Abstract
A central concept underpinning the theory and analytic narratives is the notion that centers of power—the regime’s institutional, social, and foreign bases of support—are fundamental to regime stability. The chapter explores the concept of centers of power and the relationship of centers of power to regime stability, with specific attention to the empirical application of this concept. In this chapter, Buttorff also discusses the set of common centers of powers that we observe in the Arab world, such as the military and Western powers. She then identifies the centers of powers in Jordan and Algeria that will be used in the case studies to explain opposition beliefs in the stability of the regime and the impact of these beliefs on electoral strategies over time.
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- 1.
DeNardo (1985) argues that the fundamental problem in theory is to explain how strategies and the environment in which these strategies are adopted interact. In particular, he notes: “Strategies are constrained by political circumstances, and a fundamental problem in a theory of strategy is to understand the interaction between strategy and political environment” (p. 28).
- 2.
See Rogowski (1974) on social structure and legitimacy.
- 3.
Specifically, Stinchcombe writes: “But power based only on the shifting sands of public opinion and willing obedience is inherently unstable” (p. 161).
- 4.
A large literature in political science examines the role of the US Supreme Court in legitimizing laws (even unpopular laws) passed by Congress (Gibson et al. 2005). One such example is the 2000 presidential election , in which the Supreme Court conferred legitimacy on the election of George W. Bush, despite the fact that Al Gore had won the plurality of popular votes. It was the Supreme Court that solved the political crisis in the aftermath of the election.
- 5.
The critical role of the military during the Arab Spring extended beyond Egypt to other Arab countries. According to Bellin (2012), “In every Arab country where serious protests erupted, regime survival ultimately turned on one question: would the military defect? Or, more specifically, would the military shoot protesters or not?” (p. 130).
- 6.
Owen explains his approach as considering both the “different type of actors and different types of arenas involved, as well as their different orders of importance” (p. 32). “In the case of the former,” he writes, “this will involve consideration of individuals, of unofficial as well as of organized groups, of classes, and so on. In the latter it necessitates a discussion of the various locations—bureaucratic, institutional, provincial, local—in which political activity used to, and still does, take place” (p. 32).
- 7.
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Posner (2005) both hint at the need to rely on expert knowledge. The former argues that we must consider decision-making traditions and the “channels for the expression and mobilization of protest” (p. 26). Posner (2005) argues that the “particular identities that individuals will find it most advantageous to choose will depend on the nature of the political system’s ethnic cleavage structure” (p. 21). And to know this structure, one needs to know the number of cleavage dimensions and the size of the particular groups.
- 8.
Bermeo (1997) argues that “for the costs of toleration [as opposed to costs of suppression] to seem bearable, pivotal elites must believe that they will not be ruined by reform” (p. 315). How a center of power perceives the effects of reform (i.e., will it be ruined by reform?) is critical when thinking about whether a center of power, like the military, will continue to support a regime faced with pro-reform demonstrations. Bellin (2005) draws on Bermeo’s idea in her discussion of coercive apparatuses. She argues that more institutionalized militaries are less likely to perceive they will be ruined by reform compared to patrimonial-based militaries, who will in turn be more likely to come to the aid of a challenged regime. In addition, the notion that institutional elites, to be supportive of a particular reform, must perceive that they will not be ruined (or at least be severely hurt) by reform is seen in Jordan with respect to the business elite. Only slowly have they accepted economic liberalizations, and even begun to push for them, where in the past they viewed such reforms negatively.
- 9.
There are of course important exceptions: (1) Sudan (South)—Black Christians; (2) Iraq—Kurds; (3) Morocco and Algeria—Berbers; and (4) Lebanon—Christians and Druze (Hudson 1977, pp. 38–39).
- 10.
See especially Richards and Waterbury (2008) on the three trends.
- 11.
There is of course variation. Waterbury (1989), for example, notes that working classes are stronger in Algeria and Egypt but not in Jordan and Morocco, where organized labor is largely absent (p. 42). On the salience of class, Razi (1990) argues that “all available evidence on the Third World so far indicates that class affinity is far weaker as a source of cohesion and commitment than are religion and nationalism” (p. 75).
- 12.
This is a more general problem in authoritarian and dominant party contexts in which challengers face large resources asymmetries in attracting and mobilizing supporters. See especially Greene (2007) on this point.
- 13.
I say formally and informally because although the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, was officially banned, candidates known to be Muslim Brotherhood members ran as independents during the Mubarak era.
- 14.
This is what Stinchcombe refers to as doctrines of legitimacy: doctrines or norms that justify the power of a regime to a particular center of power.
- 15.
An analogous situation would involve looking at Western countries to determine whether Christianity (as represented by Christian political parties or other religious organizations) is an important center of power.
- 16.
There have been periods during which the legislature could have been considered a center of power in some Arab countries. Unfortunately, as noted by Brown (2007), “On rare occasions in which elected institutions showed some vitality—Egypt in the 1930s, Morocco in the 1960s, Kuwait in the 1970s and 1980s—the ruler moved simply to shut them down, suspending parliament and sometimes the entire constitution” (p. 54). See also Herb (2014).
- 17.
Since 1979, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Council has had the ability to nominate new members/justices who serve until retirement. Since 1979, the Court has declared a number of laws unconstitutional, including the country’s electoral law. In fact, according to Brown (2007), “Over half the laws contested by the SCC [since `Awad al-Murr took over the presidency] were declared unconstitutional” (p. 62).
- 18.
Bellin (2005) notes that “MENA states are the world leaders in terms of the proportion of GNP spent on security” (6.7% region average compared to 3.8 world average). Moreover, the proportion of population employed in security is also comparatively large: “16.9 men per thousand under arms compared to 6.31 in France” (p. 31).
- 19.
The relationship between external support and domestic security is extremely important. As Bellin further explains, it is often the key in maintaining domestic power: “The security establishment is most likely to lose its will and capacity to hold on to power when it loses crucial international support … Withdrawal of international backing triggers both an existential and financial crisis for the regime that often devastates both its will and capacity to carry on” (p. 27).
- 20.
Demographic data from CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html. Accessed 7 July 2011.
- 21.
East Bankers is another term to refer to Transjordanians, people from the east bank of the Jordan River.
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
The Big 5 companies were the Jordanian Cement Factor Company (JFPC), Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC), Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company (JPRC), Arab Potash Company (APC), and Jordan Fertilizer Industries Company (JFIC).
- 25.
The contributions to GDP of the three sectors are as follows: 3.4 percent (agriculture), 30.3 percent (industry), and 66.2 percent (service sector).
- 26.
Although beyond scope of this discussion, see Knowles (2005) for excellent overview of the changing relationship between the state and the private sector from the mandate period to the present, and the factors affecting this relationship.
- 27.
The Supreme Court justice, Faruq Kilani, who had ruled the 1997 Press and Publication Law unconstitutional, was dismissed from the court shortly after the ruling (Ryan 2002, p. 120).
- 28.
After the 1980s economic crisis, and subsequent domestic unrest, the United States “devoted substantial resources toward economic reform in Jordan, but it has done so while providing budget support that allows the Hashemites to maintain their tribal base, as well as by constructing new institutions that secure trade-based rents for the displaced Transjordanian economic elite” (Peters and Moore 2009, pp. 274–275).
- 29.
Demographic statistics obtained from the CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html. Accessed 7 July 2011.
- 30.
The absorption crisis refers to the inability of the socialist Algerian state to provide education, housing, and employment to the population. According to Bonner et al. (2005), “Aggravating the crisis was a high population growth rate, which swelled the number of young Algerians seeking schooling, apartments and jobs” (p. 2).
- 31.
Ruedy (2005) notes that more than 4 million hectares remained in private hands and in fact “very little privately held land had actually changed hands” (p. 223). He further remarks about the agricultural reforms: “By 1980, agrarian reform had created 5966 production cooperatives, 177 service cooperates, and 670 socialist villages. But employment, production, and earnings of the sector were far short of what had been expected” (p. 223).
- 32.
The civil war largely eliminated the power of the Islamists (for a number of reasons), and they are no longer considered a center of power. Although Islamists might have been considered a center of power, they were not during the period of study. The civil war/Islamic insurgency and the co-optation of the main legal Islamist parties weakened the power of Islamists. In the last elections, the alliance of three Islamist parties (the Green alliance) only won approximately 6 percent of the seats in parliament.
- 33.
The regime responded in 1988 by establishing multiparty elections as an alternative way to justify its authority and remain in power (i.e., legitimacy based on the ballot box).
- 34.
Quandt (1998) notes that two major ideological currents in Algerian society are the nationalists and the democrats (represented by the FFS and other smaller groups).
- 35.
Belkaïd (2012) argues that this generational divide (“fault line”) was also apparent during the Arab Spring in Algeria, noting that “the majority of the protesters were young people under the age of thirty … a part of the population that was born and grew up with [armed] violence and the political crisis” (p. 145). The author further notes: “The older generations stayed away from the protest movement for the reasons described above, but also because they felt they had more to lose economically” (p. 145).
- 36.
Specifically Roberts asserts that the “public administration and the state sector of the economy did not keep pace with that of secondary and higher education, with the result that by mid- to late 1970s there were large numbers of young Algerians educated in Arabic for whom employment opportunities were scarce” (p. 12).
- 37.
See also Ayubi (1995) who notes, “As the memory of the national liberation struggle faded away among a demographically young population, the ‘socialistic’ slogans were not matched by the reality of a just, integrated society, and ‘political Islam’ came eventually to haunt the bureau-technocratic elite and its military guarantors” (p. 123).
- 38.
Quandt also notes, “True, the Algerian military had long been the real power behind the scenes, but there is still a difference between being a puppet master and being on stage” (p. 63).
- 39.
The change in external support across presidents in Algeria is a good illustration of how centers of power can change over time.
- 40.
This attitude was not unique to the United States and France as “many African and Arab leaders breathed sighs of relief. They had been fearful of the domino effect of an Islamist victory in Algeria, which might have been a beacon for Islamist movements throughout North Africa and the Middle East” (Evans and Phillips 2007, p. 73).
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Buttorff, G.J. (2019). Centers of Power, Regime Strength, and Opposition Beliefs. In: Authoritarian Elections and Opposition Groups in the Arab World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92186-0_4
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