Abstract
There is no evidence that the favoring relations constitutive of normative reasons have oneself as their source. Indeed, the thesis is preposterous once the truth of the unity thesis is acknowledged. All of the evidence—and I provide four pieces (empirical evidence, phenomenological evidence; the categoricity of some normative reasons and the fact we acquire a priori information from our reason)—strongly implies that normative reasons have an external-to-any-of-us source. I also consider and reject some analyses of normative reasons—ideal observer theories and constitutivist views—that some may mistakenly believe are still in the running. I conclude at this point that Reason is a single external mind with normative reasons being what she favours us doing and being.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
The term was Kant’s for a command of practical reason that is unconditional (conditional commands—such as, “if you want to make a fortune, invest in mail order ice cream plc” (p. 216)—he termed ‘hypothetical’ imperatives).
- 2.
It is not entirely clear whether Joyce (2006) believes categorical reasons do not exist, or cannot exist. Coons (2011) interprets him as arguing for the stronger claim “no substantive moral claim could be true because such claims are committed to the existence of a kind of reason that cannot exist” (p. 87). He seems more ambivalent to me, though.
- 3.
- 4.
David Lewis (2000) seems to hold a version of this kind of ideal observer theory. For instance, he says:
If only he would think harder, and imagine vividly and thoroughly how it would be if these putative values were realised … that would make his valuing a more reliable indicator of genuine value. And if he could gain the fullest possible imaginative acquaintance that is humanly possible, then, I suggest, his valuing would be an infallible indicator. (p. 77)
Note, my theory—unlike Lewis’s —is a theory about what genuine value consists in, rather than how best to detect it.
- 5.
These are not the only problems this kind of view confronts. Additionally, it is also hard to see how idealization will accommodate the existence of categorical normative reasons. If an ideal version of me disfavours me Xing, and if a normative reason just is the favouring/disfavouring attitude of an ideal version of me, then my reason is not independent of my ends. For how could idealizing me generate a disfavouring of Xing unless some such motivation was already present in my motivational set? (see Harman, 1975, p. 9; Joyce, 2006, p. 196). The full information requirement also seems problematic, as it would involve knowing the experiential content of each type of life he might lead. This raises problems because appreciating what one life is like is may distort one’s appreciation of another (see Miller, 2013, pp. 207–216 and Sobel, 1994 for discussion). Added to this there are worries at the normative level. For though the metanormative version of ideal observer theory should not be conflated with the normative version, it does entail it and thus problems with the normative version become additional problems for the metanormative versions. If I have horrible ends at the outset why assume that idealization will somehow lead to me deeming such ends unacceptable? An ideal version of me may just favour me being more effective at pursuing those horrible ends (Joyce, 2006, p. 196). In that case the metanormative ideal observer theory now entails that, at the normative level, I have overall reason to pursue my horrible ends (which is false, obviously).
- 6.
In respect of the likelihood that an idealized version of me will be anything like an idealized version of you, Richard Joyce (2006) notes that though “there have been attempts [to show that ideal versions of us all would converge] … no account has commanded anything like widespread assent, and all are fraught with difficulty” (p. 197).
- 7.
I should add that all of the arguments above apply to axiological properties such as “being good” and “being bad”. So, what it is for something—some state of affairs , some process, some action, some character trait, some person—to be good or bad, is for them to be standing in a valuing relation to Reason. The slight difference is just that to adopt a valuing attitude towards something is not necessarily to be favouring anyone doing it (though it may also lead one to do that, and/or one’s favouring someone doing it might lead one to value it being done). We can recognise this in our own case. There are some actions, for instance, that I would value if they were performed, yet do not favour anyone performing. When two wicked villains wreak havoc for each other, then I might value that state of affairs and take pleasure in it, despite not wanting either of them to behave in the ways they are behaving. When Reason does this, the state of affairs can be said to be ‘just’, even though the actions that are creating it are wrong.
References
Bedke, M. S. (2010). Might all normativity be queer? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(1), 41–58.
Coons, C. (2011). How to prove that some acts are wrong (without using substantive moral premises). Philosophical Studies, 155(1), 83–98.
Firth, R. (1952). Ethical absolutism and the ideal observer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12(3), 317–345.
Harman, G. (1975). Moral relativism defended. Philosophical Review, 84(1), 3–22.
Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. Oxford, UK: Rowman and Littlefield.
Joyce, R. (2006). The evolution of morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kant, I. (1836). The metaphysics of ethics. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Korsgaard, C. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. (2000). Papers in ethics and social philosophy (Vol. 3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books.
Miller, A. (2013). Contemporary metaethics, an introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.
Railton, P. (1986). Facts and values. Philosophical Topics, 14(2), 5–31.
Reader, S. (2003). Distance, relationship and moral obligation. The Monist, 86(3), 367–381.
Rowland, R. (2013). Moral error theory and the argument from epistemic reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 7, 1–24.
Scheffler, S. (1997). Relationships and responsibilities. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 26(3), 189–209.
Shafer-Landau, R. (2009). A defence of categorical reasons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109(2), 189–206.
Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
Sobel, D. (1994). Full information accounts of well-being. Ethics, 104(4), 784–810.
Velleman, D. (2000). The possibility of practical reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, B. (1981). Moral luck: Philosophical papers 1973–1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Harrison, G.K. (2018). Externality. In: Normative Reasons and Theism. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90796-3_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90796-3_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-90795-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-90796-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)