Abstract
Wittgenstein likens philosophy to both an illness and a therapy. What seems an ambiguity is actually a complex dialectical relationship, in which common sense plays a crucial role. My aim is to research common sense in order to clarify this relationship. I will do so by comparing Wittgenstein’s reflections on these issues with what in psychopathology has been named “the loss of natural self-evidence”, or “the loss of common sense”. Section 14.1 sets the scene, introduces the theme of common sense, and focuses on radical doubt as a philosophical disease. Section 14.2 describes in more detail Wittgenstein’s notion of “hinges”: these are common sense and practical certainties, doubt about which, in ordinary circumstances, is unreasonable. Building on prior literature in the psychopathology and philosophy of psychiatry, I argue that doubts about hinges can indeed characterize the early stages of schizophrenia. After developing the comparison between schizophrenia and philosophy as illness, Sect. 14.3 deals with the therapeutic side of philosophy: I argue that Wittgenstein’s point is to call for a “de-epistemicization” of life and the rediscovery and strengthening of practical trust.
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Notes
- 1.
For abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s works, see the References.
- 2.
Wittgenstein uses both “Gewissheit” and “Sicherheit” in OC, with a slight predominance of “Sicherheit”, a term more akin to the English “sureness” or “safety” than to “certainty”.
- 3.
See Marie McGinn (1989: 102–103) for a useful list of Moore-type propositions. For a classification of Wittgenstein’s hinge certainties, see Moyal-Sharrock (2005). Recent works on the relevance of this Wittgensteinian notion for epistemology include Coliva (2015), Coliva and Moyal-Sharrock (2016) and Pritchard (2016).
- 4.
- 5.
Sass has actually been criticized by some Wittgensteinians, chiefly from the “New Wittgenstein” school: see Read (2001).
- 6.
Avramides (2013) uses the same approach with respect to autism.
- 7.
This chapter is the final reworking of a paper presented, in different stages of its development, at the UNED University of Madrid, the University of Roma Tre, the New University of Lisbon, and Lancaster University. I am deeply indebted to the organizers of the events and the participants for many suggestions. I particularly thank Nuno Venturinha and Richard Gipps for reading and commenting on the final draft, and an anonymous reviewer for very helpful remarks.
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Boncompagni, A. (2018). Common Sense, Philosophy, and Mental Disturbance: A Wittgensteinian Outlook. In: Hipólito, I., Gonçalves, J., Pereira, J. (eds) Schizophrenia and Common Sense. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73993-9_14
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