Abstract
This chapter offers background information to understand senatorial behavior in Argentina. Referring to official documents published by the Senate, it describes that committee decision-making is consensus-based, and almost all unapproved presidential initiatives are killed before being scheduled to be discussed. It also recognizes the conventional wisdom that the partisan dimension dominates the floor voting. In addition, the chapter introduces a typology of senators according to the varieties in their principals at the subnational level, and claims that overrepresentation of the periphery provinces as well as decentralized party organizations makes Argentine governors important political players at the national and provincial levels, while their tenure stability varies considerably across provinces.
The original version of this chapter was revised: For detailed information please see Erratum. The erratum to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_7
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Notes
- 1.
According to the 1826 constitution , the Senate renewed one-third of its members every three years as the period 1983–2001.
- 2.
In 1951, Law 14,032 established the new electoral rules corresponding to the 1949 constitutional reform. Under the new rules, two senators were directly elected from each province (or the Federal Capital) using plurality formula , and each voter had two votes to cast.
- 3.
Since the Federal Capital did not have its legislature, its senators were indirectly elected by an electoral college. The members of such electoral college were elected using plurality formula , but the 1962 reform changed the formula to the closed-list proportional representation (PR).
- 4.
Each legislative year starts on March 1, while it began on May 1 before the 1994 constitutional reform.
- 5.
Since this study focuses on presidential bills , I only collected the information about committee reports on bills initiated by the executive branch. Moreover, I also excluded bills that (a) authorized the president to travel abroad, (b) confirmed presidential appointees, and (c) ratified international treaties on good neighborliness from my data collection, following Calvo (2007). By definition, minority reports always accompany majority reports .
- 6.
Two majority reports rejected presidential bills , while other two reports suggested return of bills to the executive branch. Two reports were published on President Menem ’s requests of withdrawal, and the General Legislation Committee published two committee reports to sentence repeal of eleven bills by the two-year time limit.
- 7.
According to Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011) and Calvo (2014), committee members from the majority party dominate committee decision-making in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies . If no party holds the majority status, however, the position of the overall median committee member comes to be more important than that of the median committee voter of the plurality party.
- 8.
“CD” means that the bill was originally introduced to the Chamber of Deputies .
- 9.
Argentina had three presidents between December 21, 2001 and January 2, 2002: Provisional President of the Senate Ramón Puerta (PJ, Misiones ) between December 21 and 23, Governor of the Province of San Luis Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ) between December 23 and 30, and President of the Chamber of Deputies Eduardo Camaño (PJ, Buenos Aires) between December 30 and January 2.
- 10.
It is usually not so difficult to make an agreement among parties, but it took several months to decide the composition of committees after the 2009 elections. Since the president’s Front for Victory (Frente para la Victoria, FPV) bloc lost the majority status, the opposition parties claimed chairmanships of more than half of 25 standing committees. Senator Pichetto (PJ-FPV, Río Negro), the leader of the FPV bloc, rejected it because the FPV still held more seats (30 senators) than any other party in the Senate. However, on March 3, 2010, the claim of the opposition parties was approved with 37 Yea votes including that of Senator Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ- Federalismo y Liberación, La Rioja).
- 11.
Disloyal committee members are forced to resign. In the case of Resolution 125 , which is discussed in the next chapter, Senator Roberto Urquía (PJ-FPV, Córdoba) had to resign from the chair of the Budget Committee , because he openly opposed the presidential bill.
- 12.
Senators’ committee memberships were limited to five between 2003 and 2008. As of January, 2018, the Women’s Caucus Committee hosted all the female senators, while the size of other committees was limited to 17 except for the four committees that have 19 members: the Constitutional Affairs , the Foreign Relations and Worship , the Mining, Energy and Fuel , and the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee s.
- 13.
They are elected for one-year terms, and reelection is permitted.
- 14.
Author’s interview with Advisor for Senator Eduardo Torres (PJ-FPV, Misiones) Pablo Salinas, November 20, 2008. According to him, the Constitutional Affairs Committee , the Budget Committee , and the General Legislation Committee are more prestigious than other committees in the Argentine Senate.
- 15.
Current Senate rules do not allow a senator to hold multiple chairmanships .
- 16.
In the case of the election, however, senators followed the requirement only when there were multiple candidates for the authority positions.
- 17.
The exceptions include the cases in which (a) a bill has a unanimous committee report; and (b) no senator is going to oppose a bill before the en general vote. Even though senators may waive the roll-call requirement with the support of the absolute majority of the senators present in these cases, they rarely do so. By contrast, resolutions, declarations, and communications are usually decided by signal voting.
- 18.
This fact might bias the statistical results of my floor voting model toward post-2004 data, even though the Heckman procedure employed in Chapter 5 should minimize the problem.
- 19.
The word “bloques” is translated as “caucuses” on the website of the Argentine Senate . Contrary to caucuses in the US Congress, however, senators in Argentina cannot be affiliated with multiple blocs.
- 20.
A disadvantage to forming a unipersonal bloc is that its senator has little chance to hold a committee chairmanship , because committee leadership positions are distributed to legislative party blocs according to their share.
- 21.
The latter two parties had a coalition in the province of Corrientes until 2000.
- 22.
This bloc also had Jorge Villaverde (Buenos Aires) as a member.
- 23.
They were Eduardo Arnold (Santa Cruz), Daniel Baum (Neuquén), and Osvaldo Sala (Chubut).
- 24.
The former had Rodolfo Terragno (City of Buenos Aires) and Juan Carlos Passo (La Pampa) as its members, whereas the latter included two senators from Jujuy: Gerardo Morales and Lylia Arancio de Beller .
- 25.
Ironically, Gioja was one of the PJ senators who were suspected to have accepted bribes.
- 26.
For example, the NOMINATE method is suitable when more than 50 legislators cast at least 100 votes in each period (Poole 2005).
- 27.
Abstentions and absences are different concepts in the Argentine Congress. A vote is recorded as an abstention only when a legislator clearly declares his or her abstention at the time of voting. If a legislator attends a floor session but is not on the floor at the time of voting, it is regarded as an absence .
- 28.
Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, October 2, 1996. This interpretation was also applied to the cases of votes on general bills.
- 29.
Besides abstentions , Jones and Hwang (2005a) also coded the cases in which deputies attended floor sessions but left the floor at the time of voting (“present but not voting”) as dissident votes against their parties. In Argentina , many legislators express their dissident opinions in a passive way, because legislators who clearly cast dissident votes might be punished by their parties (Jones 2002). However, I did not follow their coding rule, since it is difficult to distinguish the cases of passive dissidence from the cases in which senators just leave the floor to have a break.
- 30.
I used the pscl package developed by Simon Jackman (2011) for this estimation.
- 31.
In order to check inter-temporal changes in the dimensionality of roll-call votes , I separately estimated senators’ ideal points of each legislative period. This estimation also revealed that the unidimensional model correctly discriminated most of the votes in each period. The rate of correct discrimination ranged from 84.8% (2003–2005) to 100.0% (1983–1986, 1989–1992, 1992–1995, and 2001–2003).
- 32.
For instance, Desposato (2006) compared party coherence in the Brazilian Senate with that in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies using point estimates.
- 33.
In his new book, Lijphart (2012) classified Argentina into the category between “federal and decentralized” and “federal and centralized”.
- 34.
Mexico and Venezuela were classified as federal and centralized, since subnational share of expenditures in 2000 was below 33.3% in these countries.
- 35.
Another consequence is the difference in the dependence of the provincial budget on federal transfers . However, the share of federal transfers in the provincial budget is quite high even in the metro provinces. For instance, federal programs financed 46% of the expenditures of the province of Buenos Aires in 1994, while it subsidized 78% of the budgets of the periphery provinces (Gibson et al. 2004).
- 36.
Malapportionment is also found in the Chamber of Deputies , since all the provinces are guaranteed to receive five deputies regardless of their population (Gibson et al. 2004). As a result, the province of Buenos Aires is “underrepresented” with 70 deputies, whereas the province of Tierra del Fuego is “overrepresented” with five deputies.
- 37.
This is still the case even after the introduction of Open, Simultaneous, and Mandatory Primaries (PASOs) in 2009.
- 38.
In spite of the lack of the double simultaneous vote (ley de lemas) system, multiple candidates from the PJ ran for the 2007 gubernatorial elections in Entre Ríos , Jujuy , La Rioja , Misiones , Salta , and San Juan . As a result, the effective number of parties was inflated in these provinces.
- 39.
The one-week tenure of Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ) as the president during the 2001 political-economic crisis also illustrated the role of governors in national politics. He was appointed as the interim president on December 23, 2001, with support of governors. However, contrary to the initial agreement with the governors, he tried to hold the position until 2003. As a result, the governors openly opposed him, and he stepped down as the president on December 30, 2001.
- 40.
Article 6 of the constitution allows the federal government to intervene in the provincial governments to protect the republican form of government or to repel foreign invasions. It is called federal intervention ( intervención federal ), and the president appoints an interventor (interventor), who administrates the province, after the congressional approval of his or her declaration of the intervention. After the democratization, Catamarca (1991), Corrientes (between 1992 and 1993, and between 1999 and 2001), Santiago del Estero (between 1993 and 1995, and between 2004 and 2005), and Tucumán (1991) experienced such a situation.
- 41.
I identified Eduardo Duhalde (PJ, Buenos Aires, 1991–1999), Felipe Solá (PJ, Buenos Aires, 2002–2007), Aníbal Ibarra (FREPASO-Frente Grande, City of Buenos Aires, 2000–2006), Ramón Saadi (PJ, Catamarca, 1983–1987 and 1988–1991), Arnoldo Castillo (UCR-Frente Cívico y Social de Catamarca, Catamarca, 1991–1999), Ángel Rozas (UCR, Chaco, 1995–2003), Carlos Maestro (UCR, Chubut, 1991–1999), Eduardo Angeloz (UCR, Córdoba, 1983–1995), José Manuel de la Sota (PJ, Córdoba, 1999–2007), Jorge Busti (PJ, Entre Ríos, 1987–1991, 1995–1999, and 2003–2007), Sergio Montiel (UCR, Entre Ríos, 1983–1987 and 1999–2003), Vicente Joga (PJ, Formosa, 1987–1995), Gildo Insfrán (PJ, Formosa, 1995–), Eduardo Fellner (PJ, Jujuy, 1998–2007), Rubén Marín (PJ, La Pampa, 1983–1987 and 1991–2003), Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ, La Rioja, 1983–1989), Ángel Maza (PJ, La Rioja, 1995–2007), Ramón Puerta (PJ, Misiones, 1991–1999), Carlos Rovira (PJ-Alianza Frente Renovador de la Concordia, Misiones, 1999–2007), Felipe Sapag (MPN, Neuquén, 1983–1987 and 1995–1999), Jorge Sobisch (MPN, Neuquén, 1991–1995 and 1999–2007), Horacio Massaccesi (UCR, Río Negro, 1987–1995), Pablo Verani (UCR , Río Negro, 1995–2003), Juan Carlos Romero (PJ, Salta, 1995–2007), Jorge Escobar (PJ, San Juan, 1991–1992 and 1994–1999), Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis, 1983–2001), Néstor Kirchner (PJ, Santa Cruz, 1991–2003), Carlos Reutemann (PJ, Santa Fe, 1991–1995 and 1999–2003), Jorge Obeid (PJ, Santa Fe, 1995–1999 and 2003–2007), Carlos Juárez (PJ, Santiago del Estero, 1983–1987, 1995–1998, and 1999–2001), and José Estabillo (Movimiento Popular Fueguino, Tierra del Fuego, 1992–2000) as longstanding governors.
- 42.
Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ, La Rioja) left the province two years before the expiration of his gubernatorial term, since the president was elected for a six-year term at that time. Fernando de la Rúa (UCR, City of Buenos Aires) still had 9 months left as the chief of the government of the City of Buenos Aires due to inconcurrent elections. Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis) assumed the presidency on December 23, 2001 during the 2001 political-economic crisis . Néstor Kirchner (PJ, Santa Cruz) still had six more months as a governor when he left Santa Cruz in 2003.
- 43.
Carlos Ruckauf (PJ, Buenos Aires) resigned to be the minister of foreign affairs in 2002.
- 44.
They were Vicente Saadi (PJ, Catamarca) and Guillermo Snopek (PJ, Jujuy).
- 45.
Ramón Saadi (PJ, Catamarca), Carlos Mujica (PJ, Santiago del Estero), Mercedes Aragonés de Juárez (PJ, Santiago del Estero), and José Domato (PJ, Tucumán) were replaced by the intervenors.
- 46.
Aníbal Ibarra (FREPASO-Frente Grande, City of Buenos Aires), Pedro Poccard (Partido Nuevo, Corrientes), Jorge Escobar (PJ, San Juan), Alfredo Avelín (Cruzada Renovadora, San Juan), Ricardo del Val (PJ, Santa Cruz), and Mario Colazo (UCR, Tierra del Fuego) were impeached by the provincial legislatures .
- 47.
They were Néstor Perl (PJ, Chubut), Eduardo Angeloz (UCR, Córdoba), Ricardo de Aparici (PJ, Jujuy), Roberto Domínguez (PJ, Jujuy), Carlos Ficoseco (PJ, Jujuy), Carlos Ferraro (PJ, Jujuy), Leopoldo Bravo (PB, San Juan), Carlos Juárez (PJ, Santiago del Estero), Carlos Díaz (PJ, Santiago del Estero), and Sergio Acevedo (PJ, Santa Cruz). Most of them resigned due to political crises as well as the loss of support from their parties.
- 48.
Rubén Marín (PJ, La Pampa) ran for his third consecutive term in 1999, even though the provincial constitution only allowed one immediate reelections . His explanation was that it would be his “second” term under the new constitution, and his terms under the previous constitution did not count for new term limits. This logic also allowed Eduardo Angeloz (UCR, Córdoba) and Juan Carlos Romero (PJ, Salta) to serve for their third terms.
- 49.
As of January 2018, the same three provinces (Catamarca , Formosa , and Santa Cruz ) allowed indefinite reelections , while no immediate reelections were permitted in Mendoza and Santa Fe .
- 50.
Suppose Party A presents Candidates C and D, while Party B presents Candidates E and F. The share of votes for each candidate is 35% (Candidate C), 20% (Candidate D), 40% (Candidate E), and 5% (Candidate F), respectively. The winner of this election is not Candidate E but Candidate C, since C is the most voted candidate of the most voted party (Party A).
- 51.
- 52.
According to Kikuchi and Lodola (2014), these positions are less valuable than senatorial seats in Argentina.
- 53.
For instance, Villaverde was one of the key players in the Senate who blocked bills that would have allowed President Menem to run for his third term in 1999.
- 54.
According to Lodola (2010), politicians of Formosa called the national legislature “elephants’ cemetery”.
- 55.
- 56.
I would like to appreciate Germán Lodola for sharing this dataset.
- 57.
They are Argento and Gerschenson (1999), Baron (2002, 2004, 2006), Baron and Guerra (2000), Brusco (2005), Carrera (2001), Kikuchi (2012), Leiras (2007), Lodola (2010), Nogués (1989), Pousadela (2004), Slipak (2006), Tow (2011), Urquiza (2005), the website of the Argentine Senate, La Nación, Clarín, and Página/12.
- 58.
The governorship is also considered a springboard position to the presidency. Among these presidents, De la Rúa , Duhalde, Kirchner, Menem, and Rodríguez Saá served as governors before assuming the presidency. It should be noted that the latter four were longstanding governors.
- 59.
Between 1995 and 2001, this third seat was usually distributed to the first minority party in each provincial legislature . After the introduction of direct election in 2001, the third seat was awarded to the head of the list of the first runner-up regardless of its losing margin.
- 60.
These exceptions were Alfredo Benítez (PJ, Jujuy), Fernando Cabana (PJ, Jujuy), Edgardo Gagliardi (UCR, Río Negro), Jorge Massat (PJ, Santa Fe), Luis Salim (PJ, Santiago del Estero), and Julio San Millán (PJ, Salta).
- 61.
They are Argento and Gerschenson (1999), Baron (2002, 2004, 2006), Baron and Guerra (2000), Brusco (2005), Carrera (2001), Kikuchi (2012), Leiras (2007), Lodola (2010), Nogués (1989), Pousadela (2004), Slipak (2006), Tow (2011), Urquiza (2005), the website of the Argentine Senate, La Nación, Clarín, and Página/12.
- 62.
The previous constitution prescribed the staggered cycle of senatorial terms to the senators from the same province. Under the current constitution, by contrast, senatorial seats of the same province are renewed in the same year.
- 63.
One of the leaders of this faction was President Alfonsín .
- 64.
Felipe “Pipe” Sapag was the vice-governor under Governor Jorge Sobisch between 1991 and 1993. However, he distanced himself from Sobisch and came to be closer to Felipe Sapag by 1995.
- 65.
Interestingly, Cimadevilla won a national senatorial seat in 2009.
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Kikuchi, H. (2018). Committees, Floor, and the Four Types of Senators. In: Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process. IDE-JETRO Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_3
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