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General International Law: A New Source of International Law?

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Abstract

The role of general international law (GIL) within the system of international law sources can be discussed starting from the question of whether sources of international law are conceivable outside the realm of Art 38 of the ICJ Statute. Two different approaches on GIL can be taken: GIL may, in substance, belong to one of the three classes of legal rules enumerated by Art. 38 or it may instead constitute an autonomous category of its own. As far as treaties are concerned, even in cases of treaties with a very high number of ratifications, their norms cannot be considered, in technical legal terms, as GIL. In the same way, general principles of law cannot be equated to GIL. In various cases where the concept of GIL has been referred to, the rule concerned did not have that broad content that principles normally have. Norms of jus cogens may be considered as GIL; but the question remains as to whether other less prominent examples of general rules encountered in the case-law of international tribunals can be defined as GIL. According to the author the answer is negative. GIL has two components: the first is made by jus cogens rules; the second includes rules without a precise classification, but which are legal propositions expressing genuine consensus of the international community and capable of satisfying the needs of the interpreter for flexible law-making in today’s international society.

Emeritus Professor of International and Constitutional Law, Humboldt University Berlin, Faculty of Law; Professor of International Law and Constitutional Law, University of Bonn.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, pp. 14, 83 para. 204.

  2. 2.

    ICJ, Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 16 December 2015, ICJ Reports 2015, p. 665.

  3. 3.

    Ibid., p. 708 para. 108, p. 710 para. 112.

  4. 4.

    Permanent Court of Arbitration, Iron Rhine (Belgium v. Netherlands), Case 2003-2, Award of 24 May 2005, p. 29 para. 59. For a comment see Dominicé (2007), p. 1067 et seq.

  5. 5.

    Permanent Court of Arbitration, Indian Waters Kishenganga (Pakistan v. India), Case 2011-01, Award of 20 December 2013, pp. 291–291, paras. 450–451.

  6. 6.

    Permanent Court of Arbitration, Chagos Maritime Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Case 2011-03, Award of 18 March 2015, p. 129 para. 322.

  7. 7.

    Tomuschat (2010), p. 329 et seq.

  8. 8.

    First report on formation and evidence of customary international law, UN doc. A/CN.4/663, 17 May 2013, p. 18 para. 42.

  9. 9.

    See, e.g., Sloane (2012), p. 447.

  10. 10.

    Hart (1994), p. 100.

  11. 11.

    Thus, most authors accept Article 38 ICJ Statute as the relevant definition of the sources of international law, see, e.g., Crawford (2012), p. 20; Focarelli (2008), p. 83. Other authors state that the list of Article 38 is not exhaustive—Klabbers (2017), p. 24 or specify that Article 38 lists the “most important” types of sources of international law—Arnauld (2014), p. 75.

  12. 12.

    The secondary law of international organizations is invariably derived from international treaties.

  13. 13.

    As is well-known from ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, pp. 14, 118–123 regarding the principle of non-use of force as a direct consequence of sovereign equality.

  14. 14.

    Thus, Wolfrum (2012), p. 353 para. 58, identifies GIL as the basis for the recognition of treaties and customary law as legal sources.

  15. 15.

    Kelsen (1960), pp. 203–209.

  16. 16.

    Mejía-Lemos (2014), p. 310, has taken the view that Article 38 ICJ Statute contains an exhaustive list of sources. For a persuasive view to the contrary see Buzzini (2002) p. 614.

  17. 17.

    Paris Agreement of 12 December 2015 complementing the Framework Convention on Climate Change http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf: 159 States parties.

  18. 18.

    Of 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS p. 1007.

  19. 19.

    Thus, the Genocide Convention has not been ratified by Cape Verde, Dominica, Grenada, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, Samoa, San Marino, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, inter alia.

  20. 20.

    By contrast the two Additional Protocols of 1977 remain controversial to this very day, with no end of the controversies being in sight.

  21. 21.

    ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996-I, pp. 226, 257 para. 79, p. 258 para. 82. We shall come back to the question of whether humanitarian law, which is so often ignored and openly violated, really deserves the characterization as customary international law.

  22. 22.

    See, in particular, Fassbender (2009).

  23. 23.

    For a comprehensive review see Gaja (2012), pp. 370–376.

  24. 24.

    See Pellet (2012), p. 834, marginal note 256. Klabbers (2017), p. 37, characterizes principles as “open ended” so that they can be applied “in a variety of settings”.

  25. 25.

    See, in particular, Pellet (2012), pp. 834–840, marginal notes 255–269. That same view underlies the 2016 Swiss report to the ILC regarding the identification of customary law, http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/sessions/68/pdfs/french/icil_switzerland.pdf&lang=F, 12.

  26. 26.

    See, e.g., Gaja (2012), pp. 372–374; Mendelson (1996), pp. 79–80; Wolfrum (2012), p. 348 margin note 28; Petersen (2007–2008), p. 308.

  27. 27.

    ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 2010-I, pp. 135, 146 paras. 27–28.

  28. 28.

    See R. Pisillo Mazzeschi and A. Viviani in this book.

  29. 29.

    See J. d’Aspremont in this book.

  30. 30.

    Mosler (1980), p. 134.

  31. 31.

    We disagree with the general approach to the issue by the Study Group of the ILC, Yearbook of the ILC 2006, Vol. II, Part Two, pp. 176–184; see Tomuschat (2011), pp. 323–354.

  32. 32.

    ICJ, Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Question) (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and United States of America), ICJ Reports 1954, pp. 19, 32.

  33. 33.

    See separate opinion by Judge Cançado Trindade in the Pulp Mills case, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 135, at p. 138 para. 6.

  34. 34.

    ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, pp. 43, 105, para. 149.

  35. 35.

    ICJ, Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Judgment of 12 November 1991, ICJ Reports 1991, pp. 53, 70 para. 48; ICJ, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, ICJ Reports 1994, pp. 6, 21 para. 41; ICJ, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 12 December 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, pp. 803, 812 para. 23; ICJ, Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, ICJ Reports 1999-II, pp. 1045, 1059 para18; ICJ, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, pp. 466, 501 para. 99; ICJ, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 15 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2004, pp. 279, 318 para. 99.

  36. 36.

    See, e.g., Villiger (2009), p. 440, marginal note 38, who observes, however, that “the picture is not sufficiently unequivocal”. Comments on Article 31 by Sorel and Boré Eveno refrain from making a clear statement on the issue. See Sorel and Boré Eveno (2011), pp. 804–840.

  37. 37.

    See also ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 3 February 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, pp. 6, 32 para. 64; ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, pp. 403, 438 paras. 83 and 84.

  38. 38.

    ICJ, Colombian-Peruvian asylum case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1950, pp. 266, 277–278; ICJ, Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1951, pp. 116, 131.

  39. 39.

    See the comprehensive appraisal by Dunberry (2010). For an early refutation of the persistent objector rule see Dupuy (1991), pp. 257–272. Extensive discussion recently by Green (2016).

  40. 40.

    See Tomuschat (1993), p. 289.

  41. 41.

    Third Report on the identification of customary international law, UN doc. A/CN.4/682, 27 March 2015, p. 67 para. 95, Draft conclusion 16. See also the response by the delegates in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, summarized in Fourth Report on the identification of customary international law, UN doc. A/CN.4/695, 8 March 2016, p. 10 paras. 27 and 28.

  42. 42.

    Although it should be noted that the ILA, at the conclusion of its work on the Formation of customary international law, accepted the persistent objector rule: Report of the London conference (2000), p. 27, Section 15.

  43. 43.

    However, many times GIL and customary international law were simply taken as being identical. For an early example see ICJ, Fisheries case (UK v. Norway), Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, pp. 116, 131.

  44. 44.

    ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3.

  45. 45.

    ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark), Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, pp. 3, 43 para. 74, p. 44 para. 77, confirmed by ICJ, Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment of 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, pp. 13, 29–30 para. 27.

  46. 46.

    ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, pp. 99, 122 para. 55.

  47. 47.

    Tomka (2013), pp. 199 and 202. See the similar assessment by Shihata (2012), p. 202.

  48. 48.

    PCIJ, Factory at Chórzow (Germany v. Poland), Merits, Judgment of 13 September 1928, Series A, No. 17, p. 47.

  49. 49.

    ICJ, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, pp. 3, 21–22 paras. 53–54.

  50. 50.

    Another conjecture is that no relevant precedent could be found. It would then have been necessary to present a complex legal reasoning that could not be put together easily.

  51. 51.

    See, e.g., Tomuschat (2014), p. 42.

  52. 52.

    GA Resolution 60/1, 16 September 2005, paras. 138–139.

  53. 53.

    See, e.g., Schachter (1996), p. 539; Judge Cançado Trindade, Dissenting Opinion in the ICJ, Whaling case (Australia v. Japan), Judgment of 31 March 2014, calls the relevant rules “jus necessarium”, ICJ Reports 2014, pp. 348, 387 para. 90.

  54. 54.

    ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996-I, pp. 226, 257 para. 79. For an earlier discussion of elementary considerations of humanity see Tomuschat (1993), p. 304.

  55. 55.

    Precisely however the Court’s pronouncement on nuclear weapons demonstrated the paramountcy of the facts on the ground.

  56. 56.

    Alston and Simma (1992), pp. 82–108.

  57. 57.

    ICJ, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment of 30 November 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, pp. 639, 671 para. 87; ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment of 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, pp. 422, 457 para. 99.

  58. 58.

    Reference to that difficulty also by Gattini (2014), pp. 267–268; Petersen (2007–2008), p. 277.

  59. 59.

    A certain priority can only be accorded to legal culture, not to political power. International law does not know “leading nations”.

  60. 60.

    See Shihata (2012), p. 209.

  61. 61.

    Here the Trail Smelter case, Award of 15 April 1941, 3 RIAA 1938, p. 1965, is still the legal point of departure. Later, that proposition was embraced by a continuous series of pronouncements of the ICJ, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment of 15 December 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, pp. 4, 22; ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, pp. 226, 241–242 para. 29; ICJ, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, pp. 7, 41 para. 53.

  62. 62.

    But see ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia): Serbia, Counter-Memorial, Vol. I, December 2009, pp. 105–107 paras. 285–293; Croatia, Reply, Vol. I, 20 December 2010, pp. 257–267 paras. 7.43–7.72.

  63. 63.

    Gaja (2012), p. 374, para. 18, has rightly pointed out that the frequent recourse to principles by the ICJ can be mainly explained by the insufficiency of practice, i.e. the rigidity of Article 38(1) ICJ Statute.

  64. 64.

    Cottier and Muller (2012), p. 674, para. 10.

  65. 65.

    For useful references see Crawford (2012), p. 36.

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Tomuschat, C. (2018). General International Law: A New Source of International Law?. In: Pisillo Mazzeschi, R., De Sena, P. (eds) Global Justice, Human Rights and the Modernization of International Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90227-2_8

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