Abstract
Law is stable; the societies we are speaking of are progressive. The greater or less happiness of a people depends on the degree of promptitude with which the gulf is narrowed.
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Notes
- 1.
Maine (1887), p. 24.
- 2.
- 3.
Qin (2005), p. 44.
- 4.
- 5.
Kischel (1994), p. 215.
- 6.
See above, Sect. 2.2.2.3.
- 7.
Yan (2002), p. 6.
- 8.
See, for example, Article 72 (2) of the Legislation Law. In general, as Zhu Guobin notes, the Constitution and the Legislation Law do not make a clear distinction between the review of constitutionality and the review of legality: According to Article 67 No 7 of the Constitution, the NPCSC has the power to cancel any regulation that contravenes the Constitution or any national law, see in detail Zhu (2010), p. 630.
- 9.
See, for example, Article 33 of the Chinese Constitution.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
In her essay dealing with experimental legislation in Chinese law in general, Bi Yanying strongly suggests that “experimental legislation should explore an effective model to reconcile tension between the legitimacy and effectiveness of experimental legislation in China”, see Bi (2015), p. 158.
- 14.
Blasek (2015), p. 9.
- 15.
See more closely Zhang (2010), p. 952.
- 16.
Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser emphasize that constitutions also play a significant role in authoritarian regimes. For details concerning the functions of authoritarian constitutions in general, see Ginsburg and Simpser (2014), pp. 1–17.
- 17.
See for example Article 20 (3) of the German Constitution.
- 18.
Gröpl (2015), p. 30.
- 19.
This is also enshrined in Article 20 (4) of the German Constitution.
- 20.
Bu (2009), p. 23.
- 21.
Zhang (2010), p. 953.
- 22.
Jones (1985), p. 710. According to Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, the so-called “role of window dressing” of constitutions is aptly captured in the Chinese Constitution. It means that the “text is designed to obfuscate actual political practice”, see more closely Ginsburg and Simpser (2014), p. 7.
- 23.
Hand (2011), pp. 80–81.
- 24.
Nathan (1985), pp. 113 and 125. Andrew J. Nathan emphasizes that the inclusion of individual rights into the Chinese constitutions did not aim to protect the individual against the state as it is the case with the fundamental rights in German law. Instead, the individual has to play a certain role in the state that would foster a “healthy political order”.
- 25.
Vanberg (2005), p. 1.
- 26.
Bröhmer (2012), p. 75.
- 27.
Articles 99 et seq. of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 28.
According to Article 67 No 1 of the Constitution, the NPCSC has the formal right to interpret the Constitution but it has never formally exercised that power, see Kellogg (2009), p. 220. The NPCSC prefers to handle constitutional matters via internal, non-transparent political rather than legal channels, see Hand (2011), p. 108.
- 29.
Lin (2015), p. 86; Liu (2013), p. 171; Ying (2015), pp. 51–52; Zeng (2004), p. 36. This also explains why the constitutionality review described in Article 99 (1) of the Legislation Law only concerns administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous regulations and separate regulations. The supervision and review of national law enacted by the NPC would contravene the “one-way”, top-down power relationship, see Ying (2015), p. 52; Lin (2015), p. 66.
- 30.
See Article 99 (1) of the Legislation Law; Article 7 of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Citation of Such Normative Legal Documents as Laws and Regulations in the Judgements (最高人民法院关于裁判文书引用法律、法规等规范性法律文件的规定), adopted on July 13, 2009; see also Hand (2013), pp. 230–231.
- 31.
Hand (2011), p. 82.
- 32.
Zhang (2010), p. 956.
- 33.
Zhang (2010), p. 950.
- 34.
Hand (2011), p. 106.
- 35.
The Ordinance on the Archivist Filing of Regulations and Government Rules (法规规章备案条例), issued on December 14, 2001, provides detailed provisions on the filing and review system.
- 36.
See also Article 7 of the Ordinance on the Archivist Filing of Regulations and Government Rules.
- 37.
Zhu (2010), p. 640.
- 38.
More precisely, the Division of Check and Filing of Laws and Regulations (法规审查备案室), a subunit of the Committee of Legal Work of the NPCSC, is in charge of activating the process of review, see Cui (2004), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/14528/2587708.html, accessed 20 December 2017; Zhu (2010), pp. 638–639. The State Council also acts as reviewing organ in case a local regulation is believed to be inconsistent with any administrative regulation. If, upon review, the local regulation contradicts an administrative regulation, the State Council shall request the NPCSC to deal with it, cf. Article 7, Article 12 of the Ordinance on the Archivist Filing of Regulations and Government Rules.
- 39.
The formal review upon request is mandatory (Article 99 (1) of the Legislation Law) whereas the review upon proposals is discretionary (Article 99 (2) of the Legislation Law). If a citizen, organization, etc. recommended the review, the specialized committees and the operating divisions of the NPCSC have to provide feedback and may release it to the public (Article 101). This newly introduced provision constitutes an important step towards the smooth launch and implementation of the review system, taking into account the principle of due process and protecting the enabled body who lodges the proposal of constitutionality review, see more closely Ying (2015), p. 53.
- 40.
Article 99 (1), Article 99 (2) of the Legislation Law.
- 41.
See Article 99 (3) of the Legislation Law.
- 42.
This form of active review has already been introduced by Article 8 of the Working Procedure relative to Filing and Review of Administrative Rules and Regulations, Local Regulations, Autonomous Regulations and Specific Regulations, and Regulations of Special Economic Zones (行政法规、地方性法规、自治条例和单行条例、经济特区法规备案审查工作程序), as revised in December 2005 (hereinafter Filing and Review Working Procedures).
- 43.
Zhu (2010), p. 641.
- 44.
- 45.
Hand (2016), p. 41.
- 46.
This is expressed in a more cautious manner by Hand (2016), p. 36.
- 47.
Hand (2013), p. 149.
- 48.
Zhang (2010), p. 962.
- 49.
Hand (2011), p. 83.
- 50.
Guo Sujian states that the Constitution “serves as the instrumental tool of a particular leading group and their policy orientation”, see Guo (2013), p. 185.
- 51.
Kellogg (2009), p. 218.
- 52.
In the Qi Yuling case, for the first time since the foundation of the PRC, constitutional provisions have been directly applied by the Supreme People’s Court in a civil lawsuit to protect a citizen’s right to receive education, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution, see more closely Kui (2003), pp. 199–201; Werthwein (2009), pp. 24–28. The judicial interpretation promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court took effect on August 13, 2001. It is an official answer regarding the means of infringement of the right to name, infringement of the basic right of constitutional protection of public education, and whether or not civil responsibility should be assumed (关于以侵犯姓名权的手段侵害宪法保护的公民受教育的基本权利是否应当承担民事责任的批复), see also Morris (2010), p. 289.
- 53.
Morris (2010), p. 292.
- 54.
See more closely Hand (2011), p. 65.
- 55.
China News (2002), http://www.chinanews.com/2002-12-04/26/250121.html, accessed 20 December 2017; Hand (2011), p. 65; Cohen (2014), p. 6.
- 56.
Kellogg (2009), p. 218.
- 57.
Jiang (2014a), p. 8.
- 58.
Kellogg (2009), p. 223.
- 59.
According to Jiang Ming’an, the constitutional discourse is based on three theories: The first one—the most popular one—concerns the so-called “Constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics” combining Western constitutional ideals with Chinese actual conditions. The second theory refers to the constitutionalist path in the Western sense, arguing that the Western constitutional model is universally applicable. The third view expresses repugnance towards any kind of constitutional moves. According to this perspective, constitutionalism is perceived as a deceiving “beautiful lie” (美丽谎言) created by the West in order to force China to adopt a system that in fact is not suitable for a socialist country, see more closely Jiang (2014a), pp. 5–6.
- 60.
- 61.
Cohen (2014), p. 6.
- 62.
Zhang (2010), p. 951. Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser speak of “constitutions as hallowed vessels”. This is to say that the mere fact that the document is called “constitution” already creates a normative status of the Chinese Constitution in the minds of the people. This shows that despite being judicially unenforceable, authoritarian constitutions have a great influence on the citizens’ values and serve as a basis for constitutional debates especially when regime practices are at odds with the actual content of the Constitution, see Ginsburg and Simpser (2014), pp. 2 and 12.
- 63.
Concerning the different forms of such a committee, see Hand (2016), pp. 35–36. Keith Hand also states that Chinese leaders are not yet prepared to create a constitutional supervision committee, otherwise, they would have provided for it in the recent amendment of the Legislation Law.
- 64.
Concerning the goals elaborated during the Fourth Plenum, see Sect. 2.2.2.3.
- 65.
China Financialyst (2014), p. 12.
- 66.
Lin and Ginsburg (2015), p. 469.
- 67.
- 68.
- 69.
Lin (2015), pp. 73–74.
- 70.
Clarke (1995), p. 87.
- 71.
Lin (2015), p. 80.
- 72.
See Chap. 2, supra note 182.
- 73.
Lin and Ginsburg (2015), p. 474.
- 74.
See more closely Lin (2015), pp. 72–73.
- 75.
Li (2000), p. 125.
- 76.
Li (2000), p. 120.
- 77.
Article 65 of the Legislation Law 2000/Article 74 of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 78.
Article 63 (1), (2), (4) of the Legislation Law 2000/Article 72 of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 79.
Lin (2015), p. 74.
- 80.
Lin (2015), p. 61.
- 81.
Lin and Ginsburg (2015), pp. 490–491.
- 82.
- 83.
Bi (2015), p. 152; Zeng (2016), http://www.fzb.sz.gov.cn/ztzl/yfxz/fzyj/201605/t20160518_3632797.htm, accessed 23 December 2017.
- 84.
See Sect. 4.1.2.
- 85.
Article 5 (2) of the Constitution.
- 86.
Lin (2015), p. 86.
- 87.
Lin (2015), p. 87.
- 88.
Lin (2015), pp. 86–87.
- 89.
This is demonstrated by the constitutionality analysis of the empowerment decision and the respective delegated legislation in the SEZs. The Communiqué of the Fourth Plenum also called for respect for the Constitution, see China Financialyst (2014), p. 13.
- 90.
Sun (2015a), p. 62.
- 91.
The first Chinese Constitution in 1954 granted legislative power only to the NPC (Article 22 of the 1954 Constitution).
- 92.
Wan (1996), p. 40.
- 93.
Resolution on Authorizing the Standing Committee of the NPC to make separate regulations (中华人民共和国第一届全国人民代表大会第二次会议关于授权常务委员会制定单行法规的决议), adopted at the 2nd meeting of the first NPC on July 30, 1955, see Chap. 4, supra note 63.
- 94.
See more closely Wan (1996), p. 41.
- 95.
Both enabling resolutions were based on Article 27 No 14 of the 1954 Constitution which, albeit implicitly, allowed for legislative delegation, and were made in accordance with Article 31 No 19 of the 1954 Constitution: “The Standing Committee of the NPC exercises such powers as are vested in it by the NPC.” See also Qian (2015), p. 61.
- 96.
Decision of the NPC Regarding the Proposal Submitted for Deliberation by the State Council on Authorizing Municipality of Shenzhen to Formulate Regulations and Rules for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, adopted at the Second Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on April 4, 1989 (全国人民代表大会关于国务院提请审议授权深圳市制定深圳经济特区法规和规章的议案的决定); see also above, Sect. 4.2.4.
- 97.
Curiously, this decision of 1989 has been overlooked in a number of Chinese essays on SEZ delegated legislation: E.g., the profound essay on constitutionality of delegated legislation written by Sun (2015a, pp. 62–69) does not mention the decision of 1989.
- 98.
Sun (2015a), pp. 62–63.
- 99.
Yu (2008), p. 241.
- 100.
Liu (2015b), p. 62.
- 101.
Liu (2015b), p. 62.
- 102.
Liu (2015b), p. 62.
- 103.
- 104.
Article 9 of the Legislation Law 2000.
- 105.
Qian Ningfeng emphasizes that between the 1980s and 1990s, the NPC has played the most important role in delegating legislative power to subordinate organs, especially with regard to SEZs, see Qian (2015), p. 56. As mentioned above in Sect. 4.1.3, in 1988, the NPC delegated legislative power to the People’s Congress of Hainan province and its Standing Committee. In 1994, legislative power was transferred to the People’s Congress of Xiamen city and its Standing Committee as well as the People’s Government of Xiamen city. The people’s congresses of Shantou and Zhuhai City and their standing committees as well as their municipal governments received legislative power in 1996. The 1982 Constitution, however, only designates the State Council as delegatee whereas provincial and municipal legislative organs are not mentioned as delegatees. Thus, these empowerment decisions issued by the NPC are also regarded as unconstitutional, see Sun (2015a), pp. 64–65.
- 106.
See Sun (2015a), p. 66.
- 107.
Liu (2015a), p. 43. In the end, Liu Zhigang opposes this argument by stating that a constitutional interpretation must not be confused with legislation.
- 108.
Article 1 of the Legislation Law.
- 109.
Cf. Qin (2005), pp. 44–45.
- 110.
Sun (2015a), p. 65.
- 111.
- 112.
Zhang (2012b), p. 60.
- 113.
See above in this chapter, Sect. 6.1.4.
- 114.
See above in this chapter, Sect. 6.1.4.
- 115.
Liu (2015b), pp. 62–63.
- 116.
Zhang (2010), p. 970.
- 117.
Liu (2015b), p. 63.
- 118.
Lin (2015), p. 89.
- 119.
- 120.
Article 58 of the Constitution.
- 121.
Article 67 No 3 of the Constitution.
- 122.
- 123.
See above, Sect. 2.2.3.1.
- 124.
- 125.
Article 62 No 11 of the Constitution.
- 126.
- 127.
See more closely Sun (2015a), pp. 65–66.
- 128.
Liu (2015a), p. 43; Yin (2015a), p. 86. Qian Ningfeng argues that the core problem lies in the relationship between reform and law: On the one hand reform measures have already achieved political legitimacy. On the other hand, reform requires breaking free from the original legal system. According to Qian Ningfeng it is necessary to achieve harmony between law and reform, see Qian (2015), p. 61.
- 129.
- 130.
Wang (2008), p. 504.
- 131.
- 132.
Cf. Sodan (1999), p. 870; Höpfner (2008), pp. 50–52; Felix (1998), pp. 142–143. Some German legal scholars are of the opinion that the unity of legal order forms part of the constitutional principle of democracy: According to Article 20 (2) of the German Constitution, all state authority is derived from the people. The unity of the legal order is based on the unified will of the German people, see Engisch (1935), pp. 22–23. Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, however, emphasizes that the concept of uniformity of law is to be traced back to the command of justice (Gerechtigkeitsgebot) incorporated in Article 3 of the German Constitution which stipulates equality before the law, see Canaris (1983), pp. 16–17.
- 133.
Ossenbühl (2007), p. 184.
- 134.
Lindner (2007), p. 1005.
- 135.
With regard to the Chinese unitary state, see above, Sect. 2.2.1.1.
- 136.
Zhu (2012), p. 283.
- 137.
- 138.
- 139.
Article 87 of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 140.
Article 88 of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 141.
For a discussion, see Zhao (2010), pp. 160–161.
- 142.
See above, Sect. 2.2.3.3.1.
- 143.
Concerning the unclear status of delegated legislation of SEZs, see above, Sect. 4.2.2.
- 144.
Zhao (2010), p. 161.
- 145.
See above, Sect. 2.2.1.1.
- 146.
See Sect. 4.2.2.3.1.
- 147.
Shi (2009), p. 4.
- 148.
Huang (2012a), p. 6.
- 149.
- 150.
- 151.
Paler (2005), p. 306.
- 152.
Even if SEZ delegated legislation is different from general local legislation it still constitutes a special kind of local legislation, being of a legal status inferior to central legislation. Practice shows that the local level has often abused its power and acted ultra vires, threatening the still superior authority of the central level, see Zhou (2015), pp. 140–141; Wang (2015a), pp. 113–114.
- 153.
- 154.
Article 9 of the Legislation Law.
- 155.
- 156.
According to Sebastian Heilmann, the Legislation Law aims to promote the experimental power of delegated legislation of Shenzhen SEZ rather than stifling it for the sake of unification of law, see Heilmann et al. (2004), p. 7.
- 157.
- 158.
With regard to the tensions between administrative innovation and legality, see Wang (2015c), p. 8.
- 159.
See above, Sect. 4.2.5.1.
- 160.
Wu (2014), p. 90.
- 161.
Second section of the preface of the Law on Regional National Autonomy (民族区域自治法).
- 162.
Article 75 (1), (2) of the Legislation Law 2015; with regard to the nature of autonomous regulations and separate regulations, see Chap. 2, supra note 227.
- 163.
Article 4 (3), Article 115 of the Constitution.
- 164.
- 165.
Zhang (2011a), p. 51. According to Article 6 of the Chinese Marriage Law of 1980, revised in 2001, a woman shall not be younger than 20 and the man shall not be younger than 22 years old in order to marry. Historically and traditionally, the marriage age of the Xinjiang Uyghur minority has been much younger: Article 2 of the Provisions of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region supplementing the national Marriage Law (新疆维吾尔自治区执行《中华人民共和国婚姻法》的补充规定), revised in 1988 for the second time, stipulates that men can marry at the age of 20 and women at 18.
- 166.
Wu (2014), p. 56.
- 167.
Pang (2015), p. 75.
- 168.
Wu (2014), p. 90.
- 169.
It has often been emphasized by Chinese scholars that SEZs do not constitute political zones, see for example Zhang (2011a), p. 52; Song (2004), p. 57. However, as Huang Weiping and Zheng Chao argue, the whole design and goals of SEZs are determined by policies set by state organs and are characterized by a wide domain which necessarily touches on political issues considering the liberal measures to streamline bureaucracy in order to provide efficient performance and to overcome the rigid planned economy, see Huang and Zheng (2010), pp. 36–37.
- 170.
See above, Sect. 3.2.2.2.
- 171.
- 172.
This is particularly reflected by the recently established Free Trade Zone, allowing even for pre-establishment national treatment, see above, Sect. 3.2.2.6.
- 173.
Zeng (2016), http://www.fzb.sz.gov.cn/ztzl/yfxz/fzyj/201605/t20160518_3632797.htm, accessed 23 December 2017.
- 174.
- 175.
Zhang (2011a), p. 51.
- 176.
Corne (1997), p. 59.
- 177.
- 178.
Shi (2009), p. 4.
- 179.
Article 75 (1) of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 180.
Article 98 No 2 of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 181.
Article 30 (1) of the Constitution.
- 182.
Chen (1999), pp. 105–106.
- 183.
Cf. empowerment decision of 1992, more closely explained in Sect. 4.2.4.
- 184.
Chen (1999), p. 106.
- 185.
See more closely Sect. 6.3.
- 186.
See above, Sect. 4.2.2.3.2.
- 187.
- 188.
See Sect. 2.2.3.3.4.
- 189.
Guan (2015), p. 238.
- 190.
- 191.
- 192.
See above, Sect. 3.3.5.4.
- 193.
Article 4 No 3 of the 2012 Regulations of Shenzhen Municipality on the Enactment of Statutes, see above, Sect. 4.2.2.3.3.
- 194.
- 195.
Mei (2013), p. 64.
- 196.
- 197.
Guan (2015), p. 238.
- 198.
深圳经济特区救助人权益保护规定 (literally translated Provisions of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Rescuers), adopted by the Standing Committee of Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress on June 28, 2013, taking effect in August 1, 2013.
- 199.
For an overview of the content of the Good Samaritan Law, see Pelzer (2014), http://www.yamenrunner.com/post/97652291599/victims-of-victims-will-good-samaritan-laws-put, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 200.
Hainan People’s Congress (2013), p. 49.
- 201.
The Economist (2013), http://www.economist.com/news/china/21582295-soul-searching-debate-rages-about-apathy-towards-those-need-unkindness-strangers, accessed 23 December 2017; Bu (2017), pp. 147–148.
- 202.
- 203.
- 204.
This emphasizes the basic burden of proof-rule rule in Chinese law: shei zhuzhang shei juzheng 谁主张谁举证 (the one who asserts must prove). It is manifest in Article 64 (1) of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法), adopted by the NPC on April 9, 1991, revised in 2007, 2012 and 2017.
- 205.
Sina News (2013), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-02-25/121726352370.shtml, accessed 25 December 2017. The relevant national law provision concerning negotiorum gestio is Article 93 of the General Principles of Civil Law from 2009 which states that the beneficiary is obliged to indemnify the gestor for the expenses incurred.
- 206.
Lu (2011), http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_18_28918.html, accessed 20 December 2017; Sina News (2013), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-02-25/121726352370.shtml, accessed 25 December 2017. Both these articles concern the draft (cao’an—草案) of the Good Samaritan Law.
- 207.
Lu (2011), http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_18_28918.html, accessed 20 December 2017; Sina News (2013), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-02-25/121726352370.shtml, accessed 25 December 2017.
- 208.
中华人民共和国侵权责任法, adopted by the NPCSC in 2009.
- 209.
See also Pelzer (2014), http://www.yamenrunner.com/post/97652291599/victims-of-victims-will-good-samaritan-laws-put, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 210.
Dzodin (2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-01/17/content_17242681.htm, accessed 20 December 2017; Tang (2014), p. 231; Bu (2017), pp. 147–148.
- 211.
Lai (2017), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/03/16/china-acts-protect-good-samaritans-move-help-tackle-bystander-effect/, accessed 10 December 2017.
- 212.
Li (2017a), p. 13; Wei (2017), https://npcobserver.com/2017/03/13/2017-npc-session-schoolchildren-heroes-good-samaritans-draft-civil-law/, accessed 10 December 2017.
- 213.
Sina News (2013), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-02-25/121726352370.shtml, accessed 25 December 2017; Lu (2011), http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_18_28918.html, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 214.
Sina News (2013), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-02-25/121726352370.shtml, accessed 25 December 2017.
- 215.
Sina News (2013), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-02-25/121726352370.shtml, accessed 25 December 2017.
- 216.
Cf. Zhou (2015), pp. 141–142.
- 217.
Lu (2011), http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_18_28918.html, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 218.
Sigley (2013), p. 35.
- 219.
Dzodin (2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-01/17/content_17242681.htm, accessed 20 December 2017; The Economist (2013), http://www.economist.com/news/china/21582295-soul-searching-debate-rages-about-apathy-towards-those-need-unkindness-strangers, accessed 23 December 2017; Zhang (2015a), http://www.publiclaw.cn/?c=news&m=view&id=6452, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 220.
Zhang (2015a), http://www.publiclaw.cn/?c=news&m=view&id=6452, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 221.
It has to be noted that the traumatic years under Mao Zedong had destroyed respect and care for human dignity. There is still “‘anxiety’ about sticking your neck out for other people”, see The Economist (2013), http://www.economist.com/news/china/21582295-soul-searching-debate-rages-about-apathy-towards-those-need-unkindness-strangers, accessed 23 December 2017.
- 222.
Lu (2011), http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_18_28918.html, accessed 20 December 2017. For a discussion of this problem, see also Pelzer (2014), http://www.yamenrunner.com/post/97652291599/victims-of-victims-will-good-samaritan-laws-put, accessed 20 December 2017; Sina News (2013), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-02-25/121726352370.shtml, accessed 25 December 2017. Jiang Ming’an, however, contends that since the central legislation has not yet made the necessary arrangements for a legal framework of negotiorum gestio and a liability privilege for rescuers, local legislation has rightly preceded national law, see Zhang (2015a), http://www.publiclaw.cn/?c=news&m=view&id=6452, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 223.
See Sect. 2.2.3.3.2.
- 224.
Guo (2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015twosession/2015-03/11/content_19783843.htm, accessed 20 December 2017; China Daily (2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015twosession/2015-03/10/content_19765734.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 225.
Yin (2015b), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2015-06/04/content_680341_3.htm, accessed 22 December 2017.
- 226.
See above, Sect. 2.2.3.3.2.
- 227.
Huang and Lu (2015), http://news.66wz.com/system/2015/03/13/104381948.shtml, accessed 20 December 2017; Wu and Li (2015), pp. 259–260.
- 228.
Bu (2015), p. 788.
- 229.
Article 72 (2) of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 230.
Wu and Li (2015), p. 264.
- 231.
Zheng and Scase (2013), p. 3.
- 232.
Zheng and Scase (2013), p. 3.
- 233.
Zheng and Scase (2013), p. 3.
- 234.
However, it has been heavily criticized that the seemingly narrow range of matters subject to local legislation does not at all correspond to the diversity of local affairs that have to be tackled, see Guo (2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015twosession/2015-03/11/content_19783843.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 235.
Zhou (2015), p. 140.
- 236.
- 237.
Article 72 (4) of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 238.
The head of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Shenzhen Municipality, Bai Tian (白天), does not support the restricted legislative power of the former comparatively large cities. He is of the opinion that the narrow range of regulatory scope impedes the development of city legislative power which—in his eyes—has played an important role in the economic development of the Shenzhen SEZ, see Zhang and Mi (2015), http://gd.sina.com.cn/szfinance/jianguan/2015-03-11/07176553.shtml, accessed 20 December 2017. Even if the strong general local legislative power of Shenzhen Municipality contributes to the economic success, Bai Tian has overlooked that the lack of a clear scope of both delegated legislative power and general delegated legislative power has led to blurring of the dual natured legislative competence, affecting transparency and the hierarchy of legal norms.
- 239.
Zhou (2015), p. 140.
- 240.
- 241.
Interpretation to the Legislation Law (中华人民共和国立法法释义) from August 1, 2001, issued by the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC (全国人大常委会法制工作委员会编), Article 10.
- 242.
Wang (2015a), p. 115; Yin (2015b), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2015-06/04/content_680341_3.htm, accessed 22 December 2017.
- 243.
Wang (2015a), p. 115.
- 244.
See above, Sect. 2.2.3.3.5.
- 245.
Zhang (2015b), p. 23.
- 246.
- 247.
Zhou (2015), p. 141. Zhou Qian emphasizes that successful experimental local legislation constitutes an important factor in improving central legislation but exerts a complementary, not a dominant function.
- 248.
- 249.
See more closely the introduction to Chap. 3.
- 250.
Ranchordás (2014), p. 153.
- 251.
Ranchordás (2014), p. 157.
- 252.
See the jurisdiction “neue Formel” BVerfGE 55, 72 (88). For further explanations, see Höpfner (2008), pp. 42–45.
- 253.
Ranchordás (2013), pp. 437–438.
- 254.
Li and Liu (2004), p. 34.
- 255.
Li and Liu (2004), p. 34.
- 256.
- 257.
See above, Sect. 6.1.1.
- 258.
Chen (2015), p. 150.
- 259.
Concerning the phenomenon of “one city, two systems”, see above, Sect. 4.2.2.3.2.
- 260.
- 261.
Wang (2008), p. 505.
- 262.
Zhong (2012), p. 4.
- 263.
See in detail Zhang (2007), p. 68.
- 264.
Huang Zhe describes how readily fairness was sacrificed in favor of achieving economic goals, see Huang (2012b), p. 101.
- 265.
The German Constitution contains a provision that explicitly grants fundamental rights also to domestic legal persons to the extent that the nature of such rights permits (Article 19 (3)).
- 266.
The principle of equality is now incorporated in Article 4 of the newly introduced General Provisions of Civil Law from 2017.
- 267.
See above, Sect. 4.2.3.1.
- 268.
See above, Sect. 3.2.1.2.
- 269.
Wang (2010), p. 395.
- 270.
- 271.
See in general Harding (2011), p. 165.
- 272.
- 273.
Wang Wei strongly opposes the view that super-national treatment is incompatible with the WTO national treatment obligations since “no less favorable treatment” does not mean that the treatment must be more favorable. This misconception is attributed to the Chinese expression of super-national treatment—chao guomin daiyu 超国民待遇—implying that preferential measures are beyond national treatment. However, in the author’s opinion granting or recalling preferential measures for foreigners has nothing to do with the WTO but may be seen as an expression of China’s economic sovereignty, see Wang (2010), pp. 394–395; Li and Li (2005), p. 55.
- 274.
On November 27, 2014, the State Council of China issued its Notice on Reviewing and Regulating Preferential Policies for Taxation and Other Aspects (国务院关于管理清理规范税收等优惠政策的通知) requiring all provinces in China to identify illegitimate preferential policies by the end of March 2015 (see point IV of the Notice). The 15% preferential corporate income tax rate on foreign investors which was a special feature of SEZs was invalidated on January 1, 2008, when the new Enterprise Income Tax Law came into effect, see Sect. 3.2.2.3. FIEs in the SEZs are now subject to the same 25% uniform corporate income tax rate as domestic enterprises in China (Article 4 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law).
- 275.
Wang (2008), p. 505; Pang (2015), p. 76. By referring to the concept of a “harmonious society” (highlighted in the 6th Plenum of the 16th CCP Central Committee in 2006), Li Zhongxia calls into question whether the regional disparities caused by privileges granted to specific areas are compatible with the principle of equality manifested in Article 33 (2) of the Constitution, see more closely Li (2010), p. 12.
- 276.
Fan (2013), p. 29.
- 277.
Zhu (2012), p. 278.
- 278.
At first sight, one could draw a parallel to the principle of homogeneity defined in Article 28 of the German Constitution which characterizes the German federalism. The principle of homogeneity emphasizes the coherence between the Center and the states (the Laender), that is, local governments must conform to the basic principles set out in the German Constitution, see more closely Gröpl (2015), pp. 153–154; Franzius (2008), p. 496. The practice of decentralized law-making in China may suggest that the relationship between the central and local level is comparable to the relationship between the Federal Government and the states in Germany. Zhu Guobin even speaks of a “de facto legislative federalism”, see Zhu (2010), p. 629. However, due to the overarching central government that still holds political dominance over local subordinates by determining the basic policies and controlling local experiments, one cannot speak of federalist structures. The aspect of homogeneity in the Chinese unitary state focuses more strongly on the uniformity of governmental organization whereas homogeneity in German constitutional law takes account of the local autonomy typical of a de iure federal state.
- 279.
- 280.
Mei (2013), p. 63.
- 281.
- 282.
Pang (2015), p. 76.
- 283.
Fan (2013), p. 29.
- 284.
Wu (1999), p. 132.
- 285.
- 286.
Wu (2007), pp. 3–4.
- 287.
Wu (2007), pp. 3–4.
- 288.
Wei and Vanhullebusch (2015), pp. 334–335.
- 289.
Even though the government had taken initial steps to redress the striking disparities between Western and Eastern regions as early as the 1990s, a comprehensive national strategy to alleviate the regional development imbalance was only designed in 2000 by Zhu Rongji, see more closely Tian (2004), pp. 620–622.
- 290.
- 291.
The list of legal documents applicable in the Shenzhen SEZ is mentioned by Jiang (2013), p. 32.
- 292.
Articles 79, 80 Legislation Law 2000/Articles 88, 89 Legislation Law 2015.
- 293.
Jiang (2013), p. 33.
- 294.
- 295.
As early as in the 1990s, there were serious accusations that Shenzhen’s Regulations on Penalties for Violations against Traffic Safety are in clear violation of the Administrative Penalty Law and relevant national Road Traffic Safety Law, see Zhu and Xu (1999), pp. 6–7. Nevertheless, recently Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress again increased the fines and has even widened the disparity between local and central regulations, see above, Sect. 4.2.5.3.2.
- 296.
See Sect. 4.2.4.2.
- 297.
See more closely Singh (2001), p. 54.
- 298.
Article 2 of the 2005 Filing and Review Working Procedures (see supra note 42). It is striking that the Article 98 No 5 of the Legislation Law as well as Article 2 of the Working Procedures only mention the NPCSC as the filing and review organ whereas the empowerment decision of 1992 also includes the State Council as well as the Standing Committee of Guangdong People’s Congress.
- 299.
Article 3 of the 2005 Filing and Review Working Procedures.
- 300.
See Wu and Li (2015), p. 344.
- 301.
Article 97 No 7 of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 302.
See in general Zeng (2004), pp. 35–36.
- 303.
See more closely Wu and Li (2015), p. 345.
- 304.
- 305.
Hand (2013), pp. 261–262. According to Article 72 (2) of the Legislation Law 2015 the local regulations of the districted city shall come into force only after being reported to and approved by the standing committee of the people’s congress of the province or the autonomous region and thus are subject to pre-approval.
- 306.
In this context, Zhu Guobin notes: “The inconsistency under this condition is permissible because the power of regulation-making derives directly from the delegation of power from the NPC (…)”, see Zhu (2010), p. 633. Yet, this statement opens the door for excessive, uncontrolled exercise of delegated legislative power.
- 307.
- 308.
- 309.
Sun (2007), p. 88; Zhang (2014), http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20140510/Articel03003GN.htm, accessed 20 December 2017. Mei Xucheng demands a supervision “from beginning to end” (全程的监督), see Mei (2013), p. 64.
- 310.
Hand (2013), pp. 261–262.
- 311.
Article 72 (2) of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 312.
- 313.
See also Bi (2015), p. 153.
- 314.
- 315.
Sun (2015a), p. 67.
- 316.
- 317.
Chen (2014), p. 50.
- 318.
- 319.
- 320.
See Ding (2013), http://www.shiac.org/SHIAC/arbitrate_informations_detail_E.aspx?id=24, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 321.
Yang Dengfeng states that the supporters of “benign unconstitutionality” advocate proceeding with reforming first, remedying later (“xian gaige – hou bujiu 先改革——后补救”), see Yang (2014), p. 48.
- 322.
Heilmann (2008b), p. 4.
- 323.
Zhang (2012b), p. 62.
- 324.
See also Bi (2015), p. 152.
- 325.
- 326.
See also Gao et al. (2015), p. 108.
- 327.
See above, Sect. 3.3.3.2.1.
- 328.
See above in this chapter under Sect. 6.1.1.
- 329.
Zhang (2012b), p. 60.
- 330.
- 331.
See Sect. 3.3.3.2.1.
- 332.
- 333.
Hao (1996), p. 90.
- 334.
Cf. Sect. 5.1.1.1.
- 335.
深圳经济特区土地管理条例, promulgated January 3, 1988 by the Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress.
- 336.
- 337.
Hao (1996), p. 89.
- 338.
Wang (2015b), p. 7.
- 339.
- 340.
Yang (2014), p. 48.
- 341.
Wang (2014), p. 1.
- 342.
Zhang (2012b), p. 61.
- 343.
Cf. Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law (中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定), passed on October 23, 2014 at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, see Creemers (2014), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/, accessed 22 December 2017.
- 344.
Xie and He (2015), p. 113.
- 345.
Bi (2015), p. 153.
- 346.
- 347.
Yang (2014), p. 48.
- 348.
- 349.
See above, Sect. 3.3.5.1.2.
- 350.
Liu (2015b), p. 54; Zhang (2014), http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20140510/Articel03003GN.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 351.
Concerning the vagueness of Article 13, see above, Sect. 4.1.4.1.
- 352.
Clarke (2015), p. 10.
- 353.
- 354.
Zhang (2012b), p. 62.
- 355.
Cheng (2015), http://www.shekebao.com.cn/shekebao/n440/n441/u1ai8731.html, accessed 20 December 2017; Liu (2015b), p. 65; Li (2017b), p. 87.
- 356.
Xie and He (2015), p. 115.
- 357.
Feng Chongyi states that the overarching authority of the Party coincides with a rejection of universal values related to rights and other freedoms, see Feng (2016), p. 57.
- 358.
Sun (2015a), p. 69.
- 359.
- 360.
Feng (2016), p. 47.
- 361.
- 362.
Tridimas (2006), p. 242.
- 363.
Tridimas (2006), pp. 23–25.
- 364.
Ipsen (2017), p. 216.
- 365.
See above, Sect. 4.1.2.
- 366.
- 367.
Patricia Popelier advocates a more dynamic concept of legal certainty that takes into account the complex and dynamically changing reality, see Popelier (2008), p. 53.
- 368.
- 369.
Lindner (2007), p. 1006.
- 370.
The theory of essentialness has already been mentioned in Sect. 4.1.2.
- 371.
Similar Wolff (2011), p. 554.
- 372.
Liu and Liu (2004), p. 44. See also Article 10 (1) of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 373.
See above, Sect. 4.1.4.1.
- 374.
Otto (2002), p. 25.
- 375.
Otto (2002), p. 25.
- 376.
See above, Sect. 3.3.3.2.1.
- 377.
- 378.
Sun (2015b), p. 112.
- 379.
See above, Sect. 4.1.4.1.
- 380.
Keller (1994), p. 735.
- 381.
See Chap. 2, supra note 182.
- 382.
- 383.
Liu and Liu (2004), pp. 44–45.
- 384.
See Sect. 4.1.4.1.
- 385.
Pang (2015), p. 77; Liu (2014), p. 22; Yin (2015a), p. 86; Qin (2009), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zt/qt/dfrd30year/2009-04/14/content_1497664.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 386.
- 387.
- 388.
See above, Sect. 4.2.5.1.
- 389.
Sun (2015b), p. 114.
- 390.
- 391.
Qian and Du (2015), p. 10.
- 392.
Zhong (2000), p. 38.
- 393.
- 394.
Wei and Vanhullebusch (2015), p. 322.
- 395.
Wei and Vanhullebusch (2015), p. 322.
- 396.
See above, Sect. 3.2.2.6.
- 397.
Practice shows that on the basis of Article 13 of the Legislation Law 2015 the State Council has been authorized instead of the relevant local people’s congresses. This has been the object of some criticism, see Qian (2015), p. 63.
- 398.
Article 73 (1) No 1 of the Legislation Law 2015.
- 399.
Interview with Ding Mingfang (丁明方), Shenzhen Legal Affairs Institute, July 9, 2014.
- 400.
See also Zhong (2000), p. 38.
- 401.
Pang (2015), p. 77; Li and Li (2005), p. 56; Qin (2009), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zt/qt/dfrd30year/2009-04/14/content_1497664.htm, accessed 20 December 2017; Sun (2007), p. 88.
- 402.
- 403.
See above, Sect. 3.2.2.5.
- 404.
For example, in the course of China’s accession to the WTO, China ensured non-discriminatory treatment through the uniform enforcement of taxes, tariffs and non-tariff measures on trade between its SEZs and the other parts of China’s customs territory. In order to fulfill the WTO commitments, matters concerning tax, customs and foreign trade have to be regulated by the national legislator as stipulated in Article 8 No 8 of the Legislation Law 2000, see Li and Li (2005), p. 56.
- 405.
Paler (2005), p. 306.
- 406.
Pang (2015), p. 77.
- 407.
Wu and Li (2015), pp. 39–40.
- 408.
See Bai Tians’s statements in Zhang and Mi (2015), http://gd.sina.com.cn/szfinance/jianguan/2015-03-11/07176553.shtml, accessed 20 December 2017; Wang (2014), p. 1.
- 409.
Chen (2001), p. 15.
- 410.
See for example Song (2004), pp. 56–57.
- 411.
Wang (2015c), p. 8.
- 412.
Wang Yali discusses these questions when elaborating on the relation between the principle of legislative reservation and administrative innovation, see Wang (2015c), p. 8.
- 413.
Huang (2012a), p. 7.
- 414.
- 415.
Zeng (2016), http://www.fzb.sz.gov.cn/ztzl/yfxz/fzyj/201605/t20160518_3632797.htm, accessed 23 December 2017; Tan and Huang (2013), p. 50. For examples of innovative policies and regulations of the Shenzhen SEZ serving as lessons for the central government and being applied at the national level, see Chap. 5.
- 416.
- 417.
Huang (2012b), p. 101. Huang Zhe mentions the following example: Article 26 of the Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Transfer of Real Estate (深圳经济特区房地产转让条例), adopted in 1993 stipulated that the delivery of the real estate property should be fulfilled within 30 days after conclusion of the contract. After the expiry of this term, the transferee has the right to terminate the contract. However, the term of 30 days turned out to be too short in practice and numerous transferees terminated the contract. In order to avoid adverse effects on the development of real estate in the Shenzhen SEZ, the revised regulations on Transfer of Real Estate, issued in 1999, extended the term of delivery from 30 days to 90 days (Article 26). This shows that a greater emphasis was placed on economic interests, namely the promotion of the real estate business, than on the transferee’s interest to obtain real estate property quickly or to then terminate the contract.
- 418.
With regard to the tolerant attitude of the state towards violations against national law, see Wang (2008), p. 504.
- 419.
See above, Sect. 6.1.3. Cheng Xueyang states that any reform should be based on the respect of human rights, see Cheng (2015), http://www.shekebao.com.cn/shekebao/n440/n441/u1ai8731.html, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 420.
- 421.
Basic rights are guaranteed in chapter II of the Chinese Constitution and in chapter I of the General Provisions of Civil Law.
- 422.
A negative list would contribute to a uniform application of biantong quan among the SEZs, see Xiamen Municipal Bureau of Legislative Affairs (2015), http://www.fzj.xm.gov.cn/ztzl/yfxz/zffz/2014/201403/201501/t20150106_1030386.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 423.
- 424.
- 425.
Ranchordás (2014), p. 89.
- 426.
Paler (2005), p. 305.
- 427.
Ye and Qin (2014), p. 111.
- 428.
Ye and Qin (2014), p. 112.
- 429.
- 430.
Wang Yali, concentrating on administrative innovation, advocates the introduction of a generalized standard of legislative reservation modelled on the theory of essentialness in German law, see Wang (2015c), pp. 9–10.
- 431.
With regard to the theory of essentialness as crucial part of the legality framework of experimental regulations in Western jurisdictions, see Ranchordás (2014), pp. 86–87.
- 432.
Sofia Ranchordás argues in the same direction, see Ranchordás (2014), p. 90.
- 433.
Pang (2015), p. 77.
- 434.
Cf. Wang (2015c), pp. 9–10.
- 435.
- 436.
BVerfGE 61, 126 (134).
- 437.
- 438.
- 439.
Ranchordás (2014), p. 169.
- 440.
Ranchordás (2014), p. 167.
- 441.
Ranchordás (2014), p. 167.
- 442.
Stettner (1989), p. 812.
- 443.
Rao and Chen (2016), p. 38.
- 444.
See Sect. 2.2.2.3.
- 445.
See also Rao and Chen (2016), p. 40.
- 446.
Rao and Chen (2016), p. 41.
- 447.
Rao and Chen (2016), p. 41.
- 448.
- 449.
Rao and Chen (2016), p. 44.
- 450.
中华人民共和国行政处罚法, adopted in 1996, amended in 2009 and 2017.
- 451.
See more closely Yu (2009), p. 38. In this textbook on Chinese administrative law, the principle of proportionality is explained by making reference to the German concept of the principle of proportionality, even using the corresponding German legal terms such as Geeignetheit, Erforderlichkeit, Angemessenheit.
- 452.
- 453.
Liu and Liu (2004), pp. 41–43.
- 454.
Liu and Liu (2004), p. 42.
- 455.
- 456.
Liu Yantao and Liu Hongwei state that in order to approach a rule of law, the principle of necessity (biyaoxing yuanze 必要性原则) as a component of the principle of proportionality must be followed as well as the imperative of determinacy (mingque xing yuanze 明确性原则), see Liu and Liu (2004), p. 41.
- 457.
According to Wang Jianxue, the principle of proportionality serves as an important yardstick for controlling local pilot reforms, see Wang (2017), p. 39. The Legislation Law contains only vague hints of the principle of proportionality, see Article 4, Article 97 No 7 of the Legislation Law 2015, addressing the abuse of power in the first place without clearly mentioning the components of the principle of proportionality.
- 458.
See more closely below, Sect. 6.3.3.2.
- 459.
- 460.
Heilmann (2008a), p. 29.
- 461.
See above, Sects. 2.2.3.3.1 and 3.1.1. Bi Yanying argues that the design of experiments in Chinese law should be based on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), see Bi (2015), pp. 141 and 158. The dynamics of central-local interaction in China’s reform process is, however, incomparable to the modes of experimental governance existing in the EU or in Germany. The OMC aims to establish an organized learning process where the central level (the European Commission) has the task of evaluating policies tried out at lower levels (the member states), identifying the best practices and integrate them at EU-level, see more closely Kerber and Eckardt (2007), p. 230; Szyszczak (2006), p. 488. Although the core idea of coordinating and reintegrating policies at central level may seem similar to the mode of governance prevailing in China, it has to be noted that the political and economic context is wholly different from the “experimentation under hierarchy” prevailing in China. The OMC relies on drawing upon experiences gained from autonomous national decision-making areas. In China, however, the provinces and SEZs are not autonomous areas with separate jurisdictions. Furthermore, China’s mode of governance cannot be defined by the concept of (laboratory) federalism. Here, the search for better policies and their evaluation are carried out on a non-centralized level by the jurisdictions themselves, creating a jurisdictional competition, see Kerber and Eckardt (2007), p. 233; Michael (2006), p. 887.
- 462.
Bi (2015), p. 159.
- 463.
- 464.
Yin (2015a), p. 86.
- 465.
Heilmann (2009), p. 457. Bai Tian shares this view, see Zhang and Mi (2015), http://gd.sina.com.cn/szfinance/jianguan/2015-03-11/07176553.shtml, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 466.
An (2015), p. 115.
- 467.
See above, Sect. 6.2.1.2.
- 468.
See above, Sect. 4.1.4.2.
- 469.
- 470.
See Sect. 3.3.1.
- 471.
- 472.
- 473.
For more details with regard to an adequate time limit, see for example Mader (1988), p. 219.
- 474.
- 475.
- 476.
- 477.
Sun (2007), p. 88.
- 478.
Li Juan argues that experiments designed to assess the impact of more complex legal and social relations generally require a longer period than experiments in the technical-scientific sector, see Li (2017b), p. 93.
- 479.
For details concerning the options for constitutional review as proposed by scholars, see Zhu (2010), pp. 650–652.
- 480.
With regard to the debate on the status of SEZ regulations see above, Sect. 4.2.2.
- 481.
See above, Sect. 6.2.3.
- 482.
See also Pang (2015), p. 78. Article 97 (1) of the Legislation Law 2015 states: “The power to modify or revoke laws, administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous regulations, separate regulations or rules shall be as follows (…)”.
- 483.
- 484.
As explained above in Sect. 6.2.3, the post-promulgation review system is inefficient in practice, since the filing and review organs seldom exercise their formal power to annul regulations in order not to damage the face and authority of the promulgating organ. Thus, legislative conflicts are not solved through law but through political means in form of consultation of bargaining, see in detail Hand (2013), p. 205.
- 485.
- 486.
Cf. Zeng (2004), p. 35. One may be reminded of the so-called Zustimmungsverordnungen in German law which are an important tool to ensure parliamentary influence, see Pünder (2009), pp. 364–365. Yet, one might also think of the British approach of compensating the lack of substantive predetermination of executive rules by requiring the subordinate legislation to be subject to an affirmative resolution of each House or the House of Commons alone, see Pünder (2009), p. 365.
- 487.
The newly introduced Article 98 No 5 stipulates that explanations on derogation from laws, administrative regulations and local regulations shall be provided only when SEZ regulations are submitted for recordation, that is, after their promulgation, which is a rather late and risky stage in the review process.
- 488.
The modified Article 39 of the Legislation Law 2015 now emphasizes the assessment of feasibility of major rules of the draft law during the legislative procedures of the NPCSC. This provision also applies to the legislative planning of local regulations (see Article 77 of the Legislation Law 2015) and should serve as an orientation point for the drafting of SEZ regulations.
- 489.
Hand (2013), pp. 261–262.
- 490.
Concerning the lengthy process of legislative drafting, see Hand (2013), p. 146.
- 491.
- 492.
National People’s Congress Website (2015), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-03/09/content_1916887.htm, accessed 20 December 2017; Jiang (2015), p. 24. Article 5 of the revised Legislation Law emphasizes the “adherence to openness in legislation” (坚持立法公开). According to Jamie P. Horsley, permitting the general public to have greater input into the government decision, laws and regulations that affect their daily lives serves to ameliorate the “democratic deficit” in China, see Horsley (2009), p. 1.
- 493.
Hand (2013), pp. 261–262.
- 494.
Jiang (2015), p. 24; National People’s Congress Website (2015), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-03/09/content_1916887.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 495.
Pang (2015), p. 78.
- 496.
- 497.
van Aeken (2011), p. 50.
- 498.
- 499.
Mader (2001), p. 121.
- 500.
Mader (2001), pp. 130–131.
- 501.
Ranchordás (2014), p. 114.
- 502.
Ranchordás (2014), p. 116.
- 503.
- 504.
- 505.
- 506.
You (2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-03/29/c_128844452.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 507.
From 2010 on the NPCSC completed evaluations for example on the Law on Scientific and Technological Progress (科学技术进步法) and the Law on the Promotion of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (中小企业促进法), see more detailed Li and Zhang (2014), http://www.ccpc.cq.cn/Home/Index/more/id/190221.html, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 508.
- 509.
Yin (2015a), p. 83.
- 510.
深圳市人大常委会立法后评估暂行办法, adopted at the 83rd Meeting of directors of the Standing Committee of the 5th People’s Congress of Shenzhen Municipality.
- 511.
Article 8 of the Shenzhen Interim Measures on Evaluation.
- 512.
Song and Peng (2015), p. 46.
- 513.
Article 15, Article 16 of the Shenzhen Interim Measures on Evaluation. Cost-Benefit Analysis (fenxi chengben xiaoyi 分析成本效益) means that the costs have to be compared with the benefits of a regulation. The outcome will determine whether the regulation is financially feasible, see Song and Peng (2015), p. 47. The cost-benefit analysis is part of the principle of proportionality, see Yu (2009), p. 37.
- 514.
Article 12 of the Shenzhen Interim Measures on Evaluation.
- 515.
Article 22 of the Shenzhen Interim Measures on Evaluation.
- 516.
Article 23 of the Shenzhen Interim Measures on Evaluation.
- 517.
Li (2015), http://sztqb.sznews.com/html/2015-09/10/content_3331141.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 518.
深圳经济特区环境保护条例, issued by the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress on September 16, 1994, revised in 2000, 2009 and 2017.
- 519.
Krusekopf (2011), p. 84.
- 520.
Krusekopf (2011), p. 84; Li (2015), http://sztqb.sznews.com/html/2015-09/10/content_3331141.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 521.
You (2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-03/29/c_128844452.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 522.
You (2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-03/29/c_128844452.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 523.
You (2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-03/29/c_128844452.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 524.
WeChat is a mobile text and voice messaging communication service developed in China.
- 525.
You (2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-03/29/c_128844452.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 526.
When revising the national Environmental Protection Law (中华人民共和国环境保护法) in 2014, the NPC drew upon key components of the Shenzhen SEZ Regulations on Environmental Protection, such as the principle of giving priority to environmental protection or the need for environmental assessments for policy-making, see in detail Li (2016), http://sz.people.com.cn/n2/2016/0119/c202846-27571994.html, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 527.
Li (2015), http://sztqb.sznews.com/html/2015-09/10/content_3331141.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 528.
See in detail You (2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-03/29/c_128844452.htm, accessed 20 December 2017; Li (2016), http://sz.people.com.cn/n2/2016/0119/c202846-27571994.html, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 529.
The Regulations of Shenzhen SEZ on Environmental Protection were revised by the 16th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 6th Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress on April 27, 2017 and promulgated on July 5, 2017.
- 530.
You (2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-03/29/c_128844452.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 531.
Li (2015), http://sztqb.sznews.com/html/2015-09/10/content_3331141.htm, accessed 20 December 2017.
- 532.
See above, Sect. 4.2.5.3.2.
- 533.
Song Ming and Peng Xiaojian argue that the characteristics of SEZ regulations should be reflected in the evaluation criteria, see Song and Peng (2015), p. 47.
- 534.
Article 22 of the Shenzhen Interim Measures on Evaluation.
- 535.
- 536.
Concerning the evaluation system as feedback system, see Qian and Du (2015), pp. 10–11.
- 537.
- 538.
Bi (2015), p. 160.
- 539.
- 540.
See above in Sect. 6.3.2.3.
- 541.
Yue Zhang and Stening (2010), p. 176.
- 542.
Sun Shoucan speaks of a “crisis of legality” (hefa xing weiji 合法性危机), see Sun (2015a), p. 62.
- 543.
Clarke (2015), p. 10.
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Martinek, M. (2018). Legality Versus Efficiency of Reform. In: Experimental Legislation in China between Efficiency and Legality. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77616-3_6
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