Abstract
Euthyphro-style objections to divine analyses of normative concepts (and to date such analyses have been almost exclusively of moral concepts) are thought by most contemporary philosophers to refute them. Nothing could be further from the truth. Such objections—and I identify four distinct ones—fail to raise any reasonable doubt about the truth of the view defended in this work. They all either mistaken or else beg the question by interpreting relevant rational intuitions descriptively, when in fact it would be reasonable to interpret them expressively if they are communications from a god. Furthermore, all such objections apply to rival analyses, but in their case the relevant theories—unlike my theory—lack the resources to be able to deal with them. Far from refuting divine psychologism Euthyphro-style objections challenge rival analyses.
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Notes
- 1.
This chapter is not an exercise in textural exegesis, but for a good analysis of the original, see Brown (1964).
- 2.
- 3.
This is a point I made in the context of moral norms and values in my 2015.
- 4.
- 5.
Note, I do not have to accept premise 1, for I could hold that although a god’s attitudes are sufficient for our concept of a normative reason to have something answering to it in reality, they are not necessary. That is, I could hold—as J. L. Mackie (1977, p. 48) seemed to in respect of moral norms—a disjunctivist view according to which normative reasons might be either irreducible, or constituted by the attitudes of a god. However, I hold no such view.
- 6.
Again, some might object that this means the god is sometimes misleading precisely because “You are favoured Xing irrespective of whether I exist” is ambiguous. But the same reply as was given earlier applies. What such intuitions actually show is that, big surprise, Reason places more value on getting us to be kind, benevolent, and so on, than she does on giving us accurate metanormative insight. Again, this is corroborated by other rational intuitions.
- 7.
Premise 3—which I am accepting for the sake of argument—would entail that there is always an element d. However, I believe, this is false. Why does there have to be an element d? Brute desires seem entirely conceivable.
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Harrison, G.K. (2018). Euthyphro. In: Normative Reasons and Theism. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90796-3_7
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