly in August 1991 that “we have lived a long time under the leadership of only one group…it is not that they are bad, but rather that they just tend to diverge from their path. In contrast, when everyone participates, those digressions are less common” (Diario de Querétero 18 August 1991, “Necesitamos mejorar el sistema democrático”).
- 8.
In an interview with a local newspaper during the 1991 election season, the academic Eduardo Miranda commented that in Querétaro “business groups have always been very close to the PRI, they have never been with the PAN and that plays an important role” in the state’s political tranquility (El Nuevo Amanecer 18–24 March 1991, “Impactará en Querétaro la efervesencia política en San Luis y Guanajuato”).
- 9.
These events, which consisted in a series of forums on various issues relating to the local economy, were part of the larger “Encounters with Civil Society” the Burgos campaign held to discuss security, education, health, and other policies. These engagements generated concrete policy objectives that formed the basis of the Burgos administration’s economic development plan for the state.
- 10.
This list of firms includes four of the state’s top ten exporters during 1989 (Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico de Querétaro 1989).
- 11.
Mario Rodríguez Hernández, another former president of Canacintra, called on the state government to actively support the adoption of a “total quality” mindset and advocated greater university-industry linkages as well as more industrial spaces. Carlos de Mucha Icazbalceta, the director of Canacintra in Querétaro, underscored the need for a holistic approach to quality that begins with the educational system and aims to instill the mentality of quality at all levels and areas of society. He also called for a revision of the education system to meet the demands of productivity. See Partido Revolucionario Institucional (1991).
- 12.
As discussed in Chapter 7, business leaders also participated in the cabinet of Manuel Bartlett in Puebla, but there are several important differences. Most notably, Burgos opened more spaces at higher levels of government to the private sector than did Bartlett. In addition, the business leaders that participated in the Burgos administration were more representative of the local private sector, having served previously as peak business association leaders and managers of the state’s most economically important firms. Finally, the presence of business leaders in the Burgos cabinet came after a decade of growing cooperation between state governments and the local private sector, whereas Bartlett tended to bring members of the private sector into his government to defuse tensions and pursue short-term political objectives (see Chapter 7).
- 13.
These efforts led to the creation of Consejos de Empresarios with educational institutions to help ensure that universities’ programs were suited to the demand of industry (Noticias de la Mañana, 28 February 1991, “Serán creados los consejos de empresarios”).
- 14.
Noticias de la Mañana 25 August 1991, “Las prácticas en la industria serán pauta de una nueva etapa en la educación.”
- 15.
Noticias de la Mañana 15 August 1994, “La U. Tecnológica, respuesta de EBG a los industriales.”
- 16.
El Nuevo Amanecer 1 November 1993, “En septiembre ‘94 entrará en operación la Universidad Tecnológica de Querétaro.”
- 17.
El Nuevo Amanecer 6 February 1995, “Panorama Político.” Cooperation between the UTEQ and industry has included training programs and research projects that embed students in firms; while these schemes are a common feature of technical universities, their usefulness in the case of the UTEQ has been enhanced by the participation of private sector leaders in the university’s administration. Interview with Canacintra official, 22 August 2016.
- 18.
The governor’s efforts to secure the UNAM campus in Querétaro also benefitted from close cooperation with the UAQ, which agreed to relocate and redesign several of its science programs in order to create joint degree programs with the new UNAM campus (CONCYTEQ 2011).
- 19.
- 20.
The CIDESI was created as part of the national CONACYT network and has provided services to firms throughout the country, but its presence in Querétaro has helped propel the state’s industrial growth over the course of several decades (De Gortari and Santos 2006).
- 21.
The CENAM also interacted with the state’s research centers and facilitated their development of new technologies for industrial applications (see Casas and De Gortari 2001).
- 22.
In setting up research facilities in Querétaro, Mabe joined Tremec and Condumex as major manufacturers carrying out research and development in the state.
- 23.
Mabe had been founded in 1946 in Mexico City, but its local executives had long participated in the social and political life of Querétaro, illustrating how the integration of outside business people produced lasting benefits for the state. The establishment of its research center in Querétaro allowed Mabe to transition from being simply a producer to a designer of products and setting the stage for a rapid internationalization in the late 1990s (Armenta and Fuentes 2014). Mabe continues to carry out research and development activities in Querétaro, recently announcing a $100 million investment in its Querétaro research center to develop new products aimed for export markets, even as the firm announced the transfer of production lines to neighboring Guanajuato (ADN Informativo 11 April 2016, “Fortalecerá Mabe centro de investigación en Querétaro”).
- 24.
The state’s main public research centers, the CIDESI, CIATEQ, and CIDETEQ, also offered graduate degree programs in various science and engineering disciplines, helping enhance the state’s human capital.
- 25.
This was the approach taken with the Querétaro Industrial Park project, which the administration initiated at the end of the sexenio. It became the state’s leading industrial facility by the late 1990s. See Chapter 8.
- 26.
As the official explains, putting in place all the necessary services and surrounding infrastructure for industrial parks often involved considerable negotiations and interventions with federal authorities such as the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) and Secretary of Communications and Transportation (SCT) (Interview, 30 March 2016).
- 27.
Interview with administration official, 30 March 2016.
- 28.
Gobierno de Querétaro (1993). Labor relations did not figure nearly as prominently in Informes de Gobierno in Puebla during this period.
- 29.
According to a top administration official, the system of tripartite meetings had, by the Burgos administration, become ingrained in the state and won acceptance among all actors due to its track record of success: “labor peace has been preserved in Querétaro, in spite of everything, because we converted it into a practice … the rest of the actors want[ed] this style to continue.” (emphasis added). These practices, moreover, would survive changes of government and even of political party: “political alternations have not damaged [or] deformed this situation. The same line has been conserved, more or less consistently, even with different political parties” (Interview, 30 March 2016).
- 30.
Interview, 30 March 2016.
- 31.
Managers at these firms played a central role in the informal working group that helped disseminate new labor practices among Querétaro’s firms and unions in the 1980s (see Chapter 4). Massey Ferguson, for example, made contract revisions open to all employees and workers in order to dispel suspicions of backroom deals between management and union leaders. Interview with Alejandro Espinosa, 8 August 2016.
- 32.
Interview, 9 February 2017.
- 33.
Several years later, national business and union leaders tried again to adopt many of the practices that had become commonplace in Querétaro, reaching an agreement on a “New Labor Culture” in 1996.
- 34.
Gustavo Lomelí, ex-president and advisor to Canacintra, praised the agreements as the best way “to obtain benefits both for capital and labor” and said they have the potential to “revolutionize labor relations” (Diario de Querétaro 18 November 1993, “Recuperación salarial, con productividad” and Diario de Querétaro 16 November 1993, “Cambió la actitud de empresarios: GGM.”)
- 35.
See El Nuevo Amanecer 28 January 1991 “Así se ejerce el derecho de huelga en Querétaro.”
- 36.
El Nuevo Amanecer 12 July 1993, “Los patrones han extraído documentos de la planta Uniroyal; 40 días de huelgas.”
- 37.
These incidents came only months after the unexpected outbreak of a guerrilla uprising by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Chiapas on January 1, 1994.
- 38.
The mayoral race in San Juan del Río was especially contentious. The PAN’s candidate, Francisco Layseca Coellar, reported receiving death threats and having bullets fired into his house the month before the vote (El Nuevo Amanecer 20 June 1994, “No me van a doblar, aunque insistan”). After the vote, the electoral institute documented a long list of abuses, including voter intimidation, kidnapping of opposition leaders, the improper appointment of PRI members as citizen participants on the electoral institute, and the sponsorship of false polls by the PRI (El Nuevo Amanecer 22 August 1994, “El proceso electoral, plagado de pasajes turbios durante todo el año”).
- 39.
El Nuevo Amanecer 22 August 1994, “Con las elecciones retornarán confianza, paz y estabilidad: Roberto Ruiz Obregón.”
- 40.
Canacintra President Carlos Monroy also stressed the importance of maintaining social peace in the state in the run-up to the 1994 vote: “we are privileged to have peace and the incidents occurring in other parts of the country should serve as an example for us, to make sure we do not permit them to happen here.” (El Nuevo Amanecer 20 June 1994, “Debe detenerse la violencia, sostiene el dirigente patronal Carlos Monroy Arteaga”).
- 41.
El Nuevo Amanecer 20 June 1994, “Debe detenerse la violencia, sostiene el dirigente patronal Carlos Monroy Arteaga.”
- 42.
Interview with Ignacio Loyola Vera, President of Coparmex (1995–1996) and Governor of Querétaro (1997–2003), 22 April 2016.
- 43.
These examples illustrate the flexibility of the Tripartite Commission, which often adapted to address new economic concerns.
- 44.
As discussed above, public officials beginning with the governor himself enjoyed longstanding working relations with key business and labor leaders and, in the case of Economic Development Secretary Abel Baca, direct experience implementing innovative labor relations practices as a manager at Massey Ferguson.
- 45.
El Nuevo Amanecer 20 March 1995, “Los mexicanos no pueden tener como destino la frustración, dice Burgos.”
- 46.
El Nuevo Amanecer 27 March 1995, “Impugnan airadamente al diputado José Manuel García García por su voto en favor del IVA.” The groups signing this proposal included Canacintra, Coparmex, Canaco, the Association of Microindustrialists, the Club de Industriales, and associations of firms in several of the state’s industrial parks.
- 47.
Loyola told the governor that Coparmex opposed the initiative and walked out of the room where business and union leaders had gathered with state officials. Interview with Ignacio Loyola, 22 April 2016.
- 48.
In the words of Loyola, “the greatest virtue of those meetings was listening to each other, and taking each other into account. On all sides…I think that is what helped most, I think sometimes it was more a catharsis” (Interview, 22 April 2016).
- 49.
A top official describes this strategy as one of leaning on actors in the private sector and the state’s municipalities to support the government’s plans, including through in-kind contributions to public projects : “we had very difficult economic times, but society helped a lot…when people see how things are being managed, they help, they are supportive” (Interview, 30 March 2016).
- 50.
The strategy of having private developers carry out the project arose out of discussions between state officials and investors, during which it became clear that there would be private sector interest in a similar project to what the state government envisioned. Interview with developer of the Querétaro Industrial Park, 20 April 2016.
- 51.
The Querétaro Industrial Park began operations in 1998 and in 2015 was named the best industrial park in Latin America by International Property Awards. According to its developers, a key to its success has been coordination with the state government to promote the park to outside firms (Interview, 20 April 2016).
- 52.
By contrast, only half of the state’s eight industrial parks at the beginning of the Burgos administration involved private investment (Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico 1998).
- 53.
Industries are defined here at the four-digit level. The top industries in Querétaro’s industrial parks, by employment, were electrical equipment (12.2 percent), domestic goods (12.2 percent), automotive (12.2 percent), electronic equipment (9.0 percent), and other machinery (5.7 percent) (INEGI 1999).
- 54.
By 1996, three major national industrial groups had set up research and development facilities in Querétaro (Condumex, Tremec, and Mabe).
- 55.
For example, former Canacintra President Sergio Villaseñor Pelayo served on CIDESI’s external evaluation committee in the 2000s, alongside Claude Gobenceaux, an executive at the French aerospace firm Safran who later became president of Querétaro’s aerospace cluster (see Chapter 8).
- 56.
Querétaro has one of the highest levels of researchers and patent applications per capita in Mexico (see Chapter 1). In the early 2000s, researchers from the UNAM established the Querétaro Technological Development Unit (UDETEQ) at the Juriquilla campus. Their links with existing technical education and research centers in the state such as CIATEQ, CENAM, and CICATA, as well as firms such as Tremec and Massey Ferguson made Querétaro an attractive option. The UDETEQ, now called the Center of High Technology (CAT), offers masters and doctoral programs for students in several areas of industrial engineering and design that are central to Querétaro’s industrial base, including automotive, plastics, and aerospace engineering.
- 57.
Based on estimates in Germán-Soto (2005).
- 58.
INEGI Censo Económico, 1998. The sector classifications do not distinguish between auto assembly and auto parts production.
- 59.
Figures on exports and FDI are from the Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico’s Anuarios Económicos (1994 and 1997).
- 60.
In general, a greater share of small and medium-sized enterprises is often indicative of an economic environment in which firms have incentives to undertake growth-enhancing investments (see Tybout 2000).
- 61.
These figures are reported as thousands of pesos of value added per worker. For the purpose of these calculations, industries are defined at the four-digit level. The calculations are based on INEGI Censos Económicos 1994 and 1999.
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Kahn, T. (2019). Consolidation of a Developmental Alliance in Querétaro, 1991–1997. In: Government-Business Relations and Regional Development in Post-Reform Mexico. Latin American Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92351-2_6
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