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Territorial Self-Government as a Conflict Management Tool pp 69–101Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Entities in a Multi-ethnic State? Instability and Disputed Interpretations of the State

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Part of the book series: Federalism and Internal Conflicts ((FEINCO))

Abstract

This chapter outlines how the collapse of Yugoslavia led to the outbreak of a vicious war in Bosnian Herzegovina and how the 1995 Dayton peace agreement attempted to end the violence by establishing a strongly decentralised federation with two entities, the Federation and the Republika Srpska. It finds that the agreement provided for two competing understanding of the nature of the state and this inhibited the effectiveness of domestic guarantees. Furthermore, it argues that despite the international community’s initial success in preventing the re-emergence of violence in the longer-term legitimacy concerns, the focus on other international crises and growing international divisions has limited effectiveness of international guarantees.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kalyvas, S., & Sambanis, N. (2005). Bosnia’s Civil War: Origins and Violence Dynamics, in P. Collier & N. Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 191–229.

  2. 2.

    Oberschall, A. (2000). The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia. Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 6, 982–1001.

  3. 3.

    Ashdown, P. (2007). Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 32.

  4. 4.

    Kalyvas, S., & Sambanis, N. (2005). Bosnia’s Civil War: Origins and Violence Dynamics, in P. Collier & N. Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 191–229.

  5. 5.

    Klemenčič, M., & Žagar, M. (2004). The former Yugoslavia’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 311.

  6. 6.

    Kalyvas, S., & Sambanis, N. (2005). Bosnia’s Civil War: Origins and Violence Dynamics, in P. Collier & N. Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 191–229.

  7. 7.

    No agreement could be reached as to its position on the Brcko district, the Agreement submitted the issue to binding arbitration which in 1999 created an autonomous region, ‘The Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina’.

  8. 8.

    Holbrooke, R. (1999). To End a War. New York: Random House, 243.

  9. 9.

    General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995). Annex 4, Article 2.2. Accessed 31 December 2017, https://peacemaker.un.org/bosniadaytonagreement95.

  10. 10.

    London School of Economics (2011). Decentralisation and Regionalisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Issues and Challenges. London: London School of Economics Research on South East Europe.

  11. 11.

    Ashdown, P. (2007). Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 295.

  12. 12.

    High Representative (2007). Thirty-Second Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1 April–30 September 2007. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  13. 13.

    See for example Constitutional Court cases U-4/04, U-44/01.

  14. 14.

    The Dayton Agreement has been heavily criticised for its treatment of those groups and individuals who do not identify with the three main constituent communities identified in the Agreement. These criticisms have focused on the exclusionary nature of the power-sharing provisions at state-level culminating in the European Court of Human Rights The ‘Sejdić-Finci’ case in which the Court found that the ethnic rule for electing the State Presidents was unduly discriminatory. However, similar criticisms can be made of the TSG arrangements in so far as they became ethnic homelands which did not sufficiently consider the needs of those not aligned with the three constituent peoples.

  15. 15.

    See for example Annex 7, General Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accessed 31 December 2017, https://peacemaker.un.org/bosniadaytonagreement95.

  16. 16.

    United Nations Development Programme (2000). Early Warning System in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Quarterly Report, July–September. New York: United Nations Development Programme. United Nations Development Programme (2003). Early Warning System in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Quarterly Report, July–September. New York: United Nations Development Programme.

  17. 17.

    McEvoy, J. (2015). Power-Sharing Executives: Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 107–131.

  18. 18.

    Van Willigen, N. (2013). Peacebuilding and International Administration: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. London: Routledge, 148.

  19. 19.

    Balkan Insight (2012). Dodik: Republika Srpska Will Be Independent, October 5.

  20. 20.

    Ker-Lindsay, J. (2016). The Hollow Threat of Secession in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Legal and Political Impediments to a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Republika Srpska. London: London School of Economics Research on South East Europe.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Aybet, G., & Bieber, F. (2011). From Dayton to Brussels: The Impact of EU and NATO Conditionality on State Building in Bosnia & Hercegovina. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. 10, 1911–1937.

  23. 23.

    High Representative (2008). Thirty-Fourth Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1 April–30 September 2008. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  24. 24.

    Ashdown, P. (2015). Speech by Paddy Ashdown 20 years after Dayton implementation. American University, Sarajevo, November 5.

  25. 25.

    United Nations Development Programme (2000). Early Warning System in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Quarterly Report, July–September. New York: United Nations Development Programme. United Nations Development Programme (2003). Early Warning System in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Quarterly Report, July–September. New York: United Nations Development Programme.

  26. 26.

    Bassuener, K. (2009). How to Pull Out of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Dead-End: A Strategy for Success. Berlin: Democratization Policy Council.

  27. 27.

    Ashdown, P. (2015). Speech by Paddy Ashdown 20 years after Dayton implementation. American University, Sarajevo, 5 November 2015.

  28. 28.

    Ashdown, P. (2015). Speech by Paddy Ashdown 20 years after Dayton implementation. American University, Sarajevo, 5 November 2015.

  29. 29.

    See for example, High Representative (2012). 42nd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 21 April 2012–26 October 2012. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative. EU Representative and High Representative (2017). Speech by the High Representative and EU Special Representative in BiH, Miroslav Lajčak at a round table organised by GRAD Association. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  30. 30.

    The issues raised by the presence of the international judges are discussed the ‘International Guarantees’ section as these issues directly relate to the benefits and disadvantages of international intervention.

  31. 31.

    Bzdera, A. (1993). Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of Judicial Review. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de science politique, Vol. 26, No. 1, 3–29.

  32. 32.

    Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000). U-5/98 (Partial Decision Part 3), July 1. Sarajevo: Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  33. 33.

    In these cases, the Court found that by engaging a US lobbying company and submitting a report to the UN the RS was not acting engaged in foreign policy which is a central level competency.

  34. 34.

    Yoo, J.C. (1996). The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism. Southern California Law Review, Vol. 70, 1311.

  35. 35.

    Horowitz, D. (2006). Constitutional Courts: A Primer for Decision Makers. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 4, 125–137.

  36. 36.

    McCrudden, C., & O’Leary, B. (2013). Courts and Consociations: Human Rights Versus Power-Sharing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 32.

  37. 37.

    Former strategist for High Representative (2015). Interview with Dawn Walsh. Sarajevo, September 29. Independent Policy Advisor (2015). Interview with Dawn Walsh. Sarajevo, September 28.

  38. 38.

    Office of the High Representative (2006). Ambassador Butler Asks for Clarification from RS Prime Minister on Referenda Reports. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  39. 39.

    Peace Implementation Council (2015). Communiqué of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, December 2.

  40. 40.

    Office of the High Representative (2014). Entities Have No Right to Secede under the Dayton Peace Agreement. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  41. 41.

    Serbia has also been criticised for failing to adhere to its commitment in the Dayton Agreement to cooperate with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia .

  42. 42.

    Bildt, C. (1997). Beyond Grand Speeches. The Financial Times, August 2. Bildt, C. (1996). Extend the Brief on Bosnia. The Financial Times, April 11.

  43. 43.

    Slobodna Bosna (1997). Interview: Carlos Westendorp, High Representative in BiH ‘Carlos Westendorp Reveals His Opinion about the Bosnian Politicians’, November 30.

  44. 44.

    Office of the High Representative (2005). There Can Be No Meddling With BiH’s Borders. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    In 2006 Montenegro became independent completing the break-up of the old Yugoslavia . Office of the High Representative (2008). Lajčák Meets Tadić, Jeremić in Belgrade. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  47. 47.

    Ker-Lindsay, J. (2016). The Hollow Threat of Secession in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Legal and Political Impediments to a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Republika Srpska. London: London School of Economics Research on South East Europe.

  48. 48.

    Cox, M. (2001). State Building in Post-conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia. Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations. Accessed 31 December 2017, http://www.casin.ch/web/pdf/cox.pdf.

  49. 49.

    Office of the High Representative (2001). Address by High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  50. 50.

    Former strategist for High Representative (2015). Interview with Dawn Walsh. Sarajevo, September 29. Independent Policy Advisor (2015). Interview with Dawn Walsh. Sarajevo, September 28.

  51. 51.

    Office of the High Representative (2006). Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, June–December 2005. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  52. 52.

    Office of the High Representative (2007). Speech by High Representative and EU Special Representative Valentin Inzko ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina between Dayton & Europe: Current & Future Challenges’ French Institute for International Relations. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  53. 53.

    Bassuener, K. (2009). How to Pull Out of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Dead-End: A Strategy for Success. Berlin: Democratization Policy Council.

  54. 54.

    See for example, Office of the High Representative (2009). Thirty-Sixth Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1 May–31 October 2009. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  55. 55.

    Office of the High Representative (2001). Nineteenth Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 24 February–11 June 2001. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  56. 56.

    Ashdown, P. (2015). Interview with Dawn Walsh, London. November 10.

  57. 57.

    Office of the High Representative (2001). Interview: Paddy Ashdown, High Representative and EU Special Representative for BiH: ‘I have no intention of abolishing the Republika Srpska’. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  58. 58.

    Office of the High Representative (1999). OHR, OSCE Express Concern About Croatian Candidates’. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  59. 59.

    Bieber, F. (2001). Croat Self-Rule in Bosnia: A Challenge to Dayton. European Centre for Minority, Brief 5.

  60. 60.

    UNSC (2002). Report Secretary General on UNMIBH. S/2002/1314 of 2 December 2002. New York: United Nations. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2002). Policing the Police in Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda. Balkans Report, No. 130, 10 May 2002. Accessed 31 December 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/bosnia-and-herzegovina/policing-police-bosnia-further-reform-agenda.

  61. 61.

    Padurariu, A. (2014). The Implementation of Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Analysing UN and EU Efforts. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1–18.

  62. 62.

    Office of the High Representative (2003). Hard Work and Confidence Will Take BiH from Dayton to Brussels. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  63. 63.

    Office of the High Representative (2009). Inzko and Miliband: ‘Only a sovereign and single BiH can join the EU’. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  64. 64.

    Office of the High Representative (2012). High Representative Presents Report to UN Security Council. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  65. 65.

    Office of the High Representative (2006). 26th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1 January–30 June 2004. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  66. 66.

    Office of the High Representative (2002). Inaugural Speech by Paddy Ashdown, the New High Representative for Bosnia & Herzegovina. Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative.

  67. 67.

    Glas Srpske (2015). Interview with Ambassador Lars-Gunnar Wigemark for the daily Glas Srpske. October 10.

  68. 68.

    Samuel, K. (2006). Post-conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making. Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, 680.

  69. 69.

    Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000). U-5/98 (Partial Decision Part 3), Sarajevo, 1 July 2000. Sarajevo: Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  70. 70.

    Independent Policy Advisor (2015). Interview with Dawn Walsh. Sarajevo, September 28.

  71. 71.

    For an overview of Russian activities in the regions, see London School of Economics (2015). Russia in the Balkans, Conference Report, LSE-Research on South East Europe and SEESOX South East European Studies at Oxford, 13 March 2015.

  72. 72.

    Lyon, J. (2015). Is War about to Break Out in the Balkans? Foreign Policy, October 26.

  73. 73.

    Cited in Kulenović, N. (2016). Court as a Policy-Maker?: The Role and Effects of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Sarajevo: Analitika.

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    Dawn Walsh

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Walsh, D. (2018). Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Entities in a Multi-ethnic State? Instability and Disputed Interpretations of the State. In: Territorial Self-Government as a Conflict Management Tool. Federalism and Internal Conflicts. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77234-9_3

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