Abstract
“Silence is a source of great strength.” In principle, this is also true for the area of law. But the way this strength unfolds itself is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, silence in legal provisions ensures flexibility, so that the provisions readily adapt to new developments and circumstances. On the other hand, the ampler the amount of silence in a provision, the easier it can be subject to arbitrariness and misuse. This dilemma is particularly acute in anti-subsidy law. Here, an imprecise legal framework, additionally afflicted with lacunae, makes the anti-subsidy remedy an easy means for WTO members to implement protectionist interests.
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Notes
- 1.
Laozi, Daodejing, at chapter 26, for the original Chinese text (静为躁君, jing wei zao jun, literally translating as “the still is the ruler of the temperamental”) see http://ctext.org/dao-de-jing/ens (last visited 1 January 2018).
- 2.
Zhao/Wang, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4560 (2008), 1, at 36.
- 3.
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, LT/UR/A-1A/9, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 14.
- 4.
Durling in Wolfrum et al. (eds.), at para. 24.
- 5.
Durling in Wolfrum et al. (eds.), at para. 24.
- 6.
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, 571.
- 7.
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011, DSR 2011:V, 2869.
- 8.
Zheng, 19 Minnesota Journal of International Law (2010), 1, at 33 et seq.; Ahn/Lee, 14 Journal of International Economic Law (2011), 329, at 349; Detlof/Fridh, 63 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 265, at 280. The effect can also be stated for anti-dumping law, see MacLean in Herrmann/Terhechte (eds.), 189, at 199.
- 9.
For Tianjin Shuangjie Steel Pipe Co., Ltd., Shuangjie Steel Pipe Group Co., Ltd., Tianjin Wa Song Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd,. and Tianjin Shuanglian Galvanizing Products Co., Ltd. a net subsidy rate in the amount of 615.92 % was determined, see Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China, Case C-570-911, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 31966, 5 June 2008, at 31969.
- 10.
Zhao/Wang, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4560 (2008), 1, at 36.
- 11.
Of the total number of 445 anti-subsidy investigations initiated from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2016, 119 have been conducted against China (27%). Data from WTO statistics available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/CV_InitiationsByExpCty.pdf (last visited 1 January 2018).
- 12.
Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001.
- 13.
Ahn/Lee, 14 Journal of International Economic Law (2011), 329, at 339 and 350.
- 14.
OJ C 99/13, 17 April 2010.
- 15.
As of 1 January 2018, see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/completed.cfm (last visited 1 January 2018).
- 16.
Vermulst/Gatta, 11 World Trade Review (2012), 527, at 529.
- 17.
Section 15(a)(ii) CAP, which permitted the use of alternative methodologies in anti-dumping investigations against China, was set to expire “[i]n any event […]15 years after the date of accession” (Section 15(d), second sentence CAP). Uncontroversially accepted upon conclusion of the CAP in 2001, the question whether the use of alternative benchmark methodologies in anti-dumping proceedings against China could be continued beyond this deadline has been disputed and discussed intensely in recent years, see Kleimann, EUI Working Paper RSCAS No. 37 (2016); Zang, 14 Journal of International Economic Law (2012), 869, at 877; Gatta, 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2014), 165; Miranda, 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2014), 94; Tietje/Nowrot, Policy Papers on Transnational Economic Law No. 34 (2011), 2, at 10 et seq.; Ahn/Lee, 14 Journal of International Economic Law (2011), 329, at 343; Cornelis, 1 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 105, at 109; O’Connor (2011), available at http://www.voxeu.org/article/chinamarketeconomy (last visited 1 January 2018).
- 18.
Vermulst/Gatta, 11 World Trade Review (2012), 527, at 531.
- 19.
Request for Consultations by China, US – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WT/DS515/1, 15 December 2016 and the correspondent Request for Consultations by China, EU – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WT/DS516/1, 15 December 2016.
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Müller, S. (2018). Introduction. In: The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Anti-Subsidy Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77613-2_1
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