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Germany Abdicates Hard Money Power

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The Case Against 2 Per Cent Inflation
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Abstract

According to architect designs, the euro was to be a pan-European version of the hard Deutsche mark: Bundesbank vigilantes would guarantee that the ECB would pursue sound money principles. This has all turned out to be pure fiction. Berlin and the Bundesbank acting together could have challenged the ECB’s putting Europe under the 2% regime. Subsequently they could have blocked the path to radical monetary experimentation which the regime had opened up. Thus Germany would have halted the gravy train (in fact a “drug train”) of tax transfers to the south and especially Italy. But none of this happened. The fault lies in part with specific individuals, including chancellors and Bundesbank presidents, and more generally with profound failures of German democracy. Germany could still turn the clock back.

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Brown, B. (2018). Germany Abdicates Hard Money Power. In: The Case Against 2 Per Cent Inflation. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89357-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89357-0_8

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-89356-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-89357-0

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

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