Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Fraud and Corruption pp 181–211Cite as

Challenges in Controlling, Combating, and Preventing Corruption in Developing Countries

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Abstract

In developing countries where there is a movement of the people toward democratic government, the amount of resistance to corruption is determined by a number of factors, including having the political will to combat corruption.

The citizenry must have the motivation to change the disproportionate influence of the top layers of government by efforts to increase the influence of the civil society. This change will be resisted in any society where there is considerable corruption, since those in power will resist any change through which they will lose their power.

Theories relating to the reasons why corruption exists in many governments of developing countries and the reasons why attempts to prevent or reduce the amount of corruption in developing countries often fail are grounded in two models. The principal-agent model emphasizes the relationship between the leaders of government and those who administrate government operations. In this model, the principals (leaders in government) turn over the tasks of administration to the agents (administrators of government programs) who tend to serve their own interests rather than the interests of the agent. Given the fact that the governments of developing countries do not have the resources to monitor the agents, these agents have the opportunities to misuse their power and pursue self-interests, above the interests of the state.

The patron-client model implies that the patron enjoys access to state-created resources, property rights, and other benefits. The clients gain their access to such state-related resources through their relationship with the patron. A thesis that the patron-client model of corruption is a better explanation of corruption in developing countries than the principal-agent model is developed in the chapter.

In the chapter, an analysis of the questions regarding the missing of political will in combating corruption in developing countries is presented. The prevention of corruption in the governments of developing countries must address the corruption of the institutions identified by the citizenry as being the most corrupt. These are political parties, the police, and the judicial system.

The reasons why citizens tolerate corruption in government and public service institutions are many, including fear, the belief that nothing can be done to change the system, and, for some, self-interest, since they benefit from the corruption. Transparency International and many other nongovernment organizations have had some success in exposing the corruption of government officials and helping the justice agencies bring the corrupt officials to justice.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  • Angeles, L., & Neanidis, K. C. (2015). The persistent effect of colonialism on corruption. Economica, 82(326), 319–349.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bartkus, Ž. (2012). Fight against corruption in Lithuania – Achievements and future directions, In: Reinforcing political will to fight corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, High-Level Meeting (2012). OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 10 December 2012, Paris, France. http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/ACNHighLevelMeeting_10Dec2012_Report.pdf

  • Batory, A. (2012). Why do anti-corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A target compliance perspective. Regulation & Governance, 6(1), 66–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bauhr, M., & Nasiritousi, N. (2012). How do international organizations promote quality of government? Contestation, integration, and the limits of IO power. International Studies Review, 14(4), 541–566.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhattacharyya, S., & Hodler, R. (2015). Media freedom and democracy in the fight against corruption. European Journal of Political Economy, 39, 13–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blackburn, K. (2012). Corruption and development: Explaining the evidence. The Manchester School, 80(4), 401–428.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2000). Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: An analytic framework. Public Administration & Development, 20(3), 239.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camaj, L. (2013). The media’s role in fighting corruption: Media effects on governmental accountability. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 18(1), 21–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carson, L. D., & Prado, M. M. (2016). Using institutional multiplicity to address corruption as a collective action problem: Lessons from the Brazilian case. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 62, 56–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chang, E., & Golden, M. A. (2010). Sources of corruption in authoritarian regimes. Social Science Quarterly, 91(1), 1–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charron, N. (2011). Exploring the impact of foreign aid on corruption: Has the ‘anti-corruption’ aid been effective? The Developing Economies, 49(1), 66–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cho, Y. H., & Choi, B. D. (2004). E-government to combat corruption: The case of Seoul metropolitan government. International Journal of Public Administration, 27(10), 719–735.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2016). Corruption in international business. Journal of World Business, 51(1), 35–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Derevyanko, A. (2012). Preventing corruption in Ukraine, In: Reinforcing political will to fight corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, High-Level Meeting (2012). OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 10 December 2012, Paris, France. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/ACNHighLevelMeeting_10Dec2012_Report.pdf

  • Dionisie, D., & Checchi, F. (2008). Corruption and anti-corruption agencies in Eastern Europe and the CIS: A practitioners’ experience. Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doig, A., & Tisne, M. (2009). A candidate for relegation? Corruption, governance approaches and the (re) construction of post-war states. Public Administration and Development, 29(5), 374–386.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fokuoh Ampratwum, E. (2008). The fight against corruption and its implications for development in developing and transition economies. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11(1), 76–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Global Corruption Barometer. (2013). Transparency International, from http://www.wingia.com/web/files/news/61/file/61.pdf

  • Global Corruption Barometer. (2016). ECA_EN, Transparency International, from http://www.transparency-se.org/161110_GCB-ECA-Report_web.pdf

  • Hope, K. R. (2000). Corruption and development in Africa. In K. R. Hope & B. Chikulo (Eds.), Corruption and development in Africa (pp. 17–39). London: Palgrave.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Janković, S. (2016). Penal policy of courts for the criminal deed of bribe taking. In S. Bejatović et al. (Eds.), European Integration and Penal Law (pp. 211–221). Belgrade: Serbian Association for Legal Theory and Practice.

    Google Scholar 

  • Khan, M. (1998). The role of civil society and patron-client networks in the analysis of corruption. In Corruption and integrity improvement initiatives in developing countries UNDP. New York: UNDP-OECD Development Centre.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kis-Katos, K., & Schulze, G. G. (2013). Corruption in Southeast Asia: A survey of recent research. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 27(1), 79–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (Eds.). (2007). Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klitgaard, R. (1998). International cooperation against corruption. Finance & Development, 1998, 3–6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kpundeh, S. (1998). Political will in fighting corruption. In Corruption and integrity improvement initiatives in developing countries UNDP. New York: UNDP-OECD Development Centre.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kpundeh, S., & Dininio, P. (2006). Political will. In R. Stapenhurst, N. Johnston, & R. Pelizzo (Eds.), The role of parliament in curbing corruption. Washington, DC: The World Bank Retrieved from https://www.agoraparl.org/sites/default/files/the_role_of_parliment_in_curbing_corruption.pdf

    Google Scholar 

  • Markovskaya, A., Pridemore, W. A., & Nakajima, C. (2003). Laws without teeth: An overview of the problems associated with corruption in Ukraine. Crime, Law and Social Change, 39(2), 193–213.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marquette, H. (2012). ‘Finding god’ or ‘moral disengagement’ in the fight against corruption in developing countries? Evidence from India and Nigeria. Public Administration and Development, 32(1), 11–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moran, J. (2001). Democratic transitions and forms of corruption. Crime, Law and Social Change, 36(4), 379–393.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nurgaliyev, B., Ualiyev, K., & Simonovich, B. (2015). Police corruption in Kazakhstan: The preliminary results of the study. Review of European Studies, 7(3), 140–148.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2010). The failure of anti-corruption policies a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem. QoG Working Paper Series, 19(10), 1–2 from http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1350/1350163_2010_19_persson_rothstein_teorell.pdf

    Google Scholar 

  • Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail—Systemic corruption as a collective action problem. Governance, 26(3), 449–471.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Potz, B., Sporer, D., Zirgoi, C., & Burbeck, B. (2016). Falsified prospect theory in the context of corruption and foreign direct investment. In M. Edelbacher, P. Kratcoski, & B. Dobovšek (Eds.), Corruption, fraud, organized crime, and the shadow economy (pp. 81–90). Boca Raton, London, New York: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prasad, A., & Shivarajan, S. (2015). Understanding the role of technology in reducing corruption: A transaction cost approach. Journal of Public Affairs, 15(1), 22–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quah, J. S. (2015). The critical importance of political will in combating corruption in Asian countries. Public Administration and Policy, 18(2), 12–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reinforcing Political Will to Fight Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, High-Level Meeting (2012). OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 10 December 2012, Paris, France. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/ACNHighLevelMeeting_10Dec2012_Report.pdf

  • Rock, M. T., & Bonnett, H. (2004). The comparative politics of corruption: Accounting for the east Asian paradox in empirical studies of corruption, growth and investment. World Development, 32(6), 999–1017.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A study in political economy. New York: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences and reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ruhl, J. M. (2011). Political corruption in Central America: Assessment and explanation. Latin American Politics and Society, 53(1), 33–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt, D. (2007). Anti-corruption: What do we know? Research on preventing corruption in the post-communist world. Political Studies Review, 5(2), 202–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Serbia, U. N. D. P. (2008). The fight against corruption in Serbia: An institutional framework overview, April.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shim, D. C., & Eom, T. H. (2008). E-government and anti-corruption: Empirical analysis of international data. International Journal of Public Administration, 31(3), 298–316.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simonović, B., Djurdjević, Z., & Janković, B. (2017). Profile of police officers convicted of bribery. Revija za kriminalistiko in kriminologijo. Journal of Criminal Investigation and Criminology/ Ljubljana, 6(4), 371–384.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soans, A., & Abe, M. (2016). Bribery, corruption and bureaucratic hassle: Evidence from Myanmar. Journal of Asian Economics, 44, 41–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tolstoy, L. (1996). Anna Karenina, Retrieved from http://ilibrary.ru/text/1099/index.html

  • Transparency International. (2000). TI sourcebook. Confronting corruption: The elements of a national integrity system. Berlin: Transparency International.

    Google Scholar 

  • Transparency International. (2016). https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define

  • Transparency International report. (2015). Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/

  • Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399–457.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uberti, L. J. (2016). Can institutional reforms reduce corruption? Economic theory and patron–client politics in developing countries. Development and Change, 47(2), 317–345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Umar, I., Samsudin, R. S., & Mohamed, M. (2017). Appraising the effectiveness of economic and financial crimes commission (EFCC) in tackling public sector corruption in Nigeria. Journal of Advanced Research in Business and Management Studies, 7(2), 1–12.

    Google Scholar 

  • UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/62/202. (2007, February 29). Retrieved from http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1969017.68445969.html

  • Vadlamannati, K. C. (2015). Fighting corruption or elections? The politics of anti-corruption policies in India: A subnational study. Journal of Comparative Economics, 43(4), 1035–1052.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walton, G. W. (2013). An argument for reframing debates about corruption: Insights from Papua New Guinea. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 54(1), 61–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • World Bank. (2000). Helping countries combat corruption: Progress at the World Bank since 1997. Washington, DC: World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, J. (2008). Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and investment. American Journal of Political Science, 52(2), 322–343.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yadav, V. (2012). Legislative institutions and corruption in developing country democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 45(8), 1027–1058.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yeh, S. S. (2011). Ending corruption in Africa through United Nations inspections. International Affairs, 87(3), 629–650.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zaloznaya, M. (2015). Does authoritarianism breed corruption? Reconsidering the relationship between authoritarian governance and corrupt exchanges in bureaucracies. Law & Social Inquiry, 40(2), 345–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, University of Kragujevac, Kragujevac, Serbia

    Branislav Simonović

Authors
  1. Branislav Simonović
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Sociology and Justice Studies, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA

    Peter C. Kratcoski

  2. Academic Council of the United Nations System Liaison Office Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Maximilian Edelbacher

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Simonović, B. (2018). Challenges in Controlling, Combating, and Preventing Corruption in Developing Countries. In: Kratcoski, P., Edelbacher, M. (eds) Fraud and Corruption. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92333-8_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92333-8_10

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-92332-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-92333-8

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation