Abstract
In this chapter we critically discuss the so-called epistemic objection against the Growing Block Theory of time and argue that it rests on flawed conceptions of tense and of the import of the theory’s main tenets. We show how the theory enables knowledge of the location of the edge of reality that it posits. After introducing the epistemic objection as it figures in the extant literature, we argue in Sect. 6.1 and Sect. 6.2 that this objection either rests on a gross misunderstanding of the theory’s conception of the past, or else on a gross misunderstanding of the way in which utterances, or judgements, with tensed contents are evaluated for truth and falsity. In Sect. 6.3 we provide a constructive response to the remaining challenge, viz. to show how we might know that we are not in the past of the growing block’s edge of becoming.
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- 1.
The epistemic objection has a rather evident precursor in Lewis 1986: 93-94, which typically goes unacknowledged.
- 2.
Admittedly, Merricks himself thinks that proponents of GBT should try to wriggle out of the impasse he here alleges by distinguishing between two notions of being present. However, this proposal proves to be a poisoned chalice. As we argue above, we have trouble seeing how the alleged problem arises in the first place.
- 3.
Assuming B-relations to be existence-entailing , Broad writes: ‘When Queen Anne’s death became, it came into relations with all that had already become, and to nothing else, because there was nothing else for it to be related to. All these relations it retains henceforth for ever. As more events become it acquires further relations, which it did not have, and could not have had while those events were non-existent. This is all that ever happens to the event in question. […] All the relations which Anne’s death entered into with the sum total of reality, as it was when this event first became, persist eternally for ever afterwards, and are wholly unaffected by anything else that may be added on to this sum total by further becoming. Hence no proposition about these will ever become false, and no false proposition about them will ever become true’ (Broad 1923: 81–82; emphases added). Broad here merely talks about certain kinds of relations between events and about propositions concerning these relations. So nothing in these passages suggests that, according to Broad , all tensed propositions characterising a given event retain their truth-value, which would anyway be an odd thing for him to say, given only that on his view, once later events come into existence , what was present before no longer is present but past. As we have argued, on this view it is still accurate to say, as does Broad, that all that happens to a given instantaneous event e, in order for the proposition that e is present to become false and the proposition that e is past to become true, is that more events come into existence. What holds for the propositions ascribing to e the property of presentness (if such property exists) should likewise hold for propositions ascribing to e such temporary properties as occurring.
- 4.
Proponents of dynamic or A-theories of time often appeal to Arthur Prior’s ‘Thank goodness that’s over’ argument for tensed facts – an argument that was in fact anticipated by Broad although he never takes credit for this (Prior 1959; Broad 1938: 267, cf. also 527–33). In philosophical discussions, this argument is often given a reading that would not only tell against eternalism but also against GBT: to make sense of one’s relief that one’s pain is past, one has to say that the pain no longer exists; for if it did, it would still be hurting (see e.g. Zimmerman 2008: 215–16). Although we do not wish to rely on this argument, let us make two comments in response. First, like Prior himself but unlike Broad, friends of GBT may prefer not to admit events (or phases) such as pains into their ontology, in which case they might rather explain one’s relief in terms of its no longer being the case that one is hurting – consistently with one’s continued existence (Prior 2003: 7–19). Secondly, even if friends of GBT allow quantification over pains, they might still want to distinguish between the existence of an event and its unfolding, and reject the idea that insofar as the past pain still exists, it still is painful, just as we reject the idea that insofar WWI still exists, people are still dying in the trenches (pace Zimmerman 2008: 215–16).
- 5.
Cameron (2015: 64–65) discusses a principle which he calls Past Record:
If something was the case, then it is the case in the past.
As long as ‘in the past’ is here taken to function as a temporal operator embedding a present-tensed clause, the principle merely records the way in which the past tense is regimented in the standard languages of tense logic. However, Cameron argues that Past Record is controversial and should ultimately be given up. His reasoning is based on an alternative reading of this principle according to which the italicized occurrence of ‘is’ is tenseless. It accordingly remains unclear what semantical role he assigns to ‘in the past’; if the latter functioned like a temporal operator, it would be redundant provided that the ‘is’ of the embedded clause indeed is tenseless. But in any case, his contention – that, thus understood, Past Record should initially appeal to proponents of GBT – lacks all plausibility. It is clear as daylight that proponents of GBT will deny that if yesterday was the last day, then yesterday is atemporally the last day. The same goes for Nero once having believed to sit on the edge of reality.
- 6.
This also answers some of the worries that engage Evans (1985). We are at a loss to see, however, why this should imply, as Evans would seem to suggest it does, that tensed sentence-types cannot be true simpliciter without always being true.
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Correia, F., Rosenkranz, S. (2018). The Epistemic Objection. In: Nothing To Come. Synthese Library, vol 395. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78704-6_6
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