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The Drawer of Committees

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Abstract

It is a unique chapter for explaining committee behavior. Taking advantage of an in-depth case study on the 2005 anti-smoking bill and a statistical analysis based on the Heckman probit model, the author shows that tenure stability of longstanding governors allows them to shelve unwelcome presidential bills through their senators. In the case of the anti-smoking bill, longstanding governors of tobacco-producing provinces successfully defended their provincial interests using two strategies: shelving the bill until the last minute and introducing an amendment proposal. The statistical analysis reveals that senators strategically make their choice between credit-claiming and position-taking activities according to their principals at the provincial level.

The original version of this chapter was revised: For detailed information please see Erratum. The erratum to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_7

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to Article 39 of the constitution , popular initiatives must be initiated in the Chamber of Deputies .

  2. 2.

    Author’s interview with Senator and former Governor Juan Carlos Romero (PJ, Salta), August 19, 2009.

  3. 3.

    Regardless of having joint meetings, the committees are required to publish joint committee reports if they approve the bill.

  4. 4.

    Even though the Senate rules have some articles about public hearings, there is no clear distinction between hearings and markups when committees discuss bills in general. Committees sometimes invite ministers to meetings where they decide to publish committee reports at the same time. By contrast, it is required for the Agreements Committee to hold a public hearing if the president asks the Senate to confirm the appointment of judges.

  5. 5.

    Author’s interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (RS, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009.

  6. 6.

    Author’s interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (RS, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009.

  7. 7.

    Author’s interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (RS, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009.

  8. 8.

    Author’s interview with Senator Luis Carlos Petcoff Naidenoff (UCR, Formosa), August 18, 2009.

  9. 9.

    Author’s interview, November 20, 2008.

  10. 10.

    Author’s interview, August 18, 2009. (Translation by the author.)

  11. 11.

    Author’s interview, August 14, 2009.

  12. 12.

    Author’s interview, August 18, 2009. (Translation by the author.)

  13. 13.

    Author’s interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (RS, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009.

  14. 14.

    In 2011, Congress approved a different anti-smoking bill introduced by Senator Adriana Bortolozzi de Bogado (PJ-FPV, Formosa). It was also called anti-smoking law (Law 26687).

  15. 15.

    See Mejia et al. (2008).

  16. 16.

    Parlamentario.com, “No hay acuerdo en el Senado para tratar proyectos antitabaco” (No agreement in the Senate for dealing with anti-smoking bills), October 3, 2005, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-4422.html.

  17. 17.

    They were Eduardo Fellner (Jujuy ), Juan Carlos Romero (Salta ), and Carlos Rovira (Misiones ). José Alperovich (Tucumán ) was also from the president’s party, but he was a freshman at that time.

  18. 18.

    Author’s interview, August 19, 2009. (Translation by the author.)

  19. 19.

    Author’s interview, August 4, 2010. (Translation by the author.)

  20. 20.

    Author’s interview with Deputy and former Senator Marcelo López Arias (PJ, Salta ), July 8, 2009.

  21. 21.

    She was a subordinate of Governor Eduardo Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy ) at that time.

  22. 22.

    Author’s interview, August 4, 2010.

  23. 23.

    Author’s interview, August 4, 2010.

  24. 24.

    Parlamentario.com, “Ley de tabaco y ligadura de trompas” (Anti-smoking bill and tubal ligation), July 12, 2006, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-5389.html.

  25. 25.

    They were Senators Oscar Castillo (UCR-Frente Cívico y Social, Catamarca ), María Teresita Colombo de Acevedo (UCR-Frente Cívico y Social, Catamarca), Liliana Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy ), and María Sánchez (UCR, Corrientes ).

  26. 26.

    La Nación, “Se demora el proyecto antitabaco en el Senado” (The anti-smoking bill delays in the Senate), November 16, 2006.

  27. 27.

    Mariana Carbajal, “Ellos defienden grandes negocios” (They defend big business), Página/12, September 19, 2006.

  28. 28.

    Alicia Kirchner (PJ-FPV, Santa Cruz) was replaced by Haide Giri (PJ-FPV, Córdoba), because she left from the Senate on August 14 to be the minister of social development.

  29. 29.

    Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones Salud y Deporte, de Agricultura, Ganaderia y Pesca, de Industria y Comercio, de Economias Regionales, Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, de Sistemas, Medios de Comunicación y Liberdad de expresión y de Presupuesto y Hacienda (Record of Committee Meetings of the Health and Sports Committee, the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee, the Industry and Trade Committee, the Regional Economies, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Committee, the Systems, Mass Communication, and Freedom of Expression Committee, and the Budget Committee), November 15, 2006.

  30. 30.

    Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones Salud y Deporte, de Agricultura, Ganaderia y Pesca, de Industria y Comercio, de Economias Regionales, Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, de Sistemas, Medios de Comunicación y Liberdad de expresión y de Presupuesto y Hacienda (Record of Committee Meetings of the Health and Sports Committee, the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee, the Industry and Trade Committee, the Regional Economies, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Committee, the Systems, Mass Communication, and Freedom of Expression Committee, and the Budget Committee), November 30, 2006, 3–9.

  31. 31.

    Some senators had multiple committee memberships .

  32. 32.

    Author’s interview with Senator Liliana Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy ), August 4, 2010. In practice, both of them did not run for governor in 2007.

  33. 33.

    Author’s interview with Deputy and former Senator Marcelo López Arias (PJ, Salta ), July 8, 2009.

  34. 34.

    Author’s interview, August 18, 2009.

  35. 35.

    Gustavo Ybarra, “Una norma nacional, archivada” (A national regulation, archived), La Nación, December 31, 2006.

  36. 36.

    Bills must be approved by one of the two chambers within two legislative years.

  37. 37.

    If the reviewing house introduces the amendments with a two-thirds majority, the originating house also needs a two-thirds majority to override them.

  38. 38.

    By contrast, Calvo (2007) and Alemán and Calvo (2008) found that the majority status of the president’s party had no impact on the success of presidential bills in Argentina between 1983 and 2001.

  39. 39.

    Author’s interview, November 20, 2008.

  40. 40.

    Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones Salud y Deporte, de Agricultura, Ganaderia y Pesca, de Industria y Comercio, de Economias Regionales, Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, de Sistemas, Medios de Comunicación y Liberdad de expresión y de Presupuesto y Hacienda (Record of Committee Meetings of the Health and Sports Committee, the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee, the Industry and Trade Committee, the Regional Economies, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Committee, the Systems, Mass Communication, and Freedom of Expression Committee, and the Budget Committee), December 7, 2006.

  41. 41.

    There was a bill excluded from this analysis due to the lack of a printed majority report on it.

  42. 42.

    I would like to thank Ernesto Calvo for generously sharing his datasets on presidential approval rates and bills submitted to the Argentine Congress.

  43. 43.

    According to Cheibub et al. (2009), these bills should be subnational-depriving legislation.

  44. 44.

    For example, annual budget bills (including ones introduced by the chief of the cabinet), a bill that tried to relocate the capital to the province of Río Negro (PE-264/86), a bill that established a federal system of fishing regulation (PE-11/91), a bill that amended the value-added tax law (CD-27/04), and a bill that required provincial governments to participate in a new federal system of fiscal responsibility (PE-211/04) should be considered centralizing measures .

  45. 45.

    There were three presidential bills that were referred to six committees: A bill that tried to enact a national law of ports (PE-268/90), a bill that tried to privatize airports (PE-939/95), and the anti-smoking bill discussed in the last section (PE-424/05). Interestingly, none of them was approved by Congress.

  46. 46.

    Signing no committee report is equivalent to casting a “Nay” vote under the current Senate rules , since they require majority reports to be published by an absolute majority of all committee members (i.e., not by a majority of committee members present at committee meetings).

  47. 47.

    Provinces without elective governors include the City of Buenos Aires before 1996, and the provinces under the federal intervention (intervención federal) (Catamarca in 1991, Corrientes between 1992 and 1993 and between 1999 and 2001, Santiago del Estero between 1993 and 1995 and between 2004 and 2005, and Tucumán in 1991).

  48. 48.

    Thus, the baseline category is local subordinate.

  49. 49.

    Five presidential bills were rejected by majority reports between 1984 and 1986. Moreover, Kikuchi (2011) contains 15 majority reports that shelved presidential bills, returned them to the executive branch, or returned them to the Chamber of Deputies.

  50. 50.

    There were 267 senators between 1983 and 2007, but some of them did not have a chance to discuss presidential bills in committees.

  51. 51.

    I would appreciate Germán Lodola for providing me with this information.

  52. 52.

    Fellner left the governorship in 2007 due to a term limit, but he returned to the same position in 2011. He failed to be reelected in 2015.

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Kikuchi, H. (2018). The Drawer of Committees. In: Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process. IDE-JETRO Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_4

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