Abstract
The first section of this chapter provides an historical overview of the evolution of criminal use of IT capabilities as a force multiplier, highlighting a number of emblematic cases. The second section assesses more recent uses of IT and cyber capabilities, while the third assesses the strategic and policy implications of transnational crime’s use of these capabilities.
Sections one and two are conceived through the lens of a number of ‘strategic inflection points’ in IT development. These points represent moments when a new development in information technology emerged at the same time as important changes in strategic and geopolitical affairs, allowing states, private enterprise (and later citizens) to extend their interests beyond traditional borders with important implications for traditional notions of sovereignty, questions of strategic reciprocity and international politics. They also facilitated a shift in the scope and scale of criminal activity.
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Notes
- 1.
Camino Kavanagh, forthcoming.
- 2.
Gerard J. Holzmann, and Björn Pehrson, The Early History of Data Networks (Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1994).
- 3.
J.M. Dilhac, The Telegraph of Claude Chappe: An Optical Telecommunication Network for the XVIIIth Century, http://www.ieeeghn.org/wiki/images/1/17/Dilhac.pdf [No date of publication available, accessed on 14/12/2015].
- 4.
The first message relayed on 15 August 1794 was a military communique reporting French success in retaking the city of Le Quesnoy from the Austrians and the Prussians.
- 5.
Bob Pisani, ‘Plundered by Harpies: Early Examples of High-Speed Trading’, Financial History, issue 111, fall 2014, www.MoAF.org.
- 6.
Patrice Flichy, ‘The Birth of Long Distance Communication. Semaphore Telegraphs in Europe (1790–1840)’, Réseaux, vol. 1, no.1, 1993, pp. 81–101.
- 7.
The exploitation of information technology for control purposes has strong resonances with contemporary experiences in many states (Dilhac, 2009). For a detailed discussion on this case, see C. Kavanagh, “Information Technology and the State: The Long View”. Doctoral thesis. King’s College London.
- 8.
Pisani, ‘Plundered by Harpies: Early Examples of High-Speed Trading’.
- 9.
Johnathan Reed Winkler, Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008)
- 10.
Ibid.; Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics 1851–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press 1991), Kavanagh, forthcoming.
- 11.
John Keegan, Intelligence in War, (London: Vintage, 2004 ed.); Winkler, Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I; Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics 1851–1945.
- 12.
Allan Gottlieb, Charles Dalfen and Kenneth Katz, ‘The Transborder Transfer of Information by Communications and Computer Systems: Issues and Approaches to Guiding Principles’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 68, issue 2, April 1974, p. 227.
- 13.
Standage (1998).
- 14.
David Hochfelder, Partners in Crime: The Telegraph Industry, Finance Capitalism, and Organised Gambling, 1870–1920 IEEE History Centre, Rutgers University, 2001, http://www.ieeeghn.org/wiki/images/5/5b/Hochfelder.pdf
- 15.
‘Ingenious fool Traps: Action taken Against Wall Street Swindlers,’ NY Times, 8 October 1880, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9907E1DC153FEE3ABC4053DFB667838B699FDE Accessible through ‘download a high-resolution PDF’ link.
- 16.
Hochfelder, Partners in Crime.
- 17.
Ibid.
- 18.
Wesley MacNeil Oliver, ‘Western Union, the American Federation of Labor, Google and the Changing Face of Privacy Advocates’, Mississippi Law Journal, vol. 81, no. 5, 2012, pp. 971–990.
- 19.
Bucket shops did however continue to operate illicitly in many state jurisdictions for some time.
- 20.
Jonathan Lurie, The Chicago Board of Trade, 1859–1905: The Dynamics of Self-Regulation (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1979) especially chapters 4 and 6. Fabian. Cited in Hochfelder supra note 16.
- 21.
Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, vol. IV, p. 226. Today cables are governed by traditional rules of jurisdiction deriving from their ownership, as well as by other aspects of international law, such as the Law of the Sea Convention and Article 54 of the Hague Regulations. See Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
- 22.
In this case a state grand jury issued a subpoena for all the telegrams sent between four named persons over a 15-month period. Western Union fought hard against such subpoenas incriminating its clients and couched in such general and sweeping terms, as it had in the earlier Babcock case (1876) and Entick v. Carrington (1877). This time, the Missouri Supreme Court accepted Western Union’s position that the subpoena amounted to ‘an indiscriminate search forbidden by the Constitution’.
- 23.
MacNeil Oliver, ‘Western Union, the American Federation of Labor, Google, and the Changing Face of Privacy Advocates’, p. 981.
- 24.
Ibid., p. 983.
- 25.
According to court records, the extensive bootlegging network was the first of its kind involving some fifty employees, the use of sea vessels for transportation, underground storage facilities in Seattle and the upkeep of a central office ‘equipped with executives, accountants, salesmen and a lawyer.’
- 26.
Pikowsky observes that in the 1930s, the Supreme Court Congress interpreted the Telecommunications Act of 1934 to forbid wiretapping. Congress did not modify the statute to permit wiretapping until 1960. Robert A. Pikowsky, ‘The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and Interception of Email’, Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review, vol. 10, issue 1, Fall 2003, pp. 28–31. Cited in supra note 23.
- 27.
Ibid.
- 28.
“Katz v. United States.” Oyez, 25 Jan. 2018, www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35.
- 29.
This development led to the establishment of an Attorney General’s Special Group on Organized Crime in the Department of Justice with regional offices from which intelligence information was gathered and grand jury proceedings conducted, concerning the Apalachin conferees. The Group’s functions were later subsumed within the Department of Justice in a dedicated Organized Crime and Racketeering Section.
- 30.
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society: A Report by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Washington D.C. February, 1967. See in particular Chapter 7. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf.
- 31.
Gotlieb, Dalfen & Katz, ‘The Transborder Transfer of Information by Communications and Computer Systems: Issues and Approaches to Guiding Principles’, p. 230.
- 32.
Peter Gastrow, ‘Penetrating State and Business: Organised Crime in Southern Africa’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), vol. 2, 2003, pp. vii
- 33.
President’s Commission on Organized Crime, Interim Report to the President and the Attorney General: The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions, and Money Laundering, October 1984, p. 8, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/166517NCJRS.pdf.
- 34.
S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 1969.
- 35.
Interestingly, none of the IR literature of the time which focused on interdependence and transnational groups talks about transnational criminal actors.
- 36.
Established by Executive Order 12435—President’s Commission on Organized Crime. It ultimately led to the enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.
- 37.
The 1983 Commission noted how mafia-connected persons such as Michele Sindona who made his fortune by laundering illicit funds through legitimate enterprise had “mastered the details of modern technology, international finance and foreign secrecy laws to create a select fraternity of money laundering professionals,” with the result that organized crime was using banks and other financial institutions “as routinely, if not as frequently, as legitimate business.” Again, restrictions on electronic surveillance (in respect of Forth Amendment rights) coupled with the growing complexity of transnational crime were alleged to have significantly enabled money laundering and weakened law enforcement responses.
- 38.
The suggested amendments regarding wiretapping and the RFPA were included in Titles III and IV of the Cash Connection Report.
- 39.
Remarks of the Attorney General before the President’s Commission on Organized Crime, Washington D.C, 29 November, 1983 http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/11-29-1983.pdf.
- 40.
Kelly White, The Rise of Cyber Crime 1970 through 2010: A tour of the conditions that gave rise to cybercrime and the crimes themselves, 2013 http://www.slideshare.net/bluesme/the-rise-of-cybercrime-1970s-2010-29879338.
- 41.
DEA Drug Intelligence Report, 1997.
- 42.
Melissa Hathaway, ‘Connected Choices: How the Internet Is Challenging Sovereign Decisions’, American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 36, issue 5, November 2014, pp. 300–313.
- 43.
Vivienne Jabri, War and the Transformation of Global Politics, 2nd edition (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 and 2010) p. 42.
- 44.
The Changing Face of organized crime in New Jersey—A Status Report—State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation 2004 Report.
- 45.
Ramesh Thakur and Jorge Heine, The Dark Side of Globalization. (United Nations University Press, 2011).
- 46.
Misha Glenny, McMafia: A Journey Through the Criminal Underground (London: Vintage, 2009).
- 47.
Gastrow, ‘Penetrating State and Business: Organised Crime in Southern Africa’, supra note 31.
- 48.
The Cali Cartel: The New Kings of Cocaine. DEA Drug Intelligence Report, 1994.
- 49.
See: ‘UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto’ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC/.
- 50.
The cases outlined in this chapter are based on desk research only, and are only indicative of how transnational crime avails of IT and cyber capabilities for force projection purposes.
- 51.
As today, cellular phones were often bought in bulk allowing criminal entrepreneurs shift quickly from one phone to another and outwitting law enforcement. As for digital pagers, these were generally used to transmit coded messages regarding meeting venues, changes to delivery schedules etc. Pagers were difficult to surveil, and according to the DEA, paging services often ‘tipped off’.
- 52.
DEA Drug Intelligence Report, 1994.
- 53.
DEA Drug Intelligence Report, 1997.
- 54.
DEA Drug Intelligence Report, 1994.
- 55.
Ibid.
- 56.
David Lane, Into the Heart of the Mafia: A Journey Through the Italian South. (Profile Books LTD 2010) p. 72.
- 57.
Red Herring: Law Enforcement’s ‘Going Dark Spiel’ The Journal of Electronic Surveillance Technology, 6 February, 2015 https://insidersuveillance.com/red-herring-law-enforcements-going-dark-spiel/
- 58.
50 U.S.C. 1701–1706.
- 59.
60 FR 54579, 24 October 1995.
- 60.
Section 1 of the Order blocks, with certain exceptions, all property and interests in property that are in the United States , or that hereafter come within the United States or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, of: (1) The persons listed in an Annex to the Order; (2) any foreign person determined by the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of State, to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in Colombia ; or (3) to materially assist in, or provide financial or technological support for or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons designated in or pursuant to this order; and (4) persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, persons designated pursuant to this Order.
- 61.
The latter included firms such as CALI @ TELE.COM LTDA. (a.k.a. HOLA TELECOMUNICACIONES and COMUNICACIONES ABIERTAS CAMARY LTDA. These companies were fronts for the Norte del Valle cartel, operating under the name of Piedad Rocio Sanchez Candelo, a member of the Grajales family, one of the key members of the cartel. See: El Pais, 28 November 2006, https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2006/12/01/E6-20375/additional-designation-of-persons-pursuant-to-executive-order-12978#h-4 Dept. of Treasury). According to the Department of Treasury, Sanchez Candelo was removed from the SDN list in 2012.
- 62.
Rubén Luis Ayala, ‘La Marina arresta a fundador de Los Zetas ‘Lucky’ y desconecta las comunicaciones del cartel’, Agora, December 2011, http://amigosdetamaulipas2.mforos.com/1832982/10431860-la-marina-desconecta-las-comunicaciones-del-cartel/.
- 63.
Damon Tabor, Radio Tecnico: How the Zetas Cartel Took Over Mexico with Walkie-Talkies, posted 25 March, 2014 http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/radio-tecnico-how-zetas-cartel-took-over-mexico-walkie-talkies; FoxNews (Latino), December 2011, Drug Cartels in Mexico Have a Clandestine National radio Network.
- 64.
Fox News, 2011.
- 65.
Ibid.
- 66.
See United Nations, ‘Report of the independent expert on minority issues. Addendum: Mission to Guyana’ (28 July to 1 August, 2008), Human Rights Council, A/HRC/10/11/Add.2, 27 February 2009.
- 67.
Other weapons and equipment included M-16 assault rifles with night vision devices, an Uzi sub-machine gun with silencer, Glock 9mm pistols, a 12-gauge shotgun, other small caliber weapons, bullet-proof vests and helmets.
- 68.
The company’s co-director, Peter Myers, testified that the cellular intercept equipment found in Khan’s possession was indeed sold directly to him. The testimony was actually provided in the trial of Khan’s attorney, Roger Simels who himself was on trial for plotting to kill a witness against Khan. Two computers belonging to Simels connecting Khan to the surveillance equipment were discovered.
- 69.
US Diplomatic Cable: Blaze at Ministry of Health is Out, But New Allegations Keep Fires Burning, 09GEORGETOWN18_a. [Accessed 9 March, 2015].
- 70.
Kavanagh et al., Getting Smart and Scaling Up: Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Governance in Developing Countries, 7 June 2013. See Summer Walker, pp. 198–216, for the specific case study on Guyana. http://cic.nyu.edu/content/responding-impact-organised-crime-governance-developing-countries.
- 71.
See for example, Exec. Order 13606 of April 2012 ‘Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology’.
- 72.
According to a 2012 report, in Iran, firms controlled by the Revolutionary Guard have acquired large stakes in key economic sectors, including telecommunications, where sanctions have forced global companies to abandon some projects to IRGC-linked companies. The report notes that the longer sanctions persist, the more economic transactions will be controlled by the Iranian leadership through black-market channels.
See: Weighing Benefits and Costs of International Sanctions against Iran, The Iran Project, 2012 http://bakerinstitute.org/files/1339/.
- 73.
Internet Facilitated Organised Crime Threat Assessment (iOCTA) (2014), EC3, EUROPOL Cybercrime Center.
- 74.
Ibid, p. 11.
- 75.
After Rotterdam, Antwerp is Europe’s largest port. In 2010, some 8.468.476 containers passed through the Port of Antwerp . The sheer quantity of goods passing through the port makes searching them one by one impossible. Customs aim to screen 2% of all declared goods, using scanners and other devices, but even that goal has proved over ambitious, hence it is impossible to discern the scale of illegal trafficking. Frans Van Rompuy, director-general of the (Belgian) Federal Governmental Department for Mobility assumes that “between 100 and 1,000 containers annually contain illegal trafficked goods. This is … an estimation, reliable figures are not available.” Whereas Rotterdam is renowned for its Far East connections, Antwerp is a typical trans-Atlantic port. Out of 8.5 million containers, some 948.597 came from North or Central America and some 281.241 from South-America. See: Kristof Clerix, ‘The Port of Antwerp is a honey jar for organized crime’, Mondial Neiuws, 31 August 2011, http://www.mo.be/node/8041
- 76.
Communication with case officer, 7 April 2015.
- 77.
Ibid.
- 78.
Ibid.
- 79.
During the joint operation, Dutch and Belgian police are reported to have seized six firearms including a machine gun and silencer, bullet-proof vests, and 1.3m euros (£1.1m) in cash inside a suitcase.
- 80.
Communication with case officer, 7 April 2015.
- 81.
For a deeper insight into the range of cybersecurity risks at sea, see for example: Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council. The Coastguard Journal of Safety & Security at Sea, winter 2014–2015, http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/archive/2014/Vol71_No4_Wint2014.pdf.
- 82.
See: Scott Helfstein, Scott with John Solomon, Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband, (Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, May 2014) https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf.
- 83.
‘The Spider and the Web: The Fog of War Descends on Cyberspace’, The Economist, 24 September 2011. In 2010 alone, five newspapers admitted in print that due to the risks to their reporters, they would stop covering sensitive drug-war stories.
- 84.
‘Gang Sends Message with Blogger Beheading’, The Houston Chronicle, 10 November 2011, http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Gang-sends-message-with-blogger-beheading-2260814.php.
- 85.
Tamaulipas Tuitera, ‘Blogger Kidnapped and Killed’, Borderland Beat, 16 October 2014, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/10/vxt-blogger-kidnapped-and-killed.html.
- 86.
Jorge Luis Sierra, ‘Digital and Mobile Security for Mexican Journalists and Bloggers: Results of a Survey of Mexican journalists and bloggers’, Freedom House and the International Center for Journalists.
- 87.
Ibid.
- 88.
Geoffrey Ramsey, ‘Update: Anonymous Vs. the Zetas’, Borderland Beat, 1 November 2011, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/11/anonymous-vs-zetas-battle-continues.html.
- 89.
‘Anonymous cancela #OpCartel por amenazas’, El Universal, 4 Novembre 2011.
- 90.
‘The Spider and the Web: The Fog of War Descends on Cyberspace’.
- 91.
In a 2013 report, Robert Muggah and Gustavo Diniz highlight the different types of approaches to how ICTs are being used for the purpose of violence prevention in the Americas. The typology set includes: vertical (government-government); vertical (government-citizen); horizontal (citizen-government); and horizontal (citizen-citizen) approaches. See Robert Muggah and Gustavo Diniz, ‘Digitally Enhanced Violence Prevention in the Americas’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 2, Issue 3, 2013 https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.cq.
- 92.
The study was conducted by Gareth Owen, University of Portsmouth computer science researcher and presented at the Chaos Computer Congress in Hamburg, Germany on 30 December 2014.
- 93.
See: The extent to which the latter refers to transnational or organized crime is unclear, and an on-going debate regarding the methodology of the study has ensued. See for example: ‘No, Department of Justice, 80% of Tor traffic is Not Child Porn’, Wired, 1 January 2015, http://www.wired.com/2015/01/department-justice-80-percent-tor-traffic-child-porn/.
- 94.
U.S. Attorney’s Office, Ross Ulbricht, the Creator and Owner of the Silk Road Website, Found Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court on All Counts, Southern District of New York, 5 February 2015.
- 95.
According to the complaint, the site also sold hacking tools, such as keystroke loggers, password crackers and remote access and banking Trojans, as well as access to hacked Amazon and Netflix accounts and teaching tools such as a tutorial describing “22 different methods” for hacking ATMs. It also marketed a “Blackmarket Contact List”, which provided handy contact information for hit men available for hire in more than ten countries, or purveyors of counterfeit bills and firearms. Wired http://www.wired.com/2013/10/silk-road-raided/.
- 96.
United States of America v. Ross William Ulbricht, 14 CRIM 068, 4 February 2014, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/February14/RossUlbrichtIndictmentPR/US%20v.%20Ross%20Ulbricht%20Indictment.pdf.
- 97.
Kevin Pulsen, ‘In Las Vegas Courtroom, First Ever Cybercrime RICO Trial Begins’, Wired, 20 November 2013, http://www.wired.com/2013/11/open-market-trial-begins/.
- 98.
Ibid.
- 99.
Fran Berkman, ‘Silk Road Reborn: There’s a New Dread Pirate Roberts’, Mashable UK, 6 November 2013, http://mashable.com/2013/11/06/silk-road-dread-pirate-roberts/.
- 100.
Ibid.
- 101.
Ibid. See also Pierluigi Paganini, ‘The Evolution of Black Markets after Operation Onymous’, Security Affairs, 26 November 2014, http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/30538/cyber-crime/evolution-black-market.html.
- 102.
Operation Onymous, implemented in November 2014 by law enforcement and judicial agencies from around the globe was coordinated by the European Cybercrime Center (EC3) and is considered a milestone in the fight against underground black markets.
- 103.
James B. Comey, Director FBI, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy and Public Safety on a Collision Course?, Brookings Institution, Washington DC 16 October 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course.
- 104.
For example, members of the terrorist group found one of the hotel guests hiding in a suite. In order to determine his identity they took a photo, sent it directly to the operations cell which then googled the image, discovering that the person was not a school teacher as he claimed to be, but rather the second wealthiest man in India. The order from the operations cell was to “kill him.” Marc Goodman: A Vision of Crimes in the Future, Ted Talks, Edinburgh, June 2012.
- 105.
‘China wants cyber crime suspects extradited’, NTV Kenya, uploaded on 11 January 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9P37Oa5n3W8.
- 106.
Fredrick Nzwili, ‘China and Kenya at odds over suspected Chinese cyber criminals’, The Christian Science Monitor, 26 January 2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2015/0126/China-and-Kenya-at-odds-over-suspected-Chinese-cyber-criminals.
- 107.
Ndegwa Muhoro, director of Kenya’s Criminal Investigations Department, cited in ‘77 Chinese Nationals Arrested in Kenya for Cybercrimes’, Newsweek, 5 December 2014, http://europe.newsweek.com/77-chinese-nationals-arrested-kenya-cybercrimes-289539.
- 108.
South China Morning Post. ‘Beijing defends deportation of Taiwan crime suspects to mainland China’. 22 February 2017.
- 109.
United Nations: ‘The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet: Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda’, A/69/700 of 4 December 2014.
- 110.
See SDG 16: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” and more specifically the 16.4 target: “By 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organised crime.” Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgsproposal.html. For a more detailed overview of how crime impacts on governance in developing countries see: Kavanagh et al., supra note 69; and the Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime (2015), Organised Crime: A Cross-Cutting Threat to Sustainable Development.
- 111.
In addition to organized crime and illicit trade, the inability to efficiently govern results from corruption, the presence of impunity and generally weak rule of law. The report also notes that over past years, the links between many forms of global crime and corruption and their impact on global security, extremism, terrorism and fragile states have only grown stronger, and it is critical to acknowledge and address them through more effective policies that curb illegal financial flows, foster transparent governance and build capacity around anti-crime efforts at the national and local levels. See: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_2015_Report15.pdf.
- 112.
The Global Risks Report 2014. World Economic Forum.
- 113.
One of the more controversial provisions of which was to broaden the surveillance powers of federal law enforcement officials, allowing investigators to conduct searches without informing the target of the search. The broad provision was initially aimed at suspected terrorists but was discovered to be used ‘as an every day investigative tool’.
- 114.
Red Herring: Law Enforcement’s ‘Going Dark Spiel’.
- 115.
In 1999, and in a case involving crime boss Nicky Scarfo, FBI agents used a key-logger system to search for encryption keys on Scarfoag PC and find passwords that provided access to hidden files on illegal gambling another illicit activities.
- 116.
Legal authorities to use malware can also be found in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Bill, the Foreign Intelligence Service Act (FISA) and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). Red Herring: Law Enforcement’s ‘Going Dark Spiel’, supra note 54.
- 117.
For an excellent insight into the question of policing and technology see: Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here: Technology, Solutionism and the Urge to Solve Problems that Don’t Exist (London: Penguin Books, 2013), Chapter Six, Less Crime, More Punishment.
- 118.
‘Privacy and Security: A Modern and transparent legal framework’, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 12 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1UuCnL3.
- 119.
‘Toward a Social Compact for Digital Privacy and Security: Statement by the Global Commission on Internet Governance’, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and Chatham House, April 2015, https://ourinternet-files.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/GCIG_Social_Compact.pdf.
- 120.
Marc Goodman, Future Crimes: Everything is Connected, Everyone is Vulnerable and What We Can Do About It, (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2015).
- 121.
A renewed focus on MLATs has emerged in the past months, provoked in part by the absence of a global framework to respond to cybercrime. See in particular: ‘Data Beyond Borders: Mutual Legal Assistance in the Internet Age’, Global Network Initiative, January 2015, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI%20MLAT%20Report.pdf.
- 122.
See Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here: Technology, Solutionism and the Urge to Solve Problems that Don’t Exist, supra note 115.
- 123.
Helfstein with Solomon, Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband.
- 124.
U.S. submission to the 2014–2015 Group of Governmental Experts.
- 125.
For example, through companies such as VUPEN security or The Hacking Team.
- 126.
See for example: John B. Sheldon, ‘Geopolitics and Cyber Power: Why Geography Still Matters’, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, vol. 36, issue 5, 2014; David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming of Age of the Urban Guerrilla, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013).
- 127.
Sheldon, ‘Geopolitics and Cyber Power: Why Geography Still Matters’.
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Kavanagh, C. (2018). IT and Cyber Capabilities as a Force Multiplier for Transnational Crime. In: Comolli, V. (eds) Organized Crime and Illicit Trade. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72968-8_3
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