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Iran’s Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Policy

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Part of the book series: Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies ((ISSIP))

Abstract

Nima Gerami strikes a note of caution in his chapter concerning the prospects for preserving the 2015 nuclear agreement—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—between Iran and the P5+1. Explaining the “great civilization” lens through which Iran sees itself as a peer with global superpowers, Gerami discusses aspects of the Iranian national narrative which “fuel its sense of entitlement to advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies.” Gerami argues that, even if the JCPOA remains intact, some of the deal’s restrictions expire in 10 to 15 years and thus “the question of Iran's nuclear intent will grow increasingly important over the next decade.” Affirming the salience of cultural context in assessing nuclear intent, Gerami emphasizes the primacy of Iranian cultural factors in decisionmaking. He explores these factors through the lens of the Cultural Topography Analytic Framework, offering insights concerning leverage points the United States might apply in its engagements with Iran.

The author is indebted to Rameez Abbas, Gawdat Bahgat, Michael Connell, Michael Eisenstadt, Thomas Lynch, and the book editors for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Defense Department, or the US government.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Breakout is defined as the amount of time it would take to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium or plutonium for one nuclear weapon. See, for example, Olli Heinonen, “Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Time: A Fact Sheet,” The Washington Institute, PolicyWatch No. 2394, March 28, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-nuclear-breakout-time-a-fact-sheet

  2. 2.

    “Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy,” White House Briefing Statement, October 13, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy/

  3. 3.

    INARA requires the US president to certify every 90 days that: (1) Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the JCPOA, including all related technical or additional agreements; (2) Iran has not committed a material breach with respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material breach, Iran has cured the material breach; (3) Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program; and (4) suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the agreement is: (i) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program; and (ii) vital to the national security interests of the United States. Full details available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1191

  4. 4.

    “Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,” October 13, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/declaration-by-the-heads-of-state-and-government-of-france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom

  5. 5.

    Few studies, for example, explore how material and ideational factors interact and shape policy outcomes within a state’s unique strategic culture. For a review of strategic culture theory, see Jeannie L. Johnson, “Conclusion: Toward a Standard Methodological Approach,” and Colin Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture,” in Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

  6. 6.

    Michael Eisenstadt, “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Religion, Expediency, and Soft Power in an Era of Disruptive Change,” The Washington Institute, MES Monograph No. 7, November 2015, 15.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., 5.

  8. 8.

    Alastair Ian Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), page x; and Jeffrey Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency, October 2006.

  9. 9.

    J. Matthew McInnis, “The Future of Iran’s Security Policy: Inside Tehran’s Strategic Thinking,” American Enterprise Institute, May 2017, 95–101.

  10. 10.

    Gregory F. Giles, “The Crucible of Radical Islam: Iran’s Leaders and Strategic Culture,” in Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures, Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post, eds. (Maxwell AFB, USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2003), 145–147.

  11. 11.

    For a comprehensive assessment of the impact of Islam on Iran’s strategic culture, see Kamran Taremi, “Iranian Strategic Culture: The Impact of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Interpretation of Shiite Islam,” Contemporary Security Policy, 35(1), March 2014, 3–25.

  12. 12.

    Giles, “The Crucible of Radical Islam,” 147.

  13. 13.

    “Strategic Culture of Iran” in Strategic Culture, Russell D. Howard, ed. (MacDill AFB: Joint Special Operations University), December 2013, 42.

  14. 14.

    For a detailed account of Iran’s nuclear ambitions during the Shah’s era, see Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, “Iran’s Nuclear Power Programme Revisited,” Energy Policy, 8(3), 1980; Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: 1989–1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 207–209; and David Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012).

  15. 15.

    The AEOI annual budget increased from $30.8 million in 1975 to over $3 billion in 1977, second only to the National Iranian Oil Company. See Ali Vaez and Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, 5.

  16. 16.

    “Rouhani’s “U.S. Educated Cabinet,” US Institute of Peace, Iran Primer, November 13, 2014, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2014/nov/13/rouhani%E2%80%99s-us-educated-cabinet

  17. 17.

    Excellent historical treatments of US-Iran nuclear negotiations from 1974–1976 include William Burr, “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 65(1), January 2009; and Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

  18. 18.

    Norman Gall, “The Twilight of Nuclear Exports,” The Ecologist, 9(7), October–November 1979, 234.

  19. 19.

    Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran, 98–99.

  20. 20.

    In 1981, the AEOI began to conduct laboratory-scale experiments related to uranium conversion at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. In 1983, the AEOI also approached the IAEA for help with a research program in production of UO2 and UF6 but was rebuffed after the United States directly intervened.

  21. 21.

    Eisenstadt, “What Iran’s Chemical Past Tells Us about Its Nuclear Future,” The Washington Institute, Research Note No. 17, April 2014, 7.

  22. 22.

    As quoted in David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), 71. In a letter dated May 9, 2008, the IAEA reportedly asked Iran to provide information regarding the 1984 meeting (see IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2008/15, May 26, 2008, Annex, 3). Iran’s follow up on the matter does not appear in subsequent IAEA reports.

  23. 23.

    The original contract also included a Russian centrifuge enrichment plant that was eventually dropped from the agreement due to US pressure. See Michael Eisenstadt, “Iran’s Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions,” The Washington Institute, Policy Paper No. 42, 1996, 106–107.

  24. 24.

    Full text of the JCPOA is available at: https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/

  25. 25.

    See, for example, Robert Einhorn, “Debating the Nuclear Deal: A Former American Negotiator Outlines the Battleground Issues,” Brookings Institution, August 12, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/research/debating-the-iran-nuclear-deal-a-former-american-negotiator-outlines-the-battleground-issues/

  26. 26.

    Nuclear hedging is defined as “maintaining, or at least appearing to maintain, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capacity to produce them within a relatively short timeframe from several weeks to a few years.” See Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, 27(3), Winter 2002, 69. For further discussion on Iran’s strategy of nuclear hedging in a post-JCPOA context, see Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran, “Living with Nuclear Hedging: The Implications of Iran’s Nuclear Strategy,” International Affairs, 91(4), 2015.

  27. 27.

    For a useful overview of the JCPOA and the major arguments for and against the agreement, see Gary Samore, ed., The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide (Cambridge Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2015).

  28. 28.

    Hassan Rouhani, Amniyat-e Melli va Diplomasi-e Hasta’i (Tehran: Markaz-e Tahqiqat-e Istiratizhik, 2011).

  29. 29.

    Rouhani, Amniyat-e Melli, 62. See also Mehdi Khalaji, “Iran’s Shifting Nuclear Narratives,” The Washington Institute, PolicyWatch No. 2469, August 12, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-shifting-nuclear-narratives

  30. 30.

    Ali Akbar Mozdabadi, Hajj Qassem: Jostari dar Khatarat-e Hajj Qassem Soleimani (Tehran: Ya Zahra, 2015).

  31. 31.

    See author’s “Leadership Divided? The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate,” The Washington Institute, Policy Focus No. 134, February 2014, 20–21.

  32. 32.

    “Har mousabeh-ye shura-ye amniyat barayeh tahdid-e tavaanamandi taslihaati iran ‘bi ‘itabaar’ ast,” Tasnim News, July 20, 2015, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1394/04/29/804960

  33. 33.

    “Taghyeeraat dar saakhtaar-e vezarat-e kharejeh/cheh ma’avanathai hezf mishvanad?” Tasnim News, August 8, 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/05/17/1482665

  34. 34.

    For more information on the tension between Iranian nationalism and Islam, see Alam Saleh, Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 45–58.

  35. 35.

    Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1997), 233–246.

  36. 36.

    For more on the impact of religion on Iran’s foreign policy, see Rouhani, Andishe-ye Siasi-ye Eslam: Sisasat-e Kharaji (Tehran: Markaz-e Tahqiqat-e Istiratizhik, 2009), 71–96.

  37. 37.

    Eisenstadt, “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 18.

  38. 38.

    For more background on the Islamic concept of time, see Gerhard Bowering, “The Concept of Time in Islam,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 141(1), 1997.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., 77–89.

  40. 40.

    Eisenstadt, “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 19.

  41. 41.

    Iran has historically sought to avoid direct military conflict with its neighbors and confined itself to limited strikes designed to send a warning. During the Iran-Iraq War , for example, Iran attacked Arab vessels transiting the Persian Gulf to dissuade them from aiding Iraq and resupplying it with weapons. See Nadia El-Sayed, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq’s Maritime Swordplay (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); and Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).

  42. 42.

    The Israeli attack inflicted a blow to Iranian military operations in Syria . Despite IRGC Commander Jafari’s threat to unleash “devastating thunderbolts” in retaliation, Iran at present remains focused on operations in Syria .

  43. 43.

    Mohammad Javad Zarif , “Saudi Arabia’s Reckless Extremism,” New York Times, January 10, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/opinion/mohammad-javad-zarif-saudi-arabias-reckless-extremism.html?_r=0

  44. 44.

    David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, “Iran’s Swift Release of U.S. Sailors Hailed as a Sign of Warmer Relations,” New York Times, January 13, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-navy-crew-release.html

  45. 45.

    For example, Basij commander Mohammad Reza Naqdi claimed that the purpose of negotiations with the West was “to buy time for Iran to build a nuclear bomb.” See “Mowzu-ye hasta’i-ye jomhuri-ye eslami az zaban-e namayande-ye vali faqiyeh dar sepah,” Kayhan, September 11, 2013. See also Rouhani, Amniyat-e Melli, 335, 414; and “Chief Iranian Nuclear Affairs Negotiator Hossein Mousavian: The Negotiations with Europe Bought Us Time to Complete the Esfahan UCF Project and the Work on the Centrifuges in Natanz,” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 957, August 12, 2005.

  46. 46.

    Rouhani , Amniyat-e Melli, 489. Rouhani goes on to compare the nuclear negotiations to an Iranian proverb that “a stone turns into a ruby through patience, but becomes a ruby only after hard work.”

  47. 47.

    The famous Iranian novel, My Uncle Napoleon (1973) humorously depicts this time period and Iranians’ tendency to blame the British for all ills that have beset the country.

  48. 48.

    McInnis, “The Future of Iran’s Security Policy,” 2015.

  49. 49.

    Rouhani , Andishe-ye Siasi-ye Eslam, 57.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., 99–146.

  51. 51.

    “Iranian Defense Minister: The Superpowers Surrendered to Iran and ‘Obeyed Iranian Rights,’” Tasnim News, August 30, 2015.

  52. 52.

    Rouhani, Amniyat-e Melli, 341.

  53. 53.

    “Velayati: Syria is Golden Ring in Line of Resistance,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 18, 2016, http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82080242.

  54. 54.

    Rouhani , Andishe-ye Siasi-ye Eslam.

  55. 55.

    “In a Letter to President Hassan Rouhani: Ayatollah Khamenei: Sanctions Snapback Means JCPOA Violation,” Office of the Supreme Leader, October 21, 2015, http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=13791

  56. 56.

    Morteza Dehghani et al., “Sacred Values and Conflict over Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Journal of Judgment and Decision Making, 5(7), December 2010, 540–546.

  57. 57.

    Eisenstadt, “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 19–20.

  58. 58.

    Cited in Michael Axworthy, Iran: Empire of the Mind – A History from the Zoroaster to the Present Day (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 289.

  59. 59.

    For a fuller treatment of this issue, see Ervand Abrahamian, “The Paranoid Style in Iranian Politics,” PBS Frontline Tehran Bureau, August 27, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/08/the-paranoid-style-in-iranian-politics.html

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Rouhani, Andishe-ye Siasi-ye Eslam.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., 41–43.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    “Pishraft-e istratejhi-ye baazdarandegi-ye iran hamzamaan ba tamhidaat-e jadid-e amrika va israel,” IR Diplomacy, September 25, 2009, http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/fa/page/11333; and “Hasht baazdarandegi-ye jomhuri eslami-ye iran va tasaavir, Akfar News, October 11, 2014.

  65. 65.

    Yoel Guzansky and Avner Golov, “The Rational Limitations of a Nonconventional Deterrence Regime: The Iranian Case,” Comparative Strategy, 34(2), 2015, 169–184.

  66. 66.

    “Internal IAEA Information Links the Supreme Leader to 1984 Decision to Seek a Nuclear Arsenal,” Institute for Science and International Security, April 20, 2012, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Khamenei_1984_statement_20April2012.pdf

  67. 67.

    “Rafsanjani: Iran Considered Nuclear Deterrent in 1980s,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 29, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/iran-rafsanjani-nuclear-deterrent/27333079.html

  68. 68.

    Ibid.

  69. 69.

    Mozdabadi, Hajj Qassem, 165.

  70. 70.

    “Farmaande-ye nirou-ye daryai-e sepah-e pasdaran: tavaan-e baazdarandegi-ye iran ejazeh-ye hamleh ra az doshmanan migirad,” Jamejam Online, September 23, 2017, http://jamejamonline.ir/online/1873324414754019974

  71. 71.

    “Pasokh qata’ beh gostakhi amrikaiha,” Sobh-e Sadeq, July 27, 2015. 

  72. 72.

    “Matn-e kamel gozaresh-e comision-e vijheh barresi barjam dar majlis,” Fars News, October 4, 2015, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13940712000110

  73. 73.

    “Rouhani Expands Iran’s Missile Program despite U.S. Sanctions Threat,” Reuters, December 31, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-sanctions-idUSKBN0UE0QT20151231

  74. 74.

    “Baaztaab-e baynalmalalli nameh-ye rohani beh vazer-e defa,” Fararu News, January 1, 2016, http://fararu.com/fa/news/257450

  75. 75.

    “Iran Says It Could Quit Nuclear Deal if US Keeps Adding Sanctions,” Guardian, August 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/16/iran-says-it-could-quit-nuclear-deal-if-us-keeps-adding-sanctions

  76. 76.

    “Tasvib-e komak-e miliaardi barayeh taqviat-e tavaan-e defaa’i dar majlis,” Mashregh News, August 13, 2017, http://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/761622; and “Dolat maklif beh ikhtsaas dar hezaar miliaard riyal bodjeh beh niyrou-ye qods-e sepah-e pasdaran shod,” Iranian Students News Agency, August 13, 2017, http://www.isna/ir/news/96052213312

  77. 77.

    “Reason is Telling Us Not to Pursue Nuclear Weapons,” Office of the Supreme Leader, April 9, 2015, www.khamenei.ir/Opinions/tnuclear

  78. 78.

    IRIB State TV, August 2017.

  79. 79.

    After the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran replaced street names with names of the shahid (martyrs). Many more street names were changed after the Iran-Iraq War , since every soldier who died was considered a martyr, and portraits of deceased soldiers were painted on murals lining the streets. Themes of martyrdom were also evident in children’s textbooks, with as much as 10% of the texts depicting themes of death and martyrdom . For more information, see Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, Political Culture in the Islamic Republic (London: Routledge, 1992), 172; and Zahra Kamalkhani, Women’s Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 81.

  80. 80.

    As quoted in Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 132–134.

  81. 81.

    Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988 (London: Osprey, 2002), 38; and Ervand Abrahamian, History of Modern Iran (London: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 171, 175.

  82. 82.

    Rouhani , Enqelab-e Eslami: Risha va Chalesha (Tehran: Markaz-e Tahqiqat-e Istiratizhik, 1997).

  83. 83.

    Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran, 233–246.

  84. 84.

    See, for example, Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji, “Nuclear Fatwa: Religion and Politics in Iran’s Proliferation Strategy,” The Washington Institute, Policy Focus No. 115, September 2011.

  85. 85.

    After the letter appeared on Rafsanjani’s website, the word “nuclear” was removed from the letter’s text at the request of the Supreme National Security Council .

  86. 86.

    Islamic Republic News Agency, October 19, 1988. More recently, before his death Rafsanjani reportedly condemned the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria .

  87. 87.

    The IAEA’s 2015 report echoes the US government’s 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which stated Iran suspended nuclear weapons research in 2003, though the NIE judged with “moderate confidence [that] Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons programs as of mid-2007.” See IAEA, “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” December 2, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf

  88. 88.

    Taremi, “Iranian Strategic Culture,” 6.

  89. 89.

    Araghchi is known for being the closest person to Khamenei among the negotiators and was tasked with briefing the Supreme Leader on the details of the talks and passing his advice to his team, under both Saeed Jalili and Javad Zarif. Less than 24 hours after the IRIB published details of Araghchi’s meeting online, the website took down the post due to “technical errors.” See “Araghchi dar sadosima: fareidoun mataalb ra sorkheh-ye ba tehran dar miyaan migozasht/dar jang paaii keh qata’ shod aazaar dehandeh bod ama chareh-ye nabod,” Bourse News, August 1, 2015, http://www.boursenews.ir/fa/news/152331

  90. 90.

    Zalmay Khalilzad, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016), 160–165.

  91. 91.

    Mark Landler, Alter Egos: Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and the Twilight Struggle over American Power (New York: Random House Publishing, 2016), 236–248.

  92. 92.

    Elisabeth Bumiller, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Sends Top Iranian Leader a Warning on Strait Threat,” New York Times, January 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/middleeast/us-warns-top-iran-leader-not-to-shut-strait-of-hormuz.html?_r=0

  93. 93.

    Kay Armin Serjoie, “Iran Challenges U.S. and Saudi Arabia by Sending Aid Ship to Rebels in Yemen,” Time, May 18, 2015, http://time.com/3882293/iran-saudi-aid-ship/

  94. 94.

    In Persian, Iran refers to the concept of proportionality as responding “threat with threat.” For more background, see Eisenstadt, “Not by Sanctions Alone: Using Military and Other Means to Bolster Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” The Washington Institute, Strategic Report No. 13, July 2013, 24, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport13_Eisenstadt2.pdf

  95. 95.

    Eisenstadt, “What Iran’s Chemical Past Tells Us About Its Nuclear Future,” 2.

  96. 96.

    For a fuller treatment of the influence of Islam on Iranian notions of proportionality, see Asghar Eftekhari and Fatallah Kalantari, “Evaluating and Defining the ‘Threat in Response to Threat’ Strategy in Iran’s Defense Policy,” Journal of Defense Policy, 22(88), Fall 2014.

  97. 97.

    For example, Iran’s decision to mine international shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War was viewed by US policymakers at the time as a provocative and disproportionate response to US pledges to protect freedom of navigation throughout the region. Iranian leaders, however, including then Supreme Leader Khomeini and President Rafsanjani , instructed the Iranian military to “retaliate without provoking the Americans” and viewed mining as a proportionate, non-escalatory response to US actions. See Rafsanjani, The End of Defense, The Beginning of Reconstruction: The Memories and Records of Hashemi Rafsanjani of the Year 1367 (Tehran: Daftar-e Nashre Moarefe Enqelab), 119.

  98. 98.

    In addition, AEOI head Salehi warned Iran would enrich uranium up to 20% if the United States sought to renegotiate or abrogate the JCPOA . “Iran Says Only 5 Days Needed to Ramp Up Uranium Enrichment,” August 22, 2017, US News & World Report, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-08-22/iran-says-only-5-days-needed-to-ramp-up-uranium-enrichment

  99. 99.

    Members of the JCPOA Oversight Committee are appointed by Khamenei and include: President Hassan Rouhani, Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan, SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani, AEOI head Ali Akbar Salehi, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, senior foreign policy advisor to Khamenei Ali Akbar Velayati, and Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. See “Qassemi: Iran haq-e pasokh beh aqdaamaat-e zed-e irani-ye amrika ra barayeh khod mahfoz midarad,” ISNA, August 3, 2017, http://www.isna.ir/news/96051207550; and “Musahbeh-ye akhir-e amrika aqdaami doshmananeh va khosmaneh,” Fars News, July 29, 2017, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13960507001995

  100. 100.

    “Musahbeh-ye akhir amrika aqdaami doshmananeh va khosmaneh,” Fars News, July 29, 2017, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13960507001995

  101. 101.

    Rafsanjani, Souye Sarnevesht (Tehran: Daftar-e Nashre Moarefe Enqelab, 2008), 54.

  102. 102.

    For more on Iran’s use of soft power to further its regional objectives, see Hassan Rouhani , Andishe-ye Siasi-ye Eslam, 64–65.

  103. 103.

    Hamdi Malik and Maysam Behravesh, “Is Iran Creating Its Own State Within Iraq?” Guardian, May 18, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/18/irans-state-within-state-in-iraq-shia

  104. 104.

    Javan Online, July 15, 2015.

  105. 105.

    “Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations,” University of Maryland Center for International and Security Studies, June 2015, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/publications/iranian-public-opinion-nuclear-negotiations

  106. 106.

    “Iran Bans Newspaper of Nuclear Deal Critic, Warns Others,” Hurriyet Daily News, August 3, 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iran-bans-newspaper-of-nuclear-deal-critic-warns-others.aspx?pageID=238&nID=86379&NewsCatID=352

  107. 107.

    For more on Iran’s censorship of the nuclear issue see Chapter 2 of author’s “Leadership Divided? The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate,” 3–8.

  108. 108.

    Rouhani , Amniyat-e Melli, 251. 

  109. 109.

    “Muzakereh-ye diplomat ba ali akbar salehi,” Diplomat, http://thediplomat.ir/417

  110. 110.

    Ibid.

  111. 111.

    “Salehi Reveals New Details of Secret US, Iran Back Channel,” Al-Monitor, December 23, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/salehi-interview-conveys-new-details-of-secret-backchannel.html#ixzz3vYLaS48a

  112. 112.

    “Rahbar-e enqelab-e eslami bar istefadeh az taaktik-e ‘narmesh qhrmaanaaneh’ takid kardand,” ISNA, September 17, 2013, http://www.isna.ir/news/92062616573

  113. 113.

    White House correspondent Mark Landler suggests Iran agreed to the nuclear negotiations only after its baseline demand was met and that it be allowed to continue to enrich uranium . Landler claims then Senator John Kerry told Iranian officials during backchannel talks that Iran might be allowed to enrich uranium under a future nuclear agreement. See Landler, Alter Egos , 236–248.

  114. 114.

    See Sadegh Zibakalam’s analysis of the critical turning points in Iran’s political history, “Noqteh ataf taarikhi: roznameh-ye sharq,” July 15, 2015, http://www.zibakalam.com/news/2075

  115. 115.

    BBC Persian, August 26, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2015/08/150826

  116. 116.

    Michael Singh, “Deterring Tehran: An Iran Policy for the New Administration,” The Washington Institute, Policy Note No. 36, March 2017, 1–3.

  117. 117.

    Khalilzad, 276.

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Gerami, N. (2018). Iran’s Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Policy. In: Johnson, J., Kartchner, K., Maines, M. (eds) Crossing Nuclear Thresholds. Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72670-0_3

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