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The Two-Fold “War on Terror” (2015–2017)

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Abstract

This chapter examines how a new wave of violence, similar in scale to that in the1990s, unfolded in two phases: between July 2015 and April 2016, an urban guerrilla war in the towns of south-eastern Turkey and, from April 2016 until May 2017, a rural guerrilla war—in parallel with the Operation “Euphrates Shield” (August 2016–May 2017) by Turkey and the FSA in northern Syria. Analysing the course of the two-fold war on terror (against ISIS and PKK/ PYD) and the impact of the failed coup d’ état in July 2016 for the first time, the chapter demonstrates that the first phase ended in victory for Turkey and the second one in stalemate.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Tulay Karadeniz, “Turkey’s Erdogan: Peace Process with Kurdish Militants Impossible”, Reuters, July 28, 2015; Mustafa Akyol, “Who Killed Turkey-PKK Peace Process?”, Al-Monitor, August 4, 2015.

  2. 2.

    Comments by Mustafa Çosar Ünal (skype call), May 5, 2017. See also: Ünal, “Is It Ripe”: 22–23.

  3. 3.

    Indicatively, in 2014 the PKK carried out 293 attacks with firearms and 785 attacks with explosives and caused substantial casualties (nine security officers and 49 civilians dead) according to the TSK. “Çözüm Süreci Olgunlaşma Safhasında” [“The Peace Process is Maturing”], Anatolian Agency, July 8, 2014. See also: Tulin Daloglu, “PKK Risks Peace Process with Kidnappings”, Al-Monitor, April 28, 2014.

  4. 4.

    International Crisis Group, “Turkey and the PKK”, p. 5. On June 6, 2014, the TSK issued a stern statement with regards to these provocations. “TSK’dan Çok Sert Açıklama” [“Very Harsh Statement from Turkish Security Forces”], Sabah, June 9, 2014.

  5. 5.

    David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964), 11–28.

  6. 6.

    Murat Yeşiltaş and Necdet Özçelik, “PKK Terörünün Yeni Dinamikleri Radikalleşme ve Şehir Çatişmasi” [“PKK Terrorist New Dynamics, Radicalization and City Conflict”] (Istanbul: SETA, 2016), 14–18, https://setav.org/assets/uploads/2016/05/20160426225231_pkk-terorunun-yeni-dinamikleri-pdf.pdf.

  7. 7.

    Nevzat Çiçek, “PKK’nın Yeni Stratejisi: ‘Şehir Gerillacılığı’” [“PKK’s New Strategy: ‘Urban Guerrillaism’”], Time Turk, August 23, 2015; Owen Matthews, “Turkey’s Hidden War Is Spilling onto City Streets”, Newsweek, October 12, 2015; Robert F. Worth, “Behind the Barricades of Turkey’s Hidden War”, New York Times, May 24, 2016.

  8. 8.

    Ünal, “Counter-Insurgency and Military Strategy”: 66–67; Yeşiltaş and Özçelik, “PKK Terörünün” [“PKK Terrorist”], 18–23.

  9. 9.

    Between August 2015 and March 15, 2016, curfews were declared in the neighborhoods of Sur and Yenişehir in Diyarbakır and the towns of Lice, Silvan, Hazro, Hani, Dicle and Bismil in Diyarbakır province. They were also imposed in the towns of Cizre, Silopi, and İdil (Şırnak province), Nusaybin, Dargeçit and Derik (Mardin province), Yüksekova (Hakkari province), Arıcak (Elazığ province), Sason (Batman province) and Varto (Muş province). For a detailed map of the curfews, see: “Turkish-Kurd Conflict”, Imago Pyrenaei, December 24, 2015.

  10. 10.

    Genç Öncüler, “Terörle Mücadelede Strateji ve Sabır” [“Strategy and Patience in Terrorist Struggle”], Genç Öncüler Blog, October 6, 2016; Metin Gurcan, “Ankara vs the PKK: Old War, New Strategies”, Turkish Policy Quarterly 14, no. 4 (2016): 49–50.

  11. 11.

    For a discussion about the “enemy-centric” approach to COIN, see: Plakoudas, The Greek Civil War, 13–14.

  12. 12.

    Seyhmus Cakan, “Erdogan Says Turkey to Annihilate Kurdish Militants”, Reuters, December 17, 2015.

  13. 13.

    Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: The Death Toll” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016), http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/07/20/turkey-s-pkk-conflict-the-rising-toll/. Paradoxically, the civilian death toll remained quite low compared to the urban warfare in neighbouring Syria or Iraq.

  14. 14.

    David L. Philips, “Accountability for War Crimes in Turkey”, Huffington Post, February 23, 2016; “German MPs File War Crimes Lawsuit against Turkey”, Euronews, June 27, 2016. Predictably, the Turkish state authorities try to shield the TSK from war crimes lawsuits. “Askere Terör Zırhı” [“Terror Shield for the Military”], Hürriyet, February 28, 2016.

  15. 15.

    In the elections on November 1, 2015, the HDP earned 10.76% of the total vote (5,148,085 votes) and elected 59 deputies amidst widespread fraud and violence against the party—a significant drop compared to the 13.12% (6,058,489 votes) and 80 deputes of the June elections. Cengiz Çandar, “Kurds in Postelection Turkey: Silver Lining or Tough Times?”, Al-Monitor, November 10, 2015. See also: M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, “Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish Question”, Middle East Policy 22, no. 4 (2015): 73–87.

  16. 16.

    Güneş Murat Tezcür, “Electoral Behavior in Civil Wars: The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey”, Civil Wars 17, no. 1 (2015): 70–88.

  17. 17.

    “Davutoğlu Terörle Mücaele Eylem Planı’nı Açıkladı” [“Davutoğlu Announces Counter-Terrorism Action Plan”], Bianet, February 5, 2016; “Reconstruction for Turkey’s War-Torn Southeast”, DW, September 5, 2016.

  18. 18.

    Mahmut Bozarslan, “Turkey’s Sirnak Now Nothing But Ruble”, Al-Monitor, December 2, 2016; Ibid: “Reconstruction Work Brings More Gloom to Southeast Turkey”, Al-Monitor, January 24, 2017.

  19. 19.

    Metin Gürcan, “The PKK’s Child Terrorists”, Al-Monitor, December 21, 2015; “PKK’nin Yeni Oluşum YPS” [“YPS, PKK’s New Formation”], Terör Örgütleri, December 30, 2015.

  20. 20.

    Yeşiltaş and Özçelik “PKK Terörünün” [“PKK Terrorist”], 18–23.

  21. 21.

    Approximately 80% of the clashes had occurred between August 2015 and March 2016 occurred in the towns. Aaron Stein, “Kurdish Militants and Turkey’s New Urban Insurgency”, War on the Rocks, March 23, 2016.

  22. 22.

    Nevzat Çiçek, “10 Maddede PKK’nın Yeni Stratejisi” [“PKK’s New Strategy in 10 Articles”], Timetürk, March 18, 2016; “TSK’nin Yeni Stratejisi Sonrasi PKK’nin Elebaşlari Panikte” [“PKK’s New Strategy After the TSK’s New Strategies”], Marmara Gazetesi, September 7, 2016.

  23. 23.

    For an in-depth analysis of the PKK’s new tactics, see: Can Kasapoğlu, “Türkiye’ye Yönelik Terör Tehdidinde Yeni Trendler: El Yapımı Patlayıcılar ve İntihar Bombacıları” [“New Trends in the Terrorist Direction for Turkey: Handmade Explosives and Suicide Bombers”] (Girne Amerikan Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi: EDAM Araştırma Görevlisi 2015), https://teskilatimahsusa.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/trkiyeye-ynelik-terr-tehdidinde-yeni-trendler-el-yapm-patlayclar-ve-ntihar-bombaclar.pdf.

  24. 24.

    Metin Gurcan, “Have Turkey-PKK Clashes Crossed Fatal Threshold?”, Al-Monitor, March 16, 2016. See also: Can Kasapoğlu, “Düşük Yoğunluklu Çatışmadan Hibrid Harp Ortamına: PKK’nın Gelişmis MANPADS Silah Sistemlerine Erişimi” [“Low Density Conflict to Hybrid Warfare Medium: PKK’s Access to Developed MANPADS Weapon Systems”] (Girne Amerikan Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi: EDAM Araştırma Görevlisi 2016), http://edam.org.tr/dusuk-yogunluklu-catismadan-hibrid-harp-ortamina-pkknin-gelismis-manpads-silah-sistemlerine-erisimi/.

  25. 25.

    Although the PKK insists that the TAK act independently from “Qandil”, in fact the TAK and PKK operate con-jointly. Mahmut Bozarslan, “Who Is TAK and Why Did It Attack Ankara?”, Al-Monitor, February 29, 2016.

  26. 26.

    Metin Gürcan, “Are Clashes Spreading to Western Turkey?” Al-Monitor, December 30, 2015.

  27. 27.

    For a timeline of the terrorist strikes by ISIS inside Turkey, see: “Timeline of Attacks in Turkey”, Al Jazeera, February 19, 2017.

  28. 28.

    Nevzat Devranoglu and Ece Toksabay, “Turkish Tourism and Economy Struggle due to Bombings, Russia Chill”, Reuters, March 23, 2016; David Barchard, “Turkey Faces a Double Terrorist Threat”, Financial Times, January 1, 2017.

  29. 29.

    Metin Gurcan, “In Struggle against PKK, Turkey Takes Flight”, Al-Monitor, October 14, 2016.

  30. 30.

    Chiara Cruciati, “Erdogan’s War against the Kurds Creating an Arms Boom”, Il Manifesto, March 11, 2016. The decision by Ankara to invest heavily on the national defense industry is closely associated with its concern to avoid an arms embargo on the grounds of human rights violations in the war against the PKK. Hüseyin Bağci and Çağlar Kurç, “Turkey’s Strategic Choice: Buy or Make Weapons”, Defence Studies 17, no. 1 (2017): 38–62.

  31. 31.

    Metin Gurcan, “Turkish Military Struggling to Find New Recruits”, Al-Monitor, March 10, 2016; “Türkiye Askeri Kıbrıs’tan Çekiliyor!” [“Turkey’s Military Withdraws from Cyprus!”], Afrika, March 24, 2016; Metin Gurcan, “April Showers Bring … Growing Violence in Southeast Turkey?”, Al-Monitor, April 11, 2016.

  32. 32.

    The ratio was extrapolated according to the data of the International Crisis Group about the new wave of violence. Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict”.

  33. 33.

    Metin Gurcan, “Turkey’s Security Sector after July 2015: Democratizing Security or Securitizing the State?”, Turkish Policy Quarterly 15, no. 4 (2017): 65–85.

  34. 34.

    Burhanettin Duran, “Operation Euphrates Shield: Goals and Challenges”, Daily Sabah, August 30, 2016; Michel Chossudovsky, “Did the “Failed” Turkish Coup Lay the Groundwork for a NATO Invasion of Syria?”, Off-Guardian, August 31, 2016.

  35. 35.

    The attacks by ISIS cost the lives of civilians in Turkey’s southern border towns. Stephan Starr, “Isis Attacks Turkish Border Town that Hosts Syrian Refugees”, Irish Times, May 17, 2016.

  36. 36.

    Merve Tahiroglu, “Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield Is a Message to the Kurds”, Long War Journal, August 24, 2016; Kadri Gursel, “Turkey Faces Decision over Boots on the Ground in Syria”, Al-Monitor, September 27, 2016.

  37. 37.

    For example, see: “Turkey PM: Syria No-Fly Zone Needed”, BBC, August 11, 2015.

  38. 38.

    Kadri Gursel, “Can Erdogan Bully Turkey’s Armed Forces into Invading Syria?”, Al-Monitor, February 16, 2016; Murat Yenkin, “Turkish Army Reluctant Over Government Will to Intervene in Syria”, Hürriyet Daily News, June 27, 2016.

  39. 39.

    “US Guarantees No YPG West of the Euphrates, Claims Turkey”, Rûdaw, June 7, 2016.

  40. 40.

    Izat Charkatli, “SDF Captures ISIS’s Largest Stronghold in Aleppo”, AMN, August 12, 2016. Jiyar Gol, “IS Conflict: Syria’s Kurds Set Sights on Al-Bab after the Fall of Manbij”, BBC, August 16, 2016.

  41. 41.

    Tim Arango, “With Operation in Syria, Erdogan Shows His New Power over the Military”, New York Times, August 26, 2016.

  42. 42.

    Turkey’s proxies in northern Syria included (until mid-2017) the following militant groups: Sultan Murad Division, Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror Brigade, Sultan Malik-Shah Brigade, Suleiman-Shah Brigade, Alparslan Special Forces, Levant Front, Descendants of Saladin Brigade, Hamza Division, Free Men of Syria Brigade, Sham Legion, Al-Moutasem Brigade, Northern Hawks Brigade, Fastaqim Union, Al-Safwa Islamic Batallions and Akhtarin Military Council.

  43. 43.

    Amed Dicle, “What Turkey Stands to Lose in its Hunt for Syrian Kurds”, Al-Monitor, September 1, 2017; David L. Phillips, “Erdoğan’s Waterloo: Turkey Invades And Occupies Syria”, Huffington Post, September 1, 2017.

  44. 44.

    In the Battle of Marj Dabiq, the army of the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim I (Yavuz) vanquished the troops of the Mamluk Sultanate (based in Egypt) and brought the lands of the Mamluks from Syria to Sudan under the rule of the Sublime Porte. On the symbolism of the Operation “Euphrates Shield”, see Ahmed Al-Burai, “The Rise of the New Ottomans”, Middle East Monitor, September 2, 2016.

  45. 45.

    According to the US Pentagon, nearly 50% of the SDF is comprised by Arab military forces, whereas Turkey claims that the SDF is controlled by the YPG. The strength and composition of the SDF cannot be accurately calculated, but experts agree that the Kurdish YPG dominates the SDF. Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “The United States Faces Limited Options for Assault on Raqqa”, Terrorism Monitor, February 24, 2017.

  46. 46.

    Metin Gurcan, “What Comes Next for Turkey after Jarablus Victory?” Al-Monitor, August 29, 2016.

  47. 47.

    Plakoudas, “The Syrian Kurds”: 112–113.

  48. 48.

    The Russian air force twice “accidentally” bombed the advancing units of the FSA and TSK in early 2017. Turkey downplayed these incidents out of fear of displeasing the dominant power in northern Syria west of the Euphrates River. Aaron Stein, “How Russia Beat Turkey in Syria”, The Atlantic Council, March 27, 2017.

  49. 49.

    Jeff Jager, “Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield: An Exemplar of Joint Combined Arms Maneuver”, Small Wars Journal, October 17, 2016.

  50. 50.

    “Turkey Draws Western Condemnation Over Arrest of Kurdish Lawmakers”, Reuters, November 4, 2016; “Turkey’s Pro-Kurd HDP Party Boycotts Parliament after Arrests”, BBC, November 6, 2016.

  51. 51.

    Kareem Shaheen, “Turkey Arrests Pro-Kurdish Party Leaders amid Claims of Internet Shutdown”, Guardian, November 4, 2016; Amberin Zaman, “Pro-Kurdish HDP Leader Kicked Out of Parliament”, Al-Monitor, February 21, 2017.

  52. 52.

    David Kenner, “Turkey’s ‘Kurdish Obama’ Is Now in Jail”, Foreign Policy, November 4, 2016.

  53. 53.

    Caleb Laurer, “What’s Next for Turkey’s HDP?”, Middle East Institute, September 8, 2015; Gulnur Aybet, “For Peace to Succeed, PKK and HDP Must Part”, Middle East Eye, September 25, 2015.

  54. 54.

    “Rivals-Turned-Allies: Erdogan Sides with Reemerging Turkish Army”, Sputnik News, May 22, 2016; “Turkey’s President Erdogan Is Grabbing Yet More Power”, Economist, January 21, 2017; Arwa Ibrahim, “Turkey’s Right-Wing Alliance Bolsters Ruling Party and Divides MHP”, Middle East Eye, February 17, 2017.

  55. 55.

    Kareem Shaheen, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Paves Way for April Vote on Consolidation of Power”, Guardian, February 10, 2017; “Turkey Is Sliding Into Dictatorship”, Economist, April 15, 2017.

  56. 56.

    “CHP’li Çam: Çok Hata Yaptık, Bu Bir Özeleştiri Yürüyüşüdür Aynı Zamanda!” [CHP’s Çam: I Have Made Lots of Mistakes, This is a Self-Criticism Walk], Gazettemek, June 20, 2017; Pinar Trembley, “‘Justice for All’ in Turkey Must Include Kurds”, Al-Monitor, July 12, 2017.

  57. 57.

    John Sjoholm, “Showdown in Al Bab—Turks, Kurds, ISIS Clash in a Syrian City”, Lima Charlie News, November 18, 2016; Maria Nelson and Waleed Khaled a-Noufal, “Kurdish-Led Coalition Inches Closer to Contested Al-Bab, Prompting Swift Turkish Response”, Syria Direct, November 20, 2016.

  58. 58.

    Bulent Aliriza, “Syrian Kurds—Forgotten No More”, The Cipher Brief, March 31, 2017; Plakoudas, “Syrian Kurds”: 110–111.

  59. 59.

    Jessica D. Lewis, “The Islamic State: A Counter-Strategy for a Counter-State” (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, 2014), 13–16, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Lewis-Center%20of%20gravity.pdf; Lina Khatib, “The Islamic State’s Strategy: Lasting and Expanding” (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 17–20, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/islamic_state_strategy.pdf. For an analysis of the TSK’s heavy losses in armor, see: Christian Tiebert, “The Battle for Al Bab: Verifying Euphrates Shield Vehicle Losses”, Bellingcat, February 12, 2017.

  60. 60.

    Max Fisher, “Turkey, Russia and an Assassination: The Swirling Crises Explained”, New York Times, December 19, 2016; Cengiz Çandar, “Why Is Turkey so Focused on Syria’s al-Bab”, Al-Monitor, December 26, 2016.

  61. 61.

    Jabhat al-Nousra was renamed into Tahrir al-Sham in January 2017.

  62. 62.

    Mahmoud Eskaf, “Putin’s Hopes and the Russian Role in Syria Peace Talks”, Middle East Observer, January 25, 2017; Noah Bonsey, “What’s at Stake in the Syrian Peace Talks in Astana?” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/what-stake-syrian-peace-talks-astana.

  63. 63.

    “Russian Jets Strike Daesh Targets in Syria’s al-Bab for First Time”, Daily Sabah, December 29, 2016; “Turkey, Russia Airstrikes Destroy Daesh Targets in al-Bab”, Daily Sabah. January 2, 2017.

  64. 64.

    Angus McDowall, “Syrian Army Nears Turkey-Backed Rebels in New Advance”, Reuters. January 22, 2017; “Syrian Troops, Turkey-Backed Forces Surround ‘IS’ Stronghold al-Bab”, DW, February 6, 2017.

  65. 65.

    According to official accounts, over 500 fighters of the FSA and 66 soldiers of the TSK died in the Battle of Al Bab. “Rapor: TSK’nın Önündeki Tehlike IŞİD’le El Bab’da Şehir Savaşı” [“Report: Dangers in Front of the TSK With the ISİD Urban War in Al Bab”], Diken, February 14, 2017.

  66. 66.

    Cahit Storm, “The Manbij Battle: A Blueprint for Raqqa?”, Kurdish Question, August 14, 2016.

  67. 67.

    Semih Idiz, “Turkey Squeezed between Russia, US in Syria”, Al-Monitor, February 1, 2017; Murat Yetkin, “Russia Plays Kurdish Card as US, Turkey Watch”, Hürriyet Daily News, February 16, 2017.

  68. 68.

    Kamal Sheikho, “Wrath of Euphrates Spokesman: Raqqa Is Now Isolated”, Al-Monitor, March 15, 2017.

  69. 69.

    Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, “U.S. Military Deploys Forces in Syria’s Manbij in New Effort”, Reuters, March 7, 2017.

  70. 70.

    Tom Cooper, “Turley Won, and Lost, the Race to Al Bab”, War Is Boring, March 6, 2017.

  71. 71.

    Fehim Tastekin, “Is Turkey Rattled by Russian-Kurdish Deal?”, Al-Monitor, March 24, 2017.

  72. 72.

    Cengiz Çandar, “Operation Euphrates Shield: A Postmortem”, Al-Monitor, April 5, 2017.

  73. 73.

    A smaller segment of the minority allied itself with Barzani and established a PDK-friendly militia.

  74. 74.

    The cordial relations between Barzani and Erdoğan were disrupted by the separatist referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan in September 2017.

  75. 75.

    Fehim Tastekin, “How Deep is Turkey’s Sinjar Entanglement?”, Al-Monitor, March 7, 2017; Mahmut Bozarslan, “Who’s Fighting Whom in Iraq’s Sinjar?”, Al-Monitor, April 9, 2017.

  76. 76.

    Dorian Jones, “Clashes Between Rival Iraqi Kurds Fuel Fears of Proxy War”, VOA News, March 14, 2017.

  77. 77.

    Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Trump to Arm Syrian Kurds, Even as Turkey Strongly Objects”, New York Times, May 9, 2017; Cengiz Çandar, “How to Read Trump’s Blow to Turkey on Syrian Kurds”, Al-Monitor, May 11, 2017.

  78. 78.

    Mahmut Bozarslan, “How the US Stood with Syria’s Kurds”, Al-Monitor, May 4, 2017.

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  1. American University in the Emirates, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

    Spyridon Plakoudas

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Plakoudas, S. (2018). The Two-Fold “War on Terror” (2015–2017). In: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Turkey. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75659-2_5

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